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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES:  
THE ORIGINS OF THE QIZILBASH IDENTITY IN ANATOLIA  
(1447-1514) 
 
 
Rıza Yıldırım 
Ph.D., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Oktay Özel 
 
February 2008 
 
This thesis aims to evaluate the emergence of the Qizilbash Movement and 
the Qizilbash Identity during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century within the 
struggle between the Ottoman and the Safavid power. The process of the making of 
the Qizilbash Identity, which was, in essence, the concurrent process of the 
Turkoman milieu’s gradual divergence from the Ottoman axis and convergence to 
the Safavid affiliation, is reflected in available sources as if it were predominantly a 
religious issue. The present study argues, however, that the religious aspect of the 
developments was simply the ‘surface’ or ‘outcome’ of a rather inclusive process 
including anthropological, cultural, sociological, and political dimensions. It is 
argued that the Qizilbash Identity was a product of the intercession of two separate 
but interrelated lines of developments: on the one hand being the alienation of the 
‘nomadic-tribal Turkoman world’ from the ‘Ottoman imperial regime’, while on the 
other hand being the synchronized rapprochement between the ‘Turkoman milieu’ of 
Anatolia and the Safavid Order. One of the prominent promises of the present thesis 
is that the most decisive factors governing the course of both lines of the 
 iv 
developments stemmed from the structural inconsistencies, or ‘unconscious 
structures’ of societies as Lévi-Strauss states, between two ‘ways of life’: one is 
sedentary life, which accomplished its socio-political organization as bureaucratic 
state, and the other is nomadic or semi-nomadic life organized around tribal axis.  
 
Key words: Qizilbash, Safavids, Ottoman, Turkoman, tribe 
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ÖZET 
 
ĐKĐ ĐMPARATORLUK ARASINDA TÜRKMENLER:  
ANADOLU’DA KIZILBAŞ KĐMLĐĞĐNĐN KÖKENLERĐ  
(1447-1514) 
 
 
Rıza Yıldırım 
Doktora, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Oktay Özel 
  
Şubat  2008 
 
Bu tez Osmanlı-Safevi mücadelesi çerçevesinde on beşinci yüzyılın sonları ve on 
altıncı yüzyılın başlarında Kızılbaş kimliğinin oluşumunu incelemektedir. Kızılbaş 
kimliğinin oluşumu esas itibariyle Türkmen kitlelerin bir yandan Osmanlı 
ekseninden uzaklaşırken diğer yandan Safevi şeyhlerine/şahlarına bağlanmalarına 
dayanan tarihsel sürecin bir ürünüdür. Çağdaş kaynaklarda bu mesele daha çok 
dinsel yönüyle ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. Ancak elinizdeki tez bunun antropolojik, 
kültürel, sosyolojik, ve siyasi unsurları da içinde barındıran çok kapsamlı ve 
karmaşık bir süreç olduğunu, kaynaklarda bolca tesadüf edilen dinsel argümanların 
meselenin sadece dış yüzü ya da bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu çalışma, 
süreçte asıl belirleyici olan faktörlerin Osmanlı gücünün büyümesine paralel olarak 
git gide bir birinden uzaklaşan iki hayat tarzı arasındaki yapısal uyumsuzluklar, ya da 
Lévi-Strauss’un deyimiyle toplumsal hayatın gidişatını belirleyen ‘bilinçsiz 
yapılar’ın farklılaşmasında aramak gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu iki yapı, bir yanda 
Osmanlıların benimsediği yerleşik hayata yaslanan ve siyaseten bürokratik devlet 
 vi 
olarak örgütlenen hayat tarzı, diğer yanda da konar-göçer bir hayat süren ve aşiret 
yapısı içinde örgütlenen Türkmen hayat tarzı idi.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kızılbaş, Safeviler, Osmanlı, Türkmen, aşiret 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION  
 
 
Source materials quoted in the present dissertation are predominantly either in 
Ottoman Turkish or in a western language (English, French, German) translated from 
Persian. As for the second group I use the translated texts without any change or 
modification. For the texts in Ottoman Turkish I follow modern Turkish orthography 
with the diacritical marks listed below. 
 
For “ayn” (ع) and “hamza” (ء), I use “ ‘ ” and “ ’ ” (‘avārız, re‘āya, tābi‘, kāri’) 
For long “a, i, u” (`a,bc , de), I use “ ‾ ” (qādi, ulemā, Bitlisī) 
 
Arabic izāfe in Arabic and Persian texts is transcribed as “al-” like āmir al-umerā, 
while in Turkish texts it is transcribed as “u’l-” like Saffatu’s-safa. Persian izāfe in all 
texts is transcribed as “-i” like mekteb-i kebīr.  
 
In the Ottoman Turkish texts, for the terms and names that are used in Turkish – 
without regarding the origin of the word -, modern Turkish orthography is used and 
diacritical marks are omitted except in the two cases explained above. In the 
meantime, words and proper nouns that have a generally recognized English form, 
such as “shaykh, shah, pasha, qādi, waqf, ulemā, Qizilbash, Bektashi,” etc., are 
anglicized. For place names and the names of historic personages outside the 
Ottoman realm, such as “Baghdad, Ardabil, Tabriz, Junayd” etc., the generally 
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accepted anglicized form without diacritical marks are used. In quotations from 
various works, as well as published documents and manuscripts, the ways they were 
transliterated by the authors and editors are not changed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This study is an attempt to delineate the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity within the 
context of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
century. It aims to unfold the anthropological-cultural roots and socio-political 
environment of the Qizilbash zeal. A zeal which made a group of nomadic-tribal people, 
namely the Turkomans, “go into battle without armour, being willing to die for their 
monarch [spiritual and temporal master], rushing on with naked breasts, crying ‘Shiac, 
Shiac [Shah]’”1. A zeal which created an empire from a sufi order; which brought about 
a serious crystallization in the official ideology and religious stand of the Ottoman state; 
and which opened up a permanently growing crack in the socio-religious set up of 
Anatolia. The qizilbash zeal was experienced in the hearts of Anatolian Turkomans by 
the second half of the fifteenth century onward. But, of course, it was by no means 
independent from the religious and political environment that surrounded these 
nomadic-tribes. Among many other factors, two were primarily responsible for creating 
                                                 
1 A Venetian merchant reposts the qizilbashes on his eye witness in 1510. See “The Travels of a Merchant 
in Persia”, in NIT, p. 206. 
 2 
and feeding the qizilbash sentiment: the resentment against the rising Ottoman imperial 
regime, which was identified with the antipathy against the Ottoman sultans, and the 
love for the Safavid shaykhs/shahs. Thus, the present study is a history of the 
Turkomans searching for a ‘paradise’ between two empires, i.e. the Ottoman and the 
Safavid empires: a history shaped by the struggle of two mutually irreconcilable political 
systems, which were accompanied by increasingly diverging religious and cultural 
grounds; and a history that created an ‘ethnic’ socio-religious entity from the synthesis 
of the Turkoman culture and the Safavid mysticism.  
It is an established acceptance among scholars that the roots of the Qizilbash 
belief trace back to Central Asia, to the pre-Islamic religions of the Turks, and to some 
extent to Iran and Mesopotamia.2 However, the formation of Qizilbash identity as a 
social entity and a system of beliefs is mostly a legacy of the late fifteenth and the 
sixteenth-century.3 Without a doubt, the fierce political and military rivalry between the 
Ottomans and Savafids had primary influence on shaping this identity. It is known from 
contemporary sources that by the beginning of the sixteenth-century a considerable 
portion of the Anatolian population supported the Safavid dynasty against Ottoman rule 
with an intense religious vigor. As soon as Shah Ismail promulgated his state, brutal 
revolts broke out against Ottomans in Anatolia. Among these rebels some managed to 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Fuat Köprülü, Türk Edebiyatında Đlk Mutasavvıflar, Ankara, 1976; Iréne Mélikoff, 
Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, çev. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul, 1998; Sur les traces du soufısme Turc, 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS, 1992; De l’épopée au mythe, Itinéraire 
turcologique, Istanbul: ISIS, 1995; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Bektaşi Menâkıbnâmelerinde Đslam Öncesi Đinanç 
Motifleri, Đstanbul, 1983; Osmanlı Đmparatorluğunda Marjinal Sufilik: Kalenderiler, Ankara, 1992; Türk 
Sufiliğine Bakışlar, Đstanbul, 1996; Türkler, Türkiye ve Đslam, Đstanbul, 2000.  
3 Among a number of studies, consider especially Iréne Mélikoff, “Le problème Kızılbaş”, in her Sur les 
traces du soufısme Turc, Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS, 1992, pp. 29-43; 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Babailer Đsyanindan Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da Đslam Heterodoxisinin Doğuş ve 
Gelişim Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakiş", Belleten, LXIV/239, 2000, 129-159. 
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defeat the well-equipped Ottoman armies, even those commanded by grand-viziers.4 
Şahkulu, the leader of the earliest large-scale Qizilbash uprising, for example, as the 
qādi of Bursa reported5, managed to reach the walls of Bursa, after which there was 
nothing but Constantinople. A number of reports written by contemporary local 
governors shed light on the socio-political and religious dimensions of these anti-
Ottoman and pro-Safavid social movements.6 These letters stress the rebels’ evil-beliefs, 
banditry, relationship with the Safavid Dynasty and consistently draw the attention of 
central government to the fact that their numbers were increasing day by day.7 It is 
clearly seen from these archival reports housed in Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi (TSA) that the 
Qizilbash movement during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century substantially 
reduced the authority of the Ottoman Government in Anatolia. One may even go further 
arguing that it threatened the existence of the Ottoman regime in Anatolia.  
                                                 
4 For the geographical distribution of these Qizilbash upheavals and their connections with the Safavid 
Order see Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und scine Rückwirkungen auf die 
Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, pp. 95-221; for an inadequate narration of 
the Şahkulu revolt according to Ottoman archival reports, see Şinasi Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli 
Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 3-4, Đstanbul, 1959; for the revolt of Shah Celal see Jean-Louis 
Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III, Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şâh Veli b. Şeyh 
Celâl”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, pp. 5-69.     
5 On April 21st 1511, the qādi of Bursa sent a letter to the Head (Ağa) of the Janissary corps reporting the 
recent situation of the Şahkulu revolt. He was alerted that they were, after defeating the chief commander 
of Prince Korkud, Hasan Ağa, coming to Bursa and devastating everything on their way. He warned the 
Ağa insistently that if a military support from Janissaries did not arrive in two days the whole land would 
be lost. The qādi persistently emphasized the fact that he, Şahkulu, was a serious and very dangerous 
enemy and any laxity would result in a real catastrophe. See Document E 5451 in Topkapı Palace Museum 
Archives (From now on TSA). 
6 Most of these letters and reports are published by Çağatay Uluçay, Selahattin Tansel and  Jean-Louis 
Bacqué-Grammont. See Çağatay Uluçay,”Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu”, Tarih Dergisi, VIII, 
cilt 11-12, 1954, pp. 53-90, 117-142, 185-200; Selâhattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim, Ankara, 1969; 
Sultan II. Bâyezid’in Siyasi Hayatı, Istanbul, 1966 ; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, Les 
Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987.  
7 For example, the governor of Antalya informed, in his letter dated March 1511, Prince Korkud about the 
emergence of the revolt and depicted the leader of the revolt as had pretended to be a God. He reported 
from the mouth of one of his adherents that “his followers say: he is the God, he is the Messenger; and the 
day of recurrence will appear in front of him. One who does not believe in him would go to the other 
world without faith.” See TSA, E 632. Prince Osman also wrote a letter to the central government on April 
16th 1511, in which he described rebels as destroying mescids and zāviyes, setting fire to the copies of 
Kur’an and other books whenever they came across them,and deeming their leader as Mahdi, the divine 
rescuer. See TSA, E 2829. 
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Needless to say, the emergence, molding, and congealment of the Qizilbash 
identity were socio-religious processes that coincided with the politico-military struggle 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids. Nonetheless, it was long before the 
commencement of this confrontation that a discontent segment in Ottoman society, 
which would ultimately wear the red-caps of Shaykh Haydar (d. 1488) and launch fierce 
uprisings against Ottoman authority, had already appeared. They were discontent 
because the central bureaucratic administration of the Ottoman State forced them to 
leave their traditional mode of life, which was overwhelmingly nomadic; because there 
was a certain cultural discrepancy between their cultures and that of the Ottoman elite, 
who at the same time had a demeaning attitude towards them; because their 
understanding, interpretation and practice of Islam was regarded by the Ottoman 
religious scholars as heretic (rāfizi); and finally because they could no more find their 
idiom-leader prototype in the Ottoman sultans as it had been during the formative period 
of the state. Contemporary sources clearly reveal that in the second half of the fifteenth 
century, the discontent population of Anatolia, which overwhelmingly consisted of 
tribal-nomads, regarded the Ottoman rule as illegitimate and oppressive. For the 
Ottoman governors, on the other hand, they were a source of disobedience, anarchy, 
political resistance, and finally of heresy; in short, they were source of all sorts of 
trouble.  
When studying the emergence of the Qizilbash identity towards the end of the 
fifteenth century, a careful inquiry soon unveils the fact that there was not a single cause 
for a considerable segment of society in Anatolia to detach itself from the Ottoman 
Empire. It was rather a combination of political discontent, religious controversy, and 
economic incompetence. The main grounds of alienation, furthermore, were not merely 
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the unwillingness of two sides to understand and empathize with each other. It can be  
rather argued that the roots of hostility were at a deeper level; stemming from the 
incompetence of social structures, political orientations, modes of life, mentalities, and 
from the difference in perception of the faith. On one side was the Ottoman elite and 
social segments attached to them, while on the other side the Turkomans, who were 
either tribal-nomads or still maintaining the habits of tribal-nomadic way of life. Thus, if 
regarded the long dure, the emergence and development of the Qizilbash identity, or the 
Qizilbash ‘heresy’ within the Ottoman perception, should be assessed as an output of the 
interaction between these two ‘ways of life’.  
Thus the present study evaluates the emergence of the Qizilbash identity within 
the framework of the contest between the increasing ‘Ottoman bureaucratic-imperial 
regime’ and the tribal-nomadic Turkoman milieu. The first chapter attempts to construct 
a theoretical framework by placing basic anthropological premises that would govern the 
underlying conceptualization throughout the thesis. In the first part, it clarifies some 
anthropological terms employed throughout the study. In other words, the fundamental 
differences between the bureaucratic state and tribal organization as means of polity, as 
well as the difference in socio-religious structures, will be delineated. The second part of 
the first chapter provides a brief outline of the fundamental features of the interaction 
between nomadic-tribes and bureaucratic states in the Middle East. 
The second chapter examines the foundation and development process of the 
Ottoman state within the framework drawn in the first chapter. It is supposed that during 
its very early phase the Ottoman principality was an enterprise of Turkoman nomadic 
tribes expelled from the central heart-lands of the Seljukid bureaucratic state, which was 
to a certain extent ‘Persianized’ and ‘Arabized’, to the marches. Nevertheless, the 
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accumulation of power soon made the dynasty inclined to embrace the bureaucracy 
produced by Islamic scholars, or ulemā, at the cost of tribal founders. This inclination of 
the dynasty in the meantime marked the beginning of the alienation process between the 
tribal-nomadic Turkoman milieu and the rising state machinery. The alienation, 
however, was not limited to the diffusion of the tribal elements from the political scene 
but also accompanied cultural, economical, ideological, and religious detachments as 
well. During the mid-fifteenth century the estrangement between the two ‘realms’ 
reached such a degree that a reconciliation was no longer possible.  
On the other hand, a similar, but completely opposite in direction, story was 
developing in the East: The Sufi Order of Safavids attained a vast amount of audience 
among statesmen and men of culture in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Iran, Syria, and 
Anatolia, as well as enjoying great prestige and power in many palaces. During the mid-
fifteenth century, however, the Safavid Order underwent a fundamental transformation: 
under Shayh Junayd, both the esoteric doctrine and disciple landscape of the order 
fundamentally changed. The Order of Shaykh Safī (d. 1334),  which once had the image 
of a ‘high’, well-cultivated sufi Order within the sunni sect of Islam, as long as one can 
speak of ‘sect’ (mezhep) regarding Sufism, now pursued a militant-shi’ite character and 
political aspirations. In the meantime, closely linked to the doctrinal transformation, the 
order gained wide-spread audience among Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Northern 
Syria, which had already been distanced from the Ottoman regime. The third chapter 
elucidates how the Safavid Order and Turkoman milieu of Anatolia encountered, both 
experiencing significant transformation.   
  Then comes the most crucial turning point in the story: the rise of Shah Ismail. 
When he died during a battle with the Akkoyunlu army in 1488, Shaykh Haydar left to 
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his one year-old son a desperate situation but a mass of fanatically devoted disciples 
with a significant capacity of organization and military power. The adoration and 
heroism of Haydar’s disciples, now wrapped around child Ismail, created one of the 
most romantic stories of Middle Eastern History. The fourth chapter is devoted to the 
history of young Ismail and his devoted disciples: a story from a most desperate 
situation to the throne of Persia. A special emphasis should be made on that the majority 
of Ismail’s disciples were from Ottoman Anatolia. Hence, Ismail’s advent (hurūj) and 
rise to the power created a vast excitement among Anatolian qizilbashes. This 
excitement and the Ottomans’ counter measures will also be dealt within this chapter. 
The fifth chapter analyzes the rebellion of Shahklu, one of the prominent Safavid 
khalifas in Anatolia. Accompanied to the weakening of the Ottoman central 
administration because of the illness and elder ages of Sultan Bayezid II, and 
consequently of civil war among the princes, the qizilbash protest against the Ottoman 
rule peaked during the years 1509 and 1513. Among the qizilbash uprisings during this 
period, the most successful and the one having the most crucial outcome was, without a 
doubt, the Şahkulu rebellion. On the one hand, the Şahkulu rebellion proved the military 
strength of the qizilbashes, successively defeating several Ottoman armies. But yet on 
the other hand, it opened up the paths to the Ottoman throne to Prince Selim, who, 
having been recently defeated by an imperial army, could barely hope for this fortune. 
The next chapter continues the analysis of the qizilbash factor within Ottoman 
domestic politics. It delineates how Prince Selim, who had the least chance of ascending 
the throne at the beginning of the struggle, masterfully gained the central institutions of 
the already established Ottoman imperial regime. Selim’s policy was principally based 
on two promises: he would finish the ‘qizilbash problem’ and he would (re)bring the old 
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glories of the Ottoman army. Towards the end of his reign, Sultan Bayezid II and his 
statesmen were seriously favoring Prince Ahmed, who was once even officially invited 
to Istanbul to take over the throne. Ahmed’s ambiguous attitude against the qizilbashes 
turned into a powerful tool of legitimization in Selim’s hands and rapidly finished 
Ahmed’s advantage for the throne.       
The seventh chapter focuses on the climax of the struggle between the Ottomans 
and Qizilbashes. Upon capturing the throne in 1512, in a way unprecedented in the 
Ottoman history, Selim I immediately started preparing to fully fulfill his pledge. His 
ultimate aim was not only to extirpate the sympathizers of Shah Ismail in Anatolia but 
also to bring a complete solution to the problem by finishing the Shah himself. 
Nevertheless, launching war on a Muslim country was not easy according to the Islamic 
law or shari’a. They needed religiously legitimate grounds to declare such a thing. 
Selim’s heavy pressure on the ulemā produced one of the most controversial ordinances 
(fetvā) of the Ottoman history. At this stage the contest between the Ottoman imperial 
regime and the Qizilbash Turkomans, which was political in essence, gained an 
overwhelmingly religious skin: the qizilbashes were declared as ‘heretics’ deviated from 
the true path of the religion.  On his way to Çaldıran, Selim persecuted and executed a 
great number of his subjects claming they had adhered to the qizilbash movement. 
Ultimately, the plane of Çaldıran witnessed the last duel of the bureaucratic state and 
tribal federacy in the Middle East. After Çaldıran the latter would never attain an enough 
power to contest the former, neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in Safavids,  nor any 
other place in the Middle East.  
On the other hand, the fierce political and military struggle between these two 
systems, now represented by the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid-Qizilbash state, was 
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accompanied in every stage with a religious discourse. Thus the Qizilbash identity 
emerged on two principal bases: politico-militant movement and religio-mystical 
interpretation of Islam. The last chapter aims to highlight the main lines of post-Çaldıran 
events. Following the defeat of Çaldıran, the Qizilbash identity followed different 
trajectories in the Safavid and Ottoman realms, though maintaining significant 
similarities. In the Safavid Empire, the same story as in the case of the early Ottomans 
occurred. Parallel to the consolidation of its power, the Safavid state evolved towards a 
bureaucratic empire, equally pushing the qizilbash tribal aristocracy out of the scene. 
Within the Ottoman borders, on the other hand, upon gradually losing its first 
component, i.e. political, in the aftermath of Çaldıran, the Qizilbash identity developed 
in its peculiar way within the framework of Islamic Sufism.  
 
1.1.  LITERATURE 
The focus of this study, namely the history of the Anatolian qizilbashes, lays at the 
intersection point of Ottoman History and Safavid History. Therefore both Ottoman and 
Safavid historians occasionally touched upon several aspects of the qizilbash history. 
Nevertheless, none of them except for Sohrweide’s long article focused on the adventure 
of the qizilbashes themselves, but are interested only indirectly in qizilbash affairs 
because of their interaction with either the Ottoman or the Safavid state.  
The only monographic work on the qizilbash movement in Anatolia has been 
undertaken by Hanna Sohrweide.8 Sohrweide’s article starts with the emergence of the 
Safavid Order under Shaykh Safī and ends with the situations of qizilbashes in Anatolia 
                                                 
8 Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und scine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten 
Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, 95-221. 
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in the second half of the sixteenth century. In the first half of the study, Sohrweide deals 
with the history of early Safavids until the rise of Shah Ismail. In this first part, she 
underlines the fundamental change from sunni bases to ghulat shi’ism in the esoteric 
message of the order under Shaykh Junayd, as well as Junayd’s – and his successors’- 
success in recruiting new disciples from among Turkomans of Anatolia. Then she 
continues with the echoes of the Safavid success under Shah Ismail among the Anatolian 
qizilbashes. In this context, she briefly examines the Shahkulu Rebellion (1511), the Nur 
Ali Khalifa Uprising (1512), the Celālī Uprising (1519), the Kalender Çelebi Uprising 
(1524), and some other qizilbash uprisings in the first half of the sixteenth century. 
Sohrweide finishes her work by providing a brief description of the positions of the 
Anatolian qizilbashes within the Ottoman realm in the second half of the sixteenth 
century. 
Although it became a classic in the field, a fame it deserves, Sohrweide’s work 
does not cover all the aspects of the issue. First of all, she does not adequately consult 
the Ottoman sources, neither the rich archival materials in TSA nor the Selim-nāme 
literature.9 As a result many important aspects of the issue remained untouched in her 
article. Secondly, Sohrweide presents a descriptive history of events within three 
centuries, but does not attempt to provide a theoretical framework filling the socio-
cultural and ideological background. True that she occasionally refers to the tribal 
affiliations of the Safavid disciples. Nonetheless, she by no means intends to analyze the 
development of the qizilbash movement within a systematically developed theoretical 
framework.  
                                                 
9 Although she consults some Ottoman chronicles, some very important first-hand sources such as Defter 
VIII (and its addendum) and Defter IX of Kemalpaşazāde and Selim-nāme of Şükrī-i Bitlisī are absent in 
this article.   
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As mentioned above, Sohrweide’s article is the only detailed study devoted to the 
history of the Anatolian qizilbashes. In the meantime, some works on the Ottoman and 
Safavid history dealt with several aspects of the issue within their own context.  
As they founded the Safavid state and held the military privileges for a long time, 
qizilbashes occupy a significant place in studies on the Safavid history. The reader 
should be reminded, however, that since Safavid historians primarily use Safavid 
chronicles, which were almost exclusively the product of Persian literati, thus, have not 
a keen eye on Turkoman qizilbashes, their focus of interest is always the Safavid palace 
and Safavid realm, but not the socio-cultural roots of qizilbash founders of the state. For 
example, although all sources stress the Anatolian roots of the early qizilbashes around 
Shaykh Haydar and Shah Ismail, interestingly none of the Safavid historians pays 
enough attention to Anatolia.  
Still there appeared valuable contribution by Safavid historians to the history of 
Anatolian qizilbashes. Before all, Vilademir Minorsky’s groundbreaking works must be 
mentioned. Among his many other works on the Safavid history, his translation of 
Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji’s Tarikh-i Alem-ārā-yi Amini10 and Tadhkirat al-Mulūk11, 
as well as his notes to both, and his article on the poetry of Shah Ismail12 should be 
specifically cited. One should mention of Roger M. Savory’s studies especially on the 
formation and fundamental institutions of the Safavid state;13 of Jean Aubin’s articles on 
                                                 
10 Vilademir Minorsky, Persia in A.D. 1478-1490. An abridged translation of Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan 
Khunji’s Tarikh-i Alm-ara-yi Amini, Royal Asiatic Society Monographs, XXVI, London, 1957. 
11 Vilademir Minorsky, trs., Tadhkirat al-Muluk. A manuel of Safavid Administration, Gibb Memorial 
Series, XVI, London, 1943. 
12 Minorsky, Vilademir, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I”, BSOS, X, 1938-42, 1006a-1053a. 
13 Among his number of publications the followings deserve a special reference: Roger M. Savory, “The 
Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, XLI, Berlin, 1965, 71-94; “The Principal Offices 
of the Savawid State during the Reign of Ismail I(907-930/ 1501-1524)”, BSOAS, XXIII, 1960, 91-105; 
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the role of the Sufis of Lāhijan in the early Safavid history,14 the religious policy of the 
Safavids,15 and especially the comprehensive one on the rise of the Safavid power;16 of 
Michel Mazzaoui’s famous book on the origins and early history of the Safavid 
Dynasty;17 of Hans Roemer’s works, especially his article on the qizilbashes within the 
Safavid history.18 
Masashi Haneda’s book on the military system of the Safavid state deserves 
special mention. In his study, Haneda clearly determines the absolute dominance of the 
qizilbash oymaqs in the Safavid army, as well as the consolidating of the principal 
arguments of the present thesis that the qizilbashes constituted this army were almost 
exclusively tribal nomads.19 As long as the qizilbash founders of the Safavid state are 
concerned, comment should also be made of Faruk Sümer’s important work on the 
Turkoman origins of the prominent qizilbash oymaqs,20 and of Oktay Efendiev’s 
article.21 Regarding Shaykh Junayd, Walter Hinz’s famous book is still the only 
                                                                                                                                                
“The Office of Khālifat Al-Khulafā under the Safawids”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 
85, no. 4, 1965, 497-502; Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
14 Jean Aubin, “Revolution chiite et conservatisme. Les soufis de Lāhejān, 1500-1514 (Etudes Safavides 
II)” , Moyen Orient &Océan Indien 1, 1984, pp. 1-40. 
15 Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavides” in Colloque de Strasbourg, Le Shi’isme imâmite, 
Paris, 1970, 235-244. 
16 Jean Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides reconsidéré (Etudes Sfavides III)”, Moyen Orient &Océan 
Indien, 5, 1988, 1-130. Also consider his “La politique orientale de Selim Ier”, Les Orientales, [Itinéraire 
d’Orient (Hommage à Claude Cahen)], VI, 1994, 197-216. 
17 Michel M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safawids: Shi’ism, Sufism, and the Ghulat, Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 1972. 
18 Roemer, Hans R., “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, 
Intellectual Studies in Islam, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, 27-39. Also consider his 
article in the Cambridge History of Iran. (Hans .R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, The Cambridge 
History of Iran, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993.) 
19 Masashi Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 
1987.  
20 Faruk Sümer, Safevi Devleti’nin Kuruluş ve Yükselişinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü, Ankara, 1976. 
21 Oktay Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque dans la création de l’état Safavide”, Turcica, VI, 
1975, 24-33. 
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monographic work of value.22 As for the political history of the Ottoman-Safavid 
rivalry, Adel Allouche’s monograph23 and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont’s works24 
should be referred to. Regarding the ideological dimension of this struggle Eberhard’s 
study is the only monographic work.25  
In the Ottoman historiography, qizilbashes usually became the subject of those 
studies dealing with the last years of Bayezid II, and the succession of Selim I as well as 
his reign. Among modern scholars, Hüseyin Hüsamedin was the first who devoted a 
considerable number of pages to qizilbash affairs in Amasya during the opening years of 
the sixteenth century.26 His account, however, includes serious deficiencies in terms of 
methodology and approach. First of all, as well-known, he barely refers to his sources. 
Furthermore, following the Selim-nāme tradition, he pursues a fanatical pro-Selim stand 
in dealing with the struggle between Prince Ahmed and Selim for the throne. Hüseyin 
Hüsameddin, following a nationalistic approach of the early twentieth century, 
mistakenly depicts Selim as the champion of the Turkish tradition and Ahmed as the 
patron of the Persian culture. Then he argues that the Persians supported by Prince 
Ahmed spread shi’ism and organized the qizilbash rebellions in the Province of Rum. As 
will be delineated in detail, these assertions are clearly contradictive to the historical 
facts.   
                                                 
22 Walter Hinz, Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünf-zehnten Jahrhundert, Berlin,Leipzig, 1936. 
(Turkish translation: Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, XV. Yüzyılda Đran’ın Milli bir Devlet Haline Yükselişi, 
çev. Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu, Ankara :TTK, 1992.) 
23 Allouche Adel, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safawid Conflict, W. Berlin, 1983. 
24 Among his number of publications, which can be found in the Bibliography of this study, the following 
must be cited here. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 
1987. 
25 Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jh. nach arabischen Handschriften, 
Freiburg 1970. 
26 Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Amasya Tarihi, vol. 3, Đstanbul, 1927. 
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Çağatay Uluçay’s three articles in ĐÜEF Tarih Dergisi deserve special mention 
here.27 Although Uluçay’s work lacks a strong analytical construction, his extensive 
usage of the Topkapi Palace Archives enhances the value of his articles. Indeed, Uluçay 
focuses on the struggle between the sons of Bayezid II for the throne; hence the 
qizilbash affairs are of only secondary interest in his study. Nonetheless, Uluçay 
published a number of documents pertaining to the Shahkulu rebellion and the Nur Ali 
Khalifa uprisings. He also partially deals with these qizilbash rebellions since they 
played a significant role in the Ottoman domestic politics of the era. Halil Inalcik’s 
article in the Encyclopedia of Islam is one of the few scholarly studies on Selim I.28 As 
for the qizilbash affairs during the last years of Bayezid II and during the reign of Selim 
I, Selahattin Tansel’s two monographs must be regarded.29 Tansel does not present a 
systematic analysis of the events, but rather provides a sequence of events. Furthermore, 
his approach is remarkably Ottoman-centric in general and Selim-centric in particular. 
(Similar bias is observable on Uluçay as well.) Sydney Fisher’s book dealing with the 
foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire under Bayezid II also touches upon some issues 
regarding early years of Shah Ismail and his relations with the Ottomans.30 One should 
also mention Beldiceanu-Steinherr’s article dealing with the changes in the Ottoman 
politics caused by the qizilbash movement.31  
                                                 
27 Çağatay Uluçay, ”Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu”, IÜEF Tarih Dergisi, VI/9,1954, 53-90; 
VI/10, 1954, 117-143; VIII/11-12, 1955, 185-200.  
28 Halil Đnalcık, “Selim I”, EI2. 
29 Selahattin Tansel, Sultan II. Bayezid’in Siyasi Hayatı, Đstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966; Yavuz 
Sultan Selim, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969. 
30 Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512, University of Illinois Press,    
Urbana, 1948. 
31 Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de 
l’empire ottoman”, Turcica, VI, 1975, 34-48. 
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Although not directly dealing with the Qizilbash Movement, Rudi Paul Lindner’s 
two works must be mentioned for they have significantly contributed to the theoretical 
background of the present study.32 Lindner, for the first time among Ottoman historians, 
attempted to use modern anthropological findings in understanding the Ottoman history. 
His efforts to bring new notions to the concept of tribe, thus to the nature of early 
Ottoman state and society, remarkably expanded the avenue of discussion. Some of 
Lindner’s conceptualizations regarding the definition of tribe and the transformation 
from ‘tribe’ to ‘state’ during the formative period of the Ottoman state are partly utilized 
and further developed by the present author.  
In the meantime, Lindner’s approach and analyses have certain shortcomings. 
First of all, his unproductive insistence on the rejection of ‘gazā’ as an ideological tool 
and stimulating factor in mobilizing the contemporary society, especially fighting 
elements, limits the ‘inclusiveness’ of his approach. A more serious problem, from the 
point of view of a historian, is perhaps his improper – in many occasions even non – 
usage of existing sources. Lindner derives most of his information from the secondary 
literature. And lastly, his careless method of adopting the findings and concept of 
modern anthropology into the early Ottoman history seriously weakens some of his 
analyses.33  
                                                 
32 Rudi Paul Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 24, 
no. 4, 1982, 689-711; Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1983. 
33 This point is already criticized by Richard Tapper. See Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, 
and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph 
Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University 
of California Press, 1990, pp. 58-60. 
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Lastly, as for the main characteristics of the early Ottoman beylik, of the 
developing Ottoman state, and of the ideological bases of the state, Halil Đnalcık’s 
several studies34 and Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’s contributions35 should also be cited.  
 
1.2.  SOURCES 
 
1.2.1. Ottoman Sources 
1.2.1.1. Archival-Official documents  
It is not unknown to the students of Ottoman history that the proliferation of archival 
materials is witnessed only during the mid-sixteenth century. Before then, we have 
limited numbers of imperial degrees, waqfiyyes, tahrir registers, and some other 
individual documents. As long as the first and, especially, the second decade of the 
sixteenth century are concerned, however, there is a relative ‘abundance’ of archival 
documents almost all housed in TSA.36 In particular, during the struggle between Prince 
Ahmed and Selim, and the qizilbash uprisings within this context, there seems to be a 
remarkable increase in the number of reports – sometimes by spies of a prince, 
                                                 
34 See especially his following works: "The Question of The Emergence of The Ottoman State", 
International Journal of Turkish Studies, 2, 1980, 71- 79; ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, The Cambridge 
History of Islam, Vol.I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; 
“State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I”, in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman 
Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 70-94; 
“The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System”, in his The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 
1300-1600, London, 1973, 65-9; “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman 
Polity”, Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies, no. 1, 1992, 49-72; “Periods in Ottoman History, State, 
Society, Economy”, in Ottoman Civilization, I, edited by Halil Đnalcık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, 31-239; “Şerî’at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet”, in his Osmanlı’da 
Devlet, Hukuk , Adâlet, Đstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46. 
35 Among his many publications, his Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, which evaluates the development of the 
‘officially approved sphere’ and the boundaries of ‘heresy’ within the Otttoman realm, deserves  special 
attention. See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar), 3. 
baskı, Đstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003. 
36 For a list of the documents in TSA related to the Qizilbash affairs, see Appendix B.  
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sometimes by local officials or qādis – and letters, which are preserved in TSA. In these 
documents, we find detailed descriptions of the adherents of both parties (parties of 
Selim and Ahmed), as well as many details of the contemporary developments.  
Furthermore, as the Qizilbash Movement directly menaced the Ottoman rule as 
well as playing significant role in the Ottoman domestic politics, there are many reports 
of local governors and spies on qizilbashes and their acts. Especially the Şahkulu 
Rebellion and subsequent acts of qizilbashes in Anatolia are well-documented in TSA. 
Of course there is a heavy prejudice against qizilbashes in the accounts of these 
documents. Therefore one should be careful in using them. On many occasions, 
especially when describing the religious stand of qizilbashes, they rather reflect the 
picture that the Ottoman administration attempted to create regarding qizilbashes than 
their real situation. From this point of view, these documents are quite informative on 
the ‘official’ attitude of the Ottoman state. In the meantime, as being the documentation 
of official correspondence within the Ottoman state, they provide invaluable historical 
facts pertaining to details and dates of events.    
Unfortunately the archival evidence proliferates only towards the year 1510. 
Before then, we have quite a few number of documents. The history of the Qizilbash 
Movement in Anatolia before the 1510s can only be traced through narratives, both 
Ottoman and Safavid. Luckily, however, there is an exception. A register including the 
copies of the decisions made by the Ottoman Imperial Council (Dīvan) between evāhir-i 
Zilkāde 906 and evāhir-i Zilhicce 906 (8-17 June 1501/ 8-17 July 1501) is preserved in 
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Bāb-ı Asāfi Dīvān (Beylikçi) Kalemi, BA, A.DVN, 
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no.790.  The whole collection has been published by Đlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen.37 
Seven orders in this collection are directly linked to the prohibition of qizilbash’s 
communication with Iran, which is usually called ‘Yukarı Cānib’ in these documents.  
Apart from this archival evidence, we have copies of some religious treaties. 
Among them especially the fetvā of Hamza and the fetvās of Kemalpaşazāde and 
Ebussuud Efendi against qizilbashes and Safavids provide valuable knowledge 
concerning the religious and ideological stand of the Ottomans regarding the qizilbash 
issue.38 Starting form the last quarter of the fifteenth century, we also have tahrir defters 
of some provinces densely inhabited by qizilbashes. However, since nomadic tribes were 
not regularly registered in these defters, it is hardly possible to obtain information on the 
development of the early Qizilbash Movement in these surveys. There are some records 
in the defters from the 1520s indicating that some mezra’as were deserted since their 
inhabitants had been qizilbashes and had gone to Iran.39  
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Đlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen, Osmanlılarda Dīvān- Bürokrasi- Ahkām. II. Beyazıd Dönemine Ait 
906-1501 Tarihli Ahkām Defteri, Đstanbul, 1994.  
38 All of these fetvās have been studied by several scholars in different contexts. A detailed analysis of 
these religious treatises in my own context will be provided in Chapter IX.  
39 As will be delineated throughout this thesis, at least two waves of eastward qizilbash mass-flux in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries occurred: the first wave started under Shaykh Junayd, continued under 
Shaykh Haydar, and climaxed during the rise of Shah Ismail to power. The second wave took place during 
the period between the years 1510 and 1514, which experienced intense qizilbash rebellions and Selim I’s 
harsh persecution and campaign on qizilbashes. Therefore, one would expect a population reduction 
during this period especially in the ‘qizilbash zones’. However, it is not an easy job to determine such a 
drop in population since our primary - and the only – sources regarding the population, namely tahrir 
defters, are designed primarily to record the sedentary tax revenue sources. (As mentioned our qizilbash 
subjects were overwhelmingly nomadic-tribespeople during this period.) Yet some speculations on the 
available flue evidence can be made. The volume and the scope of the present thesis, however, do not 
permit conducting of such a study. I plan to discuss this issue in a separate article, thus have not consulted 
tahrir registers in the present study.      
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1.2.1.2. Narratives 
Before embarking on the evaluation of the Selim-nāme literature, one should mention the 
last chapter of Aşıkpaşazāde’s history (APZ, APZa),40 which is the only source about 
Shaykh Junayd’s journey in Anatolia. Furthermore, this short section is also the earliest 
available source elucidating the qizilbash issue on a religious ground and mentioning 
religiously condemnation of the Safavid adherents. It is obvious from the general outline 
that this part was not planned as a part of main body in Tevārih. As well-known, 
following the tradition, Aşıkpaşazāde constructed his book on a chronological basis. He 
hardly disturbs chronologically sequential order while narrating Ottoman history. 
Nevertheless, the situation is totally different for the section on Shaykh Junayd. This 
section is located after the narration of the Venetian siege of Midilli in 907/1501-2. The 
book follows a chronological order until this point. At the last section, Aşıkpaşazāde 
returns to the time of Murad II and explains the history of Shaykh Junayd and his son 
Haydar. This section (bāb) is also available in ‘Ali’s edition. However, Giese queried 
Aşıkpaşazāde’s authorship of this section of the work, thus omitted it finishing his 
edition by the events of 1492.41 Nihal Atsız, who published a combined version of these 
two editions, did not include the events of Bayezid II’s period. But his edition also 
includes the mentioned section at the end, just before the concise world history from 
Adam’s time down to the time of Prophet Muhammed. Although this section apparently 
seems to be a later addendum to the main corpus of the work, Aşıkpaşazāde’s authorship 
                                                 
40 Aşıkpaşa-zâde, Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, ed., ‘Ali Bey, Đstanbul, 1332 (APZa); Aşıkpaşa-zâde, Tevârih-i 
Al-i Osman, in Osmanlı Tarihleri, ed. Nihal Atsız, Đstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949, pp. 91-294 (APZ).   
41 See F. Giese, Die altosmanische Chronik des ‘Asiq pasazāde, Leipzig, 1929. 
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of this last section is open to speculation.42 Indeed, the orientation of the book suggests 
that this section must be a later edition either by Aşıkpaşazāde himself or by someone 
else. Atsız argues that Aşıkpaşazāde died in 886/1481.43 To him, all sections narrating 
events of Bayezid II’s reign must be a later addition. Taeschner suggests the year 
889/1484 for his date of death.44 But according to Đnalcık, who establishes his view on 
archival evidence as well as the textual analysis of the Tevārih, he must have died after 
908/1502.45 Indeed, before Inalcik this date had been already proposed by Köprülü.46 
Then it is highly possible that the author of the last sections was Aşıkpaşazāde himself, 
but as a later addendum.  
The unlawful succession of Selim I, who for the first - and the only - time in the 
Ottoman history forced his father to abdicate and ascended to the throne, created a deep 
hallmark in the Ottoman historiography. A literature called Selim-nāme,47 narrating 
deeds of Selim I but with a specific intention to legitimize Selim I’s usurpation 
appeared. Thanks to Selim’s uprising against his father, which ended in the dismissal of 
the legitimate sultan by his son,  this era became one of the most documented periods of 
the Ottoman history, both in terms of archival documents and authored historical works. 
Dozens of narratives exclusively devoted to Selim’s deeds have been written during the 
reign of Selim I himself and his son Süleyman I.  
                                                 
42 For a textual analysis see V.L. Ménage, A Survey of the Early Ottoman Histories, with Studies on their 
Textual Problems and their Sources, II, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1961, pp. 440-83. 
43 See APZ, p. 80. 
44 See F. Taeschner, “Ashik-pasha-zāde”, EI2. 
45 See Halil Đnalcık, “How to Read Aşıkpaşazāde’s History”, Essays in Ottoman History, Istanbul, 1998, p. 
34.   
46 See Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”,ĐA, p. 707. 
47 For the Selim-nāme literature and a brief description of prominent Selim-nāmes, see Ahmet Uğur, 
“Selim-nāmes”, in his The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature, Berlin: Klaus 
Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 28-64, pp. 7-27; Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Selîm-nâmeler”, Tarih Enstitüsü 
Dergisi, I, 1970, 197-231.  
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As already mentioned, the primary purpose of Selim-nāme writers was to explain 
how Selim I was rightful in overthrowing his father and killing all the males of the royal 
line. In other words, their stimulus was to create and propagate a ground of legitimacy 
for the unlawful acts of Selim I rather then recording the contemporary events. In his 
fight against both his father and his brother Prince Ahmed, Selim’s most powerful tool 
of legitimacy was, without doubt, the qizilbash issue. Skillfully treating the qizilbash 
menace pointed towards the Ottoman rule, Prince Selim masterfully developed a policy 
against his father, the living legitimate sultan, and his brother, then the heir in line to the 
throne. At the end, this policy brought him the Ottoman throne. Selim’s employment of 
the qizilbash affairs as a tool of legitimacy in the Ottoman domestic - and later foreign - 
politics was further cultivated by Selim-nāme authors. Therefore the issue of qizilbash 
became the major subject of the Selim-nāme literature.  
However, in this literature one can barely find the definition or depiction of 
qizilbashes as they were. Rather Shah Ismail and his followers were given the role of 
‘evil’, which would devastate not only the Ottoman Empire but the whole Islamic world 
if the great savior Selim had not eliminated them. From this point of view, Selim-nāme 
writers might be regarded rather as ideology-makers than historians. Hence, in their 
works the historical facts, especially concerning qizilbashes, are severely overshadowed 
by ideological treatments. As J. R. Walsh has already discussed, our contemporary 
sources pertaining to the Ottoman-Safavid relations in the late fifteenth- and sixteenth 
century are much inflected with ideological discourses and usually provide little 
information on what actually happened. In these sources, both Ottoman and Safavid, the 
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struggle between two powers is reflected as a war of religion; its social, cultural, and 
economic bases are completely ignored or not noticed by contemporary authors.48     
Consequently, on the one hand, this feature makes Selim-nāmes ‘unreliable’ from 
the religious stand, socio-political incentives, sources of motivation in their protest 
against the Ottoman rule, and the true sentiments of the qizilbashes. Yet, on the other 
hand, it is exactly this feature that makes them extremely valuable as a source for 
understanding the proliferating ‘Ottoman official ideology’, which had one of the most 
effective roles in the making of the ‘Qizilbash Identity”.   
Among a number of Selim-nāmes, some deserve special mention for the purpose 
of the present study. Before all, Defter VIII, the Addendum of Defter VIII, and Defter IX 
of Kemalpaşazāde49 must be delineated. Before discussing his works, it should be stated 
that Kemalpaşazāde’s own career, which started as a müderris in small-scale medreses 
and ended in the highest office of the scholarly-bureaucratic hierarchy – that is 
şeyhülislamlık – of the Ottoman Empire,50 makes his narratives of special interest. 
Indeed, Kemalpaşazāde was among prominent actors creating or re-shaping the 
‘Ottoman official ideology’ against the qizilbash menace and thus formulating the 
‘Qizilbash heresy’ as well. Therefore his writings, to a great extent, reflect the Ottoman 
official stand. On the other hand, as he was an active figure taking part in most of the 
contemporary events, his accounts are based either on his own eye-witness or on a report 
                                                 
48 See J. R. Walsh, “The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries”, in Historians of the Midle East, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 197-210. 
49 Defter VIII, which deals with the reign of Bayezid II, can not be deemed a selim-nāme. The other two 
defters, however, must be considered among outstanding examples of the selim-nāme literature.  
50 For the life and works of Şemseddin Ahmed bin Süleyman bin Kemal Paşa (Kemalpaşazāde), see Mecdī 
Mehmed Efendi, Şakaik-ı Nu’maniye ve Zeylleri, c. I, haz. Abdülkadir Özcan, Đstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 
1989, pp. 381-385; ALI, pp. 1209-1216; Franz Babinger, “Kemālpashazāde”, EI2, p. 912; Đsmet 
Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa Zāde”, IA, p. 561; Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Mustafa Sait 
Yazıcıoğlu, eds., Şeyhülislâm Đbn Kemâl Sempozyumu, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.  
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of a first-hand observer. Therefore, in many cases he provides valuable unique details of 
events, which is absent in other sources. So, keeping in mind the fact that he was part of 
the ‘Ottoman regime’, thus has a heavy bias and pejorative attitude towards qizilbashes, 
Kemalpaşazāde’s three works are probably the most informative and certainly among 
the most valuable primary sources for the subject of the present thesis.  
Kemalpaşazāde finished the eighth volume of his Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman51 
(KPZ8a), which comprises the reign of Bayezid II until the early months of the year 
1511, during the last years of Bayezid II, most probably in 1511.52 Being finished before 
Selim I’s ascendance, Defter VIII of Kemalpaşazāde holds a peculiar position among the 
Ottoman chronicles, which had been written under Selim I or his son Süleyman I. 
Although Kemalpaşazāde’s usual pejorative-biased attitude regarding the qizilbash 
affairs are equally echoed in this chronicle as well, Defter VIII’s account on Prince 
Selim as the governor of Trabzon fundamentally differs from the retrospective 
treatments of other Selim-nāme authors – and from Kemalpaşazāde’s own later works as 
well. Defter VIII also provides valuable knowledge concerning the Ottoman response to 
the rise of Shah Ismail from the year 1500 on and the activities of qizilbashes in 
Anatolia before 1511.  
Kemalpaşazāde completed Defter VIII with an addendum53 written during the 
reign of Süleyman I54 and comprising the events from the year 1508 to the accession of 
                                                 
51 Kemalpaşazāde’s Defter VIII is published by Ahmet Uğur. See Kemalpaşazâde, Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, 
VIII. Defter, ed. Ahmet Uğur, Ankara: TTK, 1997.  
52 See Ahmet Uğur, “Kemal Paşa-zāde ve Sekizinci Defter”, in Kemalpaşazâde, Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, 
VIII. Defter, p. XXIX.  
53 This addendum is published by Ahmet Uğur. See Ahmet Uğur, The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light 
of the Selim-nâme Literature, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 28-64.  
54 As Ahmet Uğur determines, Selim is mentioned in the text as merhum or deceased while Suleyman is 
mentioned as the sultan of our time. See Ahmet Uğur, “Selim-nāmes”, in his The Reign of Sultan Selim I 
in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p. 23.  
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Selim to the throne in April 24, 1512. This addendum (KPZ8b) is indeed devoted to the 
struggle of Selim for the throne and obviously written with the aim of legitimizing 
Selim’s acts. This addendum truly bears the general characteristics of the Selim-nāme 
literature indicated above. Kemalpaşazāde wrote a separate volume to narrate the reign 
of Selim I. Defter IX55 (KPZ9) is the history of the reign of Sultan Selim up to the year 
920/1516.56 In spite of all his prejudices regarding the qizilbash affairs, both of 
Kemalpaşazāde’s histories include quite valuable details.  
Another prominent actor of the contemporary events was Idris-i Bitlisī. Idris 
started his career as a scribe in the Akkoyunlu Palace. When Shah Ismail put an end to 
the Akkoyunlu rule in 1501, he joined Bayezid II’s suit, where he wrote his magnum 
opus Heşt Behişt, the history of the first eight Ottoman sultans down to Bayezid II. 
Unfortunately, Heşt Behişt does not include the last years of Bayezid II’s reign, when 
the qizilbash affairs became one of the most vital issues in the Ottoman politics. 
However, later on he wrote a separate history of the reign of Selim I, namely Selimşah-
nāme (IDRS).57 Idris took a very active part in the Ottoman-Safavid struggle. He was 
among the prominent advisors of Sultan Selim regarding his eastern policy. He was 
                                                 
55 This Defter is published by Ahmet Uğur in his The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-
nâme Literature, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 65-128.  
56 In the end of the text, the date Zilkāde 922 / November-December 1516 is recorded. See 
Kemalpaşazāde, Defter IX, in Ahmet Uğur, The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme 
Literature, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p. 128. A contemporary Italian source ratifies this fact. 
Giovan Maria Angiolello, who attended Selim’s campaign of Egypt, writes, “The history of this last 
expedition of Selim ağainst the Soldan and the Mamelukes was carefully written by a Cadi Lascher 
[kadıasker], who was with the army, to a Cadi [qādī] in Constantinople, and translated from the Turkish 
into Tuscan on the 22nd October, 1517.” See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and 
Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 137. It is known that Kemalpaşazāde was kadıasker of 
Anatolia during this campaign, and most probably he got the post as a reward for his Defter IX, which had 
just been presented to the sultan. (See Franz Babinger, “Kemālpashazāde”, EI2, p. 912; Đsmet 
Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa Zāde”, IA, p. 561.) Thus the history Giovan Maria Angiolello mentions must 
have been the Defter IX of Kemalpaşazāde. 
57 The Turkish translation of this work, which was written in Persian, is published by Hicabi Kırlangıç. 
See Idris-i Bitlisī, Selim Şah-nâme, translated and edited by Hicabi Kırlangıç, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 2001.  
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among the Ottoman forces sent to Tabriz by Selim I as avant-garde, immediately after 
the Çaldıran victory of the Ottomans. In the following years he was appointed as the 
governor-general of the eastern provinces commissioned to re-structure Kurdish tribes 
against the Safavids.58 As a prominent actor of the contemporary developments, his 
accounts in Selimşah-nāme mostly rely on his own eye-witness. Furthermore, as an 
activist, Ottoman ideology-maker and governor, his writings, as was in the case of 
Kamalpaşazāde, directly reflect the Ottoman official stand. Nonetheless, Selimşah-nāme 
is not very informative on actual events. It is verbose but rather sparse as to content. 
Another problem with this source is that when he died on November 18, 1520, 
approximately two months after the death of Selim I, Idris-i Bitlisī had not finished his 
history, but left its drafts. These drafts were later compiled and completed by his son 
Ebu’l-Fazl. The problem here is that which parts is Ebu’l-Fazl contribution is not clear. 
According to Hicabi Kırlangıç, who published a Turkish translation of Selimşah-nāme, 
the contribution of Ebu’l-Fazl to the original work is rather limited.59     
 The versified Selim-nāme (SKB)60 of Şükri-i Bitlisī, who served as a military 
officer under Bayezid II and Selim I, is also among important sources. Putting aside his 
usual pro-Selim stand, Şükri’s history provides unique details especially concerning 
Prince Selim’s fight against qizilbashes in Trabzon and the early phases of the Çaldıran 
Campaign. Approximately one century later Şükri’s Selim-nāme was edited and re-
written in prose by Çerkeslerkātibi Yusuf (YSF).61 
                                                 
58 For Idris-i Bitlisī, see Hicabi Kırlangıç, “Đdris-i Bitlisi”, in Ibid, pp. 5-21. 
59 Hicabi Kırlangıç, “Selim Şah-nâme”, in Ibid, p. 22.  
60 This work is published by Mustafa Argunşah. See Şükrî-i Bitlisî, Selîm-nâme, ed. Mustafa Argunşah, 
Kayseri, 1997.  
61 The entire text of Yusuf’s prose edition of this Selim-nāme is transliterated in Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf, 
Selim-nâme, the entire text is transliterated in Mehmet Doğan, Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf’un Selim-
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Apart from these Selim-nāmes, Haydar Çelebi’s Ruznāme (HYDR)62 is of 
primary importance among available sources. Haydar Çelebi participated in the Çaldıran 
Campaign as the scribe of the Imperial Council (Divan). As part of his job, he prepared a 
diary of the campaign. Although it is not very informative on ideological and political 
aspects of the contemporary developments, the Ruznāme provides a detailed trajectory 
of the campaign, as well as specific dates and some individual events that occurred 
during the campaign.  
The historians writing in the second half of the sixteenth century mostly used the 
above-mentioned contemporary histories, especially the works of Idris-i Bitlisi and 
Kamalpaşazāde, for the events of the early sixteenth century. However, they seem to 
have additionally used some oral hearsay from first-hand eye-witnesses. Therefore, they 
are also of importance as sources for the era under scrutiny. Among them the Selim-
nāme of Celalzāde Mustafa (CLZ)63, the history of Hoca Saadeddin Efendi (HSE)64 and 
the encyclopedic chronicle of ‘Āli (ALI)65 are of the special interest in the present study. 
A peculiarity of ‘Āli’s Künhü’l-Ahbar should be delineated here. Unlike other 
historians, ‘Āli does not follow a strict chronological order. Furthermore he usually 
makes mistakes in dates. The original and valuable aspect of his work is that he 
occasionally gives his own analysis and interpretations of events. From this point of 
                                                                                                                                                
nâmesi’nin Mukayeseli Metin Tenkidi ve Değerlendirmesi, Unpublished MA Thesis, Ankara Universitesi 
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997. 
62 An unscholarly transliterated and abridged text of Ruznāme’s copy housed in Topkapı Sarayı 
Kütüphanesi, R 1955 is published by Yavuz Senemoğlu. See Divan Kâtibi Haydar Çelebi, Haydar Çelebi 
Ruznâmesi, ed. Yavuz Senemoğlu, Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser Serisi. (Undated). 
63 Celâl-zâde Mustafa, Selim-nâme, haz. Ahmet Uğur-Mustafa Çuhadar, Đstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 1997. 
64 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, Tacü’t-Tevarih, vols. II-III-IV, haz. Đsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999. 
65 Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, Kitabu’t-Tarih-i Künhü’l-Ahbar, 2 vols., eds. A. Uğur, M. Çuhadar, A. Gül, Đ. 
H. Çuhadar, Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997.  
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view he seems to stray from the traditional style of chronicle writing, which usually 
lacks interpretation and analysis. Another valuable side of Ali’s history is that it includes 
biographies of contemporary viziers, statesmen, poets, scholars etc. Later chronicles 
written in the seventeenth century, such as the history of Solakzāde (SLZ)66 and 
Sahaifu’l-Ahbar of Müneccimbaşı (MNB)67 barely adds unknown bits of knowledge to 
the known corpus.  
Lastly, a sixteenth-century anonymous chronicle (Haniwaldanus Anonymous-
ANMH) deserves special attention. This anonymous history was translated from Turkish 
into Latin by a certain Murad Bey, who was encouraged by Philipp Haniwald von 
Eckersdorf, in 1584. The Latin text was translated into German and published by R. F. 
Kreutel.68 The importance of this source, for the purpose of the present study, is not only 
because of its valuable information absent in other sources, but also because of its 
relatively ‘objective’ attitude regarding the qizilbash issues. Fundamentally differing 
from other Ottoman sources, it occasionally depicts Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and 
Shah Ismail, and their disciples as ‘good men’. On the other hand, regarding the deeds of 
Selim, Haniwaldanus Anonymous does not hesitate to criticize his unlawful acts. These 
features ensure a peculiar place to this anonymous history in the Ottoman 
historiography.   
 
                                                 
66 Solakzâde Mehmed Hemdemî Çelebi, Solakzâde Tarihi, vols. I-II, ed. Vahit Çabuk, Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989. 
67 Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, Sahaif-ül-Ahbar fî Vekayi-ül-a’sâr, 2 vols., trc. Đsmail Erünsal, Tercüman 
1001 Eser Serisi. 
68 R. F. Kreutel, Der fromme Sultan Bayezid die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481-1512) nach den 
altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruç und des Anonymus Haniwaldanus, Vienna, 1978. The Turkish 
translation of this work is published by Necdet Öztürk. See Richard F. Kreutel, Haniwaldanus Anonimi’ne 
Göre Sultan Bayezid-i Velî (1481-1512), trs., Necdet Öztürk, Đstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 
1997. 
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1.2.2. Safavid Sources 
The Safavid historiography is principally based on some dozens of narratives. Except a 
few imperial decrees, mostly of Shah Ismail,69 and individual archival documents,70 
which are mainly housed in the Ottoman archives, the official records of the Safavid 
state are almost all lost to modern scholarship. Consequently, the chronicles, mostly 
written by Safavid court historians, remained as the principal, and the only in most 
cases, sources of the Safavid history. The most important narrative sources of the 
Safavid history, which are consulted in the present study, are well-known to modern 
scholarship.71 However, for the purpose of the present study, some observations should 
be made.    
As long as the history of the qizilbashes is concerned, the Safavid chronicles 
pose serious problems. First of all, except for a few number of anonymous narratives, 
whose authorship is still to be clarified, these histories were produced by Persian 
bureaucrats and the ulemā. As will be partly evaluated in Chapter VIII, immediately 
following the foundation of the Safavid state in 1501, two fundamentally different and 
contesting groups appeared within the Safavid realm: on the one side there was the 
Turcoman (tribal) qizilbash military aristocracy, which founded the state and held 
military ranks. On the other side, the bureaucracy, chancery, fiscal affairs, and 
                                                 
69 For an incomplete list of Shah Ismail’s decrees in TSA, see Appendix B.  
70 For some examples of these documents, see Said Amir Arjomand, “Two Decrees of Shāh Tahmāsp 
Concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh ‘Ali Al-Karakī”, in Authority and Political Culture in 
Schi’ism, edited by Said Amir Arjomand, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988, 250-262; 
B. G. Martin, “Seven Safawid Documents from Azarbayjan”, in Documents from Islamic Chanceries, 
First Series, ed., S. M. Stern, Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1965, 170-206. For the only comprehensive source 
explaining the structure of the Safavid administration, see Vilademir Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A 
Manual of Safavid Administration, London, 1943. (TM)  
71 For a brief description of the narrative sources of the Safavid history, the reader might regard the 
following studies: Ghulam Sarwar, History of Shah Ismail Safawi, Aligarh, Muslim University, 1939, pp. 
3-16; Masashi Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz 
Verlag, 1987, pp. 10-28 ; Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I 
(1487-1524), Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, pp. XV-XLV. 
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scholarship were left in the hands of Persian notables. Holding the military power and 
governorships, qizilbashes regarded the latter as of secondary rank that were responsible 
simply to fulfill some scribal stuff under their rule. On the other hand, for the high 
cultured Persian ‘men of pen’, qizilbashes were just coarse, uncultured, and single-
minded soldiers knowing nothing other than fighting. The latter’s despising attitude, 
however, was not only limited to the illiteracy or the vulgarity of qizilbashes, but was 
pointed towards their way of life as a whole. Consequently, the chronicles produced by 
Persian bureaucrats are by no means free of prejudice against Turkoman qizilbashes, 
even if they were written under the patronage of the Safavid shahs. A careful treatment 
immediately demonstrates that these narratives are strongly inclined to underestimate the 
contribution of the qizilbash military aristocracy, while overemphasizing the role of 
bureaucrats. Therefore, in the Safavid narratives, the student of the qizilbash (or Safavid) 
history can find neither the true accounts of the events, especially regarding the early 
phases of the Qizilbash Movement, nor the feelings and ideas of Shaykh Haydar’s and 
Shah Ismail’s devoted qizilbash disciples. In other words, one can hardly penetrate to the 
mentality, world-view, sentiments, and the nature of religious thought of qizilbashes 
through these chronicles. 
The Habibu’s-siyar of Khwandamir (HS),72 Iskender Beg Munshi’s History of 
Shah ‘Abbas the Great (AA),73 and Qādī Ahmed Qumī’s Hulāsat al-tavārīh (HT)74 are 
among the prominent Safavid chronicles that strongly bear the prejudice mentioned 
                                                 
72 Khwandamir (Mir Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Husayni), Habibu’s-siyar, translated and edited by W. M. 
Thackston, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 24, Central Asian Sources I, Harvard 
University, 1994.    
73 Eskandar Beg Monshi, History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great (Tārīk-e ‘Ălamārā-ye ‘Abbāsī), translated by 
Roger M. Savory, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.  
74 Qādī Ahmed Qumī, Hulāsat al-tavārīh, edited and translated into German in Erika Glassen, Die frühen 
Safawiden nach Qāzī Ahmad Qumī, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970. (The section from Sheikh Safī 
to the advent of Ismail in 1501). 
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above. More interesting is that the Ahsenü’t-Tevārih of Hasan- ı Rumlu (HR),75 who was 
a son of a qizilbash amir in the service of Shah Ismail and Shah Tahmasb, also follows 
the same traditon, that is looking at qizilbashes from the eyes of Persian cultured class.     
Among a few number of exceptions, the anonymous histories known as Ross 
Anonymous and Tarih-i Kızılbaşān can be counted. The authorship of the former has 
been discussed by several historians. According to E. Denison Ross, who partly 
published the text with its English translation, the narrative had been written during the 
early sixteenth century by an unknown author.76 However, Ghulam Sarwar argued that it 
was written between the years 1540 and 1548 by an author whose name starts with 
‘Bijan’.77 Andrew H. Morton, on the other hand, identifies this work with Jahāngushā-yi 
khākān and suggests a 17th-century date of composition.78 Whatever the name of the 
author and the date of compilation were, the distinguishing feature of this narrative 
comes from its content. As a close examination would immediately reveal, here the 
attitude of the anonymous author regarding qizilbashes fundamentally deviates from that 
of the Persian bureaucrat-historians. His approaches seemingly reflect the qizilbash 
mentality much more than the above-mentioned chronicles. From this point of view, 
Ross Anonymous might be regarded among the most ‘qizilbash-like’ products of the 
                                                 
75 C. N. Seddon, (ed.), A Chronicle of the Early Safawis, being the Ahsanu’t- Tawarikh of Hasan-ı Rumlu, 
Baroda, 1931. For Turkish translation, see Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü’t-Tevārih, translated into Turkish and 
abridged by Cevat Cevan, Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 2004.  
76 E. Denison Ross, “The Early Years of Shāh Isma’īl, Founder of the Safavī Dynasty”, Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, XXVIII, 1896, p. 252. 
77 Sarwar, History of Shah Isma’il Safawī, pp. 9-10.   
78 See Morton, “The Date and Attribution of Ross Anonymous. Notes on a Persian History of Shah Isma’īl 
I”, History and Literature in Iran: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P. W. Avery, ed. Charles 
Melville, Chambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1990, pp. 179-212. Also consider his “The 
Early Years of Shah Isma’il in the Afzal al-tavārikh and Elsewhere”, in Safavid Persia. The History and 
Politics of an Islamic Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, pp. 27-28.  
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Safavid historiography. Tarih-i Kızılbaşān79 can also be deemed as a product of the 
qizilbash milieu. Nevertheless, this anonymous source is rather sparse as to content. It is 
simply composed of a relatively comprehensive list of the qizilbash oymaqs and names 
of prominent amirs in each.  
It must be because of the mentioned disdaining attitude of Persian historians that 
Safavid chronicles are almost silent about Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar.80 Apart 
from the narratives produced in the Safavid realm, our principal source for the deeds of 
Shaykh Haydar and his father is Fadlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī’s Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā-yi 
Amīnī,81 which was written under Akkoyunlu patronage. Khunjī’s extreme prejudice 
against Shaykh Haydar and his disciples, as well as his father, has two major bases: first 
of all, he wrote his history in the palace of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu,82 the formidable 
enemy of the Safavid dynasty. No less affective was Khunjī’s fervent sunni fanaticism 
and shi’ī enmity. Stimulated by a combination of these two biases, his account on 
Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar appears as an enthusiastic attempt to marginalize the 
Safavids shaykhs and their disciples into an extreme heresy for certain practical 
purposes, rather than a historical work. Therefore, Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Amīnī’s 
account on qizilbashes, especially its description of qizilbash beliefs, should be treated 
with a fastidious criticism.     
                                                 
79 This anonymous work is completed in 1013/1604-5. The original Persian text, with a short foreword, is 
published by Mir Hāşim Muhaddes. See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, edited and published by Mir Hāşim 
Muhaddes, Tehran, 1361 (1982).  
80 It is to be shown throughout this study that the Safavid history from the shaykhdom of Junayd to 
Ismail’s ascendance to the throne was marked by the exuberant qizilbash movement resting on extremist-
shi’ism, Turkoman tribal culture and militarism, and a popular form of intense Sufism. By the 
development of the Safavid state with its institutions, however, the official religious stand gradually 
shifted towards the ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism, which by no means approved the Qizilbash Sufism.    
81 An abridged English translation of this work is published by Vilademir Minorsky. See Minorsky, Persia 
in A.D. 1478-1490. An Abridged Translation of Fadlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī’s Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā-yi 
Amīnī, London, 1957.  
82 Khunjī’s work is, indeed, is designed as the history of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu.  
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1.2.3. Italian Sources 
When Shah Ismail rose up as a regional power in 1501, the Ottoman-Venetian War had 
just ended with territorial losts of the Venetians. The treaty, however, by no means 
ended the immediate Ottoman threat for the Venetians. Therefore, the emergence of a 
new and powerful enemy of the Ottoman Empire in the eastern front was warmly 
welcomed by the Venetians. Indeed, establishing alliances with the enemies of the 
Ottoman Empire in the East was not a new phenomenon for European states. Before the 
Safavids, Uzun Hasan had also received the fervent support of the Venetians against 
Mehmed II. In this case, however, the excitement in Europe was two-fold: the newly 
rising ruler of Iran was not only posing a political and military menace to the Ottoman 
Empire, but also an effective sectarian contest as well. The second feature of the new 
ally even made Venetian ambassadors to perceive - as reflected in their reports – Shah 
Ismail’s religious path closer to Christianity than the sunni Islam of the Ottomans.  
As a result, the European - especially Venetian - statesmen and intellectuals had 
an increasing interest in and curiosity about Shah Ismail. The Venetians dispatched a 
number of envoys to maintain an alliance with Shah Ismail and to encourage him in his 
struggle against the Ottomans. The reports of these envoys include a detailed description 
of Shah Ismail, his palace, his followers etc. Among them, the English translation of the 
most important and the most informative six travel accounts, or reports of diplomatic 
mission, are published.83 The peculiarities of each narrative will be delineated in the 
related part of the thesis.   
                                                 
83 The narratives of Caterino Zeno, Giovan Maria Angiolello, An unknown Merchant, and Vincento 
d’Alessandri are translated into English and published by Charles Grey. See A Narrative of Italian travels 
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Since they are free from the biases of the Ottoman and Persian authors explained 
above, this third group of sources provides us extremely valuable information, especially 
about the relationship between Shah Ismail and his disciples, about the adoration of the 
latter to their shaykh, and about the nature of the qizilbash belief. Nonetheless, they have 
their own subjectivity on the matter. Because of the situation mentioned above, Italian 
writers had a recognizable tendency to exaggerate Ismail’s deeds and his power over the 
qizilbash Sufis. A careful examination of their accounts reveals that they overtone ‘non-
sunni’, which meant ‘non-Islamic’ for them, and extremist deeds of qizilbashes. In their 
attitude, one can easily recognize an intention to depict Shah Ismail and his followers as 
a separate ‘religion’ from Islam, which was more Christian-like.84   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, translated and edited by Charles Grey, Hakluyt Society, 
London, 1873 (NIT). Yet the English translations of the narratives of Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio 
Contarini are published by Lord Stanley of Alderley. See Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, Travels 
to Tana and Persia, Hakluyt Society, first series 49, translated by William Thomas and A.A. Roy and 
edited by Lord Stanley of Alderley, London, 1873 (TTP). 
84 For a discussion of the Italian sources in terms of their attitude regarding Shah Ismail, see Palmira 
Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, in Medieval 
Christian Perceptions of Islam, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland Publishing, 
1996,331-59.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A DISCUSSION ON THE 
NATURE OF TRIBE AND STATE 
 
 
 
2.1.  BUREAUCRATIC STATE VS. TRIBAL ORGANIZATION 
This thesis aims to analyze the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity within the 
framework of the interaction between two ‘ways of life’: 1) the overwhelmingly settled 
and urban-oriented way of life, which realized its political organization as bureaucratic 
state, and 2) nomadic or semi-nomadic and rural-oriented way of life, which 
accomplished its socio-political organization on tribal basis. The peasantry remains in 
between these two ends of my model and may be closer to either according to 
conditions. Especially those villagers, who had already settled in certain spaces but 
maintained tribal bonds and nomadic habits in terms of culture, mentality, ways of 
thinking and perception etc., are to be classified in the second group. Another parameter 
not to be ignored is the degree of literacy. The first way of life might be regarded under 
the dominance of literacy. However, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of 
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people in the first group were literate. Rather the point here is that the cultural, 
ideological, intellectual, political, and religious premises in this way of life were mainly 
the product of literate minds. The other members of society, majority of which might 
well have been illiterate, were to be attached to the intellectual products of the literate 
elite. The same approach is valid for the other pole of my model. Here some literate 
people might also be found. However, the governing mechanism of thought and 
perception was based on illiteracy.  
A detailed discussion of differences and similarities between these two ways of 
life is beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless, it would be useful for the 
upcoming analysis to provide a brief framework of especially the major differences 
where the influence on the religious, political, and social levels is clearly visible. 
I would like to start with asking the question, ‘what was a nomadic tribe in the 
Ottoman case?’ The term comprises two words and two notions: ‘nomad’ and ‘tribe’, 
which are closely connected to each other. Nomadism is a mode of life based on 
specialized types of food-producing systems with relatively conservative technology and 
close harmony with the ecology and all shaped by constant move. Although there were 
some nomads engaged in seasonal agriculture, the major means of food production in a 
nomadic society is always pastoralism.85 A tribe is, on the other hand, a model for social 
and political organization principally erected around a fabricated lineage axis. Virtually 
all nomadic societies are organized as tribes in one sort or another.86 There are, however, 
                                                 
85 The reader must be reminded that in the Ottoman case, which is the focus of the present study, 
‘nomadism’ in its absolute meaning of transhumance, is hardly applicable. Rather one can speak of 
‘residual nomads’ moving within a prescribed route, either long-range or short-range. So throughout the 
study the term ‘nomad’ will be used in this sense. For a brief outline of nomadism in Ottoman Anatolia, 
see Xavier de Planhol, “Geography, Politics and Nomadism in Anatolia”, International Social Sciences 
Journal, XI, 4, 525-31.   
86 Bates, Daniel and Plog, Fred, Cultural Anthropology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990, p. 156.  
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settled tribes in several parts of the world. Although tribal organization in the Middle 
East was generally associated with nomadic pastoralists, sedentary tribes, as Barfield 
notices, located in marginal mountain and desert regions, such as the Berbers, Kurds, 
and Pashtuns, probably constituted an equally large population87.  In the Ottoman 
Empire too we know of some settled tribes especially in the eighteenth and fourteenth 
century Eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, the tribes that constitute this study’s subject-
matter were overwhelmingly nomads. Hence I will use the term ‘nomadic tribe’ 
throughout my analysis.  
Yet before going into detailed analysis of tribal organization and the nomadic 
way of life, I would like to make further clarification on the type of tribe that I will 
examine. Before everything else, the notion of tribe that I will employ for the purpose of 
my subject in the context of the Middle East, as Aydın and Özel underline for some 
other purpose, is “fundamentally different from the classical understanding of the 
Anglo-Saxon concept of tribe, which generally derives from African, American or 
Oceanic anthropological research on hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists, and intensive 
agriculturalists.”88 The essential difference lies in the political content attributed to tribe.  
On the other hand, from the political point of view, one could not analyze all 
Middle Eastern tribes in one category. Comparing the tribal cultures of the Middle East, 
Charles Lindholm indicates structural differences between hierarchical Turko-
Mongolian tribes in Inner Asia and egalitarian cultural tradition of tribes indigenous to 
                                                 
87 Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, in Philip S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1990, p. 156. 
88 Suavi Aydın and Oktay Özel, “Power Relations between State and Tribe in Ottoman Eastern Anatolia”, 
Bulgarian Historical Review, vol. 3-4, 2006, 51-67.  
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the Middle East.89 Thomas Barfield also analyzes Middle Eastern tribes in a same 
manner: the egalitarian (Arabian) tribal model and inner Asian hierarchical (Turko-
Mongolian) tribal model. In the Arabian tribes, though some lineages demonstrated a 
greater capacity than others to assume political leadership, each clan considered itself to 
be the equal of any other. Thus the leadership in the egalitarian tribal system displayed 
little hierarchy.90 This sort of organization is called, in a broader sense, by 
anthropologists as the segmentary lineage system. The tribal chief in this system is no 
more than a mediator between the tribe and the outside world or in inner disputes. He 
has no real political power. For the historians of the steppe and, the Turkish tribes in 
Anatolia as well, the segmentary lineage system seems obviously inapplicable as a 
model.91 
The inner Asian pattern of tribal organization was much more hierarchical than 
that of the egalitarian organizations. This difference was reflected in both its social 
structure and political organization.92 They were organized according to a canonical 
system, in which there existed a superior segment, the leader of which is superior to all 
tribesmen. Hence, there was a central hierarchical organization which provides a 
considerable political and military might to the tribe alongside the powerful position to 
the chief. Barfield observes,  
Unlike in the Middle East, where tribal societies that were distributed in a mosaic 
fashion across the region shared close economic and cultural ties with 
neighboring sedentary states, in Inner Asia tribal societies were more isolated, 
inhabiting their own distinct territories in which they were completely dominant 
and separated by linear frontiers from neighbors whose societies and cultures 
                                                 
89 Charles Lindholm, “Kinship Structure and Political Authority: The Middle East and Central Asia”, 
Journal of Comparative History and Society, 28, 1986, 334-355. 
90  Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, p. 161. 
91 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 694. 
92 Barfield, p. 164. 
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were alien. These sedentary neighbors were far larger in population and more 
centralized than their tribal neighbors, often refusing to trade with them except 
under threat of force. To deal with these powerful sedentary states, tribal 
societies had to organize their own state structures of sufficient power to force 
their neighbors to treat them as equal.93  
 
Lapidus uses the term ‘warrior chieftaincy’ for these sorts of tribes. To him, 
“Among Turkish Inner Asian Peoples who accepted hierarchical rule and recognized 
dynastic rule, the most common form of leadership was the warrior chieftaincy 
supported by a lineage, clan, or commitatis –a band of warriors who in turn won the 
allegiance of other such warrior units and thereby dominated a subject population.”94  As 
clearly stated by Barfield and Lapidus, the Inner Asian Turko-Mongolain tribal tradition 
had an intrinsic capacity to construct a state whenever suitable conditions appeared. One 
might call it as a quasi-state organization. It is the Torko-Mongolian tribal model, or in 
Lapidus’ words ‘warrior chieftaincy’, that I will employ throughout this study. 
 
2.1.1. Means of Socio-political Organization 
A tribe is, before all, a socio-political association whose members jointly helped to 
maintain order internally and defend the unit externally. As a political organization it is 
an alternative to the state.95 As Luis Beck puts forward “it is often more appropriate to 
speak of tribal or tribally organized society than of tribe.”96 A tribe is rather an idea, a 
cultural construct, which has political, social and symbolic manifestations.97 It is a rural 
self-administration. But the means of tribal organization intrinsically deviate from that 
                                                 
93 Barfield, p. 166. 
94 Lapidus, “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, p. 29. 
95 Ernest Gellner, “The Tribal Society and Its Enemies”, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and 
Afghanistan, ed., Richard Tapper, New York, 1983, p.442. 
96 Luis Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, in Philip S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1990, p. 189. 
97 Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, p. 188.  
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of state organization. That is because of the nature of social ground and mode of life on 
which socio-political organization rises. In the lack of social stratification and division 
of labor98, and of the necessary material and tools such as literacy, social, political, and 
religious functions were assigned according to non-professional basis, which usually 
appears as blood lineage.99 As Thomas Barfield has put it, one significant difference of 
tribal polity is that  
…in contrast to states, tribal political structures employed, in theory, a model of 
kinship to build groups that acted in concert to organize economic production, 
preserve internal political order, and defend the group against outsiders. 
Relationships among people and groups in such systems were mapped through 
social space rather than geographical territory. Political units and the territories 
they occupied existed primarily as products of social relations: rights to use land 
and exclude outsiders were based on tribal affiliation. Non-tribal groups were 
generally organized in a converse fashion, with social groups defining 
themselves in terms of a common residence, system of cultural beliefs, or 
political affiliation.100  
 
                                                 
98 Closely related to their simplistic and specialized structure of economy, social structure of nomadic 
societies is purely stratified. Since the mode of subsistence is highly specialized and one-sided there is no 
need for division of labor. In such a society that almost all members professionalize in same productive 
means social differentiation could never reach a considerable level. One might argue that the only social 
stratification in a nomadic society takes place during the emergence of a ruling tribal aristocracy, which 
usually comprises kin, comrades, or slaves of the chief and of tribal militia. Never the less, in terms of 
culture and ideology it is hardly possible to distinguish considerable differentiation among nomads. One 
may add to this homogeneity and even one-sidedness of nomadic culture and ideology, the superficial and 
rudimentary nature as well. Putting aside the ruling clan, which specializes in politics and military arts, 
members of a nomadic society are more or less the same in terms of productive activities, art, cultural 
means, scientific abilities, religious professions, etc. Adam Smith long ago recognized that the differences 
between individuals mainly come from the division of labor. Individual differentiation is not due to innate 
nature of people but is a result of division of labor and the discipline that society imposes upon its 
members. “The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; 
and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to 
maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect, of the division of labor. The 
difference between the most dissimilar characters, between and philosopher and a common street porter, 
for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they 
came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much 
alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference.” See Adam 
Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book I, chap. ii., London: Penguin 
Books, 1979. Also consider Robert E. Park, “Human Nature and Collective Behavior”, The American 
Journal of Sociology, vol. 32, no. 5, (Mar., 1927), p. 736. 
99 One should remember that according to the “Ocak” or “Dedelik” system of the Qizilbash, the privileged 
religious class of the society responsible to fulfill certain religious functions and supervise ordinary 
members of the community rests on genealogical basis rather than education or training.  
100 Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, pp. 155-6. 
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So, in Barfield’s terminology, the dominance of social space instead of physical 
conditions in shaping the map of relations and structure of political organization leads to 
the creation of abstract ideas such as genealogy, which could glue tribal body.  
The political structure in the tribal system is influenced, conditioned, and 
determined by internal, local factors and external, supra-local factors. Internal forms, 
inherent tendencies, and local system parameters such as tribal values, cognitive 
frameworks, cultural commitments, mode-means and relations of production, 
environment, adaptation, eco-system are important. On the other hand, external ties, 
foreign relations, extraneous pressures such as high religions, literary traditions, 
formalized cultural transmissions, state pressure, government preferences, inter-tribal 
alliances, rivalries and conflicts play a significant role in the construction of tribal 
policy. But none of them should be taken as priori.101  
 Being one of the major external factors that determined tribal polity, it would be 
useful to give the definition of state and to point out briefly the fundamental differences 
between them. For the purpose of my study, I am inclined to take the following 
definition of state among many others. The state is a political entity characterized by 
territorial frontiers (not necessarily secure and clearly defined), a central government 
and bureaucratic apparatus, a legitimately monopolized physical coercion, extraction of 
resources (usually in the form of tax), and a socio-economically stratified heterogeneous 
population.102   
                                                 
101 Philip Carl Salzman, “Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan”, The Conflict of Tribe and 
State in Iran and Afghanistan, ed., Richard Tapper, New York, 1983, p. 281. 
102 Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the 
Middle East”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle 
East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 50; Beck, “Tribes and the 
State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, p. 191. 
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The major difference of state from tribe comes from its much more developed 
division of labor. Under the state organization there existed full-time professional 
warriors, officials of several bureaucratic offices. It sustained by the labor of peasants, 
artisans, and traders.103 The tribal mode barely has intermediary echelons in 
administrative machinery. It is socially homogeneous, egalitarian, and segmented; the 
state is heterogeneous, stratified, and hierarchical. Tribes give primacy to ties of kinship 
and patrilineal descent as basis for identity, political allegiance, and behavior. States, on 
the other hand, put personal relations of state to secondary significance and insist on 
loyalty of each person to a central authority. In the tribal organization personal and 
moral factors play primary role, whereas states stresses impersonal relations and 
recognizes contract, transaction, and achievement.104 
 
2.1.2. Chieftaincy and Lineage 
The chief, his household, and his lineage, though being usually ex post facto speculation, 
constitute the skeleton of tribal polity. In the nomadic society, which casts the main 
body of tribes under scrutiny, the physical factors that combine the members of the 
community fluctuate. Thus symbolic and abstract factors and ideas such as genealogy 
gain preeminence as a uniting factor within society. The mobility of nomads and 
instability of pastoral economy impedes stable social organization. On the contrary, it 
gives rise to a fluid social organization which is capable of change and which has the 
requisite segmentary means with which to accomplish this. The most appropriate 
principle for this turns out to be descent for it conceptualizes the structure of social 
                                                 
103 Gellner, “The Tribal Society and Its Enemies”, p. 445.  
104 Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle 
East”, p. 68.  
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relations on kinship basis.105 The lack of constant territorial settlement, in addition to the 
absence of bureaucracy as mentioned above, makes impossible for tribes to invent a 
physical or territorial administrative chart, instead they implement genealogical charts. 
As Luis Beck truly demarcates, “Genealogies were charters of organization and not 
maps of actual kinship ties.”106 In tribal context, attachment to a genealogy or common 
ancestor implies political connotations. 
Tribes use genealogy as a tool of organization and social solidarity. Genealogical 
principle is important for the nomadic society, as Khazanov notes, not only to form 
descent groups but also to govern the structure of society. “Genealogies can be 
consciously or unconsciously manipulated. They are capable of broadening and 
narrowing, and of splitting up and merging in accordance with practical necessities and a 
specific historic situation.”107 Genealogy, kinship, and descent fulfill vital function in the 
social organization of nomads. But genealogy usually does not reflect actual descent 
lines; rather it is fabricated to create a common feeling in community. Actual kinship 
relations occur only in sub-tribal units, such as families, household, and local lineages. 
Barth observes that “kinship, especially a patrilineal one, is of prominent 
importance in nomadic life in terms of internal networks and ties in a camp”108. He adds, 
however, that they had, in reality, little knowledge of genealogy. Beck and Barfield also 
indicate that the function of lineage gets its real meaning only at the local level; as it 
comes to higher levels of incorporation it gains symbolic and political notion rather than 
                                                 
105 Anatoly M. Khazanov,, Nomads and the Outside World, Madison:The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1994, pp.138-9. 
106 Beck, p. 194. 
107 Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, p. 143, 
108 Barth, p. 30. 
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actual kinship ties109. As Barfield delineates it, “The closer we get to the bottom ranks of 
any tribal system, the more the system relies on actual descent and affinal ties; the 
higher we go in the same structure, the more political its relationships become.”110   
As genealogy serves as the pillar of the theory of tribal polity, the chief occupies 
the focus of this theory. The person of the chief stays at the top of the pyramid. He has 
three main functions: 1) organizing intra-tribal economy such as allotting pastures, 
determining migration routes, coordinating migrations of the tribe, 2) settling disputes 
within the tribe, 3) representing the tribe and safeguarding its benefits in relations with 
other tribes or states.111 These functions also constitute the factors that lead to the 
emergence of leadership in a nomadic society. Namely, the need to allocate key sources, 
the establishing and regularizing of routes of pastoral migration, the need of certain 
order, the need for defense, the struggle for the livestock, pastures, and arable lands, 
migrations and wars, the desire of certain groups of nomads to subdue others, 
particularities of relations and interactions with the outside sedentary world requisite the 
accumulation of power in one hand.112 The sources that the chief derives his power from 
are closely related to the cohesive forces that holds tribesmen together. As is already 
mentioned, one of those cohesive forces is genealogy.   
  Lindner calls attention to another significant means of social solidarity in tribal 
organizations: common interest. As many other anthropologists, he regards genealogy as 
an “idiom or charters that nomads use to explain their history and politics”113, but never 
                                                 
109 For a case study among Qashka’i Tribe in southwestern Iran see. Beck, “Tribes and the State in 
Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, p. 193. 
110 Barfield, p. 157. 
111 See for the case of Basseri, for example, Barth, pp. 75-76. 
112 Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, p. 148-9. 
113 Rudi Paul Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 
24, no. 4, 1982, p. 696. 
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a map of real blood bonds. He notifies that the existence of mid-level gaps in tribal 
descent lines allows expansion and contraction114 of the number of tribesmen through 
grafting on new members.115 Kinship, as idiom, reinforces tribal cohesion.116 But the 
real factor pulling the members of tribe is common interest.117 Common interest, in 
addition to the external factors, determines the strength, size, and the life of a tribe.118 
Furthermore, it is a cohesive force providing an inclusive model, says Lindner, which 
can explain rapid growth of tribes such as the Mongols and the Ottomans. In the Mongol 
and Ottoman case it is supported by raids and predation.119 Hence, the chief draws his 
power mostly from his success in retaining the common interest of tribesmen in 
                                                 
114 This was recognized long ago by Ibn Khaldun. He writes in his monumental work, The Mukaddimah, 
as follows: “It is clear that a person of certain descent may become attached to people of another 
descent… Such a person comes to be known as having the same descent as those to whom he is attached 
and is counted as one of them… Family lines n this manner continually changed from one tribal group to 
another…”. See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, trs., Franz Rosenthal, 
abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, New Jersey: Princeten University Press, 1967, p. …….. For an 
analysis of fluctuating nature, variability, and inclusiveness of lineage system and descent lines in 
nomadic societies see also Roger Gribb, Nomads in Archeology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991, pp. 53-54.  
115 Khazanov puts it as follows: “At the same time genealogies ideologically enable many groups of 
nomads smoothly to incorporate and adopt outside groups into their own ranks, without making any 
essential structural change. It could be supposed that ideological amnesia, which has been recorded among 
many nomads, is partly to be explained by the fact that it facilitates genealogical assimilation”. See 
Khazanov, p. 143. 
116 Khazanov also indicates the use of genealogy in providing a bond for all the members of a given 
society in the notion of common descent. See. Khazanov, p. 140.  
117 Lindner, p. 697. 
118 If we look at a contemporary case, namely Basseri Tribe, Barth records, “camps, oulads and sections 
seek out the strong chief and submit to him; from him they obtain better protection and by him their 
interests are best safeguarded. A “tribe” among South Persian nomads is a political concept; its unity is not 
ethnic, but depends on its allegiance to a chief. The process whereby ethnic complexity persist in the 
tribes, and whereby rapid changes in their relative and absolute sizes take place, can now be better 
understood. Any imbalance between tribes in the effectiveness of centralized authority stimulates an 
extension of the stronger centre’s claims to authority, and a voluntary flow of commoners from the weaker 
to the stronger centre.”. Barth, Nomads of South Persia, p. 85. Luis Beck comes out with similar results 
for Qashka’i Tribe. He says, “Tribal organization involved dynamic processes and could be created and 
enhanced as well as weakened an abandoned. Tribal groups expanded and contracted. Small tribal groups 
joined larger ones when, for example, the state attempted to restrict access to resources or foreign power 
sent troops to attack them. Large tribal groups divided into small groups to be less visible to the state and 
escape its reach. Intertribal mobility was a common pattern and was part of the process of tribal formation 
and dissolution.” See Luis Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, in 
Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 191.  
119 Lindner, p. 698. 
 45 
providing vast pasturelands and organizing fruitful predations on the one hand and in 
mediating internal disputes and in acting as a fulcrum120 between tribe and external 
powers, on the other.   
Ira Lapidus additionally calls attention to religious charisma as an internal 
uniting factor, especially among segmentary Arabic tribes. But he carefully distinguishes 
the very nature of segmentary Arabian tribes and hierarchical Turko-Mongolian tribes, 
as do others, and points out the fact that religion came at a secondary stage in the history 
of the latter. “It helped consolidate the identity of khanates, hordes, and oymaqs but does 
not seem to have played critical role in their origin.”121 He also delineates the ex post 
facto legitimization function of genealogical lineages. For him, genealogical factors may 
have played critical roles in small participation kinship units, or in theoretical self image, 
but they were not significant in the actual organization of larger movements. The 
principal constituent governing the tribal organization in larger scales was the formation 
of predatory war bands. It was only after a series of successful lootings that the leader of 
the tribe could gain real power and the number of his fellow tribal warriors would 
rapidly increase.122  
Other factors which deeply influence both the power of the chief and the nature 
of tribal organization are external ones (such as the role of state and neighboring tribes; 
the proximity of frontiers, cities, and trade routes). Nomadic tribal society is not self-
sufficient especially in cultural and economic terms. They need and are dependent on 
their sedentary neighbors. Tribal system combines political autonomy with cultural and 
                                                 
120 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 700. 
121 Lapidus, p. 34; for another view attributing to religion secondary importance in Inner Asian tribal 
organizations see Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: Inner Asian Perspective”, p. 170. 
122 Lapidus, p. 29. 
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economic dependence on non-tribal societies.123 Thus, the effects of external changes are 
usually direct and deep in tribal societies. Tapper, for this reason, puts primary emphasis 
on external forces as main variables determining the emergence of central leadership in a 
tribe.124 William Irons also, as many other anthropologists, underlines external relations 
as primary determining parameter in tribal polity. As he has put it, “Among pastoral 
nomadic societies hierarchical political institutions are generated only by external 
relations with state societies and never develop purely as a result of the internal 
dynamics of such societies.”125 Thomas Barfield, furthermore, examines Inner Asian 
Turko-Mongolain tribal organizations ad he also comes up with a similar conclusion.126  
To sum up, the response of tribal society to the internal and external needs 
appears on the basis of genealogy. As Lindner has already put it, “The ideology which 
bounded the tribesmen together in a communality of thought and emotion was, then, 
kinship. Binding them together for action was the chief, whose position evolved as a 
result of the shared interests of the tribesmen and the strength of the external 
pressure.”127       
 
 
 
                                                 
123 Gellner, “The Tribal Society and its Enemies”, p. 442. 
124 Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle 
East”, p. 66. 
125 William Irons,  “Political Stratification among Pastoral Nomads”, in Pastoral Production and Society, 
Cambridge, 1979. 
126 “…such tribal societies (vast majority of whom engaged in pastoral nomadism in distant and large 
territories with low population density and relatively undifferentiated economy) could not support large-
scale political structures with their own resources; nor was there any pressing need for much supratribal 
cooperation to organize the nomadic pastoral economy itself or to handle internal political affairs beyond 
what could be provided by segmentary opposition. When large-scale organization did emerge, it arose to 
deal with surrounding sedentary states.” See Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: Inner Asian 
Perspective”, p. 166. 
127 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 700.  
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2.1.3. Bureaucracy vs. Face-to-face Relations 
One of the most prominent institutes that differentiates states from tribal organization is 
bureaucracy. A tribal chief does not need a specialized class of scripts in order to 
regulate and govern the issues of his tribe. The government of tribe works mainly on 
oral and kinship basis. Barth gives one striking example from the Basseri Tribe. As he 
writes in his ethnological study on this tribe, which became one of the classics in the 
field, “communications from the chief are relied on word of mouth via messengers – a 
service to which any Basseri may be deputed.”128 The function of professional script 
class however, ıs not confined into merely its organizational support, which makes it 
possible to govern vast areas and huge populations. It totally changes the nature of 
relations in public sphere and of the functioning state apparatus. Instead of the person of 
the chief, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order in a 
bureaucratized governmental system. Bureaucracy shifts relations from a personal to 
impersonal basis. In a tribe, not only the daily commitments of sub-tribal groups but also 
the very vital issues relating to the internal and external affairs of the whole tribe, such 
as the distribution of pasturelands, the decision on raiding when and where etc., are 
managed via personal relations and ties such as kinship, comradeship, and slavery. 
Incorporation of bureaucracy by a professional trained script class curbs, however, the 
influence of personal ties and augments the role of legal norms, abstract rules, and the 
law, which are by definition impersonal129.  
                                                 
128 Barth, p. 76.  
129 Max Weber, The Theory of Social end Economic Organization, trs., A. M. Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, New York, London: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 
329-330. 
 48 
Furthermore, the office, an impersonal source of obedience, emerges via abstract 
rules and laws. In such a system the person occupying an office could not exercise any 
power stemming from himself, but he exercises the power of his office. The web of 
offices and the rules regulating these offices requires, of course, a certain technical 
training and education, which creates, as a result, a specialized group. This bureaucratic 
administrative staff, though nominally being dependent to the ruler, to the sultan in the 
Ottoman case for example, de facto masters the functioning of the governmental 
apparatus. Among them what gains prominence is, as Max Weber has put,  
…the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality, ‘Sine ira et studio’, 
without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The 
dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal 
considerations. Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment; that is, 
everyone in the same empirical situation.130 
 
What create fundamental differences between tribal administration and 
bureaucratic state administration, at the micro level, are, perhaps, the written documents. 
It is clear that the adoption of written modes of communication was intrinsic to the 
development of more wide-ranging, more depersonalized, and more abstract systems of 
government; at the same time, the shift from oral intercourse meant assigning less 
importance to face-to-face situations.131 In a tribal organization, which barely uses 
documents, the media through which orders are transmitted is aural, which is, by 
definition subjective, personal, and humanlike. One does not need any special training or 
education in order to use aural media. Another important feature of this media, which 
also has significant influence on the nature of tribal organization, pertains to its 
durability. The life of sound finishes as soon as it appears. What lasts after a sound’s 
                                                 
130 Weber, p. 340. 
131 Jack Goody,  The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 
(first published 1977), p. 16. 
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emergence is nothing but its image in the memories of the people that heard it. Hence, 
rules and regulations have rarely a long life in tribal organizations. Rather it is a 
dynamic and flexible one, dissolving and restructuring successively.  
Bureaucratic state organizations, on the other hand, attribute little functionality to 
oral transmission, where the main media of order transmission is written documents.  
Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, even in 
cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory.132 Written documents, 
which are, by definition, formal, impersonal, and artificial, require a specific trained 
group who can write and understand them. Furthermore they provide ground for long-
lasting rules, namely laws, and, consequently, long-lasting social organizations. That 
means stability, cementing the social structure as much as possible, determining and 
delimiting the position and status of every group or class in the society, and forcing them 
to stay in their predetermined place. It is obvious enough that such a realm could be 
attractive for peasants, who look for stability and security before all, but not for nomads, 
for their life completely based on the principle of mobility and freedom.     
 
2.1.4. The ‘Compact Community’: Individuality vs. Communality 
Nomadic tribal organizations are mainly composed of close-knit communities. In his 
influential book The Open Society and Its Enemies, a work devoted to the study of 
aspects of detribalization in the ancient world and of retribalization in the modern world, 
Karl Popper uses, for such societies, the term ‘closed society’, which has a biological 
unity and does not function by way of abstract relations like ‘open society’133. It is to be 
                                                 
132 Weber, p. 332. 
133 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 
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shown, for the purpose of the present study, that there exist three kinds of relationships 
of the individual, which must be of the primary concern in determining the structural 
basis of community. These are (a) interpersonal relations within a group, (b) the 
relationship between individual and group as a whole, (c) and the relations of individual 
with other groups or members of other groups, which appears to be relatively weak in 
traditional close-knit societies. The density, strength, and nature of these three kinds of 
relationships have been considered among those factors chiefly responsible to shape the 
group structure and identity.  
If to consider society not just as a set of individuals but also as a network of 
values, norms, beliefs surrounding an individual and merging him/her into the social 
body, all the elements of the network between individuals constitute the bases of 
interpersonal relations. In other words, one might regard society as a plasmatic entity, 
whose constituents are not just particles (correspond to individuals in this analogy) but 
also mucus that holds particles together. It is by the strength of this interpersonal 
network that a group can attain a distinct being for the most part independent from the 
individuals and has a certain imperative power on its members. When the social norms, 
values, cultural premises, and religious dogmas, which are social by nature, gain 
prominence, then there would be little room for personal choices of behavior.134 In this 
perspective, hence, it appears that the stronger the cohesive forces within group, the 
                                                 
134 One striking result of this compact social structure appears in conversion to a new religion. Just like 
other issues individual can not decide to change his religion. Because, this is such an issue that must  come 
up as a result of collective consensus. But, as a rule, it is usually the leader of a group who makes that sort 
of decision and is followed by other members. The crucial point here, however, is that since the 
conversion was a collective act, an individual could hardly internalize the dogmas and cannons of a new 
religion, but only superficially imitate. What he practiced would be nothing than his old beliefs under the 
polish of new faith. This point, however, needs further analysis, which will partly be done in the next 
chapters.      
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weaker individual freedom;135 the social structure, the ‘social facts’ and the individual’s 
duty toward society are overemphasized and at the same time restrict personal wills and 
feelings. It has been known since the path-breaking works of Emile Durkheim that once 
a community emerges as a social body, then it has a certain power over its members.136 
“There is something different in this power: it goes beyond the power one individual 
may have over another; the channel of influence of one person over another can not 
account fully for the effect of various group members on each other. There is something 
in the group as an entity which in itself is a source of power.”137 Though being available 
in all social groups, this power of community as a distinct entity over individuals reaches 
its climax in close-knit societies.  
For the purpose of my analysis, hence, I will focus on the socialization, or 
reversely individualization process which takes places on the basis of interpersonal aura 
versus individual dichotomy.138 The close-knit compact societies see the individual as an 
incomplete part of society, who could never survive without social environment, which 
is for the most part true in its own context. There appears a high-degree of communality 
                                                 
135 One should not disregard the role of informal commitments in the enforcement of group solidarity. As 
Back put forward “conversation within the group will establish an unspoken base of understanding, a 
frame of reference, that is a source of strength for group members. For many attitudes, values, and beliefs 
that can not be checked objectively, group members are dependent on the agreement of those who are 
members of those intimate groups.” They have also been called ‘family resemblances’; something in 
common but hard to determine distinctively. See Kurt W. Back, “Small Groups”, in Social Psychology, 
Sociological Perspectives, edited by Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner, New Brunswick, London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1990, p. 339.  For further reading on ‘family resemblances’ see J. S. Bruner, A 
Study of Thinking, New York: Wiley, 1956.  
136 Durkheim sees society as a ‘fact’, which imposes itself on individual and constrains his/her behavior. 
See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, p. 239. For further reading on a critical 
review of Durkheim’s fundamental propositions on social construction see Gene A. Fisher and Kyum Koo 
Chon, ”Durkheim and the Social Construction of Emotions”, Social Psychology Quarterly, vol.52, no.1, 
Special Issue: Sentiments, Affect and Emotion, March, 1989, pp. 1-9.  
137 Back, p. 338. For a wider reading see also D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Group Dynamics, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1968. 
138 It should be noted, however, that ‘socialization’ is loaded with some special connotations in my 
context. I am employing this word to express the dissolving of individual into a social aura, or at least 
his/her attaching to the social body in a proper way.               
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in tribal or sub-tribal societies because of two major reasons that reinforce intra-tribal 
cohesion: one pertains to economic base and the other comes from the very nature of 
nomadic mode of life. In terms of economy, the fundamental productive base of 
nomadic society is formed by a pastoral mode of subsistence, in which the ownership 
relations are quite different from that of sedentary societies. The economic relations in 
nomadic societies are based on two important foundations: private ownership of 
livestock and corporate ownership of pastures.139 So, above all, corporate ownership of 
pastures forces nomads to act and behave collectively.140 Although every family has its 
own properties, such as herd, tent, several tools etc., it is not sufficient to stand alone. As 
Roger Cribb has made the point clear, though being autonomous in terms of decision 
making and disposal of some sources, “pastoral household can not stand alone.” 141  It 
needs other households to fulfill the full economic cycle and migratory operations. Thus 
communal ties are more advanced with regard to sedentary societies. And these 
communal ties usually, if not always, are based on kinship and affinality.142  
 In addition to economic constraints, the very nature of nomadic life also forces 
individuals to knit to one another - at the first stage between the members of family and 
                                                 
139 Barth observed in the Basseri case that the pasturelands of each tira and oulads, that are intermediary 
sub-tribal units, are assigned by the chief. A member of oulad has by birth the right of grazing on the 
pastures of his oulad without any limitation. The movements of man is restricted by the limits of oulad or 
section with whom he shared inherited pasturelands. But in the limits of pastureland of oulad he is totally 
free to move from one camp to other. See Barth, Nomads of South Persia, pp. 54-60. For a broader 
analysis of ownership relations in nomadic societies see Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, pp. 
123-25. 
140 For an analysis of ‘collective behavior’ see Dennis Brissett, “Collective Behavior: The Sense of 
Rubric”, The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 74, no.1, 1968, pp. 70-78.  
141 Roger Cribb, Nomads in Archaeology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 39. 
142 Furthermore, nomadic families are relatively small and that the workforce required by the household is 
not only insufficient for the labor, but is subject to seasonal variations as well. As a rule, Khazanov says, it 
is impossible, or at least very difficult, for one nomadic household of average prosperity to accomplish a 
complete productive cycle on its own. Thus cooperation within a group by families is necessary. 
Consequently, economic structure endorses, or arguably enforces, social solidarity and collective actions 
in nomadic communities. See Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, pp. 130-31. 
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then between families. The Nomadic mode of life is devoid of physical constraints, such 
as quarters and districts that would hold community together and organize it. Since the 
physical environment of nomads is not fixed, they had to invent abstract means to fulfill 
this function, which is usually nothing but kinship. As Barth put it for the Basseri, 
patrilineal and affinal ties function as prominent means of social solidarity and 
cooperation; and they appear to be the most effective in establishing political bonds 
between tents.143  Khazanov calls them ‘primary kin groups’. He affirms that “alongside 
families there were always primary kin groups. Members of the agnatic core of the latter 
frequently called themselves ‘sons of one father’ although in reality more than just 
brothers were included in this core. In this instance the word ‘father’ was used in the 
sense of ‘a very close ancestor’.”144 One other uniting factor, Barth adds, forming a 
herding unit with other tents that have common interest and harmony in thought and 
practice.145  
Consequently, individual existence and development, in terms of both societal 
and introspective means, is inhibited by strong interpersonal group relations. One might 
regard these societies, as pointed above, a plasma-like entity in which individuals, 
though come into sight in a certain identifiable degree, are merged into the social total. 
Hence, in a tribal-nomadic society the individual can barely act independently from the 
                                                 
143 Barth, p. 32. 
144 Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, p. 129. 
145 Barth, p. 35. One may add the problem of security as an additional factor obliging nomads to live in a 
close-knit, compact structure. They have no opportunity to built citadels or rampart around their camps or 
tents. Being dispossessed of any physical protective barriers, they are continuously vulnerable to any 
attack, banditry, or robbery. This physical situation leads them to form compact and cohesive social 
entities. The primary bonds that supply this cohesive force come from primarily kinship ties and from 
collaboration, which is based on common interest. Barth, for example, stresses the important outcomes 
that originates from vulnerable situation of nomads to any attack and argues that the psychological and 
social outcomes of the security problem must be examined in rather a wider plane, frame, and context. He 
says, for example, the excessive fear of thieves among Basseri is reminiscent of witchcraft beliefs in many 
aspects. See Barth, p. 47. 
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community to whom he/she belongs. It is of primary importance to notice that this 
narrowness in the sphere of individual freedom is not limited merely to the economic or 
social aspects. One might well argue that individual has a very limited sphere of liberty 
in intellectual, mental, and the religious level in nomadic societies as well.146  
This is not just a lack of ‘freedom’, however, but a lack of psychic development 
that would lead to the introspective contemplation and the strengthening of individual 
consciousness as well. Of course it is due to first and foremost the external constraints 
surrounding individual. Before all, in such societies, social relations and the basis of 
social structure rest primarily on face-to-face interactions, through which not the words 
and meanings are shared, but the sentiments as well. Face-to-face relations stick 
individuals sentimentally together and tighten cohesive bonds. Due to the fact that in 
such a communication, fundamentally different from that of through literal media, 
shared emotions and sentiments soon become cohesive forces holding individuals 
together. As Daniel Goleman puts it succinctly, “emotions are contagious.” 
Most emotional contagion is far more subtle, part of a tacit exchange that 
happens in every encounter. We transmit and catch moods from each other in 
what amounts in what amounts to a subterranean economy of the psyche in 
which some encounters are toxic, some nourishing. This emotional exchange is 
typically at a subtle, almost imperceptible level…We catch feelings from one 
another as though they were some kind of social virus. We send emotional 
signals in every encounter, and those signals affect those we are with…We 
unconsciously imitate the emotions we see displayed by someone else, through 
an out-of-awareness motor mimicry of their facial expression, gestures, tone of 
                                                 
146 Barth also calls attention to the passive situation of individual in relations with other societies, such as 
other tribes or sedentary societies. He attributes the primary affect to the institution of centralized 
chieftainship, for it constitutes the only media of contact with others. According to him, “The institution of 
centralized chieftainship effectively insulates the tribesmen from contacts with their environment and 
establishes them as a centripetally oriented linguistic community, with a few contacts with neighboring 
friendly tribes.” Thus, they form a close society, with hardly interactions in terms of culture, belief, 
tradition etc. with other societies. See Barth, Nomads of South Persia,  p. 133.   
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voice, and other nonverbal markers of emotion. Through this imitation people re-
create in themselves the mood of the other person.147    
 
It is of primary significance to realize that, the faith, in such compact societies, is 
regarded as a social issue rather than an individual experience. Or more moderately 
saying, the former component of the faith is far more dominant than the latter. Every 
individual experiences, of course, spiritual and mystic sentiments during religious rituals 
or prayers. But he/she has little change, even capacity, to choose, to determine, and to 
clarify in what he/she believes in and how. Rather these have been evaluated as socio-
religious processes. Once a belief appears and becomes a social fact, in Durkheimian 
terminology, it encompasses the whole society and forces every individual to believe in. 
On the other hand it becomes one of the abstracts constraints in nomadic society which 
strengthens the solidarity.148 
                                                 
147 Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, New York, Toronto, London, Sydney, Auckland: Bantam 
Books, 1995, p. 115. Moreover, emotions are, at least of their considerable part, social by nature, since 
they are originated in social relations. For further reading on social constructionist approach to emotion 
see, for example, Gene A. Fisher and Kyum Koo Chon, ”Durkheim and the Social Construction of 
Emotions”, Social Psychology Quarterly, vol.52, no.1, Special Issue: Sentiments, Affect and Emotion, 
March, 1989, p.1.  
148 The binding and imperative force of such a sentimental structure, in which individuals placed and could 
not get rid of, in a close-knit society, is, indeed, far beyond the perception of modern man. But a closer 
scrutiny would unveil how conscious and unconscious social structure surrounds an individual and heavily 
influences both emotional and intellectual activities of an individual. Very striking examples from African 
natives, which shows enormous power of social premises on individual in such societies, are presented by 
Walter B. Canon. Canon recites a number of deaths recorded among natives by European travelers and 
missioners, all caused by sorcery and magic. Among them one example would be sufficient for my 
purpose. The occurrence was recorded by Merolla in his voyage to Congo in 1682. A young negro lodged 
in a friend’s house at night. The friend had prepared for their breakfast a wild hen, a food strictly banned 
by a rule which must be inviolably observed by the immature. The young fellow demanded whether it was 
a wild hen. When the host said ‘no’, he ate of it heartily and proceeded on his way. A few years passed on 
and the two met again. The old friend asked the younger man if he would eat a wild hen. He answered it is 
strictly forbidden. Thereupon he began to laugh and told what he ate few years ago at the breakfast was a 
wild hen. On hearing this news the negro immediately began to tremble, so greatly was he possessed by 
fear, and in less than twenty-four hours was dead. See Walter B. Cannon, “’Voodoo’ Death”, American 
Anthropologist, vol.44, no.2, 1942, p. 170.  
It is obvious from this example that, in such societies, in which the individual is tightly stitched and 
sticked into the social body, once the ties with social environment are torn apart so little is left, as little as 
not enough to sustain the life. In other words, dissolution of the social personality inevitably demolishes 
individual personality in such a degree that the psyche could not maintain internal harmony of both limbic 
and psychological body, for the social environment as support for moral is of vital priority. It might be 
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One other substantial basis subsidizing cohesive bonds rests on the means of 
communication, which are merely oral. Marshall McLuhan has pointed out that the 
social bonds holding such societies together as a whole are principally the product of 
speech, drum, and ear technologies149. As Walter Ong expresses, orality fosters 
personality structures that are more communal and externalized, and less introspective 
than those common among literates. That is because of the fact that, writing and reading 
are solidarity activities that throw the psyche back on itself, while oral communication 
unites people in groups.150 Among traditional societies, the only way of transmission of 
knowledge is face-to-face communication, which appears usually to be more than 
knowledge transmission, but sentimental interaction as well. When a speaker is 
addressing an audience, for example, the members of audience normally become a unity 
                                                                                                                                                
useful to remind here that, Durkheim also sought the roots of suicide in modern societies in the collapse of 
social orientation of individual in the social construction. See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in 
Sociology, trs., J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, New York: Free Press, 1951. Charles Blondel, a 
physiological psychologist, writes, in the footprints of Durkheim, again on the members of modern 
societies, “The individual does not invent his religion, his morals, his aesthetics, his science, his language, 
the patterns of his everyday behavior….his manner…and finally his thought or his conduct. All these he 
receives ready-made, thanks to education, to instruction and language, from the society of which he is 
part. These include, to be sure, conscious activities; but they are mental states whose most essential 
characteristics are distinguishable from the purely individual states.” Cited in Maurice Halbwachs, 
“Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind”, The American Journal of Sociology, vol.44, no.6, 1939, 
pp. 814-815   
Levi-Strauss, touches also upon this social backgrounds of sorcery, which is, indeed, the real source of 
power that determines the efficacy if magic, and points out three complementary aspects, which firmly 
constitute the belief in magic: the sorcerer’s belief, victim’s belief, and the group’s belief. (See Levi-
Strauss, Structural Anthropology, p. 168.)  Levi-Strauss underlines that the power of the sorcerer comes 
from the community’s belief in his power, which is so deed-rooted and so wide-spread in whole society 
that nobody could be immune of it. (For broader analysis of Levi-Strauss’ ideas on shamanism and sorcery 
see Jerome Neu, “Levi-Strauss on Shamanism”, Man, New Series, vol.10, no.2, 1975, pp. 285-292.) At 
the cost of oversimplifying one can argue that magical thoughts are a category of collective thought. (See 
S. J. Tambiah, “The Magical Power of Words”, Man, New Series, vol.3, no.2, 1968, p. 202.) It is this 
point that makes it possible to be effective the magic. Since same patterns of thought and structures of 
belief are deep-rooted in all individual minds, when a magician pretends to initiate superstitious powers 
than psychic states of all individuals become ready to accept any kind of affect. Furthermore, The 
inclination of all minds in same direction creates a synergy which fosters to take the introspective attitudes 
of individuals to perceive supernatural beings, or to pretend as if perceived. 
149 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1962, p. 8. 
150 Walter J. Ong,, Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word, Routledge: London, 1989, p. 69. 
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having in someway of another a common consciousness and common feeling. The result 
of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a 
common whole, so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life 
and purpose of the group.151 As Ong has well put in a summary statement “the spoken 
word forms human being into close-knit groups.”152 Actually, as will be evaluated in the 
next part, the very nature of cognitive and intellectual process and psycho-dynamics of 
orality compel sociality, while inhibiting introspective solitary activities and throwing 
the psyche back on itself. 
 
2.2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM 
TRIBAL CHIEFTANCY TO BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE 
In the Middle East, Iran, and Anatolia, states were usually founded by nomads and 
governed by sedentary bureaucrats.153 Ibh Khaldun classified civilizations as either 
desert (Bedouin) civilizations found in outlying regions and mountains, in hamlets (near) 
pastures in waste regions, and on the fringes of sandy deserts; or the sedentary 
civilization as found in cities, villages, towns, and small communities that were 
protected and fortified by walls.154 The history of the Middle East seems to be the 
history of the interaction between these two types of civilizations. Today Ibn Khaldun’s 
viewpoint is still valued and shared by many scholars. Ernest Gellner, for example, 
                                                 
151 E. H. Cooley, Social Organization, New York, 1909, p. 23. 
152 Ong, p. 74: Jack Goody also indicates the role of intimate face-to-face association and co-operation in 
fostering group feeling.  See Jack Goody,  The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990 (first published 1977), pp. 15-16.  
153 For an overview of the nature of the states and the role of tribes in constructing or destructing states in 
the Middle East see Philips S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State formation in the Middle 
East, California University Press, London, I.B. Tauris, Berkeley, 1991.  
154 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, trs., Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited 
by N. J. Dawood, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 141-42. 
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along with many other historians and anthropologists, repeats the same idea: “The 
history of the Islamic Middle East can, from its very beginnings, be written to a large 
extent in terms of the interaction between the nomads and the sedentary and urban 
population.”155 
The formation process of the state and its continuance might well be evaluated in 
context of this interaction.  Following Ira Lapidus156, in the Ottoman case, I am inclined 
to analyze the interaction between tribal nomads and sedentary elements within the 
context of the state formation process in three phases: 1) the organization of conquest 
movements leading to state formation in a stateless region or to the reorganization in 
regions that already have a weak state, 2) the transformation of conquest states into 
routinized states or imperial governments, and 3) the relation of routinized or 
institutionalized empires to the tribal population within or outside their boundaries. 
In the first stage, the influx of tribal people into a state region erodes the 
established fiscal and administrative system.157 Military incursions finally lead to the 
complete destruction of the existing state, and to the establishment of tribal 
confederacy.158 The conquering rulers, however, sooner realized the necessity of 
                                                 
155 Ernest Gellner, “Introduction: Approaches to Nomadism”, The Desert and the Sown; Nomads in the 
Wider Society, Cynthia Nelson, ed., Berkeley, 1973, p.1 
156 Ira M. Lapidus, “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph 
Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University 
of California Press, 1990, p. 28. 
157 For further reading on how nomadic tribes threaten established sedentary economy and social order see 
Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, Oxford, 1989; Patricia Crone,  
‘Tribes and states in the Middle East’, JRAS 3, 1993, pp.353-76; Fredrik Barth,“A General Perspective on 
Nomad-Sedentary Relations in the Middle East”, The Desert and the Sown, 1973, 11-21; Bradburd, 
Daniel, “The Influence of Pastoral Nomad Populations on the Economy and Society of Post-Safavid Iran”, 
Nomads in the Sedentary World, Anatoly M. Khazanov and Andre Wink, eds., Surrey: Curzon Press, 
2001. 
158 For an succinct analysis of the state formation process from tribal confederacies in Inner Asia and Iran 
see Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, in Philip S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1990, pp. 153-182. Also consider Ernest Gellner, “Tribalism and the State 
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bureaucracy in order to maintain political order, and the need to preserve settled subjects 
in order to secure and develop the economic basis of the state; thus they should protect 
sedentary civilization from the extortion of the nomads. For example, when the Seljuks 
first entered Khorasan and conquered Nishapur in 1038, their leader, Toghril, had 
difficulty in restraining his brothers from looting the city. He had to point out that as the 
conquerors and new rulers of the land, they were in fact now destroying their own 
property.159 
On the one hand, this second stage marks the beginning of the conquered 
civilization’s conquest of the conquerors. On the other hand, it also marks the beginning 
of the alienation of the founder tribal elements to the governing elite, which was now 
heavily influenced by local sedentary elements, and to the newly emerging bureaucracy. 
Realizing the fact that ‘tribal nomads can easily demolish the governmental apparatus of 
the state, but can never construct it’, the new ruling dynasty, though itself was of tribal 
nomadic origin, does not hesitate to take stand in favor of sedentary institutions.  
The following example is one of many in the history of Middle East, Inner Asia, 
and Iran. Forty years after conquering Iran, the Mongols were just beginning serious 
attempts at regular government during the reign of Ghazan Khan (1195-1204). His 
appeal to his fellow tribesmen underscores their serious inability to comprehend even 
the simplest principles of governing a sedentary state: 
I am not on the side of the Tazik ra’iyyat (Persian peasant). If there is any 
purpose in pillaging them all, there is no-one with more power to do this than I. 
                                                                                                                                                
in the Middle East”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the 
Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, 109-126; Lawrence 
Krader, “The Origin of the State among the Nomads of Asia”, Pastoral Production and Society, 
Cambridge, 1979, 231-4. 
159 C. E. Bosworth, “The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)”, in J. A. 
Boyle, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, The Seljuq and Mongol Period, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 
20-21. 
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Let us rob them together. But if you wish to be certain of collecting grain and 
food for your tables in the future, I must be harsh with you. You must be thought 
to reason. If you insult the ra’iyyat, take their oxen and seed, and trample their 
corps into the ground, what will you do in the future?...The obedient ra’iyyat 
must be distinguished from the ra’iyyat who are our enemies. How should we 
not protect the obedient, allowing them to suffer distress and torment at our 
hands.160 
 
Thomas Barfield rightfully interprets these attempts by Mongol rulers as the 
beginning of the discrimination between the ruling elite and ordinary tribal basis of the 
conquest: “The concern for establishing a proper administration was only the first of 
many cleavages between Turko-Mongolian elites and ordinary tribal peoples in the 
Middle East.”161  
This ongoing process replaces conquering tribal forces by a new governmental 
organization, which is essentially derived from the previous establishment and supplies 
administrative-scribal cadres to the governmental organization. The same process also 
routinely supplements the tribal army with newly recruited forces, expected to be more 
dependent on, and thus loyal to, the ruler. In short, tribal elements are continuously and 
routinely being curbed in the newly establishing order.162 As Lapidus observes, this was 
the case for the Umayyad-‘Abbasid, Fatimid, Almoravid, Almohad, Saljuq, Ottoman, 
and Safavid regimes.  
Umayyad military policy aimed for almost a century at replacing the general 
levée en masse of the Arabs with selected client forces, whether Arab, Berber, 
Iranian, or Soghdian…The ‘Abbasids first depended on the Arab troops who had 
                                                 
160 This speech is reproduced in I. P. Petrushevsky, “The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Il-
khans”, in J. A. Boyle, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, The Seljuq and Mongol Period, Cambridge, 
1968, p. 495. 
161 Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, in Philip S. Khoury and 
Joseph Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: 
University of California Press, 1990, p. 174. 
162 On the evaluation of Islamic polity, especially on creation of slave origin soldiers to protect the 
stability of the order and the power of ruling dynasty against conqueror tribal nomads see Patricia Crone, 
Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; 
John Masson Smith, Jr., ‘Turanian Nomadism and Iranian Policies’, Iranian Studies, 11, 1978, pp. 57-81.  
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brought them to power, then on Persian regiments from the Transoxanian 
principalities, and finally on Turkish slave forces…Similarly, the Umayyad and 
‘Abbasid caliphs displaced Arab shaykhs in favor of administrators drawn from 
the former Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies. The tax-collecting bureaus 
were used to strengthen the financial and political position of the caliphate at the 
expense of Arab tribal elites. Thus, the ‘Abbasids replaced the Arab rule with a 
kind of coalition government in which Eastern Iranian, Iraqi, Nestorian, and 
Baghdadi Shi’i scribes shared power with Turkish military slaves.163   
 
At the end, conflicts arose between the founder nomadic tribal elements and the 
ruling elite about the basic concepts of state administration and fiscal measures such as 
levying taxes, restraining rights on, and the usage of land, imposing certain 
governmental duties, since tribal nomads were unfamiliar to such restrictions.164 Putting 
their tribal colleagues to one side, the rulers adapted themselves to their economic and 
political environment, mastered sedentary administration, and adopted sedentary cultural 
values.165 As the tribal confederacy transmute into a sedentary-bureaucratic state, most 
tribal nomads found themselves in opposition, attempting to maintain their autonomy 
either by inhabiting in frontier zones or by forming confederations in opposition to the 
existing state structure which surrounded them.166      
To sum up, it is reasonable to argue that the emergence, development, and 
destruction of Middle Eastern States were a process that intrinsically included the 
struggle between tribal-nomadic and sedentary-urbanized elements. The dilemma was 
that although military superiority of nomads led to the destruction of a malfunctioning 
state and a replacement was constructed in its place, the lack of social stratification, 
                                                 
163 Lapidus, p. 35 
164 For the case of Shahsevan in Iran, see, for example, Richard Tapper, Đran’ın Sınır Boylarında 
Göçebeler, çev. F. Dilek Özdemir, Đmge Yayınları: Ankara, 2004. See especially pp. 457-505 where 
Tapper discusses the resistance of tribal Shahsevans against the measures of Iranian government. For 
another case, again in Iran, see James J. Reid, “The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722”, 
Iranian Studies, 11, 1978, 117-143;  Tribalism and Society in Islamic Iran, 1500-1629, Malibu, California, 
1983; Lois Beck, The Qashka’i of Iran, New Haven, 1986.  
165 Barfield, p. 171.  
166 For analysis of the cases in Turko-Mongolian occupations in Iran see Barfield, pp. 172-177.  
 62 
bureaucracy, and sophisticated social organization prevented the nomads from 
governing the state. Once founded, the state immediately needed sedentary bureaucracy 
to maintain its existence. So, although being the founders of the new state, nomads have 
been always pushed out of the sphere of state authority. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
TURKOMANS AND THE OTTOMANS: FROM SYMBIOSIS TO 
ALIENATION 
 
 
 
The Dream of Osman Beg 
Kendülerün aralarında bir aziz şeyh [Shaykh Edebali] var idi. Hayli 
kerāmeti zāhir olmış idi. Ve cemi’ halkun mu’tekadıyidi. Adı reviş idi. 
Ve illa dervişlik bātınındayidi. Dünyesi ve ni’meti, davarı çok idi. Ve 
sāhib-i çerağ ve ‘alem idi. Dāyim müsafirhānesi hāli olmaz idi. Ve 
Osman Gāzi dahī gāh gāh gelür idi. Bu azize konuk olur idi. Osman 
Gāzi kim uyudı, düşünde gördi kim bu azizin koynundan bir ay 
doğar, gelür Osman Gāzi’nin koynuna girer. Bu ay kim Osman 
Gāzi’nin koynuna girdüği demde göbeğinden bir ağaç biter. Dahī 
gölgesi ālemi dutar. Gölgesinün altında dağlar var. Ve her dağun 
dibinden sular çıkar. Ve bu çıkan sulardan kimi içer ve kimi bağçalar 
suvarur ve kimi çeşmeler akıdur. Andan uyhudan uyandı. Sürdi, 
geldi. Şeyhe habar verdi. Şeyh eyidür: “Oğul, Osman! Sana muştuluk 
olsun kim Hak Ta’ālā sana ve neslüne padişahlık verdi. Mubārek 
olsun” der. Ve “benüm kızum Malhun senün helālün oldı” der.167   
 
 
                                                 
167 APZ, p. 95. 
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One may safely argue that the process outlined above is, for the most part, applicable to 
the Ottoman history as well. The people that founded the Ottoman Principality in north 
western Anatolia at the beginning of the fourteenth century were, without doubt, 
nomadic or semi-nomadic and organized on tribal basis.168 Osman Beg and his father 
Ertuğrul Gazi were nothing but tribal chiefs.169 Contemporary sources strongly suggest 
that Osman was illiterate.170 The effective religious leaders of the masses were popular 
sufi shaykhs, rather than ulemā, as in the later periods.171 So, the beylik (principality) 
was founded on the basis of tribal organization by overwhelmingly illiterate semi-
nomadic people. One should not disregard, however, that even during the very early 
years of the beylik, there were ‘small-scale’ educated men, who were called ‘fakı’ in 
contemporary sources, helping Osman and Orhan Beg in establishing and developing the 
                                                 
168 The portraits of early periods in the early Ottoman chronicles clearly support this argument. Consider 
Neşri, Kitab-ı Cihannûma, eds. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen, Ankara, 1995; Aşıkpaşazāde, 
Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, yay. Nihal Atsız, in his Osmanlı Tarihleri, Đstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947 (From 
now on APZ); Oruç Beğ, Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, F. Babinger, Hannover, 1925; Tevârih-i Al-i Osman ( Die 
altosmanische anonymen chroniken), nşr. F. Giese, Breslau, 1922; Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese 
Neşri, haz. Nihat Azamat, Istanbul, 1992,; Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512), haz. Necdet Öztürk, 
Đstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, 2000. Among contemporary studies on the foundation of the 
Ottoman state see Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, trl. Gary Leiser, New York, 1992; 
Halil Đnalcık, " The Question of The Emergence of The Ottoman State", International Journal of Turkish 
Studies, 2, 1980, 71- 79; ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol.I, eds., P. 
M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; Cemal Kafadar, Between Two 
Worlds, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1995. For the latest account see Heath W. Lowry, The Nature of 
the Early Ottoman State, New York: State University of New York, 2003.  
169 Fuat Köprülü states that the early Ottoman sultans were simple Turkoman chieftains too ignorant to 
understand the subtler issues of the religion. See Köprülü, “Anadolu’da Đslâmiyet”, Dârülfünûn Edebiyat 
Fakültesi Mecmûası, 5, 1338 (1922), pp. 403-404.  
170 In the famous passage of Aşıkpaşazāde, after hearing Edebali’s fortunate interpretation of his famous 
dream, Osman bequeaths some land to a dervish called Kumral Dede. Upon the dervish’s demand for a 
piece of paper to document his rights, Osman replies; “Do I know writing so that you want  paper? I have 
a sword left to me from my ancestors; let me give it you. And let me give you also my dipper. Let they be 
the sign of your rights to this land.” See APZ, p. 95. For a recent authoritative study on Osman Beg, see 
Halil Đnalcık, “Osman I”, DIA, vol. 33, 443-53.  
171 We know from contemporary sources that after the cruel repression of Babāī revolt by Anatolian 
Sejukid forces, Babāī dervishes, who were preaching a ‘heterodox’ folk Islam intermingled with intense 
mysticism, fled into the western frontiers, especially into Ottoman territories. (For the Babāī revolt see 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Babāīler Đsyanı, Đstanbul, 1996) Early chronicles mention number of them such as 
Edebali, Abdal Musa, Kumral Abdal, Abdal Murad, Geyikli Baba.  
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very early forms of the Ottoman administrative apparatus.172 One might regard these 
fakıs ‘the early pioneers’ of high Islamic ulemā, who would accumulate in the Ottoman 
capitals as the state grew up.  
As a matter of fact, soon after its establishment, during the reign of Orhan – or 
back to the time of Osman -, the Ottoman dynasty turned in favor of sedentary life.173 
The madrasa-educated ulemā began to accumulate in Bursa, the capital city of the 
Ottoman Beylik. By taking positions in newly established madrasas or filling the posts 
of qādi-ship (jurist), they not only propagated orthodox Islam but also took positions of 
responsibility in the emerging bureaucratic structure, which soon transformed tribal 
bases of Ottoman beylik into a traditional Islamic state with well-organized bureaucratic 
governmental apparatus and a centralized army.174 However, this inevitable 
                                                 
172 See, for example, Halil Đnalcık, “Osman I”, DIA, vol. 33, p. 446; “Orhan”, DIA, vol. 33, p. 383.  
173 Rudi Paul Lindner traces the first occurrence of the Ottoman tendency towards sedentary life back to 
the time of Osman. According to Lindner, pastoralism was no more profitable on the limited plateaus of 
Bithynia. Rather there were fertile soils to cultivate. Therefore, the Ottomans realized the advantage of 
sedentarization. They even established new towns such as Yenişehir. As the economy of the tribe shifted 
towards a sedentary base, so did the military technology. Orhan created an infantry corps. “With a settled 
economy and a growing infantry at the core of their army, the Ottomans now had to adapt themselves to 
the demands of administering a sedentary and sedentarizing society. In such circumstances the chief 
became a settled ruler, and the nomadic tribesmen had ultimately to settle or accept secondary position. 
The institutions of the tribe ultimately broke down before the complex task of bureaucratic record keeping 
and urban organization.” See “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
vol. 24, no. 4, 1982, p. 709. In this article Lindner focuses on three aspects of the transformation from 
tribal-nomadic basis into sedentary-state organization: domestic economy, military resources and 
practices, and political organization. He shows that since the ecology was unsuitable the Ottomans took 
advantage of sedentarizing and agricultural economy. Consequently, the change of economic base also 
brought a change of military base and political structure. See Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval 
Anatolia, Bloomington, 1983, pp. 29-34.   
174 The early Ottoman administrative apparatus was established by religious scholars. They were 
responsible both for religious issues and state bureaucracy. Among those scholars were the members of 
Çandarlı Family who had a great effect on the fate of the Ottoman state. The first known member of the 
family was Çandarlı Kara Halil, also known as Hayreddin who was appointed as qādi of Bilecik by 
Osman. During the time of Orhan he became the qādi of Iznik and Bursa. After the establishment of 
kazaskerlik post during the time of Murad I he was appointed as the first kadiasker of the Ottomans. Later 
he became the vizier of Murad I. From then Çandarlı Hayreddin’s offspring held power up until the 
conquest of Constantinople in 1453. After which Mehmed II changed the balance in favor of slave origin 
viziers. For a biography of this influential scholar family see Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir 
Ailesi, Ankara: TTK, 1988. Following the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed II executed his grandvizier 
Candarlı Halil -since he advocated diplomacy rather than attacking the city- and thus ended the Çandarlı 
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transformation of the beylik from tribal organization to bureaucratic state brought serious 
problems in terms of the relationship between the state and the nomadic tribal elements.   
The direction of the political development in the Ottoman center was to push the 
nomadic elements of the beylik out. This was not just a power-play of two opposing 
parties. Rather the conflict was deep-rooted in the socio-cultural structures and mental 
habits of two different irreconcilable social groups. Roughly speaking, the first party 
consisted of the ‘Ottoman Elite’ and its adherents: those educated literate people settled 
in the prominent cities, especially in capital cities such as, Bursa, Edirne, and 
Constantinople, and the illiterate residents of cities and villages who attached themselves 
to this elite.  The other party, on the other hand, was the ‘Turkoman rural populace’, the 
tribal nomadic population alien to literacy and bureaucracy. A recognizable 
incompatibility, which continuously fed the differentiation process between these two 
segments of society, was actually imposed by the birth of the new state. This 
incompatibility was actually nothing but the inevitable fate of almost all Middle Eastern 
states.  
In the famous dream of Osman, the six century long Ottoman Empire was 
represented as a tree sprouted from his navel, the shade of which compassed the 
world.175 Later traditions identified this tree with a plane tree probably because of its 
greatness and long life-span. Lindner, after citing the dream that “…Beneath this shade 
(of tree) there were mountains, and streams which flowed forth from the foot of each 
mountain. Some people drank from these running waters, others watered gardens, while 
yet others caused fountains to flow” truthfully concludes: “The arboreal image with its 
                                                                                                                                                
hegemony on the Ottoman bureaucracy. See Halil Đnalcık, Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler, Ankara: TTK, 
1987, pp. 132-136.   
175 See APZ, p. 95. 
 67 
firm roots and branches protecting fountains and gardens reflects the purpose of the 
Ottoman enterprise. The Ottomans represented peace and plenty for settled agriculture, a 
bucolic promise made explicit in the dream. The Ottoman dream was for farmers and 
merchants, not for nomads.”176 Taking into consideration the fact that the dream was a 
retrospective fabrication and prospective vision of the fifteenth century Ottoman 
intelligentsia, Lindner’s conclusion seems accurate. Already alienated from the 
Turcoman milieu, which once founded the beylik, their attitude towards nomadic 
elements was not limited to despising but also they forced them to transform.  
 
3.1.  SOCIO-RELIGIOUS SET UP OF THE EARLY OTTOMAN SOCIETY 
In his article analyzing the emergence of the Ottoman state, Đnalcık stresses two factors 
that led the Ottoman success: 1) the westward exodus of Turkomans177 and 2) the 
successful use of gazā ideology as a tool to attract Turkoman tribal warriors, as well as 
offering enough booty or doyum.178 Indeed, these two factors were closely 
                                                 
176 Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 37-38. 
177 The continuous Turkoman immigration into Anatolia took the form of an exodus first by the collapse 
of Byzantine defense after the battle of Manzikerd in 1071 and second under the Mongol pressure from 
the East in the period 1221-60. The overwhelming majority of Turkish immigrants were pastoral nomads, 
whose social organization was simply based on tribal means. Following Anatolian Seljuks’ second defeat 
against Mongols in 1261, the Turkoman tribes in western Anatolia enjoyed large-extend autonomy, which 
gave rise to Turkoman principalities. See, for example, Halil Đnalcık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, 
Expansions and Economic Role”, in his The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. 
Essays on Economy and Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry 
of Culture Joint Series Volume 9, 1993, pp. 97-9; “Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, Osmanlı, ed. Güler 
Eren, Ankara, 1999, pp. 37-8. (The English translation of this long article is published as “Periods in 
Ottoman History, State, Society, Economy”, in Ottoman Civilization, I, edited by Halil Đnalcık and Günsel 
Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, 31-239); “Osman I”, DIA, p. 446. According to 
Speros Vryonis, the intensive Turkoman influx led to extensive nomadization of Anatolia during the 
period 1071-1300. See Speros Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, Berkeley, 1971, 
p. 184.  
178 See Halil Đnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", International Journal of 
Turkish Studies, 2, 1980, 71- 79. Also consider his ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, The Cambridge 
History of Islam, Vol.I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; 
“Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, Osmanlı, ed. Güler Eren, Ankara, 1999, 37-116. The decisive role of 
westward Turkoman migration in the socio-political developments in the thirteenth-century Anatolia was 
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interconnected, for the tribal warriors in the gāzi-mercenary bands were recruited among 
immigrant pastoral nomads. Đnalcık rightly underlines that the population pressure under 
Turkoman immigration fundamentally changed the social set up, and consequently 
political formations, on the Seljukid frontier.179 The point of eminence for the purpose of 
the present study here is that the immigrant Turkish population, which constituted the 
social base of the Ottoman Principality, was overwhelmingly pastoral nomads. Hence, 
the structure of the early Ottoman society was predominantly tribal in character.180    
Indeed, Aşıkpaşazāde’s famous classification of the immigrant population 
(müsāfir) in Rum, that is the Turkish inhabitants of Anatolia in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth century, succinctly reflects both the major components and the basic nature of 
the early Ottoman society, or in a broader sense, the Turkish society of the thirteenth- 
and fourteenth-century Western Anatolia, and Rumelia as well. As is well-known, he 
divides the contemporary society into four groups: the Holy Warriors (Gāziyān-ı Rum), 
the Craftsmen (Ahiyān-ı Rum)181, the Popular Mystics (Abdalān-ı Rum), and the Women 
                                                                                                                                                
first scholarly discussed by Fuat Köprülü. See his The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, especially pp. 27-
70.  
179 See Đnalcık, , "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", p. 71. Đnalcık also calls attention 
to the feudal structure of the early beylik, which is closely connected to the tribal character. See Halil 
Đnalcık, “Osman I”, DIA, p. 445.  
180 This was first throughly suggested by Fuat Köprülü in his famous work The Origins of the Ottoman 
Empire (New York, 1992) and then attained wide-spread acceptance among scholars. The tribal character 
of the early Ottoman society and state was recently re-evaluated by Rudi Paul Lindner, who additionally 
employed some anthropological findings on the nature and organization of ‘tribe’. See his “What was a 
Nomadic Tribe?” and Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia. It was further refined by Cemal 
Kafadar in his Between Two Worlds.  
181 The role of akhis in the foundation of the Ottoman beylik, with a quite exaggerated tone, was first put 
forward by Friedrich Giese. (“Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches”, Zeitschrift für 
Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete, 2, Leipzig, 1924, 246-71.) Mélikoff argues without providing sufficient 
evidence that akhis co-operated with qizilbashes and hence became subjected to persecution during the 
reign of Selim I. She repeats in her several articles a verse of Hata’ī as the source of this argument.  
   Şahun evlādına ikrar edenler, 
   Ahīler, gāziler, abdallar oldı. (The whole poem is published in Tourkhan Gandjei, Il Canzoniere di Sāh 
Ismā’īl Hata’ī, p. 15) See, for example, her “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, p. 33. Before Mélikoff, however, 
Fuat Köprülü made reference to this verse in order to prove the connection between abdals and Safavid 
movement. See Fuad Köprülü, “Abdal”, Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, 
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(Bacıyān-ı Rum).182 There is no need for a detailed explanation of these four groups 
here, for it has already been analyzed by several scholars.183 There are two points, 
however, to be made for the upcoming investigation: 1) the social roots of these four 
classes, as Aşıkpaşazāde clearly stated, rested upon the tribal nomadic Turkoman 
population that had recently immigrated to Rum, 2) although they worked hand in hand 
with the early Ottoman Begs in founding the state (indeed they were principal, or one 
may think of the only, ally of the dynasty in early periods), all these four groups 
gradually lost their eminence on the socio-political scene parallel to the rise of the 
bureaucratic state; and finally they faded away.184 Meanwhile, the continuance of these 
                                                                                                                                                
sayı:1, Đstanbul, 1935, pp. 30, 36. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in this verse Hata’ī calls three of the 
four groups that Aşıkpaşazāde classified in the fourteenth century Anatolian society. On the other hand, 
contemporary sources hardly make reference to akhīs among the foremost leaders of the Qizilbash 
movement in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. One of very few examples is an archival 
document, namely a letter of Murad Aqqoyunlu, the son of Ya’kub Beg, written shortly before the Battle 
of Çaldıran and reporting the situation in Iran. When reporting Shah Suleyman (Shah Ismail’s brother)’s 
attack on Tabriz, in the winter of 1513-4, Murad Beg says that the city was defended by Helvacıoğlu and 
Tamgacı Ahî Ali oğlu Hâce Pir Ali. See TSA, document E 5591. This document is published in Jean-
Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Deux lettres de Murad Akkoyunlu (Etudes turco-safavides, VII)”, Journal 
Asiatique, CCLXXIII, 1-2, 1985, pp. 174-5. In order to escape from this persecution many akhis took 
shelter in the Bektashi Order. During this time many rituals, especially the rite of initiation, and doctrinal 
premises of akhis infiltrated into Bektashism. See Irène Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, trs. 
Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, pp. 151-7; “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: 
les Bektaşis”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, 
Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 124-5.  
182 APZ, p. 237. For Bacıyān-ı Rum, see Mikāil Bayram, Fatma Bacı ve Bacıyan-ı Rum, Konya, 1994.  
183 See, for example, Fuad Köprülü, “Abdal”, Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, çıkaran M. Fuad 
Köprülü, sayı:1, Đstanbul, 1935, 23-56; The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 82-108; Halil Đnalcık, 
“Dervish and Sultan: An Analysis of the Otman Baba Vilāyetnāmesi”, in his The Middle East and the 
Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Bloominghton, 1993, 19-36; Irène Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden 
Gerçeğe, trs. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999. (The original work is published in 
French: Irène Mélikoff, Hadji Bektach, un mythe et ses avatars, Leiden: Brill, 1998.); Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, 
"Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des Abdalan-ı Rum",The 
Ottoman Emirate(1300- 11389), Institute for Mediterranean Studies, ed.by Elisabeth Zachariadou Crete 
University Press,1993, 14 5-158; Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Marjinal Sûfîlik: Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. 
Yüzyıllar), Ankara: TTK, 1999; Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar), 3. baskı, 
Đstanbul: Tarih Waqfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003; Ahmet Karamustafa, God’s Unruly Friends. Dervish Groups 
in the Islamic Later Period 1200-1550, Salt Lake City, 1994. 
184 Parallel to the consolidation of the Ottoman regime many influential social and religious corporations 
of Anatolia disappeared gradually. Among them were Akhis, Baciyan-i Rum, and Abdals. All these 
‘anarchic’ and heterodox groups found asylum in the Bektashi Order, which proved the approval of the 
regime. Ottoman administration, on the other hand, regarded it useful to canalize this unstable social 
energy into the Bektashi Order so that they would pose less threat to the socio-political order of the 
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groups merged in time and turned into the opposing parties to the central government, 
which was structured and developed on the centralistic and bureaucratic basis, 
assimilating all independent or autonomous political entities under sultanic sovereignty. 
According to the changing conditions, these ‘heterodoxided’ groups either offered 
alliances to rival powers, to which they felt affiliation (which was the case in Anatolia) 
or became marginalized within well-defined boundaries (which occurred mainly in 
Thrace and Balkans).185   
We know that during the foundation period, Ottoman begs established a warm 
relationship, which was based on mutual benefits and support, with popular sufi milieu, 
hence accordingly with the Turkoman population. Following the stern repression of the 
Babāī revolt by Anatolian Seljuks (1240), the adherents of this socio-religious 
                                                                                                                                                
Ottomans. See Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, 
Albany : State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 107; Irène Mélikoff, “L’Origine sociale des 
premiers ottomans”, p. 133; “Recherche sur une Baciyan-i Rum: Kadincik Ana”, in her Au banquet des 
quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p.35. 
185 During the fourteenth century and after, there appeared two different currents: on one side a group of 
Turkomans progressively settled, adjusting to the sedentary life and city centers. On the other side, we see 
those who led nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life and remained in the Anatolian countryside. They 
were strongly attached to the ancient Turkish traditions and their ‘islamization’ was not accomplished yet. 
(See Irène Mélikoff, “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 128.) The first group drew 
together in tekkes and fused under the umbrella of Bektashi Order, while the second group constituted 
qizilbashs. (See Irène Mélikoff, “Recherches sur les composantes du syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi”, in her 
Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 
p. 45 (This article first published in Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata, Napoli, 1982, 
379-95.); “L’Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème”, pp. 8-9; 
“Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences”, in her Au banquet des quarante. 
Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 41; “Les Fondements de 
l’Alevisme”, pp. 14-15.) Fuat Köprülü called the latter, which was later called ‘Alevi’, ‘country Bektashis’ 
for their creed and practices were a rough form of that of the Bektashis. (Fuat Köprülü, “Les origines du 
Bektachisme. Essai sur les développement historique de l’hétérodoxie musulmane en Asie Mineure”, in 
Actes du Congrès international d’histoire des religions, Paris, 1925; Influence du chamanisme turco-
mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans, Istanbul, 1929.) Mélikoff calls attention to another difference 
in the historical developments of the two groups, namely the different ethnic influences to which they 
have been submitted: “the Bektashis were influenced by the Balkans, the Alevis by the people of eastern 
Anatolia: Iranians, Kurds and still others.” See Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition 
and Its Consequences”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, 
Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 44.  
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movement found shelter in the frontier zones186, which was, on the one hand, relatively 
immune to the interference of the Seljuk authority, and on the other, devoid of well-
established institutions of the ‘orthodox’ Islam.187 Thus, most of those Babāī dervishes 
flocked to Ottoman territory.188 The most famous representatives of this group, such as 
Shaykh Edebāli, Geyikli Baba, Abdal Musa, Kumral Abdal, and Seyyid Ali Sultan, had 
all grown up in the Ottoman territories within the Vefāī-Babāī tradition.189  
As intermediaries between society and the ruling elite, Vefāī-Babāī shaykhs 
might be regarded as chiefly responsible for enhancing the popularity of the Ottomans. 
                                                 
186 See, for example, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the 
Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam, ed. G. M. Smith and C. W. 
Ernst, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1994, p. 244; "Oppositions au soufsme dans l'Empire ottoman au quinzieme et 
sezieme siecles", Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, eds. F. 
de Jong, B. Radtke, Brill, Leiden 1999; "Quelques remarques sur le role des derviches kalenderis dans les 
mouvements populaires dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVle siecles ", Osmanlı Araştırmaları, III, 
1982, p. 70 ; “Aleviliğin Tarihsel, Sosyal Tabanı Đle Teolojisi Arasındaki Đlişki Problemine Dair”, Tarihî 
ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’de Alevîler, Bektaşîler, Nusayrîler, Đstanbul: ĐSAV, Ensar Neşriyat, 
1999, pp. 391-2; Babaîler Đsyanı, genişletilmiş ikinci baskı, Đstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1996, p. 210; 
Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences”, in her Au banquet des 
quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 43.  
187 See Fuat Köprülü, “Anadolu’da Đslâmiyet”, in F. Babinger-F. Köprülü, Anadolu’da Đslâmiyet, haz. 
Mehmet Kanar, Đstanbul: Đnsan Yayınları, 1996, pp. 63-5 (This article is originally published with the 
same title in Dârülfünûn Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası, IV, 1922-3, 291-303.); Paul Wittek, The Rise of 
the Ottoman Empire, ...; Halil Đnalcık, “The Emergence of ..”; Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de 
Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, Turcica, VI, 1975, pp. 35-42.  
188 Halil Đnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, Osmanlı, ed. Güler Eren, Ankara, 1999, p. 38; 
“Orhan”, p. 384.  
189 For the adherence of these dervishes to Babāī movement see Fuat Köprülü, “Anadolu’da Đslâmiyet”, 
pp. 63-4; Đnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, pp. 41, 48-50; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Ahilik ve 
Şeyh Edebalı: Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluş Tarihi Açısından Bir Sorgulama”, Đslâmî Araştırmalar, 12/3-
4, 1999, 225-230; “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth 
Centuries”, p. 244; “Babaīler Đsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da Đslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve 
Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, Belleten, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 138-9. These Vefāī-Babāī dervishes are 
usually called “Abdalān-i Rum”. This term is first used by Elvan Çelebi for the followers of Baba Đlyas, 
but systematically put by the fifteenth century Ottoman historian Aşıkpaşazāde and then gained wide-
currency among writers. (See Elvan Çelebi, Menâkıbu’l-Kudsiyye Fî Menâsıbi’l-Ünsiyye. Baba Đlyas-ı 
Horasânî ve Sülâlesinin Menkabevî Tarihi, haz. Đsmail E. Erünsal-Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Ankara: TTK, 
1995, 166; APZ, p. 237.) Köprülü regards abdals simply as a group of dervishes affiliated to Babāī 
movement and distinguished with their latitudinarian way of religious life. (See, for example, his “Abdal”, 
“Abdal”, Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, Đstanbul, 1935.) One of Köprülü’s students, Abdülbaki 
Gölpınarlı, on the other hand, deems abdals as a separate and independent mystical order (tariqa). (See his 
Yunus Emre ve Tasavvuf, Istanbul, 1961, pp. 17-50.) However, at the end both arrive at the same 
conclusion that they constituted the origin of Bektashi Order.  
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On the other hand, reliable sources clearly show that early Ottoman rulers bequeathed 
quite a large amount of lands as mülk and waqf to these shaykhs in return for their 
service.190 Fuat Köprülü explains this co-operation between these groups and the 
dynasty with cultural and mental resemblance.191 According to Mélikoff and Ocak, 
however, it was rather a result of the pragmatic policy of the early Ottoman begs, who 
aimed to channel the energy of these groups for the good of the state and thus, both 
saving the society from their disturbance and keeping them under control.192  
In any case, the religious atmosphere in the early Ottoman lands, and in other 
frontier principalities as well, was not fully affected by so called orthodox-sunni Islam 
or madrasa Islam; quite the contrary, it was largely dominated by a popular-sufi form of 
Islam.193 The testimony of Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited most Anatolia 
                                                 
190 For a systematic analysis of this mutual-benefit cooperation between state and sufi milieu, see Ömer 
Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı Đmparatorluğunda bir Đskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu olarak Vakıflar ve 
Temlikler; Đstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zaviyeler”, Vakıflar Dergisi, II, 1942, 279-
304. For a case study on Seyyid Ali Sultan, who not only worked for extending the legitimacy of Ottoman 
rule but also personally fought in the conquest of Rumelia, see Rıza Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) 
ve Velâyetnâmesi, Ankara: TTK, 2007.  
191 Köprülü, “Anadolu’da Đslâmiyet”, pp. 61-66.  
192 Irène Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme 
turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 115-8; “Le Problème 
Kızılbaş”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: 
ISIS Press, 1992, p. 32; “Le problème Bektaşi-Alevi: Quelaues dernières considérations”, in her Au 
banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 74; 
Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, 
p. 246. Ocak supports his argument by the example of Orhan Beg’s continuous surveillance on Kalenderî 
groups. See, in addition to the mentioned article, his Babaîler Đsyanı, p. 211; Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda 
Marjinal Sûfîlik: Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar), Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 119.   
193 Compare Halil Đnalcık, ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. I, eds., 
P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, p. 270. Two exemplary cases reflect 
how nomadic Turkomans perceived and practiced Islam. One is about Famous Geyikli Baba, who 
attended in the conquest of Bursa and some other places and received some waqfs from Orhan. It is 
recorded in the short hagiography of Geyikli Baba that once Orkhān Beg sent to Geyikli Bābā ‘two loads 
of arakı’ and ‘two loads of wine’ since he thought “Bābā was a mey-hor or wine lover.” Upon receiving 
the sultan’s presents, Geyikli Baba displays a keramet, or extraordinary deed. He says, “The Sultan sent us 
honey and oil!”. Then he orders his disciples to prepare a meal with this ‘honey’ and ‘oil’. The original 
text reads, “...merhum Orhan Padişah ‘baba mey-hordur’ deyu iki yük arakı ve iki yük şarap gönderüb 
Baba dahi yanındaki baba sultana cevab virüb padişah bize iki yük bal ve iki yük yağ göndermişler deyü. 
Bir kazan getürüb ateş yakdurub kaynatdırur ve içine pirinç koyub âlâ zerde olub getüren adam nazarında 
ve hem anın ile bu zerdeden padişaha gönderüb ve hem ateşte yanan ateşten biraz kor bir penbe içine 
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towns in the first half of the fourteenth century, reinforces this assumption. He reports, 
for example, in Balıkesir a mosque for Friday-prayer did not exist.194 As Irène 
Beldiceanu-Steinherr have already shown, the foundations of Orhan and Murad I, which 
are today known as the mosque of Orhan and of Murad, are not recorded in their 
waqfiyyes as a mosque but as a zâviye.195 Indeed, Aşıkpaşazāde’s account concerning 
deeds of early sultans clearly reflects the tendency in the Ottoman administrative, from a 
heterodox, Turco-nomadic principality to a classical Middle Eastern Islamic state 
affiliated to high Islamic culture or orthodox sunnism.196 Ocak states, even the sufi 
orders affiliated to the high Islamic culture such as Mevleviyye, Rifa’iyya, or Halvatiyya 
would come to the region after the consolidation of the Ottoman power, i.e. towards the 
                                                                                                                                                
koyub padişaha göndermiş. ...” See BOA, Ali Emiri classification, document no 1. The facsimile copy of 
this menâkıb is published in Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Marjinal Sûfîlik: 
Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar), Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 248-51.  Another example is from 
Karamanoğulları. After capturing Antalya castle, Karaman Beg (d. 1263) organized a drinking gathering 
(īyş ü işret), which is a strong custom in Turko-Mongolian and Persian tradition. Şikārī’s description here 
is very pivotal. He says: “Ezincānib, Karaman beylere destur virüb gendüsü tahsil-i mizaç için ... īyş ü 
işrete başladı.”. See Şikârî, Şikâri’nin Karamanoğulları Tarihi, edited by Mes’ud Koman, Konya: Yeni 
Kitab Basımevi, 1946, p. 32. As obviously seen in this expression, drinking gathering parties were 
regarded as an essential activity of the ruler through which he attains true nature. What is of primary 
interest here is that when the cupbearer (sāki) brings araki, the drink, to the banquet they first prayed (dua 
eyledi) before drinking. See Şikârî, p. 32. 
194 Đbn Batuta Seyahatnâmesi’nden Seçmeler, haz. Đsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 
Yayınları, 1999, p. 38.   
195 Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Recherches sur les actes des règnes des sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad 
I, Munich, 1967, pp. 127-30; “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de 
l’empire ottoman”, Turcica, VI, 1975, p. 37.  
196 According to Aşıkpaşazāde, Osman Beg delivered foods and clothes to poor people monthly. Orhan 
Beg carried on his father’s practice by institutionalizing it, i.e. establishing imārets. He also established 
zāviyes for dervishes. Murad I founded imārets, zāviyes, and also medreses and mosques. (We know, 
however, that the first medrese in the Ottoman principality was founded in Iznik under Orhan). Bayezid I 
established imārets, mosques and mescids, as well as a hospital (dārü’-şifa). Mehmed I founded a medrese 
and dispatched abounded gifts to the poor of Makka and Madina. Similarly, Murad II established imārets 
and medreses and dispatched gifts to the poor of Makka, Madina, Jerusalem. He also delivered money to 
descendants of the Prophet, seyyids. Mehmed II founded imārets, mosques, and medreses, and delivered 
abounded gifts to poor people, scholars, sufis, and other people in need. See APZ, pp. 230-3.    
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end of the fourteenth century or in the fifteenth century, although they had already 
appeared in western Anatolia, in the territories of Qaraman, Germiyan, Aydin etc.197 
Thus, during the formative period of the Ottoman principality the most dominant, 
if not only, religious group in the Ottoman territories were Vefāī-Babāī dervishes. Ocak 
observes two major reasons behind this: the geopolitical situation of the Ottoman 
principality and the socio-cultural structure of the population. First of all, the Ottoman 
Principality was geographically situated at the frontier and was in constant fight with 
Christian neighbors. Political mobility and continuous wars made this region unpleasant 
for above-mentioned classical high-Islamic sufi orders, which preferred tranquility and 
stabilization, as well as culturally high level circles. Secondly, the overwhelming 
majority of Ottoman population in the early period was composed of nomadic 
Turkomans, who were best audience of abdals, rather than cultured mystics or learned 
ulemā.198 As Ocak has put it, “A cette époque, c’est-à-dire au XIVe siècle, l’idéologie 
religieuse du beylicat ottoman reposait tout naturellement, en tant qu’un beylicat 
turcoman frontalier, sur une conception d’un Islam très simple, populaire, pas encore 
dominé par l’Islam dogmatique des medrese.”199 These dervishes not only preached 
                                                 
197 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des 
Abdalan-ı Rum", The Ottoman Emirate(1300- 11389), Institute for Mediterranean Studies, ed.by Elisabeth 
Zachariadou Crete University Press,1993, pp. 149-50. Ocak also adds the role of Mongol pressure towards 
the end of the thirteenth century, which pushed Turkomans to the most distant regions. The earliest 
Mevlevī lodge in the Ottoman territories is known to have been opened during the reign of Murad II 
(1421-1451) in Edirne. See Halil Đnalcık, The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600, London, 
1973, p. 201.  
198 The origin of this approach traces back to Köprülü, who first underlined the surveillance of ancient 
Turkish traditions in the folk Islam of Thirteenth and fourteenth century Anatolia. Köprülü indicated that 
among the nomadic, semi-nomadic, or recently settled peasant Turkish population most of the pre-islamic 
beliefs and practices continued under the varnish of Islam. The leaders of popular religion, called “dede” 
or “baba”, for example, resembled very much the ancient Kam-ozan. See Fuad Köprülü, “Abdal”, Türk 
Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, Đstanbul, 1935, p. 37; Influence du 
chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans, Istanbul, 1929.   
199 Ocak, "Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des Abdalan-ı Rum", 
p. 158.  
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mysticism among the early Ottoman population but also took part, with their disciples, 
in the ‘gazā’ against the infidels as well. We know from contemporary sources that 
Abdal Musa, Geyikli Baba, Kumral Abdal and many others fought against Byzantine 
troops during the conquest of Bursa and other cities.200 
The sentiment and the attitude of the ‘heterodox’-sufi milieu is arguably best 
reflected in the hagiography (velâyetnâme) literature attributed to the leading figures of 
this milieu. Since these works are the products of collective memory rather than 
individual authors, one may easily recognize in their accounts the traits of shared 
sentiment and opinion of the whole community.  In other words, the legends attributed 
to the religious figures in the velâyetnâme genre are simply the stories either created or 
evaluated in the folk memory; hence they strongly reflect the sentiments and concerns of 
those people who maintained this tradition. Although the anonymous characteristics of 
such sources and their abundant superstitious accounts led historians to underestimate 
the historical value of velâyetnâme genre,201 for the purpose of my analysis, this is 
exactly the feature that enhances the credibility of these accounts, for they directly 
reflect the opinion and sentiment of a particular social segment,202 which was heavily 
influenced by tribal-nomadic traditions and inclined, parallel to the centralistic tendency 
in the Ottoman administration, to set apart from the ‘accepted re’āya model’ of the state. 
It is reasonable then to argue that the heroic stereotypes and the stories in these 
                                                 
200 For Geyikli Baba see Hilmi Ziya (Ülken), “Anadolu’da Dinî Rûhiyat Müşahedeleri: Geyikli Baba”, 
Mihrab Mecmuası, 13-14, 1340. 
201 For an analysis of velâyetnâme genre as source for history see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Kültür Tarihi 
Kaynağı Olarak Menâkıbnâmeler, Metodolojik Bir Yaklaşım, Ankara: TTK, 1997.  
202 As Ocak has already stated, most stories in these hagiographic accounts might be partly or fully 
fabricated. But it is exactly this fact that augments their historical value, because in this way the stories, 
patterns of narration, the portraits of sheikhs are all vehicles that convey the desires, sentiments, and 
idealized models to be imitated by the people. See Ocak, pp. 33-34. 
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hagiographies203 genuinely reflect the religious, political, and cultural stand of those 
people who produced these legendary accounts and then transmitted them through 
generations.  
 Modern anthropological studies showed that verbatim memorization, and thus 
verbatim transmission of knowledge, is inapplicable in the oral tradition. Rather, in the 
oral milieu, every utterance and performance is, to a certain extent, a re-creation of the 
story. During the utterance, the singer or folk-teller is inevitably constrained by the 
surrounding conditions; and as a natural result adds some new elements to the story 
while omitting some others. In other words, every utterance injects some new elements 
to the story from the preset social set up or ambiance. Fundamentally differing from the 
nature of written documents, all chains of transmission in the oral milieu, hence, to a 
certain extent, alters the previous version of the story. Once written down by a compiler, 
however, this alteration process stops and the story freezes.204 Likewise, when we look 
                                                 
203 It is intended here the so called Alevi-Bektashi velâyetnâmes. Other legendary accounts narrating 
mystic leaders of sunni spiritual orders are out of the scope of this study.  
204 Among a number of studies see especially Thomas Butler (ed.), Memory. History, Culture and Mind, 
Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989; M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 
1066-1300, London, 1979; D. W. Cohen, “The Undefining of Oral Tradition”, Ethnohistory, vol. 36, no. 
1, Ethnohistory and Africa, 1989, 9-18; Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989; Susan A. Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective 
Memory”, The American Historical Review, vol. 102, no.5, (Dec., 1997), 1372-1385; James Fentress and 
Chris Wickham, Social Memory, Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992; R. Finnegan, Literacy and 
Orality: Studies in the Technology of Communication, Oxford, 1988; Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance 
and Social Context, Cambridge, 1977; Amos Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical 
Consciousness”, History and Memory, 1, 1989, 5-26; Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, “Collective Memory- 
What is it?”, History and Memory, 8, 1996, 30-50; Jack Goody, “Mémoire et apprentissage dans les 
sociétés avec et sans écriture : La transmission du Bagré”, L’Homme, 17, 1977, 29-52: The Domestication 
of the Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (first published 1977); The Power of 
the Written Tradition, Washington, London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000; Jack Goody and I. P. 
Watt, “The Consequence of Literacy”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5, 1963, 304-345; D. 
H. Green, “Orality and Reading: The State of Research in Medieval Studies”, Speculum, vol.65, no.2, 
1990, pp. 267-280; Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, edited, translated and with an 
Introduction by Lewis A. Coser, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. (Translated 
from Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1952; and from La 
topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective, Paris: Press 
Universitaire de France, 1941.); Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy, The Technologizing of the Word, 
Routledge: London, 1989. 
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at a story of the velâyetnâme attributed to Hacı Bektaş, what we see is not the historical 
event that took place during the lifetime of Hacı Bektaş; rather these metaphoric stories 
convey to us the traits of thousands of utterances – traits of the sentiments, protests, 
concerns, ideological and religious stands, and desires of singers and their audience - 
which conducted them to the compiler.  
Among a number of accounts suffice it to refer to three exemplary cases from 
this genre. As is known well, most of the prominent religious figures who enjoyed 
spiritual authority on the Turcoman society of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
Anatolia were later adopted by Bektashi tradition. Moving away from this established 
acceptance, I shall have a closer look at the velâyetnâmes of three most exalted figures 
of the Bektashi tradition.  
The first one is the Velâyetnâme of Hacı Bektaş Veli, the attributed eponymous 
founder of the Bektashi Order. Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı surmises from a textual criticism of 
the velâyetnâme that the available text must have been compiled by Firdevsi towards the 
end of the fifteenth century.205 If this assumption is true, then the stories in the 
velâyetnâme evolved in the collective memory over two centuries.  
Even a cursory reading of the Velâyetnâme of Hacı Bektaş shows that the 
memory of the intrinsic liaison between the ‘heterodox’ milieu and the frontier culture - 
thus the early Ottomans - is strongly visible in the social memory of the late fifteenth-
century ‘heterodox’ circles. The velâyetnâme depicts Hacı Bektaş Veli as a saint not 
only approving the political career of Osman but also favoring him among many other 
                                                 
205 Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, “Vilâyet-nâme ne vakit ve kimin tarafından yazılmıştır”, in Vilâyet-nâme. 
Menâkıb-ı Hünkâr Hacı Bektâş-ı Veli, haz. Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, Đstanbul: Đnkılap Kitabevi, 1995, pp. 
XXVII-XXIX. (From now on Vilâyet-nâme). Later on, Gölpınarlı’s suggestion attained wide-spread 
acceptance among scholars.  
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Turkoman begs. On one occasion Osman comes to the presence (huzūr) of Hacı Bektaş, 
demanding his auspice and spiritual support. The latter, then, puts a cap, which was 
blessed by him, on the head of Osman and wrapped his own belt, which was again 
blessed, around Osman’s waist. Following some further actions symbolizing the 
transmission of this spiritual support to Osman Beg, Hacı Bektaş uttered,  
Seni din düşmanlarına havāle ettik. Senin başındaki tācımızı gören kāfirler 
kılıcına karşı duramasınlar, kılıçları seni kesmesin! Nereye varsan üst gel! 
Önünden sonun gür gelsin! Kimse senin soyunun sırtını yere getirmesin! Hünkār 
adımı sana bağışladım, senin soyunun adını bu adla ansınlar! Gün doğusundan 
gün batısına dek çerağın yansın! Rum erenleri bu makāmı birisine vermek istedi, 
her biri bir eri tuttu. Ben se yedi yıldır senin ve soyunun ruhlarını vilāyet 
kabzasında saklayıp durmadayım. Đşte geldin, nasibini aldın.206 
 
As clearly seen in the quoted passage, the velâyetnâme depicts Hacı Bektaş as 
the spiritual patron or protector of Osman’s temporal power. Another important notion 
to be noted here is that Hacı Bektaş sanctions the political authority of Osman Begs so 
that the latter attains a claim of legitimacy in the eyes of Turkoman mass. Consequently 
he gathers the warriors of Turkoman tribes under his banner. As will be delineated 
below, the same notion is repeated in other velâyetnâmes as well.  
                                                 
206 Vilâyet-nâme, p. 74.  
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The second prominent figure in the Bektashi tradition is Abdal Musa.207 
Although Abdal Musa spent his youth in the Ottoman territories and participated in 
‘holy wars’ among gāzis, the Velâyetnâme of Abdal Musa does not mention his 
activities in the Ottoman lands. Yet there are quite valuable passages narrating his 
relationship with gāzi-frontier culture, thus reflecting the attitude of his followers on the 
issue. The Velâyetnâme states, “…Then Abdal Musa came to a shore. He said, ‘Some 
soldiers are coming here. They are hungry. Let us prepare them some food.’ After one 
hour, a ship appeared and the soldiers arrived. When the soldiers saw the dervishes, they 
said, ‘Oh! There are abdals here’”208 After the abdals’ explanation of their shaykh’s 
intention to serve them food, the gāzis realized that there was only one cauldron of food, 
which shocked them since they were many. But Abdal Musa held a ladle and served all 
of them enough food. After witnessing this obvious miracle, the leader of the gāzis, 
Umur Beg came forward and said, “From now on you are our lord, please do not 
withhold your blessing from us!”209 Abdal Musa put a red head-gear on the head of 
                                                 
207 Abdal Musa is accepted as one of the great saints in Bektashi tradition. He holds the eleventh of the 
twelve stages (post) in the order, the ayakçı postu (footservant stage). He is dubbed “Anadolu’nun gözcüsü 
Abdal Musa Sultan” (the guardian/watchman of Anatolia Abdal Musa Sultan) in Bektashi literature.207 
(Bedri Noyan, “ Abdal Musa Hakkında”, Abdal Musa Sultan ve Velâyetnâmesi, ed. Adil Ali Atalay, 
Istanbul, 1997, p. 35.) Alevi societies, which perform religious ceremonies (cem) on Friday nights in 
winters and immolate in the name of Abdal Musa, show great respect to Abdal Musa even today. In Alevi-
Bektashi literature, there are many nefeses (poems) in which he is praised and mentioned as a great saint. 
The Tekke of Abdal Musa, which contains his tomb, is considered as one of the four greatest Bektashi 
tekkes and is visited by thousands of Alevi-Bektashis with religious aspirations. He is beyond doubt one of 
the most important shaykhs of the Bektashi Order and perhaps the one who first determined the 
fundamental pillars and principals of this spiritual path. Aşıkpaşazāde explains the connection between 
Abdal Musa and Hacı Bektaş as follows: “Hacı Bektaş accepted Hatun Ana as disciple and divulged his 
spiritual secrets to her. Than Abdal Musa came and became her disciple. He learnt the divine facts that are 
the spiritual secrets of Hacı Bektaş, from Hatun Ana. He then came to the Ottoman territory and 
participated in the holy wars (gazā). The person who was responsible for spreading the fame of Hacı 
Bektaş among the Ottoman soldiers and folk was none other than Abdal Musa.” See APZ, p. 238. For 
more information about Abdal Musa see Fuat Köprülü, “Abdal Musa”, Türk Kültürü, XI, 124, 1973, 198-
207. 
208 Abdurrahman Güzel, Abdal Musa Velâyetnâmesi, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 149. 
209 Ibid, p. 149 
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Umur and said, “From now on call him ‘Gāzi Umur Beg’. Let him be a gāzi. We hereby 
bestow him the rank of gāzi-ship.”210  
It is known that Umur Beg appeared as the champion of gazā, especially in the 
Aegean sea (guzāt fi’l-bahr), in the first half of the fourteenth century. It is to be 
delineated below that following the death of Umur Beg Ottomans became the champion 
of gazā. As clearly visible in the account of the velâyetnâme,  both parties, i.e. gāzis and 
abdals, beared quite warm sentiments towards each other.  Moreover, there appears a 
co-operation between two groups. The most interesting point to be made is, perhaps, that 
as was the case in the Velâyetnâme of Hacı Bektaş, here also the gazā activities and gāzi-
ship of Umur Beg, who represents the temporal authority in the story, were sanctioned 
by Abdal Musa, who represents the spiritual power. 
Furthermore, the support of Abdal Musa to gāzis is not limited to the spiritual 
and religious sanction. Following the request of Umur Beg, Abdal Musa assigned 
Kızıldeli (Seyyid Ali Sultan), one of his prominent disciples, to join Umur’s army –
possibly commissioned him to lead and arrange the religious affairs of the gāzis. Abdal 
Musa gave him (Kızıldeli) a wooden sword and said, “Now, go nowhere but directly to 
the Boğaz Hisar. Attack it! You will conquer it. After conquering it I will give you 
Rumelia, let no one would stand in your way and impede you!”211 
Seyyid Ali Sultan might be regarded the third important religious figure in the 
Bektashi tradition.212 He was not only a mystic dervish but also a gazi-warrior as well 
                                                 
210 Ibid, p. 149. 
211 Ibid, p. 149 
212 It is known from archival evidence that he, with his mystic companions, Seyyid Ali Sultan played a 
significant part in the Ottoman conquest of Thrace. He also played prominent role in the spread of Islam 
through Thrace and the Balkans. Nevertheless, it was not official sunni version of Islam, which would 
flourish especially in the sixteenth-century among Ottoman elite, that was preached by Seyyid Ali Sultan 
and his companions, but a latitudinarian, quite tolerant, and considerably rough mystic interpretation of 
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and was obviously involved in the conquest of Rumelia, which was materialized by ex-
Karasid and Ottoman troops. The velâyetnâme attributed to Seyyid Ali Sultan vividly 
pictures the close co-operation and similar religious stands of ‘heterodox’ dervish milieu 
and the early Ottomans. 
The hagiography, if to summarize briefly, narrates how the Thrace was 
conquered under the leadership of Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty companions. While 
Orhan was deep in thought seeking a way to pass through the Dardanelles and conquer 
the Thrace, they moved from Khorasan in order to realize the Ottoman Sultan’s dream 
which he had received by an order of the Prophet in dream. After first visiting Hacı 
Bektaş and receiving his spiritual guidance, Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty friends came 
to the Ottoman Sultan, who warmly welcomed them on his own right. They negotiated 
several plans and finally accepted the suggestion of Seyyid Rüstem Ghazi213, the closest 
                                                                                                                                                
Islam, which was wide-spread among laymen and vulnerable to non-Islamic influences. The religious 
propaganda successfully fulfilled by Seyyid Ali Sultan and his disciples paved way for the emergence of 
the Bektashi Order in the Balkans. Birge portrays the religious interpretation propagated by Seyyid Ali 
Sultan and other early mystics as the ‘Bektashi Way’. (See John K. Birge, The Bektashi Order Of 
Dervishes, London, 1937, p. 51.) For the purpose of this study, the primary concern is that these mystics 
were responsible for the shaping of religious understanding among laymen, especially among the 
Turkoman populace, by whom they were perceived as ideal religious personalities to imitate and followed 
enthusiastically. 
Seyyid Ali Sultan is, indeed, one of the most famous figures in early Ottoman history. Especially the 
writers interested in the Balkan conquests and Early history of the Bektashi Order or so called ‘heterodox 
Islam’ in the Balkans, somehow mention him. But paradoxically he is a very little known man due to the 
scarcity of sources about his life. His prominent role in the early history of the Bektashi order was first 
discerned by Birge, who used the velâyetnâme and some oral traditions he had heard in Bektashi circles. 
After Birge, many scholars touched upon Seyid Ali sultan’s role in shaping the Bektashi way of spiritual 
life and in the conquest of Balkans.  Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr wrote an article devoted to the deeds of 
Seyyid Ali Sultan. (Beldiceanu-Steinherr , “Osmanlı Tahrir Defterlerinde Seyyid Ali Sultan: Heterodox 
Đslam’ın Trakya’ya Yerleşmesi”, Sol Kol, Osmanlı Egemenliğinde Via Egnatia (1380-1639), ed. Elizabeth 
A. Zachariadou, çev. Özden Arıkan, Ela Güntekin, Tülin Altınova, Đstanbul: Tarih Waqfı Yurt Yayınları, 
1999, 50-72. ) Before this article Beldiceanu, actually, presented her first findings at a conference.  But 
only the abstracts of the proceedings of this conference were published. (Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La Vita 
de Seyyid ‘Ali Sultan et la conquête de la Thrace par les Turcs”, in Proceedings of the 27th International 
Congress of Orientalists, 1967, ed. D. Sinor, Wiesbaden, 1971, s. 275-6.) For the latest publication of the 
Velâyetnâme of Seyyid Ali Sultan, text and analysis, and discussions of the sources see Rıza Yıldırım, 
Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007.  
213 Seyyid Rüstem Gazi is not mentioned in any other contemporary sources. Although a certain 
Karamanlı Rüstem, who resembles Seyyid Rüstem Gazi, can be seen in early chronicles, a close scrutiny 
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friend of Kızıldeli amongst the forty and is mentioned in the hagiography as much as 
Kızıldeli himself. From then on Kızıldeli and his ghazi-dervishes led, organized and 
achieved the Ottoman conquests in Thrace. When the campaign was completed they 
settled down in various places and founded their hospices (tekkes), where they spent the 
rest of their lives in mystical experiences and religious propaganda. The hospice of 
Kızıldeli still exists in Didymoteichon (Dimetoka) in contemporary Greece. The 
velâyetnâme depicts Seyyid Ali Sultan, along with his gāzi-dervish companions, and 
early Ottomans not only as close allies but also as having eminent familial resemblances 
in terms of religious and intellectual affairs. Furthermore, like Hacı Bektaş and Abdal 
Musa, he is also introduced as the spiritual protector of those gāzis conquered Rumelia, 
thus of early Ottoman begs and of their temporal power. Seyyid Ali Sultan was supposed 
to sanction Ottoman conquests and to attract the divine support for the sake of their 
rule.214 Nevertheless, as will be returned to below, in this velâyetnâme, there are also 
                                                                                                                                                
shows that they were definitely different people. (On this issue see Rıza Yıldırım, “Velâyetnâme’de Geçen 
Tarihi Simalar”, in his Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi.) Velâyetnâme recounts that Seyyid 
Rüstem founded a hospice near the mount Megāiri. But the place of this hospice was not known by 
scholars for a long time. Even its existence was the subject of dispute, along with the existence of Seyyid 
Rüstem himself. But the remains of this hospice were recently discovered in the triangle between modern 
day Mecidiyeköy, Erikli, and Beyköy near Keşan in Turkey. The hospice buildings had already been 
demolished but some gravestones survived and from the inscriptions it can be deduced that it was the 
hospice of Rüstem Baba. Furthermore archival evidence and folk legends pertaining to Rüstem Baba, 
which are slightly different versions of those recounted in the Velâyetnâme, make it clear that it was the 
hospice of Seyyid Rüstem Gazi mentioned in the Velâyetnâme. For a brief summary of this archival and 
archeological evidence see Ratip Kazancıgil, “Mihnetkeşan ve Rüstem Baba Dergahı”, Yöre, sayı: 37-38, 
Nisan-Mayıs 2003, s. 23; Ayhan Tunca, “Rüstem Baba Dergahı’na bir Araştırma Gezisi”, Yöre, sayı: 37-
38, Nisan-Mayıs 2003, s. 27-30; Rıza Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi. Two 
gravestone inscriptions read: “Hû. Rüstem Baba Sultan Tekkesi postnişini Ali Dede. Ruh-ı revanı şâd 
olsun. Sene 1193”; “Kutbu’l-arifin Rüstem Baba Tekkesi’nin muhibbanından merhum Seyyid Yakub’un 
ruhu için el-Fatiha. Sene 1216.” I am grateful to Dursun Gümüşoğlu, who visited the site in July 2003, 
discovered these gravestones, read them and generously shared the preliminary results of his research with 
me.    
214 In the narration of the velâyetnâme there is a clear hierarchy: at the top was the spiritual being of the 
Prophet, who orders what to do through dreams. Then come Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty companions, 
who received the ‘key’ of the conquest of Rumelia form the Prophet (of course through spiritual means). 
At the third stage there is temporal begs whose leader was the Ottoman sultan. A close examination of the 
text unveils the fact that the governing mentality behind the text, which even occasionally finds its 
expressions in the text, premises the dependency of the temporal success of Ottomans to the spiritual 
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indications of protest by dervish milieu towards the centralization tendency of the 
Ottoman administration.  
To sum up, a close scrutiny of the hagiographic literature produced by 
‘heterodox’ milieu shows that early Ottomans were perceived in this milieu as one of 
themselves and they provided every kind of support to erect the temporal power of 
Osman and his successors. The clear familial resemblance between the religious affairs 
of the early Ottomans and that of the ‘heterodox’215 sufi milieu was indeed a natural 
result of the fact that they all rose upon the same socio-cultural ground, that is nomadic-
tribal Turkoman tradition.  
Right after the consolidation of its power in the region, however, Ottoman 
dynasty took favor of sedentary life and those heterodox elements that had worked in the 
foundation of the principality were gradually shifted to periphery. As Mélikoff puts it,  
De façon générale, dans l’Anatolie du Moyen Age, la population urbaine qui 
avait subi l’influence de la culture iranienne et qui parlait persan, apprenait les 
fondements de la religion à la medrese. Mais il en était tout autrement de la 
population nomade ou semi-nomade qui se rattachait avec force à ses traditions 
et à ses croyances ancestrales. C’est pourquoi la population urbaine regardait les 
Turkmènes d’un mauvais œil. On disait en parlant d’eux : Etrāk-i bî idrāk et 
Etrākin dini zayif.216     
 
Comment should also be made of the new injections to the creeds of heterodox 
milieu in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Mélikoff underlines that this 
                                                                                                                                                
support of Seyyid Ali Sultan and other saintly personages. For a detailed analysis of the subject, see Rıza 
Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi. 
215 In the context of the fourteenth-century Ottoman society, I am using the term in a retrospective sense. 
Following Kafadar, I am inclined to elucidate the religiosity of the early Ottoman society in terms of 
“‘metadoxy’, a state of being beyond doxies”, for, in the absence of a “state that was interested in 
rigorously defining and strictly enforcing” the religion, there was no established orthodoxy, and 
consequently no heterodoxy. (See Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 76.) Nonetheless, despite all the 
deficiencies of the word, I will maintain the retrospective usage of ‘heterodoxy’ referring to the religious 
groups sooner shifted to the periphery.    
216 Irène Mélikoff, “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches 
sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 12.  
 84 
creed was a syncretism composed of several distinguishable elements.217 First of all the 
Islamized shamanism of ancient Turks and elements from some other Asian religions 
that Turks had already incorporated constituted the base of this creed. To give an 
example, the dogma of the three prohibitions - that is saving the hand, the tongue, and 
the sexual desires - is obviously a survival of Manichaeism.218  In the fourteenth century 
craft corporations, or ahilik and futuwwa, exercised certain influence, especially by 
introducing shi’ite elements, upon this creed. Later in the fifteenth century the cabalistic 
and anthropomorphic doctrine of Hurufism, principally through the works and the 
propaganda of Seyyid Nesimi and Ala al-A’la, seriously influenced it. And finally in the 
sixteenth century the extremist shi’ite elements dominated through the intervention of 
the Safavids.219 Local beliefs and customs were also absorbed to certain extent.220    
The Safavid connection is the main subject of this study. Here a brief reference 
to the Hurufī influence should be made. After the execution of Fazlullah Esterābādī221, 
                                                 
217 Irène Mélikoff, “L’Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème”, in her 
Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 
p. 8.   
218 Irène Mélikoff, “Recherches sur les composantes du syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi”, in her Sur les traces 
du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 56-7; “Un 
Islam en merge de l’Islam : L’Alevisme”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du 
Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 17 ; “Universalisme et gnosticisme dans les 
hétérodoxies du proche et du moyen-orient”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du 
Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p.136. 
219 Irène Mélikoff, Irène Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 42-3; “L’Ordre Bektaşis et 
les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème”, pp. 6-7; “Recherches sur les composantes du 
syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi”, pp. 46-7, 56-9; “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, in her Au banquet des 
quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 18-20; “La 
divinisation de l’Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevis”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du 
Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 100-118; “L’Origine sociale des premiers 
ottomans”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: 
ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 131-2; “Un Islam en merge de l’Islam : L’Alevisme”, p. 17. Also consider her “Le 
problème Bektaşi-Alevi: Quelaues dernières considérations”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration 
au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 69-71, 78-9.   
220 Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, pp. 42-3; “L’Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: 
survol du problème”, p. 7.  
221 See Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, “Fadl Allah Hurūfī”, EI2.  
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the founder of Hurufism222, in 1394, his disciples scattered to several Islamic countries. 
In Anatolia and Rumelia especially the propaganda of Mir Şerif and Đmâmeddin 
Nesîmî223 (d. 1408) found a sizable audience.224 Another famous Hurufi Turk was the 
author of Işk-nâme225, Ferişte-oğlu, who died in Tire in 1496.226 Indeed during the 
fifteenth century Tire became a Hurufi center.227 The Hurufi influence penetrated even 
into the palace: the young sultan Mehmed II was seduced by some Hurufi propagandists. 
But the reaction of the ulemā to protect the sultan from such ‘detrimental’ currents 
became brutal: those Hurufi propagandists were burned alive in Edirne in 1444.228  
By the fifteenth century, following the severe persecution in Azerbaijan and Iran, 
the center of gravity of Hurufism shifted to Ottoman Anatolia and the Balkans. 
Concomitantly the language of Hurufis switched from Persian to Turkish. In Anatolia 
and the Balkans, however, Hurufism did not emerge as a totally independent movement; 
                                                 
222 See A. Bausani, “Hurūfiyya”, EI2.  
223 See Franz Babinger, “Nesīmī”, EI2.  
224 See Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, Hurûfilik Metinleri Kataloğu, Ankara: TTK, 1989, p. 28; “Bektaşilik-
Hurufilik ve Fadl Allāh’ın Öldürülmesine Düşülen Üç Tarih”, Şarkiyat Mecmuası, V, 1964, pp. 19-20.  A. 
Bausani says Ali al-A’la, the foremost khalifa of Fazlullah, was primarily responsible for Hurufi 
propaganda in Anatolia, where he appears as early as 1400. (See his article “Hurūfiyya” in EI2.) 
Gölpınarlı rejects this idea saying no contemporary sources, except Hāce Ishāk (d. 1892-3), mention his 
visit in Anatolia. Hamid Algar, however, criticizes Gölpınarlı’s assessment putting stress the role of Ali al-
A’la while questioning the contact of Nesimi with Turkish population of Anatolia and Balkans. See Hamid 
Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et 
les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, ed. Alexandre Popovic-Giles Veinstein, Đstanbul : ISIS Press, 
1996, pp. 44-48.  Also consider Irène Mélikoff, “La divinisation de l’Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevis”, in 
her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, 
pp. 104-9; “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, 
in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 
1992, pp. 170-72.   
225 This work is partly abridged translation of Fadlullah’s Javidan-nāme, partly original. See Ömer Faruk 
Akün, “Firishte-oghlu”, EI2.  
226 See above footnote.  
227 See Irène Mélikoff, “Le problème Bektaşi-Alevi: Quelaues dernières considérations”, in her Au 
banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 69-
71. 
228 Fahruddin-i Acemî is reported to have been responsible for this execution. See Algar, “The Hurufi 
influence on Bektashism”, p. 45; Gölpınarlı, Hurûfilik Metinleri Kataloğu, pp. 28-9; Franz Babinger, 
Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, trs. Ralph Manheim, Princeton, 1978, pp. 34-5. 
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rather it merged into the Bektashi Order. Most of the influential Bektashi poets of the 
sixteenth century, such as Muhyiddin Abdal and Hayretî (d. 1534) were Hurufi.229  
But the contribution of Hurufism in the Turkish Sufism appeared not as a 
separate mystical or religious path but as doctrinal influence on the already existing 
popular sufi streams, especially on the Bektashi Order and Kalenderī circles.230 Its 
penetration into Bektashi doctrine appeared especially as embedding a deep-rooted 
pantheism and anthropomorphism. The origins of the belief in the manifestation of God 
in the form of man and divinization of man trace in most part, if not totally, to the Hurufi 
graft.231 As Ocak rightfully points out, the revolutionary affect of Hurufi graft in the 
                                                 
229 See Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, p. 49; Gölpınarlı, Hurûfilik Metinleri Kataloğu, pp. 
25-30; Mélikoff, “La divinisation de l’Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevis”, pp. 108-111. Gölpınarlı notes that 
in the Ottoman literature and documents Hurufis were called ‘Işık’. Gölpınarlı also notes, however, that 
Hurufis were not sincere Bektashis and did not venerate Hacı Bektaş by heart. Rather they simply 
pretended to be Bektashi in order to get shelter, while continuing to worship Fazlullah secretly. See ibid, 
pp. 32-3. According to Mélikoff, among the seven grand poets (ozan) of Alevi-Bektashis: Nesimî, Hatayî, 
Fuzulî, Pir Sultan Abdal, Kul Himmet, Yeminî, and Viranî, there were three Hurufis, namely Nesimî, 
Yeminî, and Viranî. See Irène Mélikoff, “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, 
en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, p. 172 ; “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, in her Au banquet des quarante. 
Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 19. Nevertheless, one 
should be careful about Hurufi affiliation of, at least Yeminî for his Fazîlet-nāme, almost the only 
available source on Yeminî himself, does not includes any indication of Hurufism. See Derviş Muhammed 
Yeminî, Fazîlet-nâme, ed. Yusuf Tepeli, Ankara: Türk Dil KurumuYayınları, 2002.  
230 As Bausani says, “When it began however, it was not intended that Hurufism should be merely a secret 
or esoteric religion but that it should become also (a premature ambition at that time) a visible religious 
organization, with autonomous rites; it was hoped that it would gain some rulers as its adherents. It did not 
succeed in this, but its doctrines penetrated in to various quarters, not only into Bektāshism but also into 
certain aspects of Persian Sūfism…” A. Bausani, “Hurūfiyya” in EI2.   
231 See Irène Mélikoff, “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, pp. 19, 23-4; Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, 
trs. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, pp.160-72. The essence of Hurufi doctrine is 
the belief in the continual theophany of the inaccessible divine treasure in man. Especially in the Man par 
excellence, Fazlullah, the manifestation of deity took its perfect form. In the Hurufi faith the history of 
being is divided into three parts: the epoch of Nubuwwa, the epoch of Imāma, and the epoch of Ulūhiyya. 
The prophecy started with Adam and ended with Muhammad. Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad, inherited 
the secrets of Muhammad and initiated the epoch of Walāya or Imāma, which ended by the eleventh Imam 
Hasan al-Askerī. By the emergence of Fazlullah, who was the Mahdi and the manifestation of God, the 
third epoch started. All the prophets were witness and foretellers of Fazlullah. There is a heavy pantheist 
influence on Hurufi doctrine. God manifests himself in being. There is a cyclic creation of being and the 
creation takes its perfect form in man, thus God can be represented only in man. But among men there is a 
perfect Man, i.e. Fazlullah, who was a perfect emanation of God. Fazlullah constructed his system of 
belief on a sophisticated interpretation of letters. The revelation of being can be possible through sounds 
and the perfect form of the sound is word, which can be produced by man. The word is composed of 
letters. So the essence of sound and word, hence, the revelation of being is letter. Hurufi works devoted 
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Kalenderi-Bektashi theology should be sought in its pantheist approach to deity, which 
can easily be reconciled with hulūl (incarnation) and Mahdism, rather than its cabalistic 
techniques or interpretations.232 Hamid Algar also lays stress on the point that the 
influence of Hurufism on Bektashism occurred primarily at the doctrinal level, while 
Bektashi rites stayed immune to any Hurufi influence; he calls attention to two intrinsic 
affinities between the two: the antinomian attitude towards religious duties and belief in 
incarnation.233  
 
3.2.  THE FORMATION OF THE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE OTTOMAN 
IMPERIAL REGIME 
The foundation of the Ottoman Principality and its transformation to a state has been 
long discussed since Herbert Adams Gibbons. There is no need of repeating all the well-
known debates here.234 I would rather call attention to some major parameters of the 
transition from tribal chieftaincy to bureaucratic state, which would provide a useful 
framework for my analysis on the making of the Qizilbash ‘heresy’ at the threshold of 
the sixteenth century.  
                                                                                                                                                
hundreds of pages to cabalistic interpretation of Qur’anic verses and other religious texts such as Javidan-
nāme of Fazlullah. For further reading on the doctrinal basis of Hurufism see Gölpınarlı, Hurûfilik 
Metinleri Kataloğu, pp. 18-24; A. Bausani, “Hurūfiyya”, EI2; Irène Mélikoff, “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et 
l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 163-74.  
232 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Babaīler Đsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da Đslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve 
Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, Belleten, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 142-4.  
233 See Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, pp. 50-53.  
234 For a revision of all the discussions regarding to the foundation of the Ottoman state it might be useful 
to see Kafadar’s Between Two Worlds. For a good collection of prominent articles dealing with the 
foundation of the Ottoman state, see Oktay Özel-Mehmet Öz, eds.,  Söğüt’ten Đstanbul’a Osmanlı 
Devleti’nin Kuruluşu Üzerine Tartışmalar, Ankara: Đmge Kitabevi, 2001. For some recent suggestions see 
Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State; Rudi Paul Lindner, Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory, 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2007.  
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One should note that in the late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century western 
Anatolia there was a complete political fragmentation. As is well known, after the 
collapse of the Seljukid authority by the Mongolians at Kösedağ in 1243235, many 
frontier governors of  the Seljukid state or powerful tribal leaders established either 
autonomous or independent principalities in the west half of the Anatolian peninsula.236 
The political fragmentation, however, was not limited to the semi- or fully-independent 
structure of these Turkoman principalities. The partition of political authority and 
military power prevailed within the internal structures of each principality as well, for 
the troops of these Turkoman begs were composed of tribal warrior groups who were 
loyal before all to their tribal leaders. One of the most eminent images of these 
Turkoman warriors was their red cap (Kızıl-börg), differentiating them from the 
immediate retinue of the beg, nöker, who wore a white-cap (Ak-börg), a symbol of 
nobility among Turco-Mongolian peoples.237 
 Osman Beg appeared, at the threshold of the fourteenth century in the Byzantine 
borders, as one of those Turkoman begs, at the beginning among less significant ones, 
and as the leader of his own tribe. The remarkable achievement of Osman and his 
successors, before all, lies in their gaining of the allegiance of other tribal warrior groups 
through successful employment of gazā ideology238 as the motivating factor and 
                                                 
235 See Osman Turan, Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye, Đstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2004, pp. 451-7.  
236 Halil Đnalcık, ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. I, eds., P. M. Holt, 
Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 263-4. 
237 See Halil Đnalcık, “The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the 
Crusades”, in his The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and 
Society. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1993, p. 325; “The Yürüks”, p. 100. I will return to this issue in 
the following pages.  
238 For further reading on ‘gazā’ in the Ottoman context, see Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman 
Empire, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992; Paul 
Wittek, The Rise of The Ottoman Empire, London, 1965; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, “The Holy War (Jihad) in 
the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire”, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 3/4, 1979-80, 467-73; Ronald C. 
Jennings, “Some Thoughts on the Gazi Thesis”, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 76, 
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legitimization tool on the one hand, and through the offering of generous booty to their 
tribal comrades on the other.239 Halil Đnalcık evaluates the Turkish expansion towards 
Byzantine territories and the formation of Ottoman Principality in four stages: 
1) it began with the seasonal movements of Turkoman nomadic groups in the 
Byzantine coastal plains; 2) it was intensified by the organization of small 
raiding groups under ghazi leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for 
employment as mercenaries; 3) it continued with the emergence of successful 
leaders capable of bringing together, under their clientship, local chiefs to 
conquer and then establish beyliks (principalities) in conquered lands on the 
model of the principalities founded in the old Seljukid frontier zone; and finally 
4) with the involvement of these ghazi-beyliks, with their definite political and 
economic aims, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the 
Balkans, the previously undirected thrusts of the war bands became focused on 
new goals.240  
   
The emergence of Osman as a significant regional power, therefore, corresponds 
to the third stage in Đnalcık’s scheme. As indicated above, for Osman and Orhan, the 
capability of bringing together fragmented small tribal gāzi-warrior groups under his 
clientship lied in the successful usage of gazā ideology and fruitful raids, which offered 
ample booty to raiders.241  
                                                                                                                                                
1986, 151-161; Colin Imber, “What Does Ghazi Actually Mean”, The Balance of Truth; Essays in Honour 
of Professor Geoffrey Lewis, eds., Çiğdem Balım-Harding and Colin Imber, Istanbul: ISIS, 2000, 165- 
178; Rudi Paul Lindner, “What Was a Nomadic Tribe?”; “Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman 
History”, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 27/2, 1987, 207-224; Lowry, The Nature of the Early 
Ottoman State. 
239 Pachymeres states that upon Osman waged violent raids on Byzantine territory Turkoman fighters or 
gāzis started gathering under his banner. (Cited in Đnalcık, ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, p. 267; “Osman 
I”, DIA, p. 449.) We learn from Cantacuzenus that when a beg embarked on a gazā expedition the gāzis 
from neighboring principalities would join his troops; and the beg, on his own terms, would willingly 
accept these gāzis in his troops. (Cited in P. Lemerle, L’émirat d’Aydın, Byzance et l’Occident. 
Recherches sur la geste d’Umur Pacha, Paris, 1957, pp. 212-3.) After his victory against Byzantine 
imperial army in Baphaeon in 1301, Osman’s fame even spread to distant Muslim countries, which 
augmented the influx of gāzi-warriors into Osman’s territory. For the Battle of Bapheus and its 
consequences, see Halil Đnalcık, “Osman Gazi’s Siege of Nicea and the Battle of Bapheus”, in The 
Otoman Empire (1300-1389), ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou, Rethymnon: Crete University Pres, 1993, 77-98. 
Also consider Đnalcık, “Osman I”, DIA, p. 446.  
240 Đnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", pp. 74-5.  
241 For some recent assessments of the construction of the Ottoman state, see Kafadar, pp. 118-150; 
Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State. 
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Indeed, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the leadership of gazā, or raids 
to the infidel lands, was carried on by two principalities: Umur Gāzi at Aegean coasts 
and Ottomans in Bithynia. Likewise, Ibn Battuta, who visited courts of most of 
Turkoman begs in 1332, refers to gazā or raids of only Umur Beg and Orhan Beg, 
putting more emphasis on the gāzi affiliation of the former than that of the latter.242 It 
has been already shown that Aydınoğlu Umur Beg was one of the most brilliant and 
successful Turkoman gāzi-leaders towards the middle of the fourteenth-century.243 His 
achievements especially in raids of the Aegean islands and Thrace made him so famous 
that he began to be known as the chief of gāzis, which attracted rootless, adventurous, 
and war-like Turkomans to gather under his banner. After the death of Umur in 1348, 
however, his successors no longer pursued the policy of gazā. Rather they preferred to 
take advantage of trade with westerners. By then Ottoman begs arose as the only 
champion of gazā raids, and consequently their entourage became the most attractive for 
warrior tribal elements of Turkomans, or gāzis.244  
However, it has been shown that the cohesive force holding Turkoman warriors 
around Osman, and later on around his successors, was neither merely religio-
                                                 
242 Ibn Battuta met Umur Beg in Izmir (Smyrnia). He writes, “He was a generous and pious prince and 
constantly engaged in war with the Christians. He had galleys, with which he used to make raids on the 
environs of Constantinople the Great, taking prisoners and booty and after spending it all in largesse he 
would make another raid. Eventually the Greeks, under the pressure of his attacks, appealed to the Pope, 
who ordered the Christians of Genoa and France to make an attack on him. They did so, and the Pope sent 
an army from Rome, which captured the port and the city in a night attack. The amir ‘Omar [Umur] went 
down from the citadel and fought them, but he died a martyr’s death together with a number of his 
troops.” See Ibn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, translated and selected by H. A. R. Gibb, London: 
Darf Publishers, 1983 (First published in 1929), pp. 134-5. Shortly after his meeting with Umur Beg, Ibn 
Battuta visited the court of Orhan Beg in Bursa. He describes Orhan Beg as the greatest of Turkoman begs 
and richest in wealth, land, and military forces. He underlines Orhan’s fight against Christian neighbors 
stating “He fights with the infidels and besieges them.” See Ibid, p. 136.   
243 For a further reading on Umur Gāzi and his gazā raids, see Đnalcık, “The Rise of the Turcoman 
Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades”; Irène Mélikoff, Le Destan d’Umur 
Pasha (Düsturname-i Enveri), Paris; Presses Universitaires de France, 1954; Tuncer Baykara, Aydınoğlu 
Gāzi Umur Paşa (1309-1348), Ankara; Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990. 
244 See Đnalcık, ”The Emergence of Ottomans”, p. 271. For economic basis of the gazā and both temporal 
and spiritual motivations of gāzis at that time see Halil Đnalcık, "The Question of the Emergence”. 
 91 
ideological discourse of gazā nor supreme lineage of the dynasty, as formulated by later 
historians. Rather, arguably the most effective factor was Osman’s success in preserving 
the common interest of the tribal participants in his service. Rudi Paul Lindner, moving 
from the results of modern anthropological studies on ‘tribe’, concludes that shared 
concerns or shared interest played a much greater role in formation of medieval tribes 
than did kinship or other factors such as ideology. He also underscores the inclusive 
feature of ‘common interest’ which, contrary to the ‘exclusive’ nature of kinship, allows 
the entrance of ‘foreigner’ element into the tribal structure, thus explains the rapid 
growth of tribes. Common interest as a cohesive force holding a tribe together as a 
political and military entity was, in the Ottoman case at least, supported by raids and 
predation.245   
 As it clearly appeared then, during its early phases under Osman and Orhan, the 
Ottoman Principality was rather a tribal confederation gathered around the Ottoman 
dynasty on the basis of common interest, which was almost wholly rested on gazā-raids, 
as well as predation, and was cemented by the idea of holy war. On the one hand, the 
successful raids of Osman and his tribal comrade-in-arms reinforced the influx of 
                                                 
245 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 698; Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, 
Bloomington: Indiana University, 1983, p. 2. Lindner, however, totally rejects the role of gazā ideology in 
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with the Greek allies of Osman? See Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 2-18. However, Lindner’s 
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Devleti’ne Kadar Türkler, ed. Sina Akşin, Đstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995, pp. 79-80; Ümit Hassan, 
Osmanlı. Örgüt-Đnanç-Davranış’tan  Hukuk-Đdeoloji’ye, Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp. 137-47. In 
a recent publication, Heat Lowry pursued a similar line of argument (with Lindner) regarding the meaning 
and function of gazā during the early periods of the Ottoman history. Lowry develops the term 
‘plundering confederacy’ for the gāzi bands fulfilling early conquests in Anatolia and the Balkans. See 
Heat W. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 46.  
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Turkoman warriors to Osman’s entourage. On the other hand, the religious 
representatives of early Ottoman society, namely ‘heterodox’ dervishes, flourished the 
idea of holy war and augmented religious sentiment among gāzi-warriors,246 as well as 
legitimizing claims of the early Ottomans for the worldly power.247   
The political and military dignitary of this confederation was intermingled and 
represented by a tribal aristocracy, who were at the same time the comrade-in-arms of 
Osman, who was simply the first among equals rather than enjoying a supreme authority 
over other begs or tribal leaders of gazā bands. During the foundation period of the 
principality, two closely intermingled classes, which would play a leading role in the 
development of the state both in terms of organization and ideology, were almost absent: 
the bureaucratic elite and high (religious) scholars or ulemā.248 Contrary to the Turko-
Mongolian step tradition, these two classes were representatives of high Islamic 
tradition, which was heavily influenced by the Arabic and Persian culture. As will be 
returned to in the further stages of the analysis in this chapter, the emergence and 
consolidation of the bureaucratic elite and ulemā class in the Ottoman capital cities 
constituted one of the two principal bases of the Ottoman Imperial regime, the other 
being the centralized military system.  
                                                 
246 One should note that there are indications in contemporary sources of that these dervishes did not only 
propagate the idea of gazā but also actively took part in many fights such as the conquest of Bursa, the 
conquest of Rumelia etc. For the prominent role of Seyyid Ali Sultan, one of the dervishes of that kind, in 
the conquest of Rumelia, see Rıza Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi. 
247 Indeed, as Đnalcık rightfully delineates, “in the Ottoman frontier lands dervishes and gāzis often became 
identical.” See Halil Đnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, in Historians of the Middle East, 
eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, Oxford, 1962, p. 157.  
248 Indeed, one could hardly differentiate these two classes in early Ottoman context since there was not a 
clear-cut border-line between them and the transition form one to other was wide-spread. Researches on 
the Ottoman history point to the fact that the bureaucracy of the Ottoman empire was predominantly – 
wholly during the formation period – emerged from the ulemā class.  
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The mode of life, on the other hand, was mainly attributed to nomadic dynamics 
and the economy of the principality rested upon pastoralism, predation, and booty from 
gazā raids. The religious affairs of the Turkoman subjects of the principality or beylik 
were looked after by sufi dervishes, who were primarily remnants of the Babāī revolt 
and propagated a popular-heterodox way of Islamic Sufism. To sum up, during the early 
periods, the Ottoman realm was under the complete dominance of tribal-nomadic 
Turkoman polity, culture, and way of religious life style. The bureaucratic elite, and 
hence the bureaucracy itself, educated representatives of high Islamic culture or ulemā, 
and detribalized- centralized army were yet to appear. This may be regarded as the 
correspondent of the first stage of Lapidus’s scheme, which is the tribal nomads’ 
organization of conquest movement leading to state formation in a stateless region or to 
the regions which already have a weak state, in the Ottoman case. 
The history of the formation of the Ottoman state - or the ‘imperial regime’ one 
might prefer to say – was, at the same time, the history of the struggle between two 
parties: one was the coalition of Turkoman tribal fighters and ‘heterodox’ mystics, while 
the other being the coalition of newly arising ulemā-bureaucrats and military elite of the 
centralized army. The following analysis will show that in the course of time the latter 
party almost wholly displaced the former, at least within the governmental machinery, 
by the reign of Mehmed II, shifting them to a position of marginalized opposition.  
The early symptoms of transition from the first stage to the second - that is the 
transformation of conqueror tribal confederacy into routinized states or imperial 
governments – appeared as early as the time of Osman’s son Orhan. One might even 
think that the very early symptoms, especially of sedentarization, were already visible 
during Osman’s last years. To Lindner, for example, by the time of Osman himself the 
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Ottomans took advantage of sedentary life, for pastoralism was no more profitable in the 
limited plateaus of Bithynia, which, on the other hand, has fertile soils to cultivate. They 
even established new towns such as Yenişehir.249 “The Ottomans now had to adapt 
themselves to the demands of administering a sedentary and sedentarizing society. In 
such circumstances the chief became a settled ruler, and the nomadic tribesmen had 
ultimately to settle or to accept secondary position. The institutions of the tribe 
ultimately broke down before the complex task of bureaucratic record keeping and urban 
organization.”250 No doubt, the sedentarization process – of especially ruling elite - 
gained impetus under Orhan and Murad I.  
Closely linked to the sedentarization, the economic base of the tribe shifted from 
pastoralism and predation to agriculture. Furthermore, using the Marxian scheme, 
sedentarization fundamentally changed the ‘infra-structure’ of socio-economic set up so 
that subsequent changes in the ‘super-structure’, i.e. nature of polity, military 
organization, and religious mind, inevitably followed.251   
One of the foremost results of this process appeared as the alienation of 
Turkoman milieu to the ‘imperializing’ state. Nonetheless, the alienation process did not 
rest barely on ideological-religious basis, but it had a substantial economic and social 
ground as well. Parallel to evolving of the Ottoman principality towards a bureaucratic 
empire, an intrinsic tension developed within a certain branch of the Ottoman society 
and the state. As J. R. Walsh has put it succinctly, 
When gradually the concept of empire evolves and an effort is made to assume 
the responsibilities which this implied, the independent and arrogant tribal 
aristocracy had to be replaced by one of the sultan’s own creation selected from 
                                                 
249 See Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 708.  
250 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, pp. 708-9.  
251 Compare Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 29-38.  
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among the subject peoples. Moreover, the organization and good order of this 
empire demanded the adoption of Islam at its most civilized expression, with all 
its heritage of law and administration, and so the dichotomy between Ottoman 
and tribal Turk revolves itself into a contest between the medrese and the tekke, a 
contest weighed heavily in favour of the former by the influence of the throne.252 
 
Among the chief instruments of centralization must be deemed the invention of 
Janissary corps, timar regime on one hand, and accumulation of traditional Islamic 
ulemā which constituted the backbone of the Ottoman bureaucracy on the other. The 
process of bureaucratization and centralization developed at the cost of the traditional 
Turkoman way of nomadic-tribal life as well as the marginalization of tribal 
organization from the politics. The foremost instruments associated with and which 
enforced this process, namely the Janissary corps, timar regime, and gradually 
consolidating ulemā class were not only alien to the nomadic-tribal way of life but also 
mortally destructive to it. Therefore, when the Ottoman polity dismantled from Turko-
Mongolian step tradition and evolved towards a classical Middle-Eastern Islamic 
empire, the struggle emerged between the representatives of these two political systems 
and ways of life. 
 
3.2.1. The Formation of the Ottoman Army 
Lindner already noted that as economic base of the principality became sedentary, so did 
the military technology. Already during the time of Orhan, the nomadic war bands of 
horsed archers began to lose their eminence in the Ottoman militia and gradually were 
replaced by the recruited standing infantry corps (Janissary) and centralized provincial 
cavalry troops (sipāhis). Orhan created an infantry corps called yaya which was not 
                                                 
252 J. R. Walsh, “The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries”, in Historians of the Midle East, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 208.  
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organized on tribal basis, but loyal directly to the sultan.253 No sooner was the yaya 
corps254 established it transformed into a standing army at that time totally composed of 
captives. As Lindner argues, “within a generation, the Ottomans became bent on the 
creation of a military force totally unlike the bands of nomadic archers not only in 
strategy, but in training, technique, and support: the Janissaries.”255  
The most salient characteristic of the new corps, at least for the purpose of this 
study, was the essential change in the means of organization and the loyalty of the 
soldiers. The new infantry of the sultan was formed totally on military basis, seriously 
damaging tribal bonds and habits. The immediate consequence of the shift from tribal 
principals in the organization was the shift in the loyalty of the soldiers from clan leaders 
to the head of the administrative machinery, i. e. the sultan. The change of loyalty found 
its symbolic expression in the color of caps. If we follow Aşıkpaşazāde, 
Orhan Gāzi’ye kardaşı Alâaddin Paşa eydür: “Hanum! Elhamdülillah kim seni 
padişah gördüm. Đmdi senin dahı birlevük leşkerin yevmen feyevmen ziyâde olsa 
gerekdür. Đmdi senün askerinde bir nişan ko kim gayri askerde olmasun!” didi. 
Orhan Gāzi eyidür: “Kardaş! Her ne kim sen eyidürsin, ben anı kabul ederin” 
dedi. Ol eyitdi: “Đmdi etrafdağı beğlerün börkleri kızıldur, senin ağ olsun!” dedi. 
Orhan Gāzi emr etdi. Bilecük’de akbörk işlediler. Orhan Gāzi geydi. Ve cemi’ 
tevâbii bile akbörk geydiler. Andan Orhan Gāzi leşkerin ziyâde etmek diledi 
kim ol vilâyetde ola. Kardaşı eyidür: “Anı kadılara danış!” der. Ve ol zamanda 
Çandarlu Karaca Halil Bilecük kadısı olmış idi. Kadılığı ana Osman Gāzi vermiş 
idi. Ve Orhan Gāzi zamanında dahı Đznik’e kadı oldı. Ve dahı Đznik’den sonra 
Bursa’ya kadı oldı. Orhan oğlı Gāzi Hünkâr zamanında kadı-asker oldı. Ve hem 
vezir oldı. Ve beğlerbeği dahı oldı. Ve bâki tafsil aşağa bâblarda gele inşaallahu 
ta’âla. Ve hem Edebalı’nun dahı kavmiydi. Ona dahı danışdı. Eyidür: “Elden 
yaya çıkar!” dedi. Ol vakıt adamların çoğu kadıya rişvet iletdi kim beni yaya 
yazdurun deyü. Ve hem anlara da akbörk geydürdiler.256  
                                                 
253 See Đnalcık, “Orhan”, pp. 383-4.  
254 Colin Imber rejects the idea that Orhan first created yaya corps arguing the related passage in APZ, 
Anoyms, and Oruç was a later alteration. However, he does not provide enough evidence for his argument. 
See Colin Imber, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, Journal of Turkish Studies (Türklük Bilgisi 
Araştırmaları), vol. 26/II, Harvard University, 2002, p. 17.  
255 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 708.  Also consider his Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 30-35. 
256 APZ, pp. 117-8. For similar accounts see also Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, pp.16-7; 
Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512), pp. 18-9. Oruç’s account shows two noticeable differences: 1) he 
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Learning from this passage, Ottomans, at a certain stage, needed to differentiate 
their immediate retinue from the troops of other begs around, i.e. tribal bands.257 The 
symbol chosen for distinguishing the ‘special forces’ of the sultan from other warriors is 
a traditional one. As indicated already, according to Turco-Mongolian tradition ‘white’ 
symbolizes the immediate retinue of the khan and thus the nobility while ‘red’ or ‘black’ 
symbolizes ordinary mass; in other words, the former symbolizes the ruling elite while 
the latter symbolizes the ruled subjects.258 In the context of Anatolian Turkomans the 
tribal warriors are known to have worn red caps. In Aşıkpaşazāde’s account, Alâaddin 
Beg refers to this fact and suggests his brother that he create a new army loyal only to 
his personality.259 Then comes the problem of how and from which source to form this 
                                                                                                                                                
specifies that the soldiers who bore ‘ak-börk’ were special retinues of Orhan while others bearing ‘kızıl-
börk’ were ordinary, i.e. tribal, soldiers of the sultan, not the soldiers of other begs around, as one might 
understand from Aşıkpaşazāde’s account at first sight. (Indeed, a close scrutiny shows that by ‘kızıl-börk’ 
Aşıkpaşazāde must also have referred to the tribal forces of Orhan Beg. See J. A. B. Palmer, 
“Yeniçerilerin Kökeni”, translated by Mehmet Öz,  in Söğüt’ten Đstanbul’a Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu 
Üzerine Tartışmalar, eds., Oktay Özel-Mehmet Öz, Ankara: Đmge Kitabevi, 2001, pp. 484-5. (The article 
originally appeared as “The Origin of the Janissaries”, Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, 35/2, 1952-3, 
448-81.) Another significant difference of Oruç appears as his connection of the origin of yaya corps to 
Hacı Bektaş. Besides its apparent anachronism, the pattern here – that is the sanction of a worldly 
innovation by spiritual representatives - is worth dwelling on. According to Palmer, this passage was 
nothing than a later Bektashi addition. (See Palmer, p. 486.) I will return to this point in the context of 
Janissary-Bektashi relations. Oruç’s account reads, “... Ali Paşa dedi ki: ‘Ey Kardeş bütün askerin kızıl 
börk giysin. Sen ak börk giy. Sana ait kullar da ak börk giysinler. Bu da âlemde bir nişan olsun.’ Orhan 
Gazi bu sözü kabul edip adam gönderdi. Amasya’daki Horasanlı Hacı Bektaş’tan izin alıp ak börk getirtti. 
Önce kendi giydi. Ondan sonra kendisine ait kullar ak börk giydiler. Ak börk giymek o zamandan kaldı.” 
See Oruç Beğ, Oruç Beğ Tarihi, summarized and edited by Nihal Atsız, Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, p. 
34.  
257 Halil Đnalcık evaluates the creation of yaya corps, the immediate military retinue of the beg within the 
Turko-Mongolian tradition of comradeship or nökerlik. See Đnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, 
pp. 51-5.  
258 See Sencer Divitçioğlu, Osmanlı Beyliği’nin Kuruluşu, Đstanbul: YKY, 1999, pp. 124-5. In a similar 
manner, Divitçioğlu regards, in the Ottoman case, ‘Ak-börg’ as the symbol of ruling class while ‘Kızıl-
börg’ as the symbol of ruled subjects.  See Ibid, pp. 116-121. Although this sort of classification might be 
useful in the analysis of the socio-political set up, it does not adequately depict the whole picture. In the 
early Ottoman case, ‘Kızıl-börg’ rather symbolizes militant Turkoman elements than passive ruled 
subjects totaly devoid of political and military capability against the ruling class. In the course of time, a 
considerable portion of the social group symbolized by ‘Kızıl-börg’ maintained their resistance againts the 
hegomony of the Ottoman ruling elite, while some other transformed into ‘tamed’ subjects, or re’āya.   
259 Palmer suggests that this must have occurred around 1340. See Palmer, p. 483.  
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army. Orhan learns the method from the newly arising ulemā: he was to recruit soldiers 
from among the people of the country. The point of eminence here, however, is that the 
soldiers would enter the infantry with their individual identity, leaving tribal bonds 
aside.  
The creation of the yaya corps marked the beginning of the cleavage between the 
Ottoman center and Turkoman milieu. In other words, it marked the transition from first 
stage to the second, i.e. the transformation of tribal chieftaincy into routinized state. It is 
not a task of this study to examine the development of the Ottoman military system. 
Stress should be put, for the present purpose however, on the stimulating role of the 
central army in realizing centralization of the administration. The Ottoman central army 
evolved in two directions: a standing army at the center, and a provincial army organized 
under the firm control of the center. It is to be shown in the following paragraphs that 
the provincial military system called timarlı sipāhi was intermingled with administrative 
and fiscal mechanisms as well. The timar system260 as a whole functioned as an efficient 
apparatus of Ottoman state in centralizing the administrative, military, and fiscal system.  
Yet the most powerful weapon in the hand of the sultan in establishing his 
absolute power within a patrimonial state was the standing army attending the court, 
namely the Janissary corps. A detailed analysis of the origin and development of the 
                                                 
260 One of the principal bases on which Ottoman central administration developed was the fiscal regime, 
namely the timar system. The earliest documentary references to the timar system dates back to the time 
of Orhan but the system developed gradually and took its classical form during the time of Murad II, when 
the first concise registers were drawn up and the system was fully developed in all its basic principles and 
features. In the timar system, all newly conquered lands belonged to the state and the state distributed the 
usufruct right of the land to individuals, demanding certain taxes in return. A timar holder was a state 
agent who did not receive any stipend from the state treasury but collected the tax of a defined piece of 
land and re’ayā as timar. Since all territories of the Empire were divided and assigned to certain timar 
holders, the subjects were strictly constrained by certain duties. See Halil Đnalcık, “Tīmār”, EI2; “Giriş” in 
his Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954, pp. XI-
XXXVI; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Timar”, IA, 12/1, 286-333.  
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Janissary corps is beyond the scope of this study.261 However, since the Janissaries 
played a significant role in the development and ‘solution’ of the Qizilbash question, a 
brief outline of the history and some peculiarities of the corps would be useful. The 
conceptual base, or the idea, of Janissary corps, that is creating an immediate and loyal 
military retinue of the sultan, traces back to the creation of yaya corps. In terms of men 
power, however, Janissary corps fundamentally differs from yaya corps.  
Early Ottoman chronicles, which are the only sources about the origin of 
Janissary corps, inform us that following the conquest of Edirne in 1361262, decades after 
the creation of yaya corps, the number of slaves obtained from gazā expeditions 
increased noticeably. By the advice of a certain Kara Rüstem, a danişmend following a 
well-known Islamic principle, one fifth (pençik) of the booty, including slaves, was put 
aside for the state treasury. In a short span of time, however, the number of slaves 
belonging to the treasury became so numerous that the leading statesmen of the time - 
Çandarlı Kara Halil, Kara Rüstem etc. – suggested establishing a troop with these slaves 
or kuls. Before becoming soldiers, however, they were sent to Turkish families to learn 
                                                 
261 The reader might consider Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’s classical work on the Slave Corps (Kapıkulu 
Ocakları): Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapıkulu Ocakları, I: Acemi Ocağı ve 
Yeniçeri Ocağı, Ankara: TTK, 1988, 3rd edition. (First published in 1943.)  
262 Halil Đnalcık, “Edirne’nin Fethi, 1361”, Edirne, Edirne’nin 600. Fethi Yıldönümü Armağan Kitabı, 
Ankara: TTK, 1993 (first published in 1965), p. 159. For another suggestion for the date of the conquest of 
Adrianople, see Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La conquête d’Andrinople par les Turcs”, 439-461. Beldiceanu-
Steinherr not only suggests some later dates for the conquest but also argues that the conquest was not 
fulfilled by Ottoman forces. She says, “La conauête d’Adrinople fut l’oeuvre de beys non attachés à la 
dynastie ottomane, elle eut lieu aux environs de 1369. Quant à Murad I, il était occupé, entre 1362 et le 
début de 1365, par sa lutte contre ses frères et la défense des frontières orientales, et entre août 1366 et 
1373 il n’avait pas la possibilité de s’imposer en Thrace en raison de la coupure des routes par la prise de 
Gallipoli. C’est seulement après la reddition de cette ville que Murad I vint à Andrinople, soit en hiver 
1376-1377, soit en été ou automme 1377.” (Ibid., p. 458). For a parallel arguement also consider Elisabeth 
Zachariadou, “The Conquest of Adrianople”, Romania and the Turks (c. 1300- c. 1500), London: 
Variorum Reprints, 1985, 211-217. 
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the Turkish language and culture. Aşıkpaşazāde and Oruç state that these “yeni-çeri” or 
“new soldiers” dressed in white caps.263  
The creation of slave-corps marked a substantial change in the socio-ethnical 
base of the sultan’s immediate military retinue or the soldiers of Ak-börg. Unlike yaya 
troops, which were formed by Turkish soldiers, the new soldiers were adopted from a 
totally different cultural environment. Evident is that the drastic change in the cultural 
environment made it easier to create an unquestionably obedient military, and later 
bureaucratic, class who were supposed to run most important offices of the state.  
This was, indeed, not an Ottoman invention. Rather, using slaves in the army and 
bureaucracy was an old practice of Islamic states that traces back, at least, to the 
Abbasids.264 Ottomans evidently learned this practice from the Anatolian Seljuks, their 
predecessors in Anatolia.265 As was the case in earlier Islamic states, slave-troops and 
slave-bureaucrats functioned, first of all, as an eminent tool of centralization of the 
Ottoman administration. It is not surprising to see that the Janissary corps, or the army of 
the Porte (kapı-kulu) in a broader sense, was strengthened and gained significance in the 
state during the reign of Bayezid I, whose attempt to create a centralized empire will be 
mentioned.266   
                                                 
263 See APZ, p. 128; Oruç Beğ, pp. 41-2. Also see Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, p. 25; 
Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512), pp. 28-9. For an analysis of these passages, see Palmer, pp. 490-
94. For a recent ‘daring’ speculation on the epistemology of the word, see Imber, “The Origin of the 
Janissaries”, pp. 18-9.  
264 For slave-system (gulām) in the Islamic states, see Halil Đnalcık, “Ghulām”, EI2; Paul Wittek, 
“Devshirme and Shari’a”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 17, 1955, 271-8; Speros 
Vryonis, “Isidora Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme”, Speculum, 31, 1956, 433-43. 
265 For a broader discussion of similarities, dissimilarities, and connections between Ottoman Devshirme 
and Seljuk Ghulams, see Speros Vryonis, “Seljuk Ghulams and Ottoman Devshirme”, Der Islam, 41, 
1965, 224-52.  
266 See Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, 2, 1954, p. 105.  
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The Ottomans in time developed this practice a step further, starting to recruit 
boys from among Christian subjects to the corps, which might be the third and the final 
stage of the development of the Ottoman Kapı-kulu corps. Palmer provides persuasive 
Latin sources, in addition to known Ottoman narratives, showing that it was Murad II 
who initiated recruiting Christian boys. And the Ottoman devshirme as an institution was 
formed by the mid-fifteenth century, at the latest.267 It is interesting to note that a 
contemporary observer, Georgius of Hungary who spent some years as captive of 
Ottomans until 1458 and wrote his book Tractatus de moribus, condicionibus et 
nequicia Turcorum in the 1470s, makes a special remark of ‘ak-börg’ as a distinctive 
sign of the sultan’s special retinue, which was strictly forbidden for others.268  
One peculiarity of this army made its loyalty to the sultan absolute. The soldiers 
in these corps were recruited from Christian lands in their childhood and underwent a 
special education and training before filling military offices, as well as posts in the civil 
bureaucracy. The special education, one might call this process rather ‘brain-washing’, 
produced a class of unquestioned defenders of the devlet-i ebed-müddet. Not only 
because of the education they vigorously worked for the prosperity of the state but they 
also had practical reasons to do so: their own prosperity was also closely linked to the 
prosperity of the state. Furthermore, their adoration of the state was reinforced by the 
special legal status of these slave origin statesmen. Contrary to the legal status of an 
ordinary subject, their lives stood between the lips of the sultan, whose decisions on 
their death were never questioned.  
                                                 
267 See Palmer, pp.495-550.  
268 Cited and quoted in Palmer, pp. 496-8.  
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One should also note that the Janissary corps was the only standing army using 
firearms. Consequently, contrary to the piecemeal organization of provincial cavalry, the 
Janissary corps held a great accumulation of military power. Thus they always had 
eminent influence on the Palace, and thus on the Ottoman politics. One should mention 
the fact that in the course of time some Janissary garrisons were stationed in the fortress 
of provincial cities to strengthen the central control on the provincial administration.269  
The liaison of Janissary corps with the Bektashis constitutes one of the most 
controversial topics of early Ottoman historiography. Earliest references to the 
connection between Janissary corps and Hacı Bektaş date back to the mid-fifteenth 
century. The Divan of the fifteenth-century Bektashi poet Sadık Abdal, who most 
probably died during the mid-fifteenth century270, is the earliest source indicating Hacı 
Bektaş’s spiritual patronage on the corps. Sadık Abdal states that Hacı Bektaş turned his 
courageous auspices on Janissaries and because of that they had a great opportunity.271 
A poetic work on the legendary prophet Hızır, namely Hızırnāme, written in 1476 by a 
shaykh near Isparta, which had just become part of Ottoman territory, also indicates the 
association between Hacı Bektaş and the Ottomans. Alongside with many other shaykhs 
from several orders, the author mentions Hacı Bektaş as well, referring to him as the 
                                                 
269 See, for example, Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, p. 107.  
270 Sadık Abdal was apparently a disciple of Seyyid Ali Sultan and grew up the latter’s tekke in Dimetoka. 
His dīvan is the only source about Sadık Abdal. The unique available manuscript of this work is copied by 
certain Rüstem Abdal in 1155/1742-3 and preserved in Konya Bölge Yazmalar Kütüphanesi, Hacı 
Bektaş’tan gelen kitaplar, no. 255. In his dīvan, Sadık Abdal explains how he became a disciple of Seyyid 
Ali Sultan, by giving valuable details. Most of the verses in this work are devoted to phrase Hacı Bektaş 
Veli and Seyyid Ali Sultan, the former is referred to as pir while the latter as mürşid. The transliterated 
text of the dīvan is being prepared for publication by Dursun Gümüşoğlu. I thank him for sharing with me 
a copy of this manuscript.  
271 “Şecâ’atle nazar kılmış Yeniçeri kullarına ol / Sezâ oldı ânınçün anlara ol fırsat-ı kübrâ”, Dîvan-ı 
Sâdık Abdal, manuscript, fol. 4a. 
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person guarding the Ottoman lands.272 The Velâyetnâme of Otman Baba, written in 
1483, also indicates the connection between Hacı Bektaş and Janissary corps. In the 
legendary account of the velâyetnâme the headgear of Janissaries is reported as the 
investiture of Hacı Bektaş.273 
Aşıkpaşazāde also touches upon the connection between the Janissaries and 
Bektashis, attempting to reject it.274 He first states Bektashis’ argument that the hat of 
the Janissaries derived from Hacı Bektaş; and then explains how it was fabricated by the 
Bektashis. He says, during the time of Orhan Beg, Abdal Musa participated in several 
gazās among Janissaries. One day he took a worn-out hat from one of Janissaries. When 
he returned from the campaign people asked about the hat on his head. Being proud, he 
answered: “I have worn the cap of gāzis. … This is called ‘elif tāc’.”275 Then finishes 
Aşıkpaşazāde: “This is the true origin of their [Bektashis’] hat (tāc).”276 He also 
underlines the point that Hacı Bektaş Veli did not meet any members of the Ottoman 
                                                 
272 “Ol Hacı Bekdaş-ı güzīn gözler bu Osman illerin / Öpdüm mübārek ellerin bir gine görsem yüzlerin.” 
See Divan-ı Muhyiddin Çelebi or Hızırnāme, Manuscript, Đstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe 
Yazmalar, no. 949, fol. 27b. For further reading on Muhyiddin Çelebi and Hızırnāme, see Ahmet Yaşar 
Ocak, “Hızırnâme”, Türkiye Diyanet Waqfı Đslâm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 17, 417-9; Mehmet Saffet Sarıkaya, 
“Hızırname’nin Bektaşiliğe Dair Malumatı ve Hızırname Çerçevesinde Bektaşi Kültüründe Hızır Đnancı”, 
2. Uluslararası Türk Kültür Evreninde Alevilik ve Bektaşilik Bilgi Şöleni Bildiri Kitabı, Filiz Kılıç and 
Tuncay Bülbül (eds.), Ankara, 2007, 1463-80. 
273 Gö’çek Abdal, Odman Baba Vilâyetnamesi, Vilâyetname-i Şāhî, haz. Şevki Koca, Đstanbul: Bektaşi 
Kültür Derneği, 2002, pp. 198-9. 
274 Aşıkpaşazāde’s account pertaining to Bektashis needs a careful reading and criticism. First of all, as 
Köprülü long ago called attention, he was an “enemy of Bektashis”. (Köprülü, “Abdal Musa”, nşr. Orhan 
Köprülü, Türk Kültürü, 124, Şubat 1973, p. 198.) Köprülü states that from Aşıkpaşazāde on the strict 
sunni ulemā of Ottomans flourished such a negative and pejorative attitude with regard to the origin of 
Bektashims and Hacı Bektaş Veli, and criticizes modern scholars like G. Jakop for they followed sunni 
ulemā on this account. Second, his principal aim in writing his history was to prove the primary role of his 
ancestors that are the descendants of Baba Đlyas, in the foundation of the empire. Thus he attempts to tone 
down the contribution of other groups, including Bektashis. See Halil Đnalcık, “How to Read 
Aşıkpaşazāde’s History”, in Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage, edited by 
Colin Heywood and Colin Imber, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1994, 139-56. Republished in Halil Đnalcık, Essays 
in Ottoman History, Istanbul, 1998, 31- 50. 
275 “Abdal Musa seferden dönicek gerü vilâyetlerine varmış. Ol Yeniçeriden geydüği börg ile bile varmış. 
Eyitmiş kim: ‘Üş de ben gaziler tacın geyüb geldüm’ deyü haylı tefâhür dahı eylemiş. Ol halk buna 
sormuşlar kim: ‘Bunın adı nedür? Buna ne derler?’ demişler. Bu dahi anlara cevap böyle vermiş kim: 
‘Buna bükme elif tac derler’ demiş.” See APZ, p. 238.  
276 APZ, p. 238.  
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dynasty.277 Aşıkpaşazāde’s endeavour to reject any link between Hacı Bektaş and the 
Janissary corps, however, clearly shows that such ideas were already in circulation 
during the second half of the fifteenth century; thus his account intrinsically indicates 
some sort of connection between the two.  
Among modern scholars Fuat Köprülü seems to follow Aşıkpaşazāde. According 
to him the liaison between the Janissary corps and Bektashis originates from the intense 
participation of Babāī dervishes, who later became Bektashi, in the early gazās.278 Thus, 
the connection between the two was an intrinsic one, which developed spontaneously in 
the course of events.279 Mélikoff also indicates the liaison between Janissary corps and 
the Bektashi Order, and regards this connection as a result of the warm relationship of 
early Bektashi missionaries with the Ottoman dynasty and a proof of the privileged 
position of Bektashis in the Ottoman Empire. A representative (vekil) of the order used 
to be present in the Janissary corps (ocak).280 She, on the authority of the fifteenth 
century Ottoman historian Oruç Beg, underlines the role of the brother of Orhan Beg Ali 
                                                 
277 “Bu Hacı Bektaş Âl-i Osman neslinden hiç kimse ile musahabet etmedi. ... Her kimse kim Hacı Bektaş 
Âl-i Osmandan kimse ile musâhabet etdi der ise yalandur, şöyle bilesiz. ” See APZ, pp. 237, 238. 
278 See Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, Albany : 
State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 108. 
279 The intimate affiliation between Bektashism and the gazā milieu is reflected in the expansion of 
Bektashi influence in Anatolia. As Faroqhi determines from contemporary sources, the order almost was 
non existent in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, while proliferating in central and western 
Anatolia. See Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da Bektaşilik, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, 
Đstanbul: 2003, p. 192.    
280 Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, p. 32. Also see Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, “Açıklama”, in Vilâyet-nâme. 
Menâkın-ı Hünkâr Hacı Bektâş-ı Veli, Đstanbul: Đnkılâp Kitabevi, 1995, pp. 125-8. However, Suraiya 
Faroqhi calls attention to the fact that the connection between the Janissary corps and the Bektashi Order 
is poorly reflected in official documents. Her research on the socio-economic history of Bektashi tekkes in 
Anatolia showed that the relationship between Janissaries and the known Bektashi tekkes was almost 
ignorable. Yet she refers some archival evidence indicating the participation of newly recruited Janissaries 
(acemi oğlanları) to the annual festival of the Tekke of Seyyid Gāzi towards the end of the sixteenth 
century. See Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da Bektaşilik, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, 
Đstanbul: 2003, pp. 138-9.  
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Pasha’s affiliation to Bektashi circles in augmenting the prestige of Hacı Bektaş and in 
making him eventually the patron-saint of Janissaries.281  
                                                 
281 Irène Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme 
turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 120-5. According to 
Oruç, Ali Pasha denounced his claims on temporal sovereignty and chose a dervish-like life. When the 
first standing army of Ottomans created during the time of Orhan, Ali Pasha suggested his brother put this 
new army under the spiritual protection of Hacı Bektaş. Then Orhan obtained the icāzet of Hacı Bektaş 
and akbörk, the characteristic white cap of Janissaries, for this purpose. See Oruc, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, 
ed. Franz Babinger, Hannover, 1925, pp. 15-6; Oruç Beg Tarihi, ed. Nihal Atsız, Đstanbul, 1972, p. 34.    
According to Mélikoff, the wide currency of Bektashi Order in the Ottoman lands was primarily due to the 
support of early Ottoman begs and due to its close connection with the core of the Ottoman army, i. e. 
Janissaries; the personality of Hacı Bektaş was only of the secondary importance on this development. 
(Irène Mélikoff, “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 133-4; Hacı Bektaş 
Efsaneden Gerçeğe, trs. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, p. 196.) On the other hand, 
the Ottoman administration benefited from Bektashis in colonizing newly conquered lands, in educating 
and Islamizing both Turkoman-Muslims and non-Muslim population, in propagating Islamic culture, and 
especially in converting and religiously educating newly recruited Christian-origin soldiers, which 
constituted the Janissary corps. The lodges founded by these dervishes also included food and shelter for 
travelers. (See Fuat Köprülü, Köprülü, Fuat, "Anadoluda Đslamiyet", Dârülfünûn Edebiyat Fakültesi 
Mecmuası, IV, 1922-3, 291-303; Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques 
musulmans, Istanbul, 1929. Ömer Lütfi Barkan,  “Osmanlı Đmparatorluğunda bir Đskan ve Kolonizasyon 
Metodu olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler; Đstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zaviyeler”, 
Vakıflar Dergisi, II, 1942, 279-304; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term 
Survival: The Bektashi Order and the Ottoman State (Sixteenth-seventeenth centuries)”, Bektachiyya: 
Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, ed. Alexandre 
Popovic-Giles Veinstein, Đstanbul : ISIS Press, 1996, p. 172.) As Mélikoff writes : “L’Ordre des Bektaşis 
a été, dans les premiers temps de l’Empire ottoman, un ordre qui jouissait de la faveur gouvernementale en 
raison des liens étroits qui existaient entre les premiers sultans et les derviches affiliés à l’Ordre. Le rôle 
des Bektaşis parait avoir été un rôle de prosélytisme et propagation de la culture islamique à l’échelle 
populaire. Ce rôle d’éducateurs du peuple des campagnes ressort clairement du Vilayetnâme. Un plus de 
ce rôle d’éducateurs, Ömer Lütfi Barkan a établi, à la lumière de documents, la contribution de ces 
derviches à l’expansion de l’économie rurale dans les régions inhabitées et dans les pays nouvellement 
conquis. Ce rôle de colonisateurs et d’éducateurs explique sans doute la raison pour laquelle le Corps des 
Janissaires, composé d’éléments d’origine étrangère, a été placé sous la protection spirituelle d’un saint 
dont les adaptes étaient chargés de l’éducation de masses.” (See Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches 
colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, p. 123.)  
In a short while, the Ottoman sultans assumed another role to the order: canalizing and organizing under 
the control of Ottoman administration those masses that was yet mal-Islamized or non-Islamized.  All 
these roles inevitably shifted the Order outside of the approved-sunni sphere of Islam. The heterodox 
elements from those mal-Islamized groups, such as Kalenderi, Abdal, Hurufi, etc., fused in Bektashi pot 
proliferating within the Order. This argument was first made by Fuat Köprülü and then further developed 
by later scholars such as Mélikoff and Ocak. According to Köprülü in the early sixteenth century Abdals 
deeply revered Hacı Bektaş but they were not yet Bektashi yet. By the seventeenth century, however, 
continuous pressure of the Ottoman administration on heterodox groups forced them to take shelter under 
the umbrella of Bektashi Order. In the course of time they melted in Bektashim. (See Fuad Köprülü, 
“Abdal”, Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, Đstanbul, 1935, pp. 31, 36.) 
Especially the infection of the Order by the qizilbash propaganda during the reign of Selim I seriously 
raised the suspect of the Ottoman administration on Bektashis. (Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches 
colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, p. 124.)  Mélikoff says, “Les Bektasis ont été à l’origine un instrument du 
gouvernement ottoman, chargés par une initiative venue du Sultan, de ranger sous la bannière d’un 
Sunnisme libéral et tolérant [Compare her “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, in her Sur les traces 
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3.2.2. The Rise of the Ottoman Elite  
It is to be shown in the following chapters that the decomposition of ‘Ak-börg’ and 
‘Kızıl-börg’, i.e. the creation of an infantry corps alongside tribal Turkoman fighters, 
would ultimately lead to a violent clash between the two in Anatolia, which would 
appear as a Qizilbash uprising. Indeed, the bipartition of ‘Ak-börg’ and ‘Kızıl-börg’ was 
part of a more comprehensive ongoing process: the formation of the routinized state at 
the cost of the tribal chieftancy. Another major part of this process was the emergence of 
the bureaucracy and judicial administrative system. The contemporary sources leave no 
doubt that both the creation of central army and the establishment of administrative-
judicial bases of the state was fulfilled by continuously arriving ulemā class. As the 
tribal war-bands of mounted archers were gradually replaced by a regular army, so were 
the popular-sufi shaykhs by the madrasa-educated ulemā, who would transform the 
tribal chieftaincy of Osman into a classical Middle Eastern Islamic state.282 
Aşıkpaşazāde’s account clearly points out the role of ulemā in this transformation. Upon 
deciding to establish a regular infantry, Orhan Beg was advised to ask ulemā how to 
form this army. Then he went to Çandarlı Karaca Halil (d. 1387), who was then the qādi 
of Bilecik, and acted according to his advice.    
                                                                                                                                                
du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 135. Indeed 
such an attitude regarding to the early phase of Bektashism, and to Hacı Bektaş himself, was first put 
forward by Köprülü. He argued that heterodox tone of Bektashism, and that attributed to Hacı Bektaş, was 
mostly a production of later ulemā and sunni circles, starting with Aşıkpaşazāde. See Köprülü, “Abdal 
Musa”, p. 198.] … au service des Sultans ottomans, ils deviennent des derviches colonisateurs, éducateurs 
et propagateurs populaires de la religion islamique et de la culture turque ; et enfin, victimes de ce rôle de 
colonisateurs et d’éducateurs, ils ont fini par devenir un ordre hétérodoxe, libéral, supra-confessionnel, 
non-conformiste et révolutionnare.” (Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, p. 
125. Also consider her “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, pp. 136-7. Also see her “Ahmed 
Yesevi et la mystique populaire turque”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam 
populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 149.) 
 
282 The ulemā immigration to the Ottoman lands gained impetus during under Orhan Beg. As will be 
returned later, the first Ottoman madrasa was opened during this time. Compare Lindner, Stimulus and 
Justification in Early Ottoman History”, pp. 213-6; Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 16.   
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One should note that the existence of fakıs, somewhat representatives of sunni 
Islam, around Ottoman begs as advisors in administrative and legislative-judicial matters 
traces back to the time of Osman. Nevertheless, those religious figures during the early 
periods of the beylik should be rather deemed as the ‘precursor’ of the upcoming ‘high 
Islamic’ or ‘real’ ulemā. Yet no others but primarily these fakıs were responsible for the 
regulation of the social, administrative, and legal affairs of the early beylik. When 
conquered a new place Osman Beg consulted fakıs on how to establish the religious and 
legal basis of his administration in the region. As the only scholars of the (sunni) Islamic 
law, fakıs laid the legal and administrative foundations of the beylik. In the lower level, 
in towns and villages, they functioned as the ‘official’ religious leaders of the 
community as imams. As we learn from tahrir registers, many waqfs were stowed by 
Osman and Orhan to fakıs.283 In a couple of decades, however, fakıs left their places and 
roles, as advisors of the begs, to the classical ulemā class.     
The role of the ulemā class, especially of the Çandarlı family, was indeed far 
beyond merely being advisors. Rather it stands to reason to argue that they were the real 
architects of the emerging state. It is to be shown that early sources of the Ottoman 
history present members of the Çandarlı family, who uninterruptedly held the most 
important posts of the state such as kadıasker and grand vizier through generations,284 
                                                 
283 See Halil Đnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, p. 56; “Osman I”, p. 446; “Orhan”, p. 383. 
284 For a biography of this utmost influential family in the Ottoman polity, especially until the conquest of 
Konstantinople, see Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi, Ankara: TTK, 1988. (First published 
in 1974.) In his work, Uzunçarşılı provides persuasive evidence that it was indeed the Çandarlı family who 
created the administrative and judicial apparatus of the Ottoman state as well as directing internal and 
external policy of the state. In this perspective, one might regard them as real founders of the state. 
Nevertheless, taking advantage of the limitless charisma brought by the conquest of Constantinople, 
Mehmed II put an end to the absolute dominance of the Çandarlı family in state affairs, executing Çandarlı 
Halil Paşa, who was then the leader of the family and the grand vizier. For further reading on the 
execution of Çandarlı Halil Paşa and Mehmed II’s policy of favoring slave-origin statesmen against 
ulemā-origin statesmen, see Halil Đnalcık, “Đstanbul’un Fethinden Önce Fatih Sultan Mehmed”, in his 
Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler ve Vesikalar, I, Ankara: TTK, 1995 (First published in 1954.), 69-136.  
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and other danişmends as immediate counselors of the sultans and as the personages who 
initiated all the institutions of the routinized state. It should also be mentioned that in the 
Ottoman realm, the first madrasa, perhaps one of the most important institutes of 
traditional Islamic civilization not only for producing science and knowledge but also 
providing grounds of legitimacy for Islamic states,285 was opened in Đznik in 1331 by 
Orhan Beg.286 Needless to say, madrasas, and thus the scholars that graduated from 
these schools, proliferated literacy-based sunni Islam at the cost of ‘heterodox’ popular 
mysticism in the Ottoman realm.287  
The accumulation of the ulemā class in the Ottoman realm did not only establish 
a classical Islamic state machinery but also created a culturally ‘Persianized’ and 
‘Arabized’ intellectual elite, which concomitantly produced the ‘Ottoman high culture’, 
which was an extension of ‘the Middle Eastern cosmopolitan culture’ as called by 
Đnalcık.288 Indeed, this was not an original story; before Ottomans, a differentiation 
between the Turkoman way of life and ‘high culture’, which was developed under the 
                                                 
285 The reader might consider that the history of madrasa institution traces back to the Madrasa of 
Nizamiyye founded by the famous statesmen and grand vizier of Great Seljuks. The institutionalization of 
education and scholarly activities under the madras system marked the Islamic ulemā’s loss of 
independency against the state. Taking their salary from the state budget, from then on ulemā’s role of 
legitimizing political power, which was actually developed to certain extent under Umayyad rule, gained 
stress. Hence, to a certain extent, madrasas served to transform religion into a tool of politics. The 
situation was equally valid in the Ottoman empire as well. According to Ocak, being a part of state 
machinery, the ulemā class left aside their fundamental function of producing knowledge and but engaged  
in producing bureaucrats to the administrative machinery and in legitimizing every action of the sultan. 
See Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, pp. 94, 110-11.  
286 It should be noted, however, that one might regard the ulemā in the Ottoman principality at this time 
rather a transition generation. Dâvud-ı Kayserî, the first mudarris of the first madrasa was a genuine 
follower of Ibn Arabī, whose mystical teaching evolved around the theory of ‘oneness of the being’, 
‘vahdet-i vücūd’ has always been suspected, even harshly criticized at times, among ulemā circles. On 
Dâvud-ı Kayserî, see Mehmet Süreyya, Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 1, Đstanbul, 1332, pp. 67-9; A. Turan 
Akbulut, “Dâvud-ı Kayserî”, Đslam Medeniyeti Mecmuası, 4, 1980, 61-83; Mehmet Bayraktar, “Dâvud-ı 
Kayserî”, DIA, 9, 32-5. On the reception of Ibn Arabī’s teaching in the Ottoman world, see Michel 
Chodkiewicz, “Đbn Arabî’nin Öğretisinin Osmanlı Dünyasında Karşılanışı”, in Osmanlı Toplumunda 
Tasavvuf ve Sufiler, ed. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak,  Ankara: TTK, 2005, 89-111.  
287 Compare Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 82.  
288 Halil Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, in Ottoman Civilization, I, edited by 
Halil Đnalcık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, p. 20. 
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patronage of sultans or begs and around palaces, had already been experienced under the 
Seljuks of Anatolia. As demonstrated by Ahmet Y. Ocak, the differentiation between the 
Turkoman mass and the Anatolian Seljukid elite, who always regarded the latter of 
secondary rank calling them ‘Etrāk-i bī-idrāk’ or ‘turks with low capacity of cognition’, 
soon turned into alienation, then into antagonism, and finally into a fierce clash. The 
Turkoman mass, now deeming Seljukid authority entirely oppressor, rose up, following 
messianic-millennialist teaching of Baba Đlyas. It is interesting to note that it was the 
mystical followers of Baba Đlyas and the same social segment fought under his banner 
that provided the foremost support to the early Ottoman begs. Nevertheless, concomitant 
to the consolidation of the Ottoman power, the same story repeated: the high Middle 
Eastern Islamic culture in the Anatolian Seljukid palace and cities now moved to the 
Ottoman capital. And closely linked to this process, the Turkoman elements were 
gradually diffused from the Ottoman official sphere.  
It is not surprising to see that most of the ulemā and statesmen in the fourteenth-
century Ottoman realm are described as either ‘coming from Persia (Acem)’ or ‘coming 
from Karaman’, one of the centers of Anatolian Seljukid civilization.289 This fact is 
succinctly reflected in a verse of Le’âlî: 
Acem’in her biri kim Rûm’a gelir, 
Ya vezâret ya sancak uma gelir. 
Whoever of the Persians comes to the Ottoman land, 
                                                 
289 See, for example, APZ, pp. 154, 240. The geographic connotation of ‘Karaman’ includes both the town 
Lārende and the region ruled by Karaman dynasty before Ottoman annexation. After Mehmed II put an 
end to the Karamanid rule the whole region became an Ottoman province and called “Vilāyet-i Karaman” 
whose capital was Konya. See J. H. Kramers, “Karaman”, IA, vol. 6, pp. 309-311; “Karaman”, IA, 6, 309-
311; Metin Tuncel, “Karaman”, DIA, 24, 444-447. While Aşıkpaşazāde was writing his history, this was 
already happened. So when his context above ‘Karaman’ must be taken as Konya and the high Islamic 
cultural basin around.  
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Comes either for a hope of a ministry or a governorship.290  
In later periods, the prestige of Persia-Islamic culture attained such a level that 
writing in Turkish was perceived as insufficiency and shame. Furthermore, proving 
affiliation to this ‘high culture’, which in most cases meant proving to be Persian origin, 
automatically attracts the favor of sultan and ruling class. Đnalcık notes that many 
Ottoman intellectuals went to Persia for further education and were welcomed as 
masters when they returned. An exemplary case cited by Đnalcık strikingly shows the 
degree of Persian and Arabic dominance on the high Ottoman culture in the fifteenth 
century: “Lâlî, one of the scribes, stayed in Persia for a long time and when he returned, 
he introduced himself as Persian. He became a musâhib to the Conqueror and when the 
truth was revealed, his position of manager of the zāviye and his salary were taken away 
from him.”291 The predicament of Turkish intellectuals and artists is perhaps best 
reflected in Mesîhî’s following verse: 
Mesîhî gökden insen sana yer yok, 
Yürü var gel Arab’dan ya Acemden. 
Oh Mesîhî there is no place for you even if you descend from the Heavens 
[For the only way of attaining esteem] Go and then come either from Arabia or 
from Persia.292  
On the other hand, parallel to the consolidation of their supremacy, Ottoman 
sultans offered generous patronage to newly arriving intellectuals and artists, for having 
renowned scholars and artists in the realm was perceived as a sign of splendor. It is 
known that, in the fifteenth century, Ottoman sultans pursued a conscious policy to 
                                                 
290 Quoted in Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 19.  
291 See Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 21.  
292 Mesîhî, Mesîhî Divanı, ed. Mine Mengi, Ankara, 1995, p. 231.  
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attract talents from the East to the Ottoman palace. Sehi Bey states, for example, “The 
conqueror used to search and bring to his court people of talents in the lands of Arabia 
and Persia and showed to them an extraordinary esteem.”293 Indeed, the palace 
patronage as an institute had been already established in the Islamic world long before 
the Ottomans. As Đnalcık indicates, in the absence of the printing press, which gave the 
opportunity for large masses to read and thus provided for authors a source of income as 
the scholars and artiste were dependent on the support of rulers and ruling class. It is 
simply because of this fact that ‘high culture’ in most Islamic states existed basically as 
the palace culture.294 Another function of the patronage of culture in the Turkish-Mongol 
states appeared as “the process of adopting the indigenous civilization for the military 
class.”295   
To conclude, the intellectual and cultured elite of the Ottoman state were formed 
by ‘immigrant’ or ‘imported’ ulemā and bureaucrats as well as artists and men of letters. 
While establishing the administrative machinery, they also imported high Islamic 
civilization, which had flourished in the hinterlands of Islam, to the Ottoman cities. 
Hence, imitating traditional style in the great Islamic states, a ‘palace culture’ of 
Ottomans was also growing under the initiative of ‘imported’ intellectuals and artists. Of 
course many indigenous scholars and artists educated in Ottoman madrasas and grown 
up in the palace banquets of either the sultans themselves or of other prominent 
                                                 
293 Sehi Bey, Heşt Bihişt, ed. G. Kut, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 97. For further 
discussion of the issue, see Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, pp. 18-23.  
294 Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 18. For further reading on the palace 
patronage of science and art in the Ottoman empire, and in the Islamic world in general, see Halil Đnalcık, 
Şair ve Patron: Patrimonyal Devlet ve Sanat Üzerinde Sosyolojik Bir Đnceleme. Ankara: Doğu Batı 
Yayınları, 2003; “Klasik Edebiyat Menşei: Đranî Gelenek, Saray Đşret Meclisleri ve Musâhib Şâirler”, Türk 
Edebiyatı Tarihi, 1, ed. Talât Halman, Đstanbul: TC Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006,221-82.    
295 Đnalcık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 18. 
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statesmen appeared in the course of time. Nonetheless the hegemony of Persian and 
Arabic culture in the Ottoman high circles continued.  
From the fifteenth century on, the ‘Persianized’ and ‘Arabized’ elite began to 
recruit novices from a completely new source of men: the slaves or kapı kulları. In the 
middle of the fifteenth century the power of slave-origin statesmen reached such a level 
that the sultan used to use the balance of power between them and ulemā-origin 
statesmen to maintain his absolute authority. It has been shown that following the 
conquest of Constantinople, the Conqueror changed the balance within the Ottoman 
state machinery in favor of the former group.  
A detailed analysis of the emergence of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite and ulemā 
class is far beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to state here that by end of the 
fifteenth century, an ‘Ottoman ruling elite’ with well-determined cultural, intellectual, 
ideological, and social boundaries had already emerged. Being eminently attached to the 
classical Middle Eastern Islamic cosmopolitan culture, they were totally alienated from 
the simple culture and ‘way of life’ of Turkomans.  
 
3.2.3. The Development of the Ottoman Ideology or “Imperial Regime”  
It should be mentioned that the arising ‘official ideology’ developed concomitantly with 
the growing of the elite class. The official ideology of Ottomans was indeed a work of 
these elite.  The most dominant components of the ‘Ottoman official ideology’ might 
well be regarded as the notion of the exalted-eternal state (devlet-i ebed-müddet)296 as a 
                                                 
296 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak argues that in the Ottoman empire the sate is a subject of belief and regarded as a 
sacred being. See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 73. Ocak also underlines that, following 
the Islamic state tradition, Ottomans perceived ‘state’ and ‘religion’ (din ü devlet) as inseparable twins. 
See ibid, p. 83.  
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possession of the Sultan (patrimonial state)297 and the sunni-orthodox way of Islam as 
socio-religious system of the empire to maintain the order and harmony.298 Indeed, as 
Ocak indicates state and religion were so much intermingled that the border-line 
between the two was usually blurred.299 The first notion was chiefly developed by slave-
origin statesmen whose existence and prosperity was eminently linked to the state, while 
the ‘approved way of socio-religious, and dependently judicial, life’ was proliferated by 
the ulemā class.300  
In terms of polity, what the Ottoman regime premised was for the tribal 
Turkomans unacceptable by nature. The ideal society envisaged was composed of 
compartments with well-defined boundaries; and inter-compartment transition was 
strongly discouraged.301 This political understanding was conceptualized as the “order of 
                                                 
297 Halil Đnalcık analyzes the patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state, making special reference to Max 
Weber’s typification of the Ottoman polity. See Halil Đnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber's 
Typification of the Ottoman Polity.” Princeton Papers: In Near Eastern Studies 1, 1992, 49-72.  
298 Compare Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, pp. 104-5.  
299 Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 73. Also consider Halil Đnalcık, “Islam in the Ottoman Empire”, 
Cultura Turcica, 5-7, 1968-1970, 19-29.  
300 It should be noted that although there were some slave-origin scholars from the fifteenth century 
onwards, the members of the ulemā class were principally derived from the Muslim subjects of the 
empire. Đnalcık points out this fact in a slightly different manner: “… with regard to the concept of state, 
while the ulemā laid emphasis on the Islamic notions, the bureaucrats (küttâb) insisted on the Turko-
Iranian traditions.” See Halil Đnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân”, in his 
The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Bloomington, 1993, p. 70. The twin-
structure of the Ottoman state is clearly visible in the judicial system of the empire. As is well-known, 
Ottoman laws rose upon two different sources: the Shari’a and the Tradition or Örf. The affairs of the 
religious sphere and daily life of the re’āya were subject to the Islamic Law, while the state affairs were 
arranged by the Sultanic Laws, whose origin traces back to the Turko-Mongolian tradition of örf or yasa. 
Đnalcık indicates that by the Turkish domination in the Islamic world, which started mainly by Great 
Seljuks in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Islamic scholars developed a political theory which 
emphasizes the necessity of a sultanic authority separated from the religious law. Thence, in the later 
Islamic states, the temporal rulers enjoyed the power to create a ‘secular’ sphere of jurisprudence side by 
side the Shari’a.  See Halil Đnalcık, “Şerî’at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet”, in his Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk , 
Adâlet, Đstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46.  
301 As Đnalcık has pointed out, Ottomans inherited this type of conceptualization of state from the Persian 
tradition, which divides the society into four estates at the top of which, between the society and God 
indeed, stays the ruler: 1) clergy, 2) military, 3) scribes, 4) artisans, merchants, herders of cattle, peasants, 
etc. See Đnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 53-4. The letter of Tansar, a royal advice letter from 
Sasanian times, advices the ruler: “Assuredly there shall be no passing from one [estate] to another unless 
in the character of one of us outstanding capacity is found. … The King of kings … kept each man in his 
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the realm” or “nizām-ı ālem”. The protection of the order of the realm was more 
important than all affairs.302 The protection of the order generally meant keeping every 
subject within their own social compartment. Hence Ottoman polity fervently favored 
social stability and strongly discouraged social mobility.303 Indeed, most of the stern 
reactions of the state against social upheavals, including Qizilbash rebellions, were 
simply because of the menace posed to the socio-political order of the Ottomans. 
Nevertheless, the harsh measures of the state were usually skinned by  the religious 
formulation of heresy.304  
The most evident discrimination in this ideal socio-political order was between 
the ruling class (askerī) and ruled subjects (re’āya).305 The foremost concern of the 
Ottoman regime had always been to absorb the political content of the re’āya, aiming to 
make politics an exclusive profession of the askerī class. In order to achieve this goal 
against tribal order, Ottoman policy focused on destructing two fundamental basis’ of 
the tribal system: breaking down the hereditary transmission of power and prosperity 
                                                                                                                                                
own station and forbade any to meddle with a calling other then that for which it had pleased God … to 
create him. He laid commands moreover on the heads of the four estates. … All were concerned with their 
means of livelihood and their own affairs, and did not constrain kings to this by evil devices and acts of 
rebellion. … The commands given by the King of kings for occupying people with their own tasks and 
restraining them from those of others are for the stability of the world and the order of the affairs of men. 
…” See The Letter of Tansar, trans. M. Boyce, Rome, 1968, pp. 33-6. Quoted and cited in Đnalcık, 
“Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 53-4.  
302 It is interesting to note that among the most popular disciplines in the Ottoman madrasas was fıkh, the 
Islamic jurisprudence, which deals with the clarification, consolidation, and imposition of the rules of the 
Ottoman socio-religious order.  
303 Compare Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 84, Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 51-66.  
304 The reader might remember the merged nature of state and religion in the Ottoman empire.  
305 See, for example, Đnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, p. 49; “Quelques remarques sur la formation du 
capital dans l’empire ottoman”, Histoire Economique du Monde Mediterraneen 1450-1650: Melanges en 
l'Honneur de Fernand Braudel, 1973, p. 235. According to Kafadar, the stratification of society as askeī 
and re’āya traces back to the time of Murad I, who also appointed first kādıasker and frontier begs (uç 
beyleri). See Kafadar, pp. 142-3.  
 115 
and dividing subjects into the smallest pieces so that they would be totally devoid of the 
capacity to develop socio-political organization.306  
From this point of view, one may regard Ottoman timar system as a perfect 
embodiment of the Ottoman classical regime developed at the cost of the tribal system. 
As well-known timar holders were simply servants of the sultan without any social and 
lineage roots and were appointed directly by the central government.307 It is true that the 
Ottomans assigned timars to the local aristocracy of the region they conquered. 
However, they usually received a timar in region far away from their homeland.308 
Furthermore, upon the death of a timar holder, his offspring could take over only a small 
portion of the prosperity of their father. So as timar regime progressed so did the 
function of heredity decease in the administrative system.  
                                                 
306 Indeed, following the Persian tradition, Ottomans regarded the right of rule solely a possession of the 
Sultan. The askerī class was nothing but the tool of the Sultan in ruling re’āya. One should remember that 
in this context ruling means to preserve every member of society within their pre-described boundaries, or 
to preserve the ‘order of the affairs of men”. In the letter of Tansar cited above, the first three estates 
obviously constitute the state, i.e. askerī class in the Ottoman context. As owner of the state, thus, the 
Sultan was to a certain extend, also owner of the people belonging to the askerī class. In the classical form 
of the Ottoman regime, kuls represented arguably the ‘perfect askerīs’, owing everything to the Sultan, 
but, in return, holding the most important posts of the state and exercising the power in the name of the 
Sultan. Although being deemed askerī, the ulemā had a different status. Nevertheless, the status, 
privileges, and any forms of power were delivered directly by the Sultan to all members of askerī class, 
either kul- or Turkish-origin. As the absolute owner of the whole state apparatus, thus, the Sultan enjoyed 
some sort of ownership on the people running the state. On the other hand, the re’āya was in a completely 
different status. They were, to certain extend, protected from the arbitrary interference of the Sultan by the 
Shari’a. In the meantime, they were ‘subject’ to the rule of askerī class with the full meaning of the word. 
The function of re’āya was strictly limited to the production of food and goods. (For a broader analysis of 
the Ottoman polity, see Đnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, especially pp. 49-60.) There is no doubt that 
the Ottoman monarchy with a highly centralized administrative apparatus and an omnipotent ruler at the 
top took its classical form under Mehmed II. With the immense prestige provided by the conquest of 
Constantinople, Mehmed II first eliminated elements which could have resisted him. (His execution of 
Çandarlı Halil Pasha and dismissal of this family from effective posts in the bureaucracy is already 
referred.) The reader might remember that the first codes or general kanun-nāmes were promulgated by 
Mehmed II. See Halil Đnalcık, “Mehmed II”, IA, 7, 506-535; “Kānunnāme”, EI2, electronic edition; “The 
Rise of the Ottoman Empire”, The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. 
Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 300-308; “Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş, Örfî- Sultanî Hukuk 
ve Fatih’in Kanunları, Siyasi Đlimler ve Hukuk”, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 13, 1958, 102-126. 
307 For timar regime, see See Halil Đnalcık, “Tīmār”, EI2; “Giriş” in his Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i 
Sancak-ı Arvanid, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954, pp. XI-XXXVI; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Timar”, IA, 
12/1, 286-333.  
308 See, for example, APZ, pp. 219-20.  
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 As Đnalcık formulized long ago, the timar regime of the Ottomans is based, first 
of all, on peasant family units (çift-hane system).309 A family unit, in this system, was 
simply an agricultural producer totally dismantled of political and military content. More 
important perhaps is that they were placed in a situation in which they could never come 
together to form a political or military unit. Rather the political and military functions in 
the rural area were wholly designed to be held by sipāhis, who were simply appointed 
servitors of the sultan. As a famous maxim frequented in the Ottoman law codes, 
“re’āya ibn-i re’āya”, suggests, even the doors for a peasant-subject to become a state 
servitor, or a member of the ruling class (askerī) are almost completely closed. In the 
Ottoman regime, the ideal re’āya was obedient to the ruling class (ulū’l-emr), totally 
apolitical, never regarding himself in a position to interfere in politics, was totally 
subjugated to the established socio-political order and never thinking of changing his 
status.310 The class of ‘ideal subjects’, which constituted the principal producer class of 
the empire, were under cautious protection of the sultan himself.311 Comment should be 
made here of the frequent articles in the Ottoman law codes insistently ordering to 
protect the rights of subjects against usurpations of askerīs.312   
                                                 
309 For çift-hane system, see Halil Đnalcık, "Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsûmu", Belleten, 23, 1959, 575-610.  
310 See Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 92. 
311 The protection of small farmers, or peasants, had always been foremost concern of the Sultan since 
they constituted the principal producer class, thus, the principal source of revenue for the treasury. See, for 
example, Đnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 62-3.  
312 Ottoman sultans used to promulgate frequent firmans, which might also be regarded as law code, called 
adāletnāme to protect against the usurpation of ruling class, i. e. askerīs.  In these imperial edicts the 
agents of the sultan in provincial offices were strictly banned any practice outside the kānun, or law, 
which was deemed as oppression (zulm). (For a detailed analysis of adāletnāmes, see Halil Đnalcık, 
“Adâletnâmeler”, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 11, 1965, 49-145. Also consider Halil Đnalcık, “Şikâyet 
Hakkı: ‘Arz-i Hâl ve ‘Arz-i Mahzar’lar”, in his Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet, Đstanbul: Eren 
Yayınları, 2000, 49-71.) This was stemmed from the notion of ‘adālet, justice, a key principle constituted 
the kernel of pre-Islamic Persian or Middle Eastern political systems, which was later developed by 
Muslim bureaucrats as well. See Halil Đnalcık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of 
Süleymân”, pp. 70-78.  
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Needles to say, such a piecemeal organization could by no means conform with 
the nature of the tribal way of life, which was based intrinsically on their social 
organization around a lineage, either real of fictitious. Therefore, dividing a tribal unit 
into small pieces is impossible by definition. In other words, it means completely 
destroying the tribal mode of life. As a matter of fact, Ottoman kanuns set nomadic 
tribes apart from the ordinary subjects of the sultan. In the compilations of cadastres, 
they were registered by tribes or cema’ats not by individual or family with places of 
residence, as it was with ordinary re’āya. This was, indeed, inevitable: each tribe was a 
compact political entity, having its own social organization under a tribal chief, who was 
the intermediary between the tribesmen and the outside world. The Ottoman 
administrative system, therefore, had to identify tribes by their chiefs, but could not 
reach every single individual within the tribe, whose absolute loyalty was, before all, to 
his tribal chief.313 It is also evident that the Ottoman model also desired sedentarizing 
nomads. Rudi Paul Lindner showed that Ottoman regulations aimed either to sedentarize 
nomads or “to circumscribe their migrations within a predictable, ‘settled’ routine.”314 
Ottoman administration evidently aimed to curb down two essential features of the 
nomadic-tribal mode of life, namely movement and independence, for these features 
                                                 
313 Lindner detects, in cadastres from the early sixteenth century, some attempts of central government to 
reach down inside the structure of the tribe, bypassing the chiefs and aiming to weaken the political 
structure of tribes. See Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 95.  
314 Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 51. Lindner also determines as an outcome of sedentarization 
policy that in Axylon, for example, the pasturelands and average herds per household decreased from 
1500 to 1500, while mezraas and revenues from Horse Drovers (Atçeken) nomads increased. See ibid, p. 
87. Lindner’s case study on Atçeken tribes in the first quarter of the sixteenth century shows that the 
Ottoman administration forced nomadic tribes to settle down by limiting the pastures on the one hand and 
by levying heavy taxes over herds on the other. As a result, nomads could not maintain minimal seize of 
herds to perpetuate nomadic life and inevitably settled down. See ibid, pp. 75-96. Some premises of 
Lindner are, however, criticized by Halil Đnalcık, who accuses the former for misinterpreting the Ottoman 
taxation system of subjects, namely çift-resmi system. See Đnalcık, “The Yürüks”, pp. 112-3. For a 
detailed study on Atçeken tribes, see Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “A propos des tribus Atčeken (XVe-
XVIe siècles)”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. XXX, 1987, 122-95.  
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made it difficult to govern them.315 On the other hand, this two-fold demand of timar 
regime was basically intolerable for nomadic-tribes, for it threatened the very existence 
of their ‘way of life’.316 At the end, as Lindner concludes, under the prescribed 
conditions “the poor nomad had the final choice of either settlement or revolt.”317 
One should also point the fiscal aspects of timar system, which was also 
incompatible with the nomadic mode of life. First of all, the timar regime rested upon a 
regular record keeping system. All the subjects of the heartlands, the lands on which 
timar regime was imposed, of the empire were recorded according to their tax 
incumbencies as family or half-family units in mufassal tahrir registers (defter). Then 
the sources of income were distributed timar holders, which was also registered as icmāl 
defters. Thus the system established a socio-economic structure which clearly 
determined the limits of freedom for the re’āya, and strictly forbade going outside the 
pre-described sphere. Remembering the fact that the nomadic mode of life is essentially 
rested on ‘mobility’318, one would easily recognize how deep the contradiction between 
the ‘ideal social system’ of the Ottomans and the nomadic way of life.  
                                                 
315 Lindner already discussed Ottoman regulations discouraging nomadic-tribal mode of life by levying 
heavy taxes and fines. In addition to fiscal pressures on nomadic mode of existence, they were also forced 
to fulfill demeaning duties in the military system of the state. See Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 66.  
316 Compare, Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 54-5.  
317 Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 66.  
318 The essence of nomadic mode of life, without doubt, is mobility or constant movement. Roger Cribb 
determines essential features of nomadic life as follows: 1) The presence of transhumance migrations of 
livestock accompanied by human communities- vertical or horizontal, long or short distance. 2) The 
possibility of fluidity in the formation of residential associations, including some turnover in group 
membership in both seasonal and long term changes in the size of co-resident communities. 3) A high 
degree of household autonomy at the operational level of herding logistics and camp group formation. 4) 
The maintenance of a flexible system of rights of axes to territory in accordance with frequent changes in 
residence and wholesale shifts in the pattern of migration tracks and demands on grazing land. See Roger 
Cribb,  Nomads in Archaeology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 20. For another 
definition of pastoral nomadism see Khazanov, p. 16-17. In his definition Khazanov makes clear 
distinctions in economic terms. He stresses two fundamental features of nomads, which are their 
engagement in extensive mobile pastoralism and in periodic migrations. Fredrick Barth records his 
observations on Basseri as follows: “The life of nomads is going on a constant move. They pitch and 
unstitch tents continuously. Thus the question of whether to move on, or to stay camped, constitutes the 
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The constant movement, in fact, does not govern merely daily life of nomads but 
shapes the basis of all aspects of life. Their economy, material culture, social relations, 
moral values, mentality, religious interpretations must be all in competence with 
constant move. In sedentary life, contrary to nomadic one, the fundamental institutions 
of daily life and of society as a whole are based on fixed elements. They live in a 
immovable house; their farms and fields, which constitute the primary means of 
economy, are stationary; they live in a geographically well-delimited village or town 
during almost all of their lifetime; the web of social relations is stable, since they see 
more or less same faces in their routine; they master the environment creating well-
protected houses, villages, and towns, shaping close environment as they wish since they 
live for longtime in same bounded territory. Hence, the position and ‘coordinates’ of 
every member in sedentary society are well determined. They can hardly surpass the 
spatial and social space pre-determined. The situation is completely opposite in nomadic 
societies. They do not recognize borders; they can not be confined in a spatial space. 
Being considerably free from territorial boundaries and spatial constraints, they would 
hardly accept structure and stability of any kind. The notion of independence can be 
arguably regarded as one of the most prominent traits of a nomad’s disposition. They 
successfully combine political autonomy with cultural and economic dependence. 
Besides being essentially reliant on their sedentary counterpart, independence 
                                                                                                                                                
most crucial problem in daily life of nomads. These decisions are the very staff of a pastoral nomad 
existence; they spell the difference between growth and prosperity of the herds, or loss and poverty. Every 
household in a camp is autonomous. Hence every day the members of the camp should decide whether to 
move or to stay. The maintenance of a camp as a social unit thus requires the daily unanimous agreement 
by all members.”318 See Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia, The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh 
Confederacy, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1961, p. 26. 
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paradoxically constitutes one of the fundamental characteristics of nomadic life.319 
Needless to say, therefore, nomadic tribes strongly resisted the expansion of timar 
system. 
To summarize, it was indeed these two principal foundations of the Ottoman 
official ideology or imperial regime that was chiefly responsible for producing an 
antagonized social segment, which would appear with their red head-gear in Anatolia. It 
is to be shown that both the political-military and religious aspects of the Qizilbash 
movement evolved in response to the arising official ideology or regime of the Ottoman 
state. On one hand, the notion of the exalted state, which leaves no room for the political 
content of tribal organization, seriously disturbed the existing political habits of the 
militant Turkomans. On the other hand, the sunni-orthodox version of Islam imposed on 
the subjects by the state was neither practicable nor perceivable by nomadic Turkomans, 
who were too ignorant to understand the subtler details of the religion; thus the 
‘approved’ way of religion was unacceptable for them. As a matter of fact, they refuted 
both imposition of the Ottoman regime and raised the banner of revolt, which would 
appear as if in the name of Safavid shaykhs.320  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
319 For a broader evaluation of nomadic autonomy in context of cultural and economic dependence among 
Middle Eastern tribes see Gellner, “Tribal Society and Its Enemies”, p. 442. 
320 One should be reminded, however, that not all the discontent Turkomans converted to the 
Qizilbashism; but a considerable portion somehow conformed within the Ottoman regime. The focus of 
the present study is those Turkomans who did not conform but raised strong resistance against the 
Ottoman imperialism. 
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3.3.  OTTOMAN REGIME’S DISCONTENTS 
 
3.3.1. Early Protests  
The protest of the Turkoman milieu against the development of the administrative 
apparatus and the growing Ottoman high culture is vividly reflected in the Anonymous 
histories. As Fuat Köprülü put it, Anonyms were produced among lower strata of the 
society and were written to be read by laymen.321 Therefore, they are much closer to folk 
sentiment and opinion than any other early chronicles.  In the Anonyms there are clever 
criticisms against centralization policies and bureaucratization of the state. As a strategy, 
they never directly attacked the sultans but point their criticisms towards Çandarlı Kara 
Halil and other danişmends who were responsible for establishment of the scribal base 
of the state. They accused the newly emerging statesmen of innovating the ‘register’, 
where the tax revenues were written down, which was previously unknown to them.322 
Another severe criticism of Anonyms pointed towards the arising ulemā and 
bureaucratic elite was that these two groups were accumulating a large amount of money 
in the state treasury but not delivering it to the gāzi-fighters.323 This point appears to be 
very important in order to understand the tribal nomadic mentality regarding a state 
organization. These sources depict the piling up of money in the state treasury as a 
                                                 
321 Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, “Lütfi Paşa”, Türkiyat Mecmuası, I, 1926, p. 148.  
322 Compare Halil Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, 2, 1954, pp. 104-5.  
323 According to the tradition, the innovation of one-fifth rule that is taking one-fifth of the booty for the 
treasury was first suggested by a danişmend came from ‘Karaman vilāyeti’, namely Kara Rüstem. 
Aşıkpaşazāde narrates the innovation of this practice, which naturally created a serious discontent among 
gāzi leaders, with a veiled criticizing manner. As will be delineated, the practice of one-fifth rule 
constituted the starting point of the invention of the Janissary corps. See APZ, p. 35; Anonim Tevârih-i Al-
i Osman, Giese Neşri, p. 25; Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512), pp. 28-9. 
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useless, even harmful, act and regard this practice of bureaucrats as stinginess.324 
Another point to be noticed is that they present such scholars, which were depicted Acem 
or Karamânî origin, as the source of all evil innovations, which was actually nothing 
more than the establishment of the early forms of the routinized state’s administrative 
institutions.   
...Heman kim Osman beğlerine Acem ve Karamânîler musâhib oldı, Osman 
beğleri dahi dürlü dürlü günahlarla mürtekib oldılar. Kaçan kim Çandarlu Kara 
Halil ve Karamânî Rüstem bu ikisi ol zamanda ulular ve âlimler idi, heman kim 
bunlar Osman beğleri yanına geldiler, dürlü dürlü hîleyile âlemi toldırdılar, 
andan ilerü hesab-defter bilmezlerdi, heman anlar Osman beyleri yanına geldiler, 
hesab defteri anlar te’lif itdiler. Akçayı yığıp hazine idinmek anlardan kaldı.325  
 
The criticism, however, is not limited merely to the efforts of establishing a 
bureaucratic state. The emergence of ‘palace life’, which, following the tradition, 
centered on drinking gatherings (bezm), is also deemed among most evil innovations in 
the Ottoman realm. So the ‘imported’ intellectuals and artists, who were chiefly 
responsible for the development of this ‘alien’ style of living and administering, are 
bitterly criticized by Anonymous authors, and by Aşıkpaşazāde as well. These histories 
trace the practice of vine drinking in the Ottoman dynasty back to Bayezid I, who is 
known with his vigorous effort to create a centralized empire.326 It is claimed that early 
                                                 
324 “Ol zamanda pâdişahlar tama’kâr değüllerdi. Her ne ellerine girürse yiğide yegile virürlerdi. Hazine 
nedür bilmezlerdi. Heman kim Hayreddin Paşa kapuya geldi, pâdişahlar ile tama’kâr dânişmendler 
musâhib olub takvâyı koyub fetvâya yüridiler. ‘Hazine dahi pâdişah olana gerekdür’ didiler. Ol zamanda 
pâdişahları kendülere döndürdiler. Eydürler: ‘Tama’ ve zulm peydâ oldı, elbette tama’ olduğı yerde zulm 
dahi olsa gerekdür, şimdiki halde dahı ziyâde oldı. Bu memleketlerde ne kadar zulm ve fesâd olsa 
dânişmendlerdendür, sebep anlardur. Eğer anlar ilm ile amel eyleseler ümmî halk dahi anlara tâbi’ 
olurlardı’ dirler.” See Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, p. 27; Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-
1512), p. 31. 
325 See Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, haz. Nihat Azamat, Istanbul, 1992, p. 33. Aşıkpaşazāde 
also criticizes danişmends for similar reasons. But his stress was rather on the ‘immoral’ and ‘irreligious’ 
acts of these men of pen surrounded the sultan rather then crucial innovations towards bureaucratic state.  
326 Bayezid I is usually accepted as the first Ottoman sultan who attempted to create a centralized empire. 
Đnalcık says, for example, “Bayezid was responsible for the development of the semi-feudal state of 
Osman Gāzi and Orhan Gāzi with its vassals and powerful uc-beyis (chiefs in the military frontier-zone), 
into a real Islamic Sultanate with traditional institutions.” See Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, p. 
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Ottoman begs, until Bayezid I, never drank wine and followed the words of sincere 
ulemā. The Ulemā in their time, on the other hand, prudently followed the orders of the 
religion, but looked not for posts in the state machinery, which naturally made them 
indifferent to the orders of the religion. By the time of Bayezid I, however, the new type 
of ulemā organized drinking parties with the sultan and engaged in all sorts of immoral 
acts. The Serbian wife of Bayezid I is also said responsible for making the sultan 
addicted to the wine. Aşıkpaşazāde writes, 
Bayazıd Han sohbet esbābın Laz kızı elinden öğrendi. Ali Paşa mu’āvenetiyilen 
şarap ve kebap meclisi kuruldı. ... Bunlar  bir sādık soydur. Hiç bunlardan 
nāmeşru hareket vāki olmamış idi. Ulemā bir nesneye kim yazuk deye, Āl-i 
Osman andan kaçarlar idi. Orhan zamanında ve Gāzi Murad Han zamanında 
ulemā var idi. Ve illā müfsid değüller idi tā Candarlu Halil’e gelince. Kaçan kim 
Candarlu Halil geldi, Türk Rüstem geldi, Mevlāna Rüstem dediler, āleme hile 
karuşdurdılar. Halil’ün oğlı Ali Paşa kim vezir oldı danişmend dahı anın 
zamanında çoğ oldı. Bu Āl-i Osman bir sulb kavm idi, anlar kim geldiler fetvāyı 
hile etdiler, takvāyı götürdiler. Üşbu vilāyetde kim eski akçeye kimse satu bazar 
etmeye ve hem gayri vilāyete gitmeye, Ali Paşa zamanında oldı. Bu Ali Paşa 
zevvāk kişiydi. Müsāhibleri dahı zevvāk oldılar. ... Zira anun yanına hīle eder 
Acem danişmendleri çok gelürler idi.327  
  
Both Aşıkpaşazāde and Anonymous history incline to see the reasons of Bayezid 
I’s defeat against Timur in the aforementioned ‘irreligious’ innovations, which distanced 
the ruling elite from the subjects. A close examination would show that this account 
reflects the historical fact in a sense that the accelerated centralization process of the 
administration, which went hand in hand with the growth of ‘Ottoman elite’, created a 
vast discontent among Turkoman subjects, who still constituted the majority, as well as 
widening the socio-cultural distance between the two. Furthermore, Bayezid I attempted 
                                                                                                                                                
105. Likewise, differing from his predecessors who referred themselves as ‘gāzi’, Bayezid I, for the first 
time, claimed the title Eşrefu’s-Selâtin, the most distinguished and honored of the Muslim rulers. See 
Đnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography”, p. 166. Nonetheless, the heavy blow by Timur in 1401 
postponed Bayezid’s project half a century.  
327 APZ, pp. 138-9.  Also see Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, pp. 31-4; Anonim Osmanlı 
Kroniği (1299-1512), p. 36. 
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to transform the state still bearing traits of confederacy into a strictly centralized empire, 
trying to grind Turkoman dynasties of Anatolia up. Nevertheless, the center had not yet 
achieved enough gravity to stick all political actors together that in the battle of Ankara 
most of the Turkoman fighters under their own leader left Bayezid I with his Christian 
soldiers.328 The words attributed to Timur summarize the mentality and attitude of the 
milieu discontent of the rising Ottoman regime and of its actors. When brought to his 
court, Timur asks Bayezid I in a mocking manner, “Hay Bayazıd Han! Kanı ol 
güvendüğün oğullarun, ol sancağun beğleri, ya ol sarhoş vezirlerün? Ne gökçek 
yoldaşlık ettiler sana!”329  
As stated previously, the sentiments and opinion of heterodox sufi milieu is best 
reflected in anonymously authored hagiographies or velâyetnâmes as well. So the 
change in the attitude of popular mystics towards the changing Ottoman state might be 
observed in some velâyetnâme accounts. Among the several exemplary cases 
demonstrating the disaffection of these mystics, and thus Turkoman folk populace 
attached to them, to the rising ‘Ottoman regime’, I will examine an account in the 
Velâyetnâme of Seyyid Ali Sultan, also known as Kızıldeli.330 One peculiarity of this 
                                                 
328 Indeed, already before the Battle of Ankara, many Turkoman begs of Anatolia suffering from Bayezid 
I’s arrogant policies, such as Germiyanoğlu, Aydınoğlu, Menteşeoğlu, and Đsfendiyaroğlu, went to the 
court of Timur provoking him to invade Anatolia. See APZ, p. 142.   
329 APZ, p. 144. Anonymous history says, Turkoman begs and soldiers left Bayezid I in the battlefield and 
only his own retinue or standing army (kapusu halkı) remained loyal to him. See Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i 
Osman, p. 43.  
330 The Velâyetnâme of Seyyid Ali Sultan was published in a non-scholarly manner by Bedri Noyan. 
(Bedri Noyan, Seyyit Ali Sultan Velâyetnâmesi, Ankara:Ayyıldız Yayınları, 1999.) Noyan states in the 
introductory part of his work that he used a copy given to him by his spiritual master. But it is apparently a 
copy of the manuscript preserved in the Ankara National Library, (Manuscript section no.1189) apart from 
that there are a couple of other copies in Turkey whose content does not differ from the National Library 
copy.  John K. Birge states that another copy existed in the Tekke of Kaygusuz Abdal, in Cairo. But after 
the closing of the tekke by the socialists in the middle of the nineteenth century this copy was lost. 
Nevertheless, luckily, Birge had copied this manuscript and his (uncatalogued) copy is preserved in 
Hartford Seminary Library in Connecticut. For an analysis of this hagiography as a source for history and 
edited text of the hagiography see Rıza Yıldırım, Seyyid Ali Sultan(Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi. 
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hagiography strikingly probes the focus of this study’s thesis. A close examination 
makes it clear that the attitude of the hagiography regarding the relationship between the 
state authority and popular sufi milieu changes markedly after the settlement of the 
Dervishes. Until then, the relationship between the two sides seems to be developed on 
mutual profit and reflects a deep respect of both parties to one another. The Hagiography 
mirrors the opinion of the Dervishes, and in a broader sense, the opinion of laymen who 
still maintained the Turkish culture and tradition which was chiefly nomadic in 
character. Hence, it gives the primary rank to Seyyid Ali Sultan and the dervishes. 
Nonetheless, it also refers to Ottoman sultans and commanders such as Orhan Beg, 
Suleyman Pasha, and Gazi Evrenos with great respect.  
After a series of conquests, Kızıldeli and his mystic companions refrain from the 
waging of war and each settles in different places. From then on, the hagiography 
recounts the story of Seyyid Rüstem, who after leaving Seyyid Ali Sultan, arrives at a 
place he loves very much. He writes to Bayezid I requesting that he bequeath this place 
to him. Bayezid I accepts his request and immediately sends a document indicating that 
this land was bestowed to Seyyid Rüstem. Then Seyyid Rüstem goes into seclusion in a 
poplar copse for seven years, which at the same time marks profound changes in 
Rüstem’s relation with state agents. At the end of his seclusion, Rüstem decides to clear 
the land and begins to cut down the trees. However, conditions have changed. It can be 
clearly seen in the account of the velâyetnâme that the affirmative relationship between 
the dervish milieu and the state, at least the state agents, had seriously deteriorated. The 
beg of the region, upon hearing that a dervish is cutting down trees in his district, 
becomes angry and immediately mounts his horse and goes to admonish Rüstem. Asking 
him why and with which right does he settle in this area without permission and refuse 
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to obey the law, Rüstem, replies: “this is my place that I conquered with my sword” and 
he curses the beg  angrily.331 
The mise en scene of narration profoundly changes after Rüstem’s seclusion, 
which in the framework of this study symbolizes the transition from the first to the 
second stage. First, there was no longer  such a thing as a member of the ruling dynasty, 
but an agent of the state, possibly the timar holder of the region.332 The personal 
relations on issues shifted to an impersonal basis, where rules gained prominence. It is 
important here to remember that Rüstem was a person whose opinions and suggestions 
had been immediately accepted by the Sultan, and this land was also bestowed through a 
personal communication with the Sultan. But now, a lower-rank representative of the 
Sultan, whose name is not mentioned in the hagiography, does not recognize his rights, 
and, furthermore, does not respect him. He uses the term ‘torlak’ for him with the 
connotation of being despicable. A close examination illustrates that in this setting, 
dervishes were not considered as favorably as they had been in the first stage, at least for 
the begs, the state agents.  
The quarrel between the dervish and the beg also sheds light on the profound 
changes in the social and political structure. It might be read as a conflict between the 
                                                 
331 Noyan, p. 71. 
332 One of the principal basis on which Ottoman central administration developed was the revenue-holding 
system based on the timar institution. The earliest documentary references to the timar system dates back 
to the time of Orhan but the system developed gradually and took its classical form during the time of 
Murad II, when the first concise registers were drawn up and the system was fully developed in all its 
basic principles and features. The timar system abolished private-land holdings – except in certain 
extraordinary cases such as pious foundations; all newly conquered lands belonged to the state but the 
state distributed the right of use of the land to individuals, demanding certain taxes in return. A timar 
holder was a state agent who did not receive any stipend from the state treasury but collected the tax of a 
defined piece of timar. Since all territories of the Empire were divided and assigned to certain timar 
holders, the subjects were strictly constrained by certain duties. See Halil Đnalcık, “Tīmār”, EI, 2nd edition; 
“1431 Tarihli Timar Defterine Göre Fatih Devrinden Önce Timar Sistemi”, IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 1948, 
Ankara, 1952, 132-9; Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1954.     
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wish of nomadic mentality for freedom of action and the demand of a sedentary state to 
constrain its subjects within well-determined limits. When the beg heard about Rüstem, 
his immediate response was to ask: “with which courage could this torlak create a field 
in my land and stray out of the sphere of obedience? How could he reside there without 
permission?”333 It is obvious from this conversation that in the intervening years a 
system had been developed to which subjects were expected to conform.  
The final symptom of distinction between the two parties reflected in the second 
part of the hagiography refers to the religious interpretation. In the first part, there is a 
complete harmony in religious perceptions of the dervishes and the members of the 
dynasty. They dream the same thing at the same time; they do not utilize written Islamic 
rules, but rather learn what to do through dreams. In one instance, Orhan saw the 
Prophet in a dream, ordering him to take certain portion of the booty for the state 
treasury. Upon Orhan’s question of how much of the booty he should take, the Prophet 
replied “Seyyid Rüstem knows, ask him!” Seyyid Rüstem in turn, was informed to take 
one fifth of the booty again through dream.334 There are many other passages in the text 
reflecting the religious perception of those dervishes, which was mystical, tolerant, and 
relied on subjective spiritual experiences rather than the written laws of Islamic Shari’a. 
The crucial point is that the hagiography depicts first Ottoman Sultans and begs as not 
just respecting that sort of interpretation of Islam represented by dervishes, but as 
accepting, sympathizing, and sharing it. In the second part, however, the beg is certainly 
disdainful of the dervish and his way of religious life.   
                                                 
333 Noyan, p. 70. 
334 Noyan, p. 86. 
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Most of the events mentioned in the hagiography occurred in the second half of 
the fourteenth century, particularly during the reign of Orhan (1326-1362) and Murad I 
(1362-1389). It seems from the text and archival evidence that Seyyid Ali Sultan, Seyyid 
Rüstem and other dervishes settled down during the reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402) and 
founded their hospices in several districts in Thrace.335  From contemporary sources it 
can be seen that a centralistic tendency gained impetus during the reign of Bayezid I 
especially under the initiative of the Çandarlı Family.336 But the bureaucratic Imperial 
dream of Bayezid I turned into a nightmare by Timur in the Çubuk Valley, which was 
followed by a civil war among the sons of Bayezid I. It was after some ten years that 
Çelebi Mehmet, the youngest prince managed to eliminate his brothers and reunify the 
Ottoman territories. From then on the centralistic tendency in the state organization 
continued. Towards the last years of Bayezid I and later, though not being an emperor 
like Mehmet the Conqueror and his successors, the Ottoman Sultans could be no more 
be regarded as tribal chiefs as Osman and Orhan had been.  
The hagiography gives Seyyid Rüstem’s date of death as 1421. This can be 
interpreted that the first part of the narration corresponds roughly to the time of Orhan 
and Murad I and perhaps to the early years of Bayezid I’s reign, while the second part, 
after the seclusion, must correspond to the reigns of Mehmed I and Murad I, when the 
nomadic tribal basis of the Ottoman state had already seriously diminished.337 Hence, in 
this perspective, the sharp change in the attitude of the hagiography towards state 
representatives seems quite meaningful.  
                                                 
335 See Beldiceanu-Steinherr , “Osmanlı Tahrir Defterlerinde Seyyid Ali Sultan: Heterodox Đslam’ın 
Trakya’ya Yerleşmesi”, p. 62.  
336 See, for example, Halil Đnalcık, The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age, 1300-1600, London, 1973, p. 
16; Feridun Emecen, “Kuruluştan Küçük Kaynarca’ya”, in Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi, cil I, Ekmeleddin 
Đhsanoğlu, ed., Đstanbul, 1999, p. 18.   
337 The first registers of land surveys were drawn up during the reign of Murat II.  
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This change should not be read simply as the personal contest of Seyyid Rüstem 
but rather as the discontent of a certain social segment, which was fit into a legendary 
story attributed to a highly revered religious figure. It is important to remember that the 
stories in this hagiography evolved in the collective memory of the social group under 
scrutiny through the fifteenth-century, which experienced the transmuting of the 
Ottoman state into its classical form with all institutions and the solidifying of its 
‘official ideology’, and written down towards the end of the same century.338 From this 
point of view, it becomes clear that the protest of Seyyid Rüstem should be read in a 
broader perspective and be regarded as a middle-stage symptom of an ongoing process 
of alienation outlined in this chapter. Towards the end of the century, when the 
alienation process reached its third and final stage, in which discontent would turn into 
antagonism, this segment of society would not hesitate to stand up against the Ottoman 
imperial regime.339 
 
3.3.2. The Opposition against the Ottoman Imperialism 
 
3.3.2.1. ‘Akıncı’ (Passive) Resistance in Balkans  
As the centralization of the Ottoman administration grew so did the discontent of local-
provincial lords and tribal leaders. In the Balkans and Thrace, the resistance was 
represented by powerful akıncı-families, while in Anatolia the opposing force was 
organized and led by local aristocracy, whose roots trace back to the pre-Ottoman 
                                                 
338 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Bektaşi Menâkıbnâmelerinde Đslam Öncesi Đnanç Motifleri, , Đstanbul: Enderun 
Kitabevi, 1983p. 13. 
339 See, for example, Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et 
religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, Turcica, VI, 1975, pp. 47-8.  
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period, and tribal chiefs. However, as J. R. Walsh already underlined, the conditions of 
these two opposing groups in the Balkans and Anatolia were completely different. The 
akıncı-groups in the Balkans, whose autonomy was threatened by the centralizing polity 
of the Ottoman state, were still dependent on  the support of the Ottomans, which could 
prevent Christians from destroying them piecemeal, for they were still little more than 
small, isolated groups in the hostile territory. In Anatolia, on the other hand, the situation 
was completely different. First of all, there was no such menace. Second, the social roots 
of the Turko-Mongolian tradition were still strong in Anatolian lands. As Walsh says,  
Here the Turkish tribal elements could maintain their natural independence of 
each other and of the central power; though the petty emirates were gradually 
absorbed, that instinctive separatism which had formerly atomized the Seljuq 
state of Rūm into ineffectual begliks was too ingrained in these pastoral peoples 
ever to respond easily to coercion or argument, especially when to the East lay an 
assured and inviting haven.340 
 
As a matter of fact, the centralistic tendencies in the Ottoman politics created a 
serious discontent among the akıncı-gāzi milieu in the frontier regions of Thrace and the 
Balkans. Contemporary sources strongly suggest that the early conquests of the 
Ottomans in Balkans are associated with the eponymous founders of akıncı dynasties 
such as Evrenos Bey, Köse Mihal, Turahan Bey etc. These comrades of Osman, Orhan, 
and Murad were acting autonomously in the frontiers.341 Beldiceanu-Steinherr already 
                                                 
340 J. R. Walsh, “The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries”, in Historians of the Midle East, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 202. One should note that Ottoman conquests in Anatolia 
could attain strongholds only towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the champion of tribal 
resistance against Ottoman regime, namely the Karamanid dynasty, was removed. Before, Ottoman 
conquests in Asia Minor usually appeared as a temporary military invasion. In most cases, the former 
order was re-established following the return of the Ottoman army. See, for example, APZ, p. 191. 
Compare Oktay Özel, “The Transformation of Provincial Administration in Anatolia: Observations on 
Amasya from 15th to 17th Centuries”, The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and ‘Black Holes’. 
Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber, eds., Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 
2006, 51-73. 
341 In the beginning, frontier raider-leaders were acting independently as comrades of Osman and Orhan. 
Osman Beg, for example, used to give conquered lands as appanage or yurtluk to those begs who 
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indicated that during the conquest of Rumelia and Thrace there were influential military 
and religious leaders, such as Hacı Đlbeyi and Seyyid Ali Sultan, semi-dependent or 
independent from the Ottoman dynasty. To Beldiceanu-Steinherr, indeed, they were the 
ones who first crossed Maritza River and conquered many towns in the region but later 
became subjected to the superior authority of Murad I.342  
Later on the prerogative of leading the akıncı troops was left in the hands of their 
descendents. These families with a great deal of raider-warriors under their command 
constituted an alternative focus of power during the formative periods of the empire, 
when the state institutions were still to be clearly defined and regulated. They ruled the 
regions that they conquered like small principalities on the frontier, with an only 
nominal dependence to the Ottoman sultan.343 In the course of time, when Ottomans 
evolved towards a bureaucratic empire, they became the representatives of the resistance 
against centralistic policies.  
The reign of Mehmed II marked a drastic change in the status of akıncı families. 
They lost their political and military autonomy and were incorporated in the institutions 
                                                                                                                                                
conquered those places. This practice later continued in Rumelia. See Halil Đnalcık, “Periods in Ottoman 
History. State, Society, Economy”, in Ottoman Civilization, vol. I, eds., Halil Đnalcık and Günsel Renda, 
Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 2003, p. 48. Also consider Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, 
pp. 45-54.  
342 Beldiceanu-Steinherr argues that even the conquest of Adrionople was the work of these gāzi groups 
under Haci Đlbeyi. The dominance of Murad I was not before the winter of 1376-7. See her “La conquête 
d’Andrinople par les turks : la pénétration turque en Thrace et la valeur des chroniques ottomanes”, 
Travaux et Mémoires, 1, Paris, 1965, 439-61; “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et 
religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, pp. 44-6.  
343 See Đnalcık, “The Emergence of the Ottomans”, p. 284. After indicating a somewhat independent status 
of akıncı-begs, Đnalcık makes the point that these begs were prevented from becoming feudal lords with 
truly private armies since the timars were given directly by the sultan, who also maintained a greater 
power of slave surpassing the military power of akıncı begs. See Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of 
Conquest”, pp. 121-2. Also see Mariya Kiprovska, The Military Organization of the Akıncıs in Ottoman 
Rumelia, Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University, 2004, pp. 22-3. To give an example of the 
excessive power held by akıncı commanders, Konstantin the Philosopher, who was a clerk in the court of 
the Serbian ruler Stefan Lazarević, on his eyewitness account states that Musa Çelebi wanted to kill 
Mihaloğlu Mehmet Bey, who was an akıncı commander under his rule, since the latter gained too much 
glory and was suspected to have condoned the escape of George Branković. Recited in Kiprovska, p. 25.   
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of the empire; their loyal akıncı troops turned into a branch of imperial army effectively 
controlled by the sultan. The nearly independent frontier begs of the early periods now 
became almost fully subdued officers in the administrative system of the empire, namely 
sanjakbeyi. Although they preserved their hereditary rights on the commandership of 
akıncı troops, this was now far from providing any means of independence from the 
sultan for the latter was fully integrated into the centralized Ottoman army.344 Towards 
the end of his reign, so much power accumulated in the hands of Mehmed II that he 
could confiscate the property of great akıncı families along with the properties of other 
noble families and dervish lodges. The waqf of Malkoçoğulları in the region of Hasköy 
and the mülk of Turahanoğulları in Thrace were turned into timar.345  
Closely connected to the aforementioned structural and geo-political conditions, 
however, akıncı begs of Rumelia could not dare to take arms against the central 
authority. Rather they pursued a policy of passive protest such as supporting heterodox 
sufis, patronizing antinomian-critical literature against the orthodox establishment, 
recovering or adding new buildings to prominent shrines, which were centers of 
pilgrimage of the unorthodox population of the empire. One should also mention the fact 
that the protest in the Balkans was religiously proliferated by heterodox mystics known 
as Abdal, Kalenderî, Hurufî, and Bektashi.346 
                                                 
344 Mehmed II exercised his power on akıncı begs by appointing them as sancakbey to several sancaks for 
short periods of time. For some examples, see Kiprovska, pp. 32-4.  
345 For a broader look at the issue, see M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livası. 
Vakıflar-Mülkler-Mukataalar, Đstanbul: Üçler Basımevi, 1952, pp. 276-341.  
346 As has been already put by several scholars all these ‘heterodox’ for some reasons had  merged in the 
Bektashi Order by the seventeenth century at the latest.  
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The akıncı families - and fighters under their banners – were, indeed, 
representatives of the frontier (uç) culture347, and thus had close links with heterodox 
dervish milieu, just like the early Ottomans during the foundation period. The 
‘strongholds’ of these powerful families in the Balkans emerged as centers of 
unorthodox Sufism, which had intrinsic ties with the frontier culture and enjoyed the 
patronage of these families. To give an example, towards the end of the fifteenth century 
and during the sixteenth century Yenice-i Vardar under Evrenosoğlu patronage became 
one of the most important cultural centers of the empire, where a number of poets 
affiliated to heterodox sufi currents grew.348  
One should remember that when he revolted against Mehmed I, Shaykh 
Bedreddin found his natural allies in the Balkans, that is akıncı milieu and influential 
frontier begs; and the revolt of Bedreddin appeared as a sufi-messianic movement, a 
usual characteristics of heterodox-mystic upheavals.349 Moreover, the benevolent grants 
                                                 
347 For frontier culture in the Ottoman context, see Köprülü, The Emergence of the Ottoman State; Paul 
Wittek, The Rise of The Ottoman Empire, London, 1965; Đnalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, 
pp. 45-8. 
348 Most of these poets are affiliated to Hurufism and to the Bektashi Order in some way or another. 
Among them Hayretî (d. 1535), Usûlî (d. 1538), and Hayâlî (d. 1557) must be mentioned here. Especially 
Hayâlî, whose Shi’ite and Hurūfī affiliation is clearly seen in his poems, can be deemed a spokesman of 
the protest of the periphery against centralizing state.  His verse “Ne Süleyman’a esirüz ne Selimün 
kuluyuz / Kimse bilmez bizi bir Şah-ı kerimün kuluyuz.” is famous. See Hayretî, Hayretî Divanı, haz. 
Mehmed Çavuşoğlu-Ali Tanyeri, Đstanbul: Đstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981, p. 
219. For further reading on the culture and literature proliferated under akıncı patronage, see Michael Kiel, 
Yenice-i Vardar (Vardar Yenicesi-Giannitsa). A Forgotten Turkish Cultural Centre in Macedonia of the 
15th and 16th Century, Leiden: Studia Byzantina et Neohellenica Neerlendica III, 1971; Hayâlî, Hayâlî Bey 
Divanı, haz. Ali Nihat Tarlan, Đstanbul: Đstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1945; Mehmet Çavuşoğlu, Hayâlî 
Bey ve Divanı’ndan Örnekler, Ankara: KTBY, 1987; Cemal Kurnaz, Hayâlî Bey Divanı’nın Tahlili, 
Ankara: KTBY, 1987; Mustafa Đsen, haz., Künhü’l-ahbâr’ın Tezkire Kısmı, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür 
Merkezi Yayınları, 1994; “Akıncılığın Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatına Katkıları”, Türkiye Günlüğü, 49, 1998, 
88-96; Ötelerden Bir Ses, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1997; Filiz Kılıç, Meşâi’rü’ş-Şu’arâ I-II, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara, 1994; Kınalı-zâde Hasan Çelebi, Tezkiretü’ş-şuarâ, 
2 vols., haz. Đbrahim Kutluk, Ankara: TTK, 1989; Latîfî, Latîfî Tezkiresi, haz., Mustafa Đsen, Ankara: 
KBY, 1990; Usûlî, Usûlî Divanı, haz. Mustafa Đsen, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1990; Mustafa Tatçı, 
Hayretî’nin Dinî-Tasavvufî Dünyası, Đstanbul: Horasan Yayınları, 2006; Hiclâl Demir, Çağlarını Eleştiren 
Dîvan Şairleri: Hayretî – Usûlî – Hayâlî, Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001.   
349 See, for example, “The Shahkulu Rebellion” in this study. For the revolt of Şeyh Bedreddin see Michel 
Balivet, Islam mystique et révolution armée dans les Balkans Ottomans vie du Cheikh Bedreddin le 
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of foremost akıncı dynasties like Malkoçoğlu, Mihaloğlu, and Evrenosoğlu to zâviyes of 
these dervishes, who later melted in the pot of the Bektashi Order, are well-known.350 
Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay has suggested that the interest of Rumelian akıncı families in 
the two greatest shrines most celebrated by ‘heterodox’ dervish groups, namely Shrine 
of Hacı Bektaş and Seyyid Gāzi, and their financial support to recover and to extend 
buildings of these shrine complexes should be regarded as a symbolic act of protest 
against the centralistic-imperial tendency in the Ottoman polity. She interprets the 
palatial arrangement of the Hacı Bektaş complex, which is composed of three successive 
courtyards, as a symbol of contest posed by akıncı families, whose autonomy and 
splendor started to waste away under Mehmed II.351  
 
3.3.2.2. Turkoman (Active) Resistance in Anatolia 
In Anatolia, the opposition was led by pre-Ottoman aristocracy, who were transformed 
into simple timar holders from hereditary feudal lords, and tribal leaders. It is not 
surprising that in the battle of Ankara, in 1402, all the troops from the sanjaks of 
Saruhan, Ayın, and Menteşe abandoned Bayezid I, holding their position in Timur’s 
army and leaving the Ottoman sultan only with Serbian troops and Janissaries.352  
                                                                                                                                                
« Hallâj des Turcs » (1358/59-1416), Istanbul : ISIS Press, 1995 ; Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı (with a foreword 
by Đsmet Sungurbey), Simavna Kadısıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin, Đstanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1966; Ahmet Yaşar 
Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhitler, pp. 136-202; Müfid Yüksel, Simavna Kadısıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin, Đstanbul: 
Bakış, 2002. In the latter work, however, one would realize the effort of the author to tune down the 
unorthodox aspects of the revolt  and of Shaykh Bedreddin’s religious identity.      
350 See, for example, Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et 
religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, p. 41. For a recent study on the sponsorship of great akıncı families to the 
shrine of Hacı Bektaş and socio-political motives behind this sponsorship see E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, 
Legend and Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid Gāzi and Hacı Bektaş, 
Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 2005, especially pp. 174-91.  
351 See Yürekli-Görkay, pp. 263-6.  
352 Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire 
ottoman”, p. 42. Also consider Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527”, 
pp. 156-7.  
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The social milieu in which the seeds of protest grew was principally Turkoman 
groups who still continued their traditional tribal culture and habits. For a long time the 
Karamanoğlu dynasty became the champion of tribal polity against Ottoman 
imperialism. By the fall of Karaman, the tribal forces, which could not resist against 
Ottoman’s great military power by themselves, had to rely on a new fulcrum. The 
ideology of this protest, on the other hand, was developed on the grounds of a ‘mal-
Islamized’ mystical religion of Turkomans which later incorporated the Safavid Order. 
In contrast to the Rumelian protest, in Anatolia the resistance was quite active taking 
arms against the Ottoman’s imperial army and engaging in bloody combats when 
necessary.353     
It is delineated above that, starting in the time of Orhan, the Ottoman center 
gradually distanced itself from the Turkoman culture. In the works of the fifteenth 
century Ottoman historians, one may notice a clear differentiation between settled- 
‘Ottomanized’ subjects and ‘untamed’ nomadic elements; the former group is usually 
referred to as ‘Türk’ while the latter as ‘Türkmen’.354 Đnalcık also notices that Ottoman 
                                                 
353 One may observe the footprints of different characteristics of these two movements of protest in 
Bektashims and Alevism, the former proliferating mainly in the Balkans while the latter being primarily a 
product of Anatolian qizilbashes.   
354 See, for example, APZ, pp. 142, 143, 168, 169, 188, 224. Aşıkpaşazāde uses the term clearly for 
nomadic Turkish tribes (that is referred to throughout this study as ‘Turkoman’). In one occasion, for 
example, he narrates how Yörgüç Pasha, the tutor (lala) of Murad II, punished a nomadic group called 
‘Kızılkoca Oğlanlarınun Türkmanları’ in Amasya-Tokat region, for the latter used to plunder the settled 
subjects. See APZ, pp. 168-9. The word ‘Türkmen’ is nothing but a derivation of ‘Türk’, in which the 
suffix “men” intensifies the meaning, which might be understood as ‘hundred percent ‘Türk’. (See V. 
Minorsky, “The Middle East in the 13th, 15th, and 17th Centuries”, JRCAS, 27, 1940, p. 439.) The origin of 
the term might be traced back to the second half of the tenth century. For further reading on the origin and 
meaning of  “Türkmen” see Đbrahim Kafesoğlu, “A propos du nom Türkmen”, Oriens, vol. 11, no.1/2, 
1958, 146-50; “Türkmen adı, manası ve mahiyeti”, J. Deny Armağanı, Ankara, 1958, 121-33. Kafesoğlu 
revises Köprülü’s view, which says, principally basing on Divan-i Lügat-i Türk, that the branch of Oğuz 
tribes who converted to Islam were called Türkmen. (Türk Edebiyatında Đlk Mutasavvıflar, Đstanbul, 1919, 
p. 152). To him, the usage of this word goes further back, principally originating from “Kök-Türk”. 
Kafesoğlu sees a semantic liaison between two words. The word “Türkmen” is composed of two parts: 
“Türk” and the suffix “men”, which reinforces the meaning of the main word. Thus, “Türkmen” means 
pure, noble, and real Türk. As for the word “Kök-Türk”, again we have two parts: an adjective “Kök” 
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historians employ the term ‘Türkmen’ for those nomadic Turkish tribes who did not 
recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and for those Turkish states in the form of tribal 
confederacy such as Akkoyunlu, Dulkadir etc. For their own ‘tamed’ nomads, which 
were transformed into a special type of subject with certain duties against the state 
especially in Balkans and Western Anatolia (in the areas west of the river Kızılırmak), 
the Ottomans rather used the term ‘Yörük’, literally meaning the men who walk.355  
There is strong evidence showing that a clear-cut differentiation between these 
two social groups, i. e. ‘Türk’ and ‘Türkmen’, was already established towards the mid-
fifteenth century. A guide-book for students, Tarîku’l-Edeb356, which was completed in 
1453, for example, evidently reveals that Turks and Turkomans were perceived as 
different socio-‘ethnic’ groups. The author Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasī357, a middle-rank 
ulemā of the era of Murad II and Mehmed II, divides the people (tavā’īf) of the Ottoman 
Empire into seven groups, giving a short description of most prominent dispositions of 
each group. He says,  
Evvelā Arab tā’ifesinün tabī’atı bārid olur. Bunlardan ülfet ve muhāletat 
mülāhaza etme.  
Acem tā’ifesi sāhib-i ‘akrab tabī’at ve tīz nefes olur. Bunlardan şefkāt ve 
merhamet ve muvāfakat umma. 
Ve Kürd tā’ifesi deve gibi kindār ve hod-pesend tā’ife olur. Bunlardan ihtirāz 
eyle. Bunlarunla adāvet bağlayub muhāsemet ve mu’ānedet kılma. 
                                                                                                                                                
defining the main word “Türk”. “Kök” means sky in Turkish. Yet it also has connotations noble, grand, 
and universal. On this subject also see Halil Đnalcık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansions and 
Economic Role”, in his The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy 
and Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint 
Series Volume 9, 1993, pp. 97-103; Louis Basin, “Notes sur les mots ‘Oğuz’ et ‘Türk’”, Oriens, vol. 6, no. 
2, 1953, 315-22.  
355 See Halil Đnalcık, “The Yürüks”, p. 102. For further reading on the word ‘Yörük’ or ‘Yürük’, see Faruk 
Sümer, “XI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak’da Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumī Bir Bakış”, Đktisat 
Fakültesi Mecmuası, 11, Istanbul, 1949-50, pp. 518-22.  
356 The book was obviously written in the aim of explaining how to behave on several occasions, mostly 
pertaining to educational circles, for students and teachers.  
357 He is said to be the tutor of Hızır Beg, who was the son of famous Yörgüç Pasha and was the 
sancakbey of Amasya. See Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşilı, Osmanlı Tarihi, I, 1972, p. 450.  
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Ve Türkmen tā’ifesi gürk (kurt) tab’ olur. Bunlarunla muvāfakat idüb yola 
gitme kim kurt birbirinde kan görse birbirin yer yutar. 
Tatar tā’ifesi anduk misāl olur. Bunlarun değmesi temiz olmaz. Zīrā anduk gāh 
olur ki otlar, gāh olur ki murdār yer. (Gāh cīfe yer, gāh olur ki ot otlar.) Pes 
bunlardan diyānet ve salāhiyet umma. 
Ve Köle tā’ifesi katır gibi bed-huy ve mütemerrid olur. Zīrā ki katırı ne denlü 
nāz-ı nā’īmle besleseler isyānun ve haramzādeliğün komaz. Pes bunlardan 
toğruluk ve mürüvvet umma. 
Ve Türk tā’ifesi sādık ve müşfīk ve yavaş tā’ife olurlar. Koyun gibi birbirine 
muvāfakatı ve ülfeti ve şefkati ve tā’ati vardur. Görmez misin kim mecmu’sı 
birbirine ittibā’ ider ve hem cemi’ hayvanatda koyundan menfe’atlüsü dahī 
yokdur ve koyundan yavaşı dahī olmaz ve hem ganem ganimetdür dimişler.358  
 
What is interesting here is that he deems Türkmen (Turkoman) and Türk (Turk) 
as different socio-‘ethnic’ groups like ‘Arab’ and ‘Turk’ or ‘Kurd’ and ‘Turk’ etc. His 
description of both is also quite interesting and informative indeed. To him Turkomans 
resemble wolves while Turks are like sheep. He warns his reader not to believe in the 
friendship of Turkomans, for they always betray when opportunity arises. On the other 
hand Turks were the best of all the seven groups. They were loyal, compassionate, and 
slow; they harmonize and obey each other like sheep. Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasī deems 
their obedience to each other as their most valuable feature. One can obviously observe 
in this depiction that Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasī calls nomadic Turkish elements as 
“Türkmen” while sedentary Turkish elements, or the ordinary re’āya of the Ottoman 
state, as “Türk”.359 Thus, this testimony puts forward that already during the mid-
fifteenth century the Turkish people in the Ottoman realm were differentiated in terms of 
cultural, social, political, and even religious aspects: one was the sedentarized ‘peasants’ 
                                                 
358 Ali b. Hüseyin el-Amâsî, Tarīku’l-Edeb, haz. Mehmet Şeker, Ankara: Diyanet Đşleri Başkanlığı 
Yayınları, 2002, pp. 254-5.  
359 For a similar usage of ‘Türkmen’ see Kemal, Selâtîn-nâme (1299-1490), haz. Necdet Öztürk, Ankara: 
TTK, 2001, pp. 180-81. Modern scholars also appriciate the usage of ‘türk’ and ‘türkmen’ with such 
connotation. See, for example, Irène Mélikoff, “L’Islam hétérodoxe en Anatolie”, in her Sur les traces du 
soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 63. Mélikoff 
puts stress on that ‘türk’ indicates the sedentary Turkish people who became ordinary Muslims and 
Iranized culturally while ‘türkmen’ denotes nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkish groups who were either 
mal-Islamized or not Islamized.  
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transformed into modest ‘re’āya’ of the Ottomans, while the other still insisted on the 
traditional nomadic-tribal habits and resisted against the Ottoman imperial regime.   
The opposing Turkoman elements of central and southern Anatolia politically 
organized around the Karaman dynasty against the Ottomans. It stands to reason to 
argue that, especially in the fifteenth century the continuous clash between Karaman and 
Ottoman states was indeed the struggle between two modes of state organization: 
‘bureaucratic-imperial sate’ and ‘Turko-Mongolian tribal confederation’.     
Already before the Ottomans, by the mid-thirteenth century, the Karamanoğlu 
dynasty appeared as the leader of a powerful tribe or tribal confederacy, which usually 
rose up against Anatolian Seljuks and Mongol governors of Anatolia. Faruk Sümer finds 
plausible Yazıcıoğlu Ali’s suggestion regarding their ethnic origin that suggests they 
were from the Afşar tribe, one of the twenty four great Turkish clans, and among five 
great clans which produced the ruler dynasty360 (the others are Kayı, Eymür, Yazır, 
Beğdili).361 After the suppression of Babāī revolt, in which they actively took part, 
Karamanids moved to the Mut-Ermenek region under the leadership of Nūre Sofi. Under 
Karaman Beg, Mehmed Beg, and Güneri Beg in the second half of the thirteenth 
century, the Karamanoğulları became the champion of the Turkoman struggle against 
Mongol-oriented Seljukid rulers and thus Mongol domination in Anatolia, at times by 
fighting with Sejukids or Mongol armies at times supporting the more Turkoman 
oriented candidate to the Seljukid throne.362 There is evidence that Mongols regarded 
                                                 
360 Faruk Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 619; “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 454.  
361 Faruk Sümer, “Avşar”, DIA, 4, p. 160.  
362 The reader might remember that Mehmed Beg of Karaman (d. 1277) declared, for the first time, 
Turkish as the only official language, forbidding the speaking any other language in “divan, dergāh, 
bārgāh, meclis, meydān”.  Sümer puts special stress on two policies of Mehmed Beg’s: supporting the 
Turkish language and initiating the war of independence of Turkomans against the Mongols.  See Sümer, 
“Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 455; Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Şemsüddin Mehmed Bey Devrinde 
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Karamanids as the main barrier to their domination of the whole of Anatolia. Referring 
to the role of Karamanoğulları in stopping Mongol expansion in Anatolia, Gazān Han is 
reported to have said: “I was seeking the enemy in the east and west, while he was 
hiding beneath my clothing. If it had not been for the Karāmānids, Turkmens and Kurds, 
the Mongol Horsemen would have reached the place where the sun sets.”363  
It is indicated that the alienation between Turkoman milieu and Seljukid ruling 
elite - in terms of culture, religion, political orientation – had already been emerged in 
the first half of the thirteenth century. And this alienation finally led to the revolt of the 
formers, namely Babāī revolt. After losing de facto power by the defeat of Kösedağ in 
1243, Seljukids became the satellite of Mongol khans by both representing ‘Persianized’ 
imperial political tradition and high Islamic culture against nomadic Turkomans. 
Karamanids, having taken part in the Babāī revolt as well, appeared as the champion of 
the Turkoman resistance against Anatolian Seljukid rule and Mongol imperialism. Many 
Turkoman tribes provided their alliances to Karamanids in this struggle. Sümer counts 
Turgutlu, Bayburtlu, Varsak, Oğuzhanlı, Hoca Yunuslu, Hocantılı, Bozkırlı, Bozdoğan, 
Bulgarlı, Đğdir, Beğdili, Yapaoğulları, Şamlu, Adalıoğulları, and Yuvalılar among 
principal tribes over which Karamanids ruled.364 Among these tribes especially 
Turgutlu, Bayburtlu, and Varsak proved to be long-lasting allies of the Karamanids and 
constituted a significant portion of their tribal army. The posts of beylerbey, the chief-
commander of the army, in the Karamanid state were usually held by the leaders of the 
                                                                                                                                                
Karamanlılar”, ĐÜEFTD, 19, 1964, 81-98. Also consider Faruk Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”, Selçuklu 
Araştırmaları Dergisi, I, 1969, 1-147.  
363 Cited and quoted in Faruk Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 621.  
364 Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 619; “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, pp. 454-5.  
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Turgutlu tribe.365 As will be delineated below, Ottoman sources also frequently mention 
these tribes in the Karamanid army against the Ottomans.  
A close examination of Şikārī’s Karaman-nāme366, the only hitherto known 
narrative produced under the Karaman patronage, clearly pictures the tribal 
confederative nature of the Karamanid state. Since its beginning under Nūre Sofi, Şikārī 
describes Karamanid power as a political and military entity consisting of a coalition of 
(semi-nomadic) tribal leaders.367 And the confederative character of the state is 
continued throughout the narration. The army was composed of autonomous tribal 
forces, which could easily dissolve when difficulty arose. The state could not establish 
her centralized institutions with an efficient bureaucratic apparatus.368 The suzerainty of 
Karamanid begs over other tribal leaders, who always held the loyalty of their tribal 
soldiers, usually did not go beyond a symbolic dependency.369    
In Şikārī’s depiction, Karamanids had absolute superiority over other Turkoman 
tribes until the fifteenth century. He argues that Osman also received tabl u alem, drum 
and standard, which were regarded as signs of suzerainty, from Karamanids.370 He even 
describes Osman as a shepherd of the Seljukids.371 However, the situation changed 
during the reign of Murad I, when the Ottoman state not only emerged as a significant 
                                                 
365 Sümer, “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 454.  
366 For a short assessment of Şikārī’s work, see Rudi Paul Lindner, “Appendix Two: Şikari”, in his 
Nomads and Ottomans, pp. 145-7.   
367 See, for example, Şikârî, Şikâri’nin Karamanoğulları Tarihi, edited by Mes’ud Koman, Konya: Yeni 
Kitab Basımevi, 1946, pp. 10, 19, 20-21, 34.  
368 Modern scholars agree upon the idea that the Karaman army was consisted of tribal forces inhabited 
central Anatolia, Tas-ili and Taurus region. See for example, Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, p. 
118.  
369 Şikârî summarizes this confederative system as follows: “Ol zamanda adet bu idi ki: etrafta olan beyler 
yılda bir kere üç gün gelüb Lārende’de sākin olurlardı. Sultandan yeni hüccet alub gene diyārlarına 
giderlerdi. Yahud Sultan çıkub etrafı devr iderdi. Ellerine hücceti nev verirdi. Zira azil ve nasb yokdu.” 
See Şikârî, p. 149.  
370 Şikârî, pp. 47, 78.  
371 Şikârî, pp. 78, 130. 
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regional power but also established early forms of her centralized institutions, curbing 
the power of feudal lords. The first Ottoman-Karaman confrontation occurred between 
Murad I and Alāaddin Beg (d. 1398), who married the daughter of the former, in 1386-
7.372 This battle marked the first victory of the centralized bureaucratic state of the 
Ottomans over the tribal confederacy of the Karamans.373 The rise of Ottoman 
imperialism at the cost of the power of tribal-hereditary dynasties is reflected in Şikārī’s 
narration as follows: “[Karamanoğlu] Osman’ı bir gedā iken şah eyledi. [Osman] Aslı 
cinsi yok bir yürükoğlu iken bey oldı. Beyzādeleri beğenmez oldı, ocak erlerin incidür 
oldı.”374 As clearly seen, Şikārī points his criticism, which might be a common 
sentiment of Turkoman milieu, particularly towards the Ottoman policy of reducing the 
power of tribal leaders.   
The Ottoman-Karaman struggle continued throughout the fifteenth century. As 
Şikārī himself also admits, however, Ibrahim Beg (d. 1464) had to admit Ottoman 
superiority.375 In 1475, Mehmed II finally finished the Karamanid rule. By the death of 
Kasım Beg, who ruled the region until 1483 as a vassal of the Ottoman sultan,376 the 
political existence of the Karamanid dynasty de facto diminished.377 An account of 
Şikārī is of primary interest for the purpose of the present study. Şikārī says following 
                                                 
372 Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 623; “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 457.   
373 Şikârî often accuses Ottomans for being not of noble blood, disloyal, not keeping their words. See, for 
example, Şikârî, pp. 149, 161, 162. Suffice it to quote following expressions from Şikârî to show 
Turkoman perception of the Ottoman rule: “Đbn-i Osman’ın ne ahdi dürüstdür ne imanı!”. (Şikârî, p. 159.) 
“Bu ādem and içer tutmaz, ahd ider tutmaz. ... Osmanoğlu’nun ne dostluğu belli ne düşmanlığı belli!” 
(Ibid, p. 165.) I would like to remind the different nature of relationships in bureaucratic state and tribal 
organization already delineated in this study. In the tribal mode of socio-political organization keeping 
one’s ‘word’ is of utmost importance since the relationships are constructed on face-to-face interactions. 
On the other hand, in the bureaucratic system, the system rests on a scribal base, thus personal 
relationships are always subordinated by impersonal rules. See “Theoretical Framework” in this study.  
374 Şikârî, p. 141. 
375 Şikârî, p. 191. 
376 KPZ8, p. 40.  
377 Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 624; “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 459. 
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the death of Kasım Beg, his commander-in-chief (çeribaşı) Pīr Bayram and some 
leading generals, among whom were certain Kökez-oğlu and Esed Çelebi, did not 
surrender to the Ottoman rule but wandered with their guerilla-band for seven years. 
Finally they joined the forces of Shah Ismail.378 The last unsuccessful attempt to revive 
the Karamanid rule in the region occurred in 1500.379  
One might well regard the Ottoman-Karaman rivalry as a struggle between the 
Ottoman imperial regime and opposing tribal forces in Anatolia. In this struggle, special 
attention should be given to the eminent place of Taş-ili tribes,380 who spent summers in 
the high plateaus of Bulgar Mountain and during winters came down to the surrounding 
low plains, especially those of the Turgutlu and Varsak in the Karamanid ranks. 
Contemporary sources strongly suggest that in the second half of the fifteenth century, 
tribes of Taurus and Taş-ili region, taking advantage of mountainous topography, 
constituted the backbone of tribal resistance against Ottoman imperialism. A great 
number of Turkomans from the Taurus-Karaman area were forcibly deported to Rumelia 
in the period 1468-1474 under Mehmed II.381 
Kemalpaşazāde describes the region as “gāyet-i menā’at ve nihāyet-i hasānetle 
ma’rūf u mevsūf diyārdur … müfsidler yatağı ve fāsid-nihād, bed-nijādlar 
durağıydı…”382 and the people of region as “Ma’mūre-i mezbūrenün nevāhisinde olan 
kabāyil ki, itā’ata kābil değiller idi, ol zamana gelinceye dek bir sultana fermān-ber 
                                                 
378 Şikârî, pp. 206-7. As will be delineated, Bayram Beg Qaramanlu was among famous seven great 
qizilbash sufis of Lahijān, who protected, educated, and trained young Ismail. Following the foundation of 
the qizilbash state of Ismail, he undertook high-ranking functions. See “The Rise of Shah Ismail” in this 
study. 
379 For a detailed examination of this attempt see “The Qaraman Uprising, 1500” in this study.   
380On one occasion, Kemalpaşazāde recounts Yüregir, Kuşunlu, Varsak, Kara Đsalu, Özerlü, Gündüzlü, 
and Kuş Temurlu among Tas-ili tribes. See KPZ8, p. 88.  
381Đnalcık, “The Yürüks”, p. 106.  
382 “This is a region very precipitous and difficult to access … it was a den of mischief and the station of 
seditious-natures and bad-races.” KPZ8, pp. 40, 52.  
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olmamışlardı, hizmete kāyil değillerdi.”383 The frequent phrase Kemalpaşazāde employs 
to describe these tribes is “bāğī” and “tāğī”, which means the ferocious, rebellious 
people who do not recognize state authority.384 Remembering the ideal subject or re’āya 
that the Ottoman regime demanded within the timar system, the view of Kemalpaşazāde, 
who was intrinsically attached to the official ideology, becomes meaningful.   
Both Şikārī and Ottoman sources frequently refer to the Turgutlu tribe as the 
most loyal and powerful ally of the Karamanids.385 Several suggestions have been made 
about the ethnic origin of this tribe. According to Hammer they were Tatar386, while 
Zeki V. Togan suggests they were Kıpçak.387 Faruk Sümer rejects both arguments and 
asserts that Turgutlu was a Turkoman tribe.388 Şikārī counts Turgut among six begs 
gathered around Nūre Sofi.389 From then on until the end of the Karamanid rule, the 
Turgutlu tribe had always been primary ally of the Karamanids, which was often 
reinforced by marriages. The leaders of Turgutlu tribe usually held the post of beylerbey 
in the Karamanid state.390  
                                                 
383 “The tribes of aforementioned region did not hitherto accept suzerainty and service of any sultan.” 
KPZ8, p. 87.   
384 See, for example, KPZ8, pp. 88, 90, 103, 104. 
385 Turgutlu tribe lived in Taşlık-Silifke region and in the area between Akşehir, Aksaray, and Karaman. 
See Faruk Sümer, “Turgut-eli”, IA, 12/2, p. 120.  
386 Hammer, Osmanlı Tarihi, III, trs. M.Ata, Đstanbul, 1330, p. 92. 
387 Togan, Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş, Đstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1981, pp. 318-9.  
388 Faruk Sümer, “Turgutlular”, IA, 12/2, p. 120. Zeki Oral follows the same arguement. See Zeki Oral, 
“Turgut oğulları”, IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara: TTK, 1952, pp. 153-4. For the extended version of 
this article, see Zeki Oral, “Turgut Oğulları, Eserleri-Waqfiyeleri”, Vakıflar Dergisi, III, 1956, 31-64.  
389 Şikârî, p. 10. Another begs were Bayburt, Kaya, Mirza, Đmadeddin, and Hayreddin. Şikârî always 
mention Turgut Beg and Bayburt Beg as close men of Nūre Sofi and his son Karaman Beg. Later on the 
tribes of these two begs became known as Turgutlu and Bayburtlu. According to a legendary source, 
Didiği Sultan Menâkıbnâmesi, Turgut and Bayburt were brothers and sent by Didiği Sultan from Khorasan 
to Rūm. Another interesting point here is that according to the hagiography, Didiği Sultan was a cousin of 
Hacı Bektaş.  See Zeki Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 149. On the tekke of Didiği Sultan, see Ömür Bakırer-
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Dediği Dede ve Tekkeleri”, Belleten, 39, 1975, 447-71.  
390 Sümer, “Karamanoğulları”, p. 454 ; Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 140; Gary Leiser, “Torghud”, EI2, X, p. 
570. 
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Contemporary sources clearly indicate that Turgutlu had always been against the 
Ottoman rule.391 In the first confrontation of the Karamanids with the Ottomans in 1386-
7, they fought in the left wing of the Karamanid army.392 Turgutoğlu Ali Beg’s utterance 
in the battlefield, as reported by Şikârî, truly reflects the attitude of the Turgutlu tribe, as 
well as other Turkoman tribes of Anatolia, towards the Ottomans:  
Turgutoğlu Ali Bey meydana girüb Murad Bey’i çağırdı. Didi ki: “Ey Murad 
Bey! Karamanoğlu değilmidir ki senin pederini Germiyanoğlu habsinden çıkardı. 
Tabl u alem ve nakkāre virdi. Şimdi nice cenk idersin ve Tekfur-ı Konstantin’den 
iki kāfir beyin neye neye yardımcı aldın, Müslüman üstüne geldin? Müslüman 
olan kāfir askerin yardımcı mı idinür?”393 
 
In all of the later battles between the two powers, the Turgutlu always constituted 
a significant portion of the Karamanid army. Turgutlu’s hostility against the Ottomans 
was equally reciprocated in the Ottoman side by the fact that when he dispatched an 
army to finish the Karamanid rule, Mehmed II ordered his commander Mahmud Pasha 
to extirpate Turgut forces.394  
Ottoman historians always pursue a despising attitude against the Turgutlu tribe 
and describe them as stubborn, wild, arrogant, and ‘uncivilized’ people. Suffice it to 
refer to Aşıkpaşazāde’s description of Turgutlu troops in the Ottoman army at the battle 
of Kosovo in 1444. Ibrahim Beg of Karaman dispatched an auxiliary force to Murad II 
                                                 
391 Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 155.  
392 Sümer, “Turgutlular”, p. 121. Also consider Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri, p. 22; Anonim 
Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512), pp. 25-6.  
393 Şikârî, p.  158.  
394 Although Mahmud Pasha pillaged Turgut-eli in 1463, most of Turgutlu fighters managed to flee to 
Tarsus with their leader. Aşıkpaşazāde writes, “Padişah Mahmud Paşa’ya eydür: ‘Durgutoğlınun 
kandalığın bil! Dahı üzerine var!’ dedi. Durgutlu dahı Bulgar Dağı’na çıkmış idi. Mahmud Paşa dahı 
bunlarun kandalığın habarın aldı. Üzerlerine yüridi. Bunlar dahı duydılar kaçdılar. Darsus tarafına 
aşdılar. Mahmud Paşa dahı koyub ardından yetüb alıbildüğin alıkodılar, alınmayanlar varub Darsus 
Eli’ne girdiler.” See APZ, p. 216. Also consider Sümer, “Turgutlular”, p. 121; Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 
157.   
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in his battle against Christians. Aşıkpaşazāde narrates on his eye witness the inspection 
of the army in the battlefield, 
Amma cemi’ vilâyetinün askerini cem’ etmiş idi. Ve Karamanoğlı’ndan ol 
seferde gazāya adem gelmiş idi. Tamam leşker cem’ oldukdan sonra cebelüsi arz 
olındı. Cemi’i leşkerinün cebelüsin gördi. Diledi kim Karamanoğlı’ndan 
gelenleri dahı göre. Andan gelen leşkerin beğine eyittiler kim: “Sen dahı getür 
adamlarını ve cebelülerini göster” dediler. Ol dahı cebelüsün arz etdi. Kaltak 
eyerlü ve yırtmaç kürklü, örmeç kuşaklu, kabalak dülbendlü, kayış üzengilü, 
ipden kılıcı bağı, şol Durgutlu’nun boğazından asılacak at uğrılarını devşirüb 
göndirmüş. Ak-Çayluoğlına Hünkār eyidür: “Benüm gerçü anın yardımına 
ihtiyacım yokdur Allah ināyetinde. Amma min vechin bunları göndürdüği 
begāyet eyü varmış” der. “Benüm çerimün bir masharası eksük idi, anun içün 
göndürmişdür” didi.395 
  
Leaving aside the obvious scorn, Aşıkpaşazāde’s description, evidently puts 
forward the differentiation between tribal forces and the professionalized regular army 
of the Ottomans, and also how the latter regarded the former.  
Kemalpaşazāde also frequently refers to the ‘stubborn’ tribes of Taş-ili, 
especially to Turgutlu and Varsak.  To him, when the Karamanid rule came to an end, 
under the Ottomans, peace and prosperity arrived in the region, which was a “den of 
mischief and the station of seditious-natures and bad-races”.396 Kemalpaşazāde makes a 
special reference to the Turgutlu tribe, describing them as a “fireplace which spurt the 
fire of dissention out to the sky.” He says they used to create dissention, disturbing the 
inhabitants, pillaging villages, and attacking tribes in the region. If an army marched on 
them, they fled to Bulgar Mountain.397  
                                                 
395 APZ, p. 186. Aşıkpaşazāde personally attended this battle. In the following page he says he killed an 
enemy during the battle and received a good horse from the sultan as a present.   
396 KPZ8, p. 52. 
397 “Çün Kasım Beg öldi ve nesl-i Karaman münkarīz olub madde-i fesād münkatı’ oldı. Ol diyār, günc-i 
bī-mār ve gül-i bī-bār olub, bilād-ābād-ı Yūnān emn ü emān toldı. Ol bucākda, ki müfsidler yatağı ve 
fāsid-nihād, bed-nijādlar durağıydı, bir ocak dahī var idi andan da āfāka şerār-ı nār-ı fitne intişār 
bulurdı. Đl dilinde Turğudlu adıyla iştihār bulmuşlardı. Hiç bir makānda Turgūdmalu ta’ife değildiler. 
Her zamānda ol bilādda fesādları āşikār olurdı. Fırsat bulıcak kişver-i Karamanun bir kenārına ilğār 
iderlerdi. Leşkere haber olıcak çıkarlar kaçarlar kūhsār-ı Bulğāra giderlerdi. Ol havālinin ahālisini ta’cīz 
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As already delineated, Mehmed II finished Karamanid rule in 1475. However, 
when civil war broke out between his sons Bayezid I and Cem, following his death in 
1481, Karamanoğlu Kasım Beg returned to Đçel.398 Hearing Kasım Beg’s arrival, 
Turgutlu Begs, alongside with Varsak and other tribes of the region, immediately 
presented their allegiance to the former with great pleasure.399 Nevertheless, Kasım Beg 
could never achieve independence, but governed the region for two years as a vassal of 
Bayezid II.400 Following his death in 1483, Turgutoğlu Mahmud Beg, who had 
Karamanid blood from his mother, became the governor of the Ottoman province of 
Karaman. However, since he supported the Mamluks against the Ottomans, he had to 
flee to Aleppo in 1487.401 Turgutlu, Varsak, Ramazanoğlu and other ex-Karamanid 
tribes seem to have never accepted Ottoman suzerainty, or more properly stating, they 
never became a ‘tamed’ re’āya of the empire. During the Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry, they 
supported Mamluks and took arms against Ottomans when the opportunity appeared.402 
Turgutlu and Varsak tribal forces came up against the Ottoman imperial army, for the 
                                                                                                                                                
itmişlerdi. Nice köyü issüz koyub, nice boyı tağıtmışlardı.” KPZ8, pp. 52-3. In the following page, 
Kemalpaşazāde narrates how Prince Şehinşah dispatch an army under the command of Karagöz Pasha on 
the Turgutlu and Varsak tribes, and how the latter were defeated by Karagöz Pasha. According to 
Kemalpaşazāde, these events occurred in 1483-4.  
398 KPZ8, pp. 23-4.  
399 Sümer, “Turgutlular”, p. 121. 
400 KPZ8, p. 40. 
401 See KPZ8, p. 89; Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2, IV, p. 624; “Karamanoğulları”, DIA, 24, p. 459; 
“Turgutlular”, pp. 121-2.   
402 Kemalpaşazāde vividly describes the ‘rebellious’ and conceited nature of the tribal people of the 
region, and narrates consecutive Ottoman campaigns on these tribes in the last decades of the fifteenth 
century to subjugate them. See KPZ8, pp. 87-110. Đnalcık and Lindner rightfully argue that the real reason 
behind the continuous enmity of Turgut, Varsak, and other Tas-ili tribes against Ottomans was their desire 
to avoid the Ottoman centralizing administration. Lindner says, “… so in some way must these nomads 
have learned that the Ottomans threatened the continuation of their ways. And in response to this storm, 
the nomads sought any port.” See Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans, p. 81. As a matter of fact, during the 
sixteenth century the tribal elite of the region were assimilated the timar system of the Ottomans and the 
tribal structure of the local society to a great extend dissolved. See Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of 
Conquest”, pp. 118-9. 
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last time, during the last Karamanid attempt to regain the control of Karaman-ili in 
1500.403  
Comment should also be made about the fact that when the civil war began 
within the Ottoman borders, Turgutlu always supported the candidates who diverged 
from traditional imperial policy of the state and were cast out by the central forces. In 
1423, when Küçük Mustafa rose up against Murad II, who was engaged in executing his 
uncle Düzmece or Fake Mustafa in the Balkans, and marched on Bursa, Turgutlu tribal 
forces constituted a significant portion of his army.404 During the civil war between 
Bayezid II and Prince Cem, they, alongside with the Karamanid dynasty, maintained 
military support to Prince Cem.405 And lastly, during the struggle between Prince Selim 
and Prince Ahmed in the 1510’s, Turgutlu tribal forces were one of the significant 
constituents of Ahmed’s army against Selim.406  
One may safely think of the exemplary cases of Turgut and Varsak for other Taş-
ili and Taurus tribes such as Yumlu, Ramazanoğulları, Turkomans of Teke-ili, etc. 
Contemporary sources suggest that during the decline of Karamanid power towards the 
end of the fifteenth century, Turgutlu, Varsak, and other tribes looked for another 
powerful ally against the Ottoman imperialism. This power turned out to be the qizilbash 
state of Shah Ismail. Likewise, as clearly put by strong archival evidence, which will be 
examined in the next chapters of this study, Turgutoğlu Musa, the leader of the tribe 
then, acted in accordance with directives of Shah Ismail.    
 
                                                 
403 See KPZ8, pp. 210-212. A detailed evaluation of this attempt will come in the next chapters. 
404 Sümer, “Turgutlular”, p. 121. 
405 See KPZ8, pp. 23-6.  
406 Chapter VII will discuss this issue in detail. 
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3.4.  CONCLUSION 
By the second half of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had captured Constantinople 
and rose as a world power, with a bureaucracy that had been fully created by traditional 
Islamic ulemā and slave-origin bureaucrats. On the other hand, a vast Turkoman 
population, still mainly nomadic, or at least sustaining nomadic habits, no longer 
considered the Ottoman power as their legitimate state authority. Furthermore, the 
centralistic policies of the Ottoman government, which accelerated under Mehmed II’s 
reign, created a vast discontent among nomadic tribes of Anatolia.407 As has been 
pointed out by a modern scholar, “their tribal identity is never allowed to disappear into 
that of the state, and the interests of the tribe are the only paramount ideal which they are 
ever seen to serve.”408 Nevertheless, the tribal structure of Anatolia did not have enough 
potency of resistance against the extension of the Ottoman imperialism. Consequently 
they started to wait for a savior who would stop the Ottoman oppression. Furthermore, 
the messianism, which had already dominated their belief system, augmented this 
expectation.409 From the poems of qizilbash ozans (poet and singer) of the sixteenth 
century, it can be understood that the Turkoman considered the Ottoman governmental 
                                                 
407 See Halil Đnalcık, “Mehmed II”, IA, vol. 7, 506-535; Oktay Özel, "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 
'Land Reform' Revisited", Journal of Social and Economic History of the Orient, 42/2, 1999, 226-246; 
Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527”, Studia Islamica, 
LXII, Paris, 1985, pp. 156-7. Another reason aroused discontent of dervish milieu toward Ottoman 
administration was the confiscation of waqfs by Mehmed II in 1476, obviously for financial reasons. See 
Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire 
ottoman”, pp. 46-7; Oktay Özel, "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited", Journal 
of Social and Economic History of the Orient, 42/2 (1999), 226-246.  
Yet it is reported that right after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmet II bestowed Akataleptos church 
in the Şehzadebaşı district to Kalenderîs, who rushed to the army’s aid during the siege. See Oruç Beg, 
Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, ed. F. Babinger, Hannover, 1925, p. 65; Mehmed Neşrî, Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ, II, ed. 
F. R. Unat-M. A. Köymen, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 691. O. Nuri Ergin argues, however, that this was not 
because of Mehmed II’s approval of Kalenderîs’ religious path, but because of the necessity to make them 
harmless for the society by settling in a certain place. See O. Nuri Ergin, Türk Şehirlerinde Đmaret Sistemi, 
Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939, pp. 26-7. 
408 Walsh, p. 203.  
409 Ocak, “Babīler Đsyanından Kızılbaşlığa”, p. 148; Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: 
tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, p. 43.   
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agencies as oppressors (zalim) who were forcing them to change their traditional life.410 
On the other hand, as will be evaluated in the following chapters, this unhappy 
population had already found their savior or mahdi, namely Safavid shaykhs and later on 
shahs, who would annihilate this oppressing power and take the oppressed into Heaven. 
As Lindner states, “The ‘pure nomad’ who suspected (rightly) Ottoman intensions after 
the founding of Yenişehir soon found a nomadic alternative in the tribes that supported 
the rise of the Safavids to power in Iran; the grandson of a fourteenth-century Osmanli 
could – and some did – become one of the fifteenth century Safavi Rumlu.”411  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
410 Most of these poems have been published in the following anthologies: Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, Pir 
Sultan Abdal, Hayatı, Sanatı, Şiirleri, Istanbul, 1969; Alevî Bektâşî Nefesleri, Istanbul, 1992; Abdülbâki 
Gölpınarlı-Pertev Naili Boratav, Pir Sultan Abdal, Istanbul, 1991; Cahit Öztelli, Pir Sultan Abdal, Bütün 
Şiirleri, Đstanbul, 1985; Bektaşi Gülleri, Istanbul, 1997; Sabahattin Eyuboğlu, Pir Sultan Abdal, Istanbul, 
1997. 
411 Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 710.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
TURKOMANS AND THE SAFAVIDS:  
FUSION OF TURKOMAN CULTURE AND THE SAFAVID 
MYSTICISM 
 
 
 
The Dream of Shaykh Safī 
While still a lad he was favored with divine grace and spent his 
time performing religious acts. During that period of his life he 
had strange visions that made him hopeful of receiving even 
more divine and regal bounty. One night he saw in a vision 
that he was seated on the dome of the congregational mosque 
in Ardabil when suddenly there rose a sun that filled the whole 
world with light. When he looked closely he saw that the sun 
was his own blessed countenance rising above the horizon of 
felicity. Then he woke up and told his mother his dream, 
asking her for an interpretation. After contemplating the dream 
she replied, “My dear son, the dream indicates that the light of 
sainthood will so shine from you that the east and the west will 
be lighted by it.” Of course he was delighted.412 
                                                 
412 After citing Shakh Safī’s dream Khwandamir adds his comment: “During the writing of this dream it 
occurred to the writer of these pages that apparently at that time in was indicated to the shaykh in the 
visionary world that there would soon rise from his loins a luminary, the final of whose reigning banner 
would shine like the sun over the expanse of the world, and truly those words have now come true.” See 
HS, pp. 556-7. 
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It is also related that one night during the shaykh’s youth he 
saw in a dream that he was seated on a high mountain, with a 
long, broad sword bound to his waist and a crown of sable on 
his head. Even in his dream he said to himself. “What is the son 
of Shaykh Aminuddin Jibrail doing with a sword and a 
crown?” He tried to loosen the sword from his waist but was 
unable. The he took the crown off, and from his blessed head 
rose a sun that illuminated the whole world. When he put the 
crown back on his head, the light was covered. When he had 
taken the crown off and put it back on three times, he woke up 
from his dream.413 
 
 
4.1.  THE SUFI ORDER OF SAFAVIDS 
 
Although the order of Safaviyya was extremely influential on both the elite and the 
masses of Azerbaycanian, Iranian, Eastern Anatolian, Syrian and Iraqi societies up until 
the time of Ismail, a period covering two centuries, we do not have access to any 
religious or mystical works by Safavid sheiks during this period. After the death of 
Shaykh Safī in 1334, the mürşid-post of the order was filled by Sadreddin Musa (1334-
1391), Hāce Alāaddin Ali (1391-1429), Shaykh Ibrahim (1429-1447), Shaykh Juneyd 
(1447-1460), and Shaykh Haydar (1460-1488), consecutively. With the exception of 
Saffetu’s-safa, no work written by either the Shaykhs of the order or any other affiliated 
man has been discovered from this period. The scarcity of sources makes it difficult to 
                                                 
413 Khewandamir writes his interpretation as follows: “This writer says that if an illuminated person 
contemplates the meaning of this dream he will realize that the sword was a metaphor for the appearance 
of the world-conquering sword of the victorious padishah and the crown and sun were metaphors for the 
tāj and hāj of His Majesty’s [Shah Ismail] royal head.” See HS, p. 557. Khwandamir, however, does not 
specify where the Shaykh saw this dream and to whom he asked for contemplation. Iskender Beg Munshī, 
who wrote his history nearly a century later than Khwandamir, recites the same dream. But in his account 
the interpretation of the dream is said to be made by Shaykh Gilānī. AA runs, “He related his vision to 
Shaikh Zāhed, and asked him what in meant. Shaikh Zāhed’s interpretation was as follows: ‘The sword 
and the sunlike radiance are the signs of the appearance and coming forth of a powerful king from your 
stock. The reflection of his sunlike felicity will shine upon the people of the earth, and the flashing blade 
of his sword will obliterate and utterly destroy the dark evil of innovators and those in error.’” See AA, p. 
23.  
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write a satisfactory history of the order between Shaykh Safī and Ismail, especially in 
terms of the religious agenda of the order. From a historian’s point of view, this period 
resembles a long, dark tunnel into which the order entered as a typical sunni mystical 
tarīqa, but emerged as a shi’ite, militant order featuring many ghulat elements. Since 
this passage through the ‘tunnel’ is not sufficiently documented, one can not properly 
determine the mechanism, dynamics, socio-cultural and theological grounds, nor the 
doctrinal basis of this transformation. Nonetheless, thanks to the great respect awarded 
to early Safavid Shaykhs and to their influence, we find some information in bits and 
pieces in contemporary Mongol, Timurid, and Sufi sources.   
Even a cursory glance at the contemporary sources leaves no doubt that Shaykh 
Safīyuddin Ishak (1252-1334)414, who founded the Safaviyya order at the beginning of 
the fourteenth century in Ardabil415, was an adherent of the sunni interpretation of 
Islam.416 He is unanimously reported by contemporary sources as a sunni Shaykh who 
                                                 
414 After a spiritual query under the auspices of several Shaykhs, the eponymous founder of the Safavid 
Order became the disciple of Shaykh Zāhid Gilāni, and married his daughter Bībī Fātima. Following the 
death of Shaykh Zāhid in 1301, Safīyuddin Ishak succeeded to the post of his master in accordance with 
the will of the latter. See HS, p. 557; AA, p. 23; HT, pp. 126-8; Ghulām Sarwar, History of Shāh Ismā’īl 
Safawī, Aligarh, 1939, p. 21; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980, p. 6. 
415 For the geographical position of Ardabil and its effect on the growth of the order, which was not 
ignorable, see Michel M. Mazzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids. Šī’ism, Sūfism, and the Āulāt, 
Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972, pp. 43-46; Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 1.  
416 See, for example, BRW, p. 43.  A letter recorded in Ahsanu’t-tevārih, from Uzbek Ubeyd Khan to Shah 
Tahmasb reads, “We have thus heard concerning your ancestor, His sainted Holiness Shaykh Safī, that he 
was a good man and an orthodox Sunnī, and we are greatly astonished that you neither follow the conduct 
of Murtaza Ali nor that of your ancestor.” Quoted in BRW, p. 44. In Saffetu’s-safa, “Shaykh Safī asked 
once: ‘What is your madhab?’ He replied that he believed in the madhab of the imāms (i.e. the four 
schools of Abū Hanīfa, Šāfi’ī, Mālik, and Inb Hanbal) whom he loved, and that from among the (four) 
medāhib he chose those hadīts that had the strongest chain of authority (asnad) and are the best (ağwad), 
and applied them. He added that he did not allow for himself or his murīds any license in these matters, 
but rather carried out the details that are expressed in the various madāhib.” Quoted in Mazzaoui, p. 49. 
Ottoman sources, which were used to take a vigorously opposing stand to the Safavid movement, also 
unanimously depict Safīyuddin and early Safavid Shaykhs up to Junayd as saintly and respected figures. 
These sources will be cited in the following pages. Even Fazlullah Ruzbihan Khunji, a rigorous sunni 
scholar who frequently expressed his hatred of Safavids in his writings, describes the early Safavid 
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pursued the orders of the shari’a and banned his disciples from indulging in 
unsanctioned practices such as drinking wine.417 In fact, Saffetu’s-safa, the principal 
source of information about Shaykh Safī, permits no suspicion on the issue.418 Ibn 
Bazzaz, an adherent of the order, composed this encyclopedic book in 1356 by the order 
of Shaykh Sadruddin, the son, the chief disciple, and the deputy of Safīyuddin. Saffetu’s-
                                                                                                                                                
Shaykhs in a quite positive manner. Like most Ottoman historians, he also argues that the saintly nature of 
this order was destroyed by Shaykh Junayd. See TA, pp. 62-3.   
417 Such an image of Shaykh Safi is unanimously accepted by modern scholars. Minorsky writes, for 
example, “The early shaykhs were strictly orthodox and their religious authority could not be called in 
question and opposed.” V. Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 1957, p. 439. Also see Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der 
Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der 
Islam, 41, 1965, p. 100; BRW, p. 43; Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk. A Manual of Safavid Administration, 
London, 1943, p. 125; Zeki V. Togan, “Sur L’origine des Safavides”, Mélanges Massignon, III, 1957, p. 
356; Walther Hinz, Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd. XV. Yüzyılda Đran’ın Millî bir Devlet Haline Yükselişi, 
çev. Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, Ankara: TTK, 1992, p. 15; Jean Aubin, “Etudes Safavides I, Sah Ismail et les 
notables de l’Iraq persan”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, II/I, 1959, p. 9; Basil 
Nikitine, "Essai d'Analyse du Safwat as-Safa", Jounal Asiatique 245, 1957, p. 388; Hans Robert Roemer, 
“The Safavid Period”, The Cambridge History of Iran, 6, ed., Peter Jackson, Cambridge, 1993, p. 195. 
418 For a very brief summary of the content of this principle source regarding the early period of the order 
see BRW, pp. 38-39. Despite its eminence among sources of the history and especially the religious stand 
of early Safavids, a critical edition of this work is yet to be published. Saffetu’s-safa is composed of an 
introduction, a conclusion, and twelve chapters (bāb). A German translation of the eighth chapter 
alongside its original text in Persian was published by Heidi Zirke. (Ein hagiographisches Zeugnis zur 
persischen Geschichte aus der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts, Das achte Kapitel des Safwat as-safa in 
kritischer Bearbeitung, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987.) In the introductory part of his study, Zirke 
briefly discusses the content of the whole work and the manuscript copies available in several libraries 
across the world. Zirke also provides a genealogical map of available manuscripts. See Zirke, pp. 1-32. 
The oldest copy of Saffetu’s-safa is known as to be that in the Library of Leiden (Or. 465) dated 1485. 
(Mirza Abbaslı says he has a microfilm copy of the author copy, that was written by Ibn Bazzaz, dated 
759/1357. But unfortunatelly he does not clarify where the original copy is. See  Mirza Abbaslı, 
“Safevîlerin Kökenine Dair”, Belleten, XL, 1976, p. 289.) Two later copies are preserved in Süleymaniye 
Kütüphanesi in Istanbul (Ayasofya 3099 and Ayasofya 2123), the former being dated 1491 and the latter, 
1509. All the other copies were written during and after the reign of Shah Tahmasb. Interestingly, the 
fourth chapter (bāb) of Saffetu’s-safa was translated into Turkish only one year later than it was written, in 
760/1357. This copy is preserved in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, (Kemankeş 247). So, excluding Abbaslı’s 
unknown copy, this is the oldest copy of Saffetu’s-safa, even though it was partial and a translation of the 
original work. Another point to notice is that this Turkish translation of Saffetu’s-safa seemingly gained 
wide currency among Ottoman learned circles, especially by the sixteenth century. There are numbers of 
copies of this Turkish translation in several libraries in cities such as Istanbul, Kastamanu, Konya, and 
Manisa. One should not disregard that these cities, except Istanbul, were prince sanjaks of the Ottoman 
Empire; thus, they were at the same time scholarly, literary and artistic centers. Furthermore there are 
respectful references to  the sayings and deeds of Shaykh Safī in the works of some leading Ottoman sufis. 
For example, in his famous book Müzekki’n-nüfûs, which was written in 1448, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, who is 
known as the second great pîr of the Kâdirî Order in Anatolia, counts Shaykh Safî among the greatest 
saints of Sufism and on six occasions refers to his words,  an honor reserved for only few great sufis. See 
Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, Müzekki’n-nüfûs, yay. Nezihi Ferhun-Ali Ayağ, Đstanbul, 1976. For an analysis of 
Saffetu’s-safa see Basil Nikitine, "Essai d'Analyse du Safwat as-Safa", Jounal Asiatique 245, 1957, 385-
394.      
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Safa offers plentiful information about the religious stand and views of Shaykh Safī. 
Even a cursory sketch of Saffetu’s-Safa makes it clear that Safīyuddin’s ideas and mystic 
interpretations can hardly be evaluated as shi’ite.. Even though there might be some 
implicit implications to the contrary, these do not exceed the traditional shi’te core in all 
tasavvuf schools of Islam. After an analysis of Saffetu’s-safa, Basil Nikitine, for 
example, arrives at the conclusion that the work depicts the Prophet as a sufi master who 
was carefully followed by Shaykh Safī; and thus, that the Shaykh did not deviate from 
the traditional way of the sunna and shari’a. “Leur orthodoxie est donc” says Nikitine, “ 
indiscutable.”419 Sohrweide writes in a similar manner, 
Die Einstellung der frühen Safāviya zur Šari´a reiht sie eher unter die Vertreter 
des gemäßigten Sufismus ein. Der Überlieferung nach hatte Scheich Zāhid Safī 
ad-Din strenge Befolgung der Šari´a empfohlen, die dieser Zeit seiner Lebens 
eingehalten und auch von seinen Jüngern gefordert haben soll. Mit besonderer 
Schärfe lehnte Safī das Weintrinken ab. Unter seinen Jüngern ahndete er streng 
jedes Vergehen gegen das Verbot; häufig war das Tod des Sünders die Folge, so 
erschien es jedenfalls den Jüngern. Ob dieser tatsähhlich durch den Zorn des 
Scheichs verursacht wurde, ist hier unwesentlich; wichtig ist, daß man den 
Verstoß gegen das Weinverbot für eine Todsünde hielt.420    
 
On the other hand, a closer look at Saffetu’s-safa shows that Shaykh Safīyuddin 
was a highly educated man and that among his audience were figures from cultured 
classes of society as well as villagers and middle or low-class townspeople.421 Shaykh 
                                                 
419 Nikitine, p. 390.  
420 Sohrweide, p. 100. Sohrweide also calls attention to the negative attitudes of both Shaykh Zāhid and 
Shaykh Safī toward antinomian Qalandar groups, whom they denounced as heretics. See Sohrweide, p. 
103. Walther Hinz describes the daily activities of the Tekke of Ardabil: The day started with the early 
morning, before the sun rose. Then followed the prayer and zikr, which continues approximately one hour; 
the same zikr was repeated at the evening. In the mid-afternoon there was regular recitation of the Koran. 
The disciples of the hospice were fond of fasting. Especially during the last ten days of Ramadan and the 
first ten days of Zilhicce they lived in seclusion, totally devoting themselves to prayer and contemplation.  
See Hinz, p. 11. This description clearly indicates that during this time the Tekke of Ardabil was a great 
center of high Islamic Sufism, quite distanced from any forms of ‘heterodoxy’.     
421 The fourth chapter of Saffetu’s-safa, for example, is composed of the Shaykh’s interpretation of 
Qur’anic verses, of some sayings of the Prophet, and of the special phrases produced by Islamic mystics. 
Even a cursory glance at its style and its evaluation of subjects makes clear that this work delves far 
beyond the perception level of illiterate people. Rather, its audience must have been learned mystics.  
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Safī and his spiritual master, Shaykh Zāhid Gilānī, were, indeed, representatives of high 
Sufism prudently respecting the rules of Islamic law (şeriat).422  
Shaykh Safīyuddin was highly influential, not only among ordinary people, but 
among the ruling elite as well. He gained the respect of Mongol rulers; and he saved 
many people from being harmed at their hands.423 Two letters of the great Minister 
Rashiduddin Fadlullah (d. 1318), one addressed to Shaykh Safī himself and the other to 
Mir Ahmad, the son of Rashiduddin, reflect in an obvious manner the concern of the 
Minister for the welfare of the Shaykh and his desire to win the Shaykh’s favor and 
intercession. In his first letter, Rashiduddin offers to Shaykh Safī, for his convent, a 
yearly gift of corn, wine, oil, cattle, sugar, honey, and other food-stuffs for the proper 
entertainment of notables of Ardabil on the anniversary of the Prophet’s birthday. In his 
second letter, the Minister enjoins his son, who was then the governor of Ardabil, to take 
care of the all inhabitants, and especially “to act in such wise manner that His Holiness 
the Pole of the Heaven of Truth, the Swimmer in the Oceans of the Law, the Pacer of the 
Hippodrome of the Path, the Shaykh of Islam and of the Muslims, the Proof of such as to 
attain the Goal, the Exemplar of the Bench of Purity, the Rose-tree of the Garden of 
Fidelity, Shaykh Safīyyu’l-Millat wa’d-Dīn (may God Most High perpetuate the 
                                                 
422 As Sohrweide determines, both Shaykhs took positions against antinomian Qalandar groups, 
denouncing them as heretics. See Sohrweide, p. 103.  
423 HT, p. 130. Also consider Mazzaoui, p. 46; Sohrweide, p. 110; Aubin, “Etudes Safavides I, Sah Ismail 
et les notables de l’Iraq persan”, pp. 42-3; Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 192-3. An interesting 
dialogue between the powerful Mongol amīr Amir Chūbān, who was a murid of the Shaykh, and Shaykh 
Safī is recorded by Safavid sources. Asked by the amīr whether the soldiers of the king or his disciples 
were more numerous, Shaykh Sadruddin is said to have answered that his disciples were twice as 
numerous.  According to another version, he is said to have replied that in Iran alone for every soldier 
there were a hundred Sufis. To this the amīr is said to have replied: “You speak truly, for I have traveled 
from the Oxus to the frontiers of Egypt, and from the shores of Hurmuz to Bāb al-Abvāb [Darband], 
which are the furthest limits of this kingdom, and I have seen the disciples of the Shaykh embellished and 
adorned with the ornaments and the garb of the Shaykh, and they have spread the sound of zikr to those 
parts.” Recited in Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 10. The same occurrence is recorded in HT. See HT, 
p. 130. 
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blessings of His Holy Exhalations!) may be well pleased with and grateful to thee.”424 
These two letters suffice to show the high repute which Shaykh Safī enjoyed amongst 
his contemporaries.425  
The popularity of the Safavid order was so great during the time of its most 
illustrious founder that the number of those who came to visit the Shaykh along one road 
only – that from Maragha and Tabriz – in the course of three months amounted to some 
thirteen thousand.426 Khwandamir writes, 
In Safwatu’s-safâ it is recorded that Khwaja Muhyiddin, one of Shaykh Safī’s 
sons, said, “Once all the mosques and places of worship in Ardabil and 
surrounding areas were filled with a multitude of disciples gathered from Iraq, 
Azerbaijan, Anatolia, Diyarbakir, and Shirvan, and they were all in retreat under 
the shaykh’s guidance. It was my duty to take each of them a loaf of bread to 
break their fasts in the evening. During those days we had to prepare five 
thousand loaves every day in order to have enough.” It is also mentioned in 
Safwatu’s-safâ that once in the village of Darwar in Pir-Muhammad Darwari’s 
hermitage nearly twenty thousand people repented before the shaykh and became 
his disciples. Mawlana Abdul-Latif, the shaykh’s prayer leader, said, “One night 
I heard the shaykh say, ‘Now I have two thousand perfected disciples, who have 
gone through the stages of fear and danger and arrived at the stage of 
fearlessness.’”427 
                                                 
424 Quoted in BRW, pp. 33-4. 
425 Roemer underscores the political and commercial dimensions of Shaykh Safī’s leadership, as well as 
the spiritual one. He writes, “Shaikh Safī is portrayed as a paradoxical personality in which the miracle 
worker and man of God combined with a sober, practical politician and a cunning merchant.” Roemer, 
“The Safavid Period”, p. 191. 
426 BRW, p. 44. According to Browne, many if not most of these disciples must have come from Asia 
Minor. Also see Hinz, p. 8. Khwandamir records a slightly different version: “It is related that Mawlana 
Abdul-Malik, son of Mawlana Shamsuddin Barniqi, once said, ‘I once counted the people who were going 
through Barniq to see the shaykh. Within three months there were thirteen thousand people, and God only 
knows how many came by other roads.” HS, p. 559. It is true that the Safavid Order gained a wide-spread 
popularity even at the time of its founder. But one should not interpret this success merely as an 
achievement of Safavid shaykhs; the religious landscape of the Islamic world should also be taken into 
account. As Roemer rightfully asserts, with the destruction of the Caliphate by the Mongols, Islam was 
faced with a grave crisis, both political and religious.  As a result, the official theology of Islam lost its 
political background and was deprived of much of its importance and influence. Instead, popular 
religiosity, which has been always chiefly represented by sufi brotherhoods, attained widespread 
popularity. This form of religiosity “included a marked willingness to believe in miracles, a cult of saints 
with the growth of much frequented places of pilgrimage, and even the veneration of ‘Ali.” See Roemer, 
“The Safavid Period”, p. 191. 
427 HS, p. 559. HT recites similar passages from Saffetu’s-safa, saying many disciples of Shaykh Safī were 
coming from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Rum, Diyarbakr, and Shirwan in order to benefit the holy presence of the 
Shaykh. See HT, pp. 128-9.  
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The ethnic origin of the Safavid family is not clearly documented in 
contemporary sources. The family’s claim of descendence from the Prophetic line has 
been already discussed by several scholars, and a consensus was established.428 To 
summarize, the origins of Safavid family had no relation to the family of the Prophet. 
The legend that family members descended from the seventh Imam Musa al-Kazim was 
a later invention, dating to the shaykhdom of either Hoca Ali or Junayd, closely 
connected to desires for the appearance of shi’ite tendency in the doctrine of the Order 
and aiming to provide legitimate ground for claims of worldly power.429 
Some scholars argue that Firuzshah, the oldest confirmed ancestor of Shaykh 
Safī, was born to a Kurdish family.430 Nonetheless, the family has certain affinity to 
Turkish culture and language as well. An interesting entry in Saffetu’s-safa, which was 
recited in some later Safavid chronicles as well, recounts that while searching for a 
mature spiritual guide Shaykh Safī went to the Province Fars, where he encountered a 
recommended Shaykh. After realizing the young age of Safī, the Shaykh calls him 
“Turkish Pīr” (Pīr-i Türk).431 The same phrase is used several times to name Shaykh 
Safī in Saffetu’s-safa. But, how should we understand this phrase? Basil Nikitine, after 
reciting these phrases in Saffetu’s-safa, argues that during this period, Ardabil was not a 
                                                 
428 In the context of later Safavid assertion that they descended from the family of the Prophet, the origin 
of Safavid Dynasty, indeed, has been discussed at length by scholars and an agreement on the seyyidship 
of Safavids has already been reached. To repeat all those discussions here would be repetitive. For a brief 
summary, see Mazzaoui, pp. 46-52. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, the oldest well-known ancestor of 
Safavids, Firuzshah, was a Kurd. See Z. V. Togan, “Sur L’origine”, p. 356.  
429 An extremist form shi’ism was certainly implanted in the doctrine of the Order by the shaykhdom of 
Junayd This topic will be further analyzed in the following pages.   
430 See Zeki V. Togan, “Sur L’origine des Safavides”, Mélanges Massignon, III, 1957, p. 356. Togan 
argues that the descendants of Shaykh Safi, who descended from a Kurdish family, were completely 
‘turkified’ by the time of Shah Ismail. See i.b.i.d., p. 353.    
431 Recited in Sohrweide, p. 99. AA recounts the same event. But in that account Safī is called “O Turkish 
youth!” See AA, p. 22.  
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“région turcophone”.432 Despite being curious about Nikitine’s argument, Sohrweide 
also inclines to underestimate the connection of Safīyuddin with the Turkish cultural 
sphere. He states, the word ”Türk” is used here as a synonym of “beautiful”.433 To 
conclude, the origin of the Safavid dynasty was neither seyyid, nor shi’ite, nor of 
Turkoman blood.434 
Indeed, the connection of the early Safavid Shaykhs to Turkish culture and 
language, as well as their ethnic origin, and the relationship of the order to the Turkish 
folk during the early years of its history are not clearly known.  Modern scholars tend to 
identify the principal language spoken by the early Shaykhs as the Persian dialect of 
Gilan.435 Nonetheless, the translation of Saffetu’s-safa, albeit partially, into Turkish 
immediately after its appearance clearly shows that by at least the mid-fourteenth 
century the order had attained a wide-spread acceptance among Turkish speaking 
people. Likewise, by the Shaykhdom of Junaid, at the latest, the decisive majority of the 
order’s disciples hailed from Turkoman tribal peoples of Anatolia and Syria. Moreover, 
from this time onward until the fall of dynasty the native language of the Shaykh’s 
family members is known to have been Turkish.436  
                                                 
432 Nikitine, p. 393, footnote 3. Nikitine’s view is, however, open to criticism. Sohrweide, for example, 
took a skeptic stance toward this view. See, Sohrweide, p. 99, footnote 26.   
433 Sohrweide reminds that in the Persian poetry the phrase “schön Türke” is celebrated. Thus, this phrase 
in Saffetu’s-safa does not necessarily mean that Shaykh Safī was ethnically a Turk, but rather, that he was 
as beautiful as a Turk. See Sohrweide, p. 99, footnote 26.  
434 Hans Roemer argues, however, that Ismail’s etnhic origin must be accepted Turkish or Turcoman; “At 
any rate,” he writes, “Ismail’s Turkish or Turkoman descent is beyond any question.”  See Hans R. 
Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, Intellectual 
Studies in Islam, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 29.  
435 Sohrweide, p. 113. Brown states that Shaykh Safī produced poetry both in the dialect of Gilan and in 
ordinary Persian. See BRW, p. 43. However, Mazzaoui says that the Shaykh may possibly have produced 
some Turkish written works as well. See Mazzaoui, pp. 49-50, footnote 7.  
436 Shah Ismail is said to have learned Persian during his concealment in Lahijan. (See Muhammad Karim 
Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I (1487-1524), Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Edinburgh, 1981, p. 13.) And “more than a century after Isma’īl’s death, when the capital had been 
transferred from the north of Persia to Isfahān, Turkish seems still to have been the language generally 
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After performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, Shaykh Safī died on September 12, 
1334 at Ardabil.437 As Mazzaoui concludes, two significant facts exist about the Order 
of Ardabil during his lifetime; namely, “one: the high respect which the Order and 
Shaykh Safī enjoyed under the Mongols, and two: the curious fact that most of the 
inhabitants of Ardabil were of [the] Šāfi’ī school and were followers of Shaykh Safī ad-
Dīn.”438 Furthermore, Shaykh Safī himself was a sincere and prudent follower of sunni 
Islam. However, the nature of contact between the Order and the Turkoman milieu, even 
its existence, is not clear in the available sources.  
Towards the end of his life Shaykh Safī named his second son Shaykh Sadruddin 
Musa439 (1305-1391) as his successor.440 Shaykh Sadruddin held the position for 57 
years. His Shaykhdom witnessed the further proliferation of disciples and the influence 
of his family on regional politics. The wealth of the tekke also increased considerably;441 
and his followers visited Ardabil in great numbers.442 During his long term of office, 
many Ilkhanid amīrs and Mongol nobles became his disciples.443 As Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā 
writes, “[his glory] spread everywhere, the number of adepts increased and these 
brought him masses of valuables, and soon, as his father’s successor, he added to the 
                                                                                                                                                
spoken at court.” BRW, p. 15. Attempting to prove the dominance of Turkish in the Safavid realm, 
Browne also calls attention to the fact that the war-cry of Safavid soldiers was not “Long live Persia!” or 
the like, but rather, in the Turkish language, “O my spiritual guide and master whose sacrifice I am!”  Is 
this your translation or his?  If it’s yours, change it to:  “O my spiritual guide and master, for whom I 
sacrifice myself.” Also see Sümer, pp. 5-6. For several European travellers’ witness accounts see Fuat 
Köprülü, “Âzerî”, IA, pp. 120-21. 
437 Sarwar, p. 21; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 9;  
438 Mazzaoui, p. 46.   
439 Sadruddin Musa was born from the marriage of Shaykh Safī and Bibī Fatima, the daughter of Shaykh 
Zāhid Gilnānī. HS recounts Shaykh Zāhid’s miraculous foretelling of the birth of Sadruddin during the 
wedding ceremony of Shaykh Safī and Bibī Fatima. See HS, p. 559. AA repeats the same account. See 
AA, pp. 25-6.  
440 HS, p. 559. 
441 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 9. 
442 Sarwar, p. 21. 
443 AA, p. 26. However, Shaykh Sadruddin seems to have occasionally fallen into conflict with temporal 
rulers. The competition between him and Malik Ashraf is recorded in Safavid sources. See, for example, 
HS, p. 560; HT, pp. 137-48. 
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dignity of Aaron (Hārūn) the magnificence of Korah (Qārūn). His cellars (hafīr) became 
full of supplies, and the place of pilgrimage brimful with merchandise.”444 
During the Shaykhdom of Sadruddin Musa the sacred enclosure of the Safavid 
Family at Ardabil was established under the direction of the Shaykh.445 The principle 
source regarding the early periods of the order, namely Saffetu’s-safa, was compiled by 
Ibn Bazzaz. Indeed, the basic organization of the Safavid order had already been 
established by Shaykh Safī, who extended the Safavid propaganda network to eastern 
Anatolia and Syria. But, under his son Sadruddin, this network was consolidated and 
regular contact with proselytes was maintained.446  
Shaykh Sadruddin died in 1391 and, like his father, buried in the Ardabil 
sanctuary.447 Shortly before his death, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca448 and 
named his son Hoca Ali as his successor. Hoca Ali headed the order until his death in 
1427. Some historians argue that the first discernible shi’ite tendency in the esoteric 
doctrine of the order appeared under Hoca Ali.449 However, some other scholars have 
                                                 
444 TA, p. 63.  
445 HS, p. 559; AA, p. 26; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, pp. 9-10; BRW, p. 44. 
446 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 10. Savory also asserts that as a result of their propaganda in 
eastern Anatolia and Syria, the Safavids recruited many disciples from the pastoral Turcoman tribes 
inhabiting in these regions. But this assertion needs to be supported by historical evidence. Moreover, as 
indicated above, during this early period the message of the Safavid Shaykhs was not so attractive to 
illiterate pastoral nomads. It seems reasonable to conclude that the large-scale spread of the Safavid order 
among Anatolian and Syrian nomadic-tribal Turkomans must have occurred later.  
447 Browne says both Sadruddin and his son Hoca Ali composed verses in Persian. See BRW, p. 44, 46. 
448 BRW, p. 45; Sarwar, p. 22.  
449 “In him strong Shi’a tendencies reveal themselves: instigated by the Ninth Imam Muhammad Taqi in a 
dream he converts the people of Dizful, by a miraculous stoppage of their river, to a belief in and 
recognition of the supreme holiness of Ali inb Abī Tālib…” See BRW, p. 46.  Browne also recites from 
Nasab-nāme-i Silsilat as-Safaviyya that on one occasion Hoca Ali exhorts Timur to “chastise, as they 
deserve, the Yazdī Kurds, the friends of Mu’āwiya, because of whom we wear the black garb of mourning 
for the Immaculate Imāms.”; and he considers this occasion as a strong proof of the Shaykh’s shi’ite 
tendency.  Also see Hinz, p. 15. Mazzaoui, p. 55; Hinz, p. 23; H. Roamer, “Die Safawiden”, Speculum, 
IV, 1953, p. 28; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 13.  
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contested this idea, arguing that the esoteric doctrine of the order reflected shi’ism by the 
time of Shaykh Junayd, the grandson of Hoca Ali.450 
Another controversial issue pertaining to the era of Hoca Ali is the story of his 
meeting with Timur.451 Savory, following Iskender Beg Munshī452, argues that these two 
men met three times, and that the last of these meetings occurred in 1404, shortly before 
Timur’s death, when he was travelling back to Central Asia after his victory over the 
Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I at the battle of Ankara in 1402. According to traditional 
Safavid account, Timur summoned Hoca Ali, and after the latter’s display of kerāmet, or 
extra ordinary deeds, he became a disciple of the Shaykh. He then, upon the request of 
the Shaykh, handed over the prisoners taken in his campaign against the Ottomans. Hoca 
Ali set them free and settled in Ardabil. The grateful descendants of these freed captives, 
known as Sūfiyān-ı Rūm, became the most devoted adherents and supporters of the 
Safavid family.453 According to the Anonymous history of Shah Ismail, most of these 
                                                 
450 See, for example, Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, p. 189; Jean Aubin, “Notables”, p. 9; Heribert Horst, 
Tīmūr and Hōğä ´Alī, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden, in Abhandlungen der Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang, Wiesbaden, 1958, p. 49; Sohrweide, p. 122.  
451 On the relation between Hoca Ali and Timur see Horst, Tīmūr and Hōğä ´Alī. 
452 According to AA, Hoca Ali met Timur on three occasions. The first occasion was when Timur was 
crossing the river Oxus on his way to invade Transoxania. At that time Hoca Ali appeared to Timur in 
dervish clothes and foretelled him that he would re-appear in Dezdul and die in Jerusalem. The second 
occasion was while Timur was passing through the river Dezful on his way from Baghdad to Kūzestān, 
again wearing dervish clothes. The third meeting occurred while Timur was returning from his campaign 
on Asia Minor. See AA, p. 27. 
453 BRW, p. 46; Hinz, pp. 8-9; Mazzaoui, p. 54; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 13; Oktay Efendiev, 
“Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque dans la création de l’état Safavide”, Turcica, VI, 1975, p. 27. 
Iskender Beg Munshi narrates this event as follows: “Several years later, when Timur was returning from 
Asia Minor, bringing with him a large number of prisoners whom he had taken in that campaign, he 
stopped at Ardabil. The fame of Shaikh Safī al-Dīn and accounts of his high mystical station had reached 
Timur, and he made the pilgrimage to the Safavid mausoleum. Afterward, he asked some questions to 
dervishes sitting nearby, and they directed him to Kāja ‘Alī. He went to the Shaikh’s private quarters and 
found the Shaikh at prayer, offering praises to God. However much the servants importuned him, 
informing him of the arrival of the great conqueror, Kāja ‘Alī paid no attention. When he had finished, he 
saw that Timur was seated in a proper manner, and then began to offer him words of counsel and 
admonition. [Then Hoca Ali shows a karamat revealing Timur’s secret thoughts and the latter became the 
disciple of the Shaykh. Upon Timur’s offer to fulfill any request of the former, whose “mind was 
completely free from any worldly considerations”] … the Kāja, seeking always to please God, requested 
the release of the prisoners whom Emir Timur had taken in Asia Minor. Emir Timur honored the request, 
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prisoners, upon becoming Safavid disciples, were sent back to Anatolia with 
representatives (khalifa) appointed to accompany them.454 Minorsky, basing his 
argument on the Anonymous History of Shah Ismail, states,  
Under his [Safī’s] grandson Sultan Ali, we have more direct indications of the 
threads drawn from Ardabil to the far-away Anatolia. When after his campaign 
in Asia Minor, Timur was passing through Ardabil, he told Sultan Ali to crave a 
boon. The Shaykh begged for the liberation of the prisoners of Rum, and Timur 
freed them all (majmū’) and appointed them to the service of the family of 
Ardabil. He also issued an order (raqam) to the rulers (salātīn) and governors of 
Rum to the effect that the men whom he had freed “and who are the Sufis of the 
Safavid family,” wherever they be, should not be oppressed (dast-andāz) or 
prevented from visiting (āmad-u-shud) their Murshid; they must be exempted 
from payments to their masters, as well as from government taxes. Out of his 
own lawful money Timur bought fields and villages in the neighborhood of 
Ardabil and allotted them as vaqf to the resting place (mazār) of Shaykh Safī, 
which he recognized as a bast (asylum). He also made over to the Safavid family 
the land taxes (kharāj) of the said vilāyat. To those of the prisoners who 
expressed the desire to return to Rum, permission was granted to do so. Shaykh 
Sultan Ali appointed his representatives (khalifa va-pīra) to all the tribes (oymaq) 
and said: ‘let your comings and goings be not infrequent, for the advent (khurūj) 
of the righteous Duodeciman religion is nigh and you must be ready to sacrifice 
your lives.455 
 
                                                                                                                                                
and  gave orders that all the captives should be released. In the town of Ardabil and its environs, Timur 
bought, out of his lawful money, villages and excellent pastures, and made them into vaqf in favor of the 
Safavid sanctuary, which he declared to be a bast (sanctuary) and place of refuge. Further, he 
alloted/transferred to the Safavid family the land taxes of that region. From that date, the descendants and 
posterity of those prisoners, who indeed owed their freedom to that saintly family, have been enrolled in 
the ranks of their disciples and Sufis.” AA, pp. 27-8. After reciting the event, Iskender Munshi genuinely 
questions the authenticity of this account. He attributes this meeting with Timur to Shaykh Sadruddin 
Musa and expresses his disagreement, stating “a more accurate account is that Kāja ‘Alī was the person 
involved.” Then he admits that he could not find this account in any written sources, but learned of it 
through verbal reports. He says, “Although I have not found this tradition in the historical chronicles, or in 
any other accounts of the circumstances of the Safavid family, either in prose or poetry, nevertheless it is 
widely rumored and disseminated by a succession of verbal reports, and so I have written it down.” AA, p. 
28. Then he specifies the story of waqf documents said to have issued by Timur. “The actual vaqf 
document, written in an antique hand and embellished with the Mongol seal and with the personal seal of 
Emir Timur, fell into Safavid hands during a campaign in the region of Balk, while Safavid forces were 
laying siege to Andekūd. It was brought to the notice of Shah Abbas I.” AA, p. 28. Qādi Ahmed Qumī, 
who finished his work in 1591, 25 years before the appearance of Iskender Beg Munshi’s first two 
volumes, recites the summary version of this occasion. But here, Shaykh Sadruddin Musa is said to have 
met with Timur. See HT, p. 149. It should be noted, however, that the earliest Safavid chronicle, HS, does 
not mention this meeting.  
454 See the former footnote. Also consider Hinz, p. 9; Mazzaoui, p. 54.  
455See Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A Manual of Safavid Administration, London, 1943, pp. 189-190.   
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However, this account of Hoca Ali’s meeting with Timur has been rejected by 
some prominent scholars. According to Roemer and Sohrweide, for example, this story 
must be a later invention of the Safavids, either during the time of Haydar or Ismail, 
simply to provide legitimacy for their temporal suzerainty by somehow establishing a 
connection with the former great ruler of the region. Sohrweide notes that none of the 
Mongol sources mention Timur’s visit to Hoca Ali in Ardabil.456 Faruk Sümer follows 
the same line of argument. After mentioning the absence of any single reference in 
Mongol sources to this event, he concludes that this story must have been a distortion of 
qizilbash Turks’ collective memory pertaining to their Rūmī origin.457 Likewise, 
Sohrweide argues that Shaykh Sadreddin and Shaykh Hoca Ali could hardly have had 
disciples among the Turkoman nomads of Anatolia.458  
As a matter of fact, Timurid sources do not mention any meeting between Hoca 
Ali and Timur, or even any correspondence between the two. Nonetheless, we learn 
from Zafernāme, the biography of Timur written by Nizamuddin Şâmî in 1402, that 
while returning from his campaign in Asia Minor, Timur passed through Georgia, 
Armenia, Shirvan and Azerbaijan, conquering some fortresses in Georgia and Armenia. 
Zafernāme says that upon returning from Asia Minor, Timur decided to invade Georgia 
and laid siege to Berts, one of the most fortified fortresses of Georgia. After a nine-day 
                                                 
456 Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 205-6; Sohrweide, p. 126.  
457 Faruk Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü, Ankara: TTK, 
1999, pp. 6-7. 
458 Sohrweide, p. 130. Babinger recites from the Ottoman historian Cenābī (d. 1590) that Shaykh 
Sadreddin had a great number of disciples in the Province of Teke and Hamid-ili, who joined Timur while 
he returning from his campaign. See Franz Babinger, “Schejh Bedr ed-Din, der Sohn des Richters von 
Simaw”, Der Islam, 11, 1921, p. 85. Nonotheless, Sohrweide regards this record of Cenābī as “Tekelü-
Version der Tīmūr-Legende”. For a similar approach see Herbert Horst, Tīmūr and Hōğä ´Alī, ein Beitrag 
zur Geschichte der Safawiden, in Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse 
Jahrgang, Wiesbaden, 1958.  
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siege, Timur’s forces managed to capture the fortress on August 12, 1403.459 Timur then 
advanced towards Armenian lands. Upon the Armenian ruler’s acceptance of levy 
payments (cizye), however, he gave up the idea of invading Armenia and proceeded to 
Karabağ-ı Erran through Tiflis and Beylekan.460 Here Timur stayed for a while, enjoying 
the entertainment and the banquets of religious scholars and spiritual guides (ulemā ve 
meşāyih), who came from Iran and Turan and were Turk, Tacik, Arab, and Acem. 
Zafernāme specifies that all these parties were organized and sponsored by the governor 
of Shirvan, Shaykh Ibrahim.461 After spending some time in Karabağ-ı Erran, Timur 
seems to have moved to Gilan, where he made generous bestowments to Seyyid Rıza 
Kiya462, who was the governor of Gilan.463 Zafernāme also records that Timur helped a 
certain group living in Asia Minor, called the Karatatarlar, to emigrate to the East, 
providing safe conditions for travel. Zafernāme relates that the Karatatarlar, whose 
number included nearly 1000 families, emigrated with their properties, cattle, camels, 
and sheep.464  
In light of these facts, namely that the returning trajectory of Timur evidently 
crossed the Ardabil region,465 and that he took with him a one thousand-family nomadic 
group from Anatolia, and that he evidently participated in the banquets of religious 
                                                 
459 Nizamudin Şâmî, Zafernâme, çev. Necati Lugal, Ankara: TTK, 1987, pp. 334-8. 
460 Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 339-41. 
461 Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 346-7. 
462 He must be a member of the famous Kirkiyā family, who ruled the region of Gilan for centuries. One 
century later, one of his descendants, Ali Kirkiyā would offer asylum to unprotected Safavid princes 
against the Aqquyunlu rulers.   
463 Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 349-50. Indeed, Zafernāme does not state clearly where Timur met Seyyid Rıza 
Kiya. But the flow of narration strongly suggests that this meeting occurred in Gilan, on his way back to 
Central Asia.  
464 Nizamuddin Şâmî, pp. 328-9.  The description of this group here strongly suggests that they were 
pastoral nomads.  
465 Ardabil is located on the road connecting Shirvan and Gilan. 
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scholars and mystical leaders466 in Shirvan, the account of Safavid sources seems 
possible, though not certain.  
As stated, towards the end of his life Hoca Ali decided to make the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. His son Ibrahim, despite his father’s desire to leave him in Ardabil as spiritual 
director and supervisor of the tekke, joined him on the journey. On the way back to 
Ardabil, the Shaykh made a visit to Jerusalem, where he died and was buried in 1427. In 
accordance with the will of the deceased Shaykh, his son Ibrahim, better known as 
Shaykh-Shah, succeeded to the post and served as the head of the order until his death in 
1447.467 Safavid sources are almost silent on the period of Shaykh Ibrahim. 
Khwandamir, for example, mentions him only in one sentence: “After the death of his 
father, Shaykh Khwaja Ali, Shaykh Ibrahim traveled in great sorrow until he reached 
Ardabil, where he took up the prayer carpet of his fathers and forefathers in guiding 
dervishes and devotees of his house.”468 
Iskender Beg Munshī expands this account slightly, emphasizing the great 
number of the disciples under Shaykh Ibrahim’s auspice as well as his bounty and 
generosity. It seems from Iskender Beg’s account that Shaykh Ibrahim maintained and 
strengthened the network of adherents who were actively conducting the propaganda of 
the order in Anatolia and elsewhere. Likewise, according to Iskender Beg, Shaykh 
Ibrahim sent out khalifas to all regions wherever his disciples existed; as a result, in a 
short space of time, Ardabil became a meeting place for people from both near and 
                                                 
466 Timur is famous for his interest in and benevolence toward religious figures.  
467 HS, p. 561; HT, p. 150; AA, p. 28. BRW, p. 47; Sarwar, pp. 22-23; Savory, p. 15;  
468 HS, p. 561.  HT also skips some details, mentioning brief examples with more or less the same 
meaning. See HT, p. 151. 
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far.469 During Shaykh Ibrahim’s time, the glory and the wealth of the Order seemingly 
exceeded that during the times of his forefathers. We are told,  
The throng of disciples circumambulating the Safavid sanctuary had become so 
great that not all of them could be admitted into the presence of the Shaykh 
Ibrahim. His authority increased daily, so that no one in the Province of Ardabil 
could oppose his orders, which had to be obeyed. … His well-stocked kitchens 
were full of dishes and vessels of gold and silver, and his munificence exceeded 
even that of his forefathers. His manners and customs were positively regal.470 
 
It can be concluded from these limited records that Ardabil became increasingly 
more frequented by the followers of the Safavids. But Ibrahim’s shaykhdom does not 
include any considerable event in the flow of the history of the Order. As a modern 
scholar describes, “His period of leadership of the order, which lasted for some two 
decades, gives one the decided impression of having been the lull before the storm.”471 
Mazzaoui correctly describes the establishment period of the order, the period 
from Shaykh Safī to Shaykh Ibrahim, as “The Sūfī Order” while describing the period 
from Shaykh Junayd to Shah Ismail as “The Safavid Movement.”472 During the 
establishment period, the four heads of the order were renowned as pious men of 
exemplary conduct and character, loved by their followers and respected by 
contemporary temporal rulers. Even such a tempestuous sunni author as Fadlullah b. 
Ruzbihan Khunjī has admitted the virtue of these men, using only good words to 
describe Shaykh Safī: “a unique man of the world.”473 Minorsky also paints a positive 
picture: “…the Lords of Ardabil, they are highly respected shaykhs leading a 
                                                 
469 AA, p. 29. For similar conclusions see also Savory, p. 16. 
470 Savory, p. 16. Mazzaoui, however, sees the time of Ibrahim as the least significant period, when the 
activity of the Ardabil Order appears to have hit its lowest point in the history of the order. See Mazzaoui, 
p. 56.  
471 Michel M. Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, Iqbāl Review, XII/3, Karachi, 
1971, p. 83.  
472 See Mazzaoui, pp. 52-82.  
473 TA, p. 62. 
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contemplative life, spending their time in prayers and fasting, and credited with 
supernatural powers.”474 No palpable signs of Shi’ism, either in terms of high level of 
Twelver Shi’ism or at the folk level of the ghulat, were recognizable during this period 
of the Order.475 Although not clear enough in the sources, a special interest among 
nomadic Turkoman masses towards the Order was not detected during this period. On 
the contrary, this early Safavid Shaykh had great numbers of khalifas and disciples 
among the educated circles of towns and cities. And finally, no indications of inclination 
towards worldly power – i.e. assuming political authority – were seen in the first four 
heads of the Order. As will be discussed in the next section, during the Shaykhdom of 
Junayd three sudden, fundamental changes occur: one in esoteric doctrine, a second in 
the social background of the disciples, and the third – a natural result of the first two 
changes – being the transformation of the traditional quietist sufi order into an extremist-
shi’ite mystic-political movement. Not only does Junayd’s creed display evident shi’ite 
elements, but his disciples were principally nomadic Turkomans of Anatolia and Syria; 
and finally, he displayed desire for the temporal as well as spiritual. The following 
section will evaluate how this deep-seated transformation of the order occurred was 
fulfilled under Shaykh Junayd.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
474 Minorsky, Tadhkirat al Mulūk, p. 189.  
475 Mazzaoui, p. 56.  
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4.2.  SHAYKH JUNAYD (1447-1460): TURKOMAN DOMINATION AND THE 
SCHISM WITHIN THE ORDER 
 
4.2.1. The Succession of Shaykh Junayd and his Removal from Ardabil 
As the previous section of this paper described, the Safavid Order under its eponymous 
founder and his immediate successors was a peaceful and contemplative order, one that 
did not differ in any aspect from countless other sufi orders established in other parts of 
the Muslim world.476 Shaykh Junayd is generally accepted by the historical and modern 
scholars as the one who was responsible for transforming the theological frame of the 
order from sunnism to shi’ite militancy.477 However, whether or not elements of shi’ism 
within the order can be traced back to before Junayd’s time is not clear. What is clear is 
that under the leadership of Junayd the transformation process, which will be discussed 
below, was more or less accomplished. Contemporary evidence reveals that one, Junayd 
                                                 
476 See Michel M. Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, Iqbāl Review, XII/3, 
Karachi, 1971, p. 82. 
477 Minorsky states:  “The early shaykhs were strictly orthodox and their religious authority could not be 
called in question and opposed. The turning point came in the years 1449-56, when a descendant of 
Shaykh Safī in the forth generation, the young Shaykh Juanyd, appeared ...” See V. Minorsky, “Shaykh 
Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 
1957, p. 439. Hanna Sohrweide follows the same line of argument: “Ğunaid ist der Verantwortliche für 
den radikalen Wandel im Orden, durch den dieser, das heißt der sunnitisch ausgerichtete, eher gemäßigte 
Orden Safī ad-Dīns, zu der militanten, extrem-schiiteischen Qizilbaš-Safavīza wurde.” See Sohrweide, p. 
122. Also consider Aubin, “Les notables”, pp. 45-46; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Babīler Đsyanından 
Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da Đslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, Belleten, 
LXIV/239, 2000, p. 147. Among the foremost specialists on the Safavid history,  Minorsky, Horst, Aubin, 
and Efendiev accept the turning point in the ideology of the order as the Shaykhdom of Junaid. Some 
other scholars, such as Browne, Hinz, Savory, and Roemer, however, argue that the first signs of shi’ism 
were already discernable during the time of Hoca Ali. See V. Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A Manual of 
Safavid Administration, London, 1943, p. 189; Jean Aubin, “Notables”, p. 9; Heribert Horst, Tīmūr and 
Hōğä ´Alī, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden, in Abhandlungen der Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang, Wiesbaden, 1958, p. 49; Efendiev, “Le role des tribus de 
langue Turque”, p. 25; Browne, p. 19, 46; Hinz, p. 23; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 13; Roemer, 
“Die Safawiden”, Speculum, IV, 1953, p. 28; “The Safavid Period”, pp. 193-6. Indeed, Roemer draws 
quite a vague picture regarding Safavid’s adherence to shi’ism. Stressing the obscure line of separation 
between sunnism and shi’ism, especially at the folk level, during that period, he says one might trace the 
traits of shi’ism even back to the founder himself. Conversely, one might argue that the discernable shi’ite 
tinges in Junayd and Haydar should be regarded as a natural feature of folk Islam.    
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preached a ghulat-shi’ite form of Islamic mysticism, two, that he had obvious political 
ambition, and finally that during his shaykhdom, nomadic Turkoman disciples from 
Anatolia and Syria became the dynamic force within the Order. Likewise, all sources 
unanimously remark, albeit with distinct attitudes and in varying manners, that the 
Safavid order experienced a decisive change or transformation during the Shaykhdom of 
Junayd. Mazzaoui claims, for example, that Junayd transformed the “Safavid Sufi 
Order” into the “Safavid Movement”. As a matter of fact, Junayd’s Shaykhdom marked 
actual starting point of the Safavid Movement, which would create the qizilbash state of 
Shah Ismail in half a century.  
 
4.2.2. Junayd’s Shaykhdom: a ‘Turning Point’ 
The Safavid sources do not provide enough information about Shaykh Junayd or the 
crucial transformation under his leadership.478 They routinely make brief mention of the 
Shaykh’s exile from Ardabil, his arrival in Diyarbakir, his marriage to the sister of Uzun 
Hasan, and finally, his return to Ardabil and battle with Shirvanshah, during which he 
was killed. Yet, interestingly, these sources do not document the most important part of 
Shaykh Junayd’s journey out of Ardabil, namely his visits in Anatolia.479 Another 
deficiency of the Safavid sources pertaining to Shaykh Junayd, and to Shaykh Haydar as 
well, is their negligence of the three fundamental changes which came into existence 
during this period. Ignoring these changes, they depict a linear history from Shaykh Safī 
                                                 
478 Compare Mazzauoi, p. 72. It should be stated here that although the general attitude prevailed in 
Safavid sources is alike, there are some little exceptions as well. AA makes the point, for example, that 
Shaykh Junayd had clear political aspirations. Another seventeenth century Safavid source, whose author 
is unknown, namely ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl, attributes to Shaykh Junayd to change the secret teaching 
of the Order. These sources will be further referred in the following pages. 
479 These visits will be discussed shortly later.  Luckily, this part of Shaykh Junayd’s history was recorded 
by the Ottoman historian Ashikpashazāde. A very brief indication with one sentence is also available in 
TA, p. 63. 
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to Shah Ismail and his descendants. Apart from the Safavid chronicles, a contemporary 
sunni author, Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī, the court historian of Aqqoyunlu Yakub 
Beg, provides valuable information about both Junayd and Haydar.480 Nevertheless, his 
bias against Safavids and qizilbashes is most passionate; thus, his account must be 
treated prudently.481 Shaykh Junayd’s raid on Trebizond was recorded in Byzantine 
sources as well.482    
Interestingly, the most informative historical source on Junayd is not a Safavid, 
but an Ottoman one: the history of Aşıkpaşazāde. In a section at the end of his historical 
treatise, which appears to be an appendix, he gives valuable information about Shaykh 
Junayd, especially about his journey in Anatolia.483 What increases the historical value 
of this account is that Aşıkpaşazāde himself participated in some of the events of this 
narrative.484 This section was obviously added in order to provide a legitimacy and 
                                                 
480 See TA. 
481 Although Khunji’s sunni bias is evident, it is interesting to note that his exaggerated accounts of 
Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and their followers - such as his assertion that Shaykh Junayd’s disciples 
idolized him as God – are used by modern historians without serious criticism. In the following lines this 
subject will be evaluated further.  
482 See Rustam Shukurov, “The Campaign of Shaykh Djunayd Safawī against Trebizond (1456 AD/860 
H)”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, v. 17, 1993, 127-140.  
483 It is interesting to note that all the Safavid sources are silent on Shaykh Junayd’s journey in Anatolia, 
which, as will be explained, was the precursor to the future Safavid movement. Rather they narrate events 
as if Junayd had traveled directly to Diyarbakir after being exiled from Ardabil. Indeed, keeping in mind 
the fact that the earliest Safavid chronicle, which was Habibu’s-siyār, was composed during the last years 
of Shah Ismail’s reign by a learned Persian man, such an establishment in the Safavid historiography is apt 
to reflect the regard of Safavid shahs and their courts on their past. This, however, is another story.  
Maybe you should leave out this part, if it’s another story!  Seems unnecessary. 
484 It is obvious from the general outline that this part was not planned as a part of main body in his 
Tevārih. As well-known, following the tradition, Ashikpashazāde constructed his book on a chronological 
basis. He rarely disturbs chronological, sequential order while narrating Ottoman history. However,the 
section on Shaykh Junayd is related otherwise. This section is located after the narration of the Venetian 
siege of Midilli in 907/1501-2. The book follows a chronological order until this point. During the last 
section, Ashikpashazāde returns to the time of Murad II and explains the history of Shaykh Junayd and his 
son Haydar. This construction is available in ‘Ali’s edition. However, Giese queried Ashikpashazāde’s 
authorship of this section of the work and omitted it ending his edition with the events of 1492. See F. 
Giese, Die altosmanische Chronik des ‘Asiq pasazāde, Leipzig, 1929. Nihal Atsız, who published a 
combined version of these two editions, did not include the events of Bayezid II’s period. But his edition 
also includes the aforementioned section at the end, just before the concise world history from Adam’s 
time down to the time of Prophet Muhammed. Although this last section seems to be a later addendum to 
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persuasive religious ground for the Ottoman mass deportation of qizilbashes in 1501-
2.485  Attempting to explain the legitimacy of this deportation, Aşıkpaşazāde asserts that 
the religious scholars issued sanctions upon heretics; but then he asks a question which 
seems to reflect some doubt in the public mind: ‘They were sufis and disciples of 
Shaykh Safi, who followed the religion of Muhammed in their mystical path. If this was 
the reality, what became the reason for accusing them as unbelievers?’486 The whole 
section (bāb) 161 of his treatise is devoted to answering this question.  
As can be understood from his question, Aşıkpaşazāde tacitly accepts the order’s 
revered past. But, he argues that under the Shaykhdom of Junayd the order underwent an 
essential transformation, which continued during his son Haydar’s reign and was 
culminated by his grand-son Ismail. The whole section (161. Bāb of his Tevārih) is 
                                                                                                                                                
the main corpus of the work, no Ottoman historian other than Giese expressed serious doubt of 
Ashikpashazāde’s authorship. For a textual analysis see V.L. Ménage, A Survey of the Early Ottoman 
Histories, with Studies on their Textual Problems and their Sources, II, Ph.D. Thesis, University of 
London, 1961, pp. 440-83.    
Indeed, the orientation of the book suggests that this section must be a later edition either by 
Ashikpashazāde himself or by someone else. Atsiz argues that Ashikpashazāde died in 886/1481. See 
APZ, p. 80. According to him, the whole sections narrating events of Bayezid II’s reign must be later 
additions. Taeschner argues 889/1484 for Ashikpashazāde’s date of death.  See F. Taeschner, “Ashik-
pasha-zāde”, EI2. But according to Inalcik, who bases his view on archival evidence as well as on the 
textual analysis of the tevārih, he must have died after 908/1502. See Halil Đnalcık, “How to Read 
Ashikpashazāde’s History”, p. 34.  Indeed, before Inalcik, this date had been already proposed by 
Köprülü. See Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”,ĐA, p. 707. This date is correct, then it is possible that the author 
of last sections was Ashikpashazāde himself. But still, the original plot of his narrative logically must have 
ended with the narration of Venetian attack on Midilli, which was chronologically the last event. 
485 This is the deportation of Qizilbashes from Teke and Hamid-ili region to Moton and Coron. We know 
that following the conquest of these port cities on the Morean coasts in 1500, the Ottoman government 
forced the Ardabil sympathizers of Teke and Hamid-ili region to emigrate to these newly conquered cities. 
(See, for example, MNB, p. 417.) It seems that this deportation created such a dispute in Istanbul that 
Ashikpashazāde felt obliged to explain the reasons in an appendix to his history. Indeed the dispute was 
not limited to the deportation of sufis. It was a part of greater danger arising from Ottoman suzerainty in 
Anatolia. The beginning of the sixteenth century marked the rise of a new power, which relied not only on 
political and military networks,  but on religious beliefs as well. In 1500, Ismail managed to defeat  the 
Akkoyunlu army and captured Tebriz, their capital city, where he promulgated the foundation of his 
theocratic state. Ismail’s capture of temporal power in addition to spiritual power stirred up Anatolian 
Ardabil sympathizers, who had been uneasy with the Ottoman administration for a while. Social unrest 
became discernable. The mass deportation of Teke and Hamid-ili sufis was, hence, only part of a series of 
measures to quell this unrest.   For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Chapter IV of this study. 
486 ‘Sual: Bunlar hod sofılar idi. Şeyh Safi müridlerinden idi. Tasavvufdan Şer-i Muhammedî sallalahu 
‘aleyhi ve sellem üzerine olurlar idi. Bunları tekfir etmeğe sebep ne oldı?’ APZ, p. 249. 
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devoted to explaining how this transformation materialized, even though it is thinly 
guised as the story of Junayd and Haydar. 
Apart from Aşıkpaşazāde, there are references in many other Ottoman sources as 
well. All the Ottoman sources, except Haniwaldanus Anonym, which deploys the 
traditional pejorative attitude of Ottoman authors towards Shaykh Junayd and Haydar, 
depict the history of the Safavid Order in the same manner as Aşıkpaşazāde. To 
summarize, the early Shaykhs until Junayd were revered as saintly persons and rightly 
guided spiritual masters; by the time of Junayd, however, desire for worldly power had 
invaded the souls of the Safavid descendants, and they deviated from the true path of 
their ancestors. 
Idris-i Bitlisī, a contemporary writer of the era, who first served at the 
Aqqoyunlu court and  then moved to the Ottoman palace, writing Heşt Behişt, the 
famous history of the first eight Ottoman Sultans up to Bayezid II, repeats more or less 
the same account without mentioning any names. He says that the early Safavid Shaykhs 
set their feet on the path of şeriat and on the prayer rug (seccade) of tarikat; and that 
thus, a great number of prominent religious men and people of truth in the Ottoman and 
Şam (Damascus) countries followed them. Nonetheless, he claims, their descendants did 
not continue the rightly guided tradition established by the early Shaykhs, but went 
astray, preferring the worldly throne to the spiritual one. They married daughters of 
Persian kings and established kinship with temporal rulers. Consequently, certain 
licentious disciples began to be excited by the ‘mania’ for temporal sovereignty. To 
ratify their legitimacy on temporal power, they eventually claimed descendance from the 
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family of the Prophet, a claim which had not been made during the time of their 
ancestors. 487   
These later Shaykhs, says Idris, even joined in the Ghulat Shi’ism. Sometimes 
they argued, like Hulūlīs488, that the imam, who was known as a descendant of the 
Family of the Prophet (ehl-i beyt), would appear among the members of Safavid family. 
Still, at other times they permitted their disciples to perform some actions prohibited by 
the Islamic law (haram). In doing so, they claimed to be following the words of some 
mystics such as Hallac-ı Mansur, but by omitting the fact that these words were uttered 
during ecstasy, (cezbe-sekr) could not anyhow be regarded as reference to the acts of 
ordinary people.489 However, despite all their fallacious deeds, Idris says, a great number 
of people in Anatolia, who were sincerely looking for a true way of salvation, adhered to 
Safavid shaykhs.490    
Another contemporary Ottoman author Kemalpaşazāde, also deems the 
Shaykhdom of Junayd as the breaking point in the history of Safavid Order. He says, 
although he was a respected Shaykh during his early years, shortly after his succession, 
Junayd ignited the fire of discord (fitne) and waged wars against Georgia pretending to 
conduct holy war or cihad. Thus he lost the reverence of the people of truth. Following 
his death at the hands of Shirvanshah, his son Haydar, whose majesty was further 
                                                 
487 IDRS, p. 121.  
488 A group in the Islamic society who argues that the soul of a person, especially that of important figures, 
may incarnate into another person. For a further reading on Hulūlī groups see Ebu Muhammed Hasan b. 
Musa en-Nevbahtî, Şiî Fırkalar, çev. Hasan Onat, Sabri Hizmetli, Sönmez Kutlu, Ramazan Şimşek, 
Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2004; Abdülkahir el-Bağdadî, Mezhepler Arasındaki Farklar, çev. 
Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2005; Buckley, R. B., “The Early Shiite 
Ghulah”, Journal of Semitic Studies, Autumm 2: XLII (1997), 301-325.  
489 IDRS, p. 121. 
490 IDRS, p. 121. 
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reinforced by marrying with the daughter of Uzun Hasan, followed the same fallacious 
path.491  
Celalzāde follows a similar line of arguement,  
... Acemin silsile-i saltanatı dūdmān-ı Ardabilden Şeyh Haydar oğlu Şah Đsmail’e 
müyesser ü mukadder olub, ol vilāyetlere mutlak şah-ı cihan-penāh olıcak zātına 
sezāvar u elyāk bu idi ki saltanat-ı Aceme mālik oldı ecdād-ı ‘izāmı tarīkına sālik 
olub şer’-i Mübīn-i Ahmedī üzerine sābit-kadem olub gendüden mukaddem olan 
selātin-i şeri’at-āyin yollarından çıkmayub, āsār-ı Đslamı tebdīl ü tanvīl 
itmeyeydi. Serīr-i saltanata cülūs idicek, sürūr-ı şeyātin-i Đblis-i menhūsla me’nūs 
olmuş, ba’zı etrāk-i bī-idrāk492 ile üns ü ictimā’ idüb tarīk-ı dalālete sülūk eyledi. 
Sanāyi-ı rafz u ilhād ki pīşe-i erbāb-ı dalāl u fesāddur ol tarīka i’tikādla zulm u 
dalāl iklimlerini ma’mur u ābād eyledi. Cevāmi-i hidāyet-savāmi’i āhūr-ı devvāb 
kılub ashāb-ı güzīn-i Rasūle sebb ü la’n ile bir bātıl mezheb ihtirā’ idüb Şi’a 
dimekle meşhur sebīl-i şenī’a şüyū’ virdiler.493   
 
Arguably the most figurative account reflecting the peculiarity of Junayd’s 
period is recorded in Şakāyık-ı Nūmāniye. While writing the biography of Abdurrahman 
Erzincānī,494 one of the leading Safavid khalifas who had lived in Amasya in the 
fifteenth century, Taşköprüzāde writes, 
Nakl olunur ki bir seher şeyh Hāmid hamîdesirin çehre-i bâ-behresinde keder, 
hüzün ve melâl ve semâ-yi necābet imāsında gubar gam ve hem .... işkār olub 
āyine-i safāsında jenk fütūr meşāhid oldı. Şeyhin hıyār-ı ehibbāsı istikşāf-hāl 
idüb bu bābdan feth-i kelām eyledüklerinde cevab virüb tāife-i Ardabiliyye 
şimdiye değin gāyetle vera’ ve takva ve hüsn-i akīde üzere iken hālen şeytan-ı 
bed-güman anların sudūrına duhūl ve .... fāside gibi ervākına (ervāhına) hulul 
                                                 
491 KPZ9, p. 86 
492 Nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkoman tribes must be meant by this term. As put forward by several 
scholars, and scrutinized throughout this study as well, Ottoman authors usually use these terms such as 
“etrāk”, “Türkmen”, in a pejorative manner and to indicate nomadic groups. For further reading on the 
connotation of these words in the Ottoman literature see, for example, Faruk Sümer, “XI. Asırda Anadolu, 
Suriye ve Irak’da Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumī Bir Bakış”, ĐFM, 11, 1952, 509-523; Yusuf 
Halaçoğlu, “Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrāk, Kürd-Ekrād Kelimeleri Üzerine Değerlendirme”, 
Belleten, 60, no. 227, 1996, 139-146; Đlhan Şahin, “Review of the Recent Studies on the Nomads (Yörüks) 
in the Ottoman Empire”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, 35-45.   
493 CLZ, pp. 208-9. 
494 “Şeyh Safiyeddin Ardabilî hazretlerinin hulefâsındandır. Vatan-ı aslîsini terk idüb Diyār-ı Rum’a 
geldükde Amasya kurbunda tavattun eyledi.” Mecdî, p. 78. In the Mecdî’s Turkish translation of Şakāyık, 
which was completed in 1586, 30 years after the composition of the original work, Abdurrahman 
Erzincānī is counted among the meşāyih of Sultan Bayezid I’ period. But the content of the passage quoted 
above obviously contradicts this assumption. He must rather have lived during the lifetime of Shaykh 
Junayd and Shaykh Haydar. See also Sohrweide, p. 117. 
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idüb tarīka-i Đslamdan ihrac ve idlāl eyledi diyu buyurdular. Fi’l-vāki’ ..... ve 
‘ahd-i ba’īd mürūr itmeden Şeyh Haydar’ın umūr-ı diniyede ve i’tikadiyātda 
eslāf-ı eşrāfın i’tikādatını tağyīr ve tebdīl ve adāb ve ahvallerini tahvīl itdüği ve 
tarīk-i zığ ve dalālete gitdüği haberi istima’ olındı.495 
 
A similar account is seen in a letter of Shaykh Bālī Efendi496 adressed to Rüstem 
Pasha (d. 1561), the Ottoman grand vizier under Suleyman I.497 Shaykh Bālī Efendi 
dedicates most part of his letter to draw a brief sketch of the history of the Safavid 
family.498 Indeed his account is full of invention and historical error. However, it truly 
reflects the established picture of the Safavid family line among Ottoman intellectuals. 
Bālī Efendi begins with Shaykh Safī. After stating some doubts on the authenticity of his 
family line, which was alleged to trace back the seventh Imam Musa al-Kazim, he 
continues, “Sayyid or not, the faith of Islam should be respected. In any case, it is known 
that Shaykh Safī is a perfect murshid and one of God’s men (ehl Allah).”499 Then he 
recites an attributed dream of Shaykh Safī, which is most probably a sunnī invention. 
Shaykh Safī is said to have witnessed in a visionary world that in his loins tiny puppies 
were yapping and calling to one another. He interprets this dream in such a manner that 
he imagined that from his descendants a tyrannous band would rise up and uproot the 
                                                 
495 Mecdî, p. 78. 
496 He was learned and pious man and enjoyed the favor of Sultan Suleyman I whom he accompanied on 
several campaigns and recited prayers for his victories. He died in 1553 and was buried in Sofia. See 
Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, p. 442.  
497 He occupied the post twice, first from 1545 to 1553, and second from 1555 to 1561.  
498 At least two copies of this letter are available. One is preserved in Ecole des Languages Orientales 
Vivantes in Paris (No. 103, f. 10r) and the other one is preserved in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul 
(Halet Efendi, 818, ff. 97a-98b). The English translation of the full text of the first copy, with a brief 
introductory note, is published by Minorsky in his article “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”. The 
content of the letter indicates that it was written after 1550.  
499 Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, pp. 444-5. “Şeyh Safī bu tāyifenin dedesidür. 
Meşāyih silsilesindendür. Ve biz gördüğümüz silsilelerde seyyiddür deyü kayd olunmamış. Bazı mürşidler 
seyyiddür deyu kayd itmişler.Bā-seyyid evliya olmıya, itibar-ı din-i Đslamdır. Beher-hal meşhur budur ki 
Şeyh Safī mürşid-i kāmildür ve ehlullahdandur.” Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi, 
818, f. 97a.  
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Mohammedan law, oppressing learned and pious believers.500 The next words that Bālī 
Efendi recites from the mouth of Shaykh Safī are typical Ottoman jargon which 
prevailed in Selim I’s court.501  
 Fearing such a future for his offspring, in his last days Shaykh Safī asked his 
khalifas to select a successor from among themselves (among khalifas); on the other 
hand, he advised not choosing his son to the post. Following the death of the Shaykh his 
rightly guided khalifas followed Safī’s words and selected one from among them as 
successor to the shaykh. Nevertheless, the son of the Shaykh also established himself in 
his father’s place. From then on the two separate lines of tradition appeared: those who 
were licentious promoted Shaykh Safī’s son to his father’s place; and those who were 
people of truth did not accept his decision and each of them betook himself to a country 
and being occupied with his own plight (hāl) acted in conformity with the şeriat. Among 
the ignorant and common the son of Shaykh Safī had a large number of followers, who 
were also heretics, while learned and pious men shunned his assembly. “Because of the 
multitude of the ignorant (in his assembly), the idea of a Holy War (ghazā) occurred to 
Muhammad-shah502 and moved by this mania (savdā) he led expeditions towards 
Georgia several times.”503   
                                                 
500 In Bālī Efendi’s account, after interpreting his dream Shaykh Safī makes an analogy to the case of 
Mu’āwiya and his son Yazid: while the former being, according to Bālī Efendi’s account, a great man 
from his loins a hated man like Yazid was born. In the sunni literature on Safavid family the analogy to 
the famous story of Noah and his son: while the former being one of great Prophets, his son did not 
believe him and fell in idolatry. See, for example, TA, pp. 61-62; Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-tekfīr-i Kızılbaş, 
Manuscript, Milli Kütüphane, YzA 695, ff. 8a-8b. 
501 “Hak teala anları ve anlara tabi olanları helak eylesün didi. Đmdi benim oğlum bu duanın maktezası 
budur ki ... bu tayifenin sabibānından gayrısın ulusun ve kiçisin erini ve avratını kılıç urub kahr ile helak 
etmek vacibdür. Çare yokdur bu tayife lütf ve ihsan ile ıslaha gelmek müyesser değildür.” Manuscript, 
Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi, 818, f. 97b. 
502 As was indicated, regarding to historical flow of events Shaykh Bālī-Efendi’s account is full of errors. 
Firstly, he makes an evident mistake regarding the son of Shaykh Safī, who was Shaykh Sadruddin Musa. 
Secondly, the crucial deviation of Shaykh Safī’s descendants certainly did not occurre following the death 
of the Shaykh. Rather it occurred either during the Shaykhdom of Junayd or shortly before his succession. 
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Following the death of Muhammad-shah, his son Junayd succeeded him. Those 
who loved Muhammad-shah crowded together around Junayd, who too launched ‘holy 
war’ several times. As they were successful, many people good and bad joined him. In 
the end, they applied for permission from the king of Persia (the Aqqoyunlu ruler) to 
invade Georgia through Persia. Although the king of Persia504 was inclined to give 
permission, one of his viziers suspected something and suggested to investigate the 
situation. After a thorough investigation, the king realized that no man of virtue or good 
temper was in his retinue, but all were wicked and seditious. Consequently permission 
was not granted. Upon Junayd’s insistence to march on Georgia, the king sent a 
detachment of men on Junayd. After a great battle the army gone astray was put to flight 
and Junayd was beheaded.505 Then his son Haydar, who like his father pursued the way 
of gazā and gathered all the ignoramus, libertines and heretics around,506 succeeded him,  
                                                                                                                                                
So when considering the known history of the order the best person identifiable with Muhammad-shah of 
Bālī Efendi seems to be Shaykh Junayd. But in the following part of his letter Bālī Efendi separately 
mentions Junayd as son of Muhammad-shah. Whatever the truth is, Bālī Efendi’s knowledge about the 
history was obviously not based on authentic sources but on the tradition circulating among Ottoman 
ulemā. The value of his account as a source, thus, not stems from his penetration into the true history of 
the dynasty but his capacity to reflect the established view of the Ottoman scholars.   
503 Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, p. 446. The Istanbul copy runs, “Kaçankim Şeyh Safi 
mevte karib oldı .... cem oldı. Didi ki cümleniz itaat iderek aranızdan birinizi ihtiyar idin. Makamda olsun. 
Benim oğlum yerime otursun. Benim yerime layık vekildür didi. Ve ahirete intikal itdi. Muhammed Şah 
dirler bir oğlı kaldı. Sofiler ana yolak(?) oldılar. Anlar ki ehl-i hevâdır alayıyla bu canibe oldılar 
Muhammed Şah yerine geçürdiler. Cüheladan ve avamdan çok kimse tabi oldılar. Ve bir bölük tayife ki 
ehl-i Hakdır kabul itmediler. Şeyhin emrine muhalifdür dediler. Her biri bir memlekete başların aldılar 
gitdiler. Gendü hallerine meşgul oldılar. Şeriatle âmil oldılar. Muhammed Şah babası makamında karar 
eyledi. Amma hali şöyle oldı ki vardıkça ehl-i hevâ oldı. Râfizî tâyifesi meclisinde kesretle cem olur 
oldılar. Ulema ve süleha meclisinden i’raz eyledi. Cehlinin bu vecihle cemiyyetinden Muhammed Şaha 
gaza hatırası düşdi. Bu sevdayla birkaç defa gaza eyledi.” Halet Efendi, 818, f. 97b.  
504 Bālī Efendi again makes a mistake. Junayd had to pass through Shirvan in order to raid Georgia. 
Shirvanshah Khalil did not permit him to pass through his territories, thus broke out the war between two 
sides, which cost Junayd at his life.  
505 “Muhammed Şah fevt oldı. Oğlı Cüneyd yerine geçdi. Muhammed Şahın muhibbi olanlar Cüneyd’in 
başına çökdüler. Cüneyd dahi gazā hevāsıyla birkaç defa eşdi yurtdı. Gazası rast gelmekle eyu ve yatlu 
katına kesretle cem’ oldı. Bir defa dahi cem’ oldılar, Acemden geçüp Gürciye gaza itmeğe destur dilediler. 
Padişah destur verdi vüzerādan birisi razı olmadı. ‘Padişahım bu tāyifenin cemiyyeti eyu adla söylenmez. 
Ben kulun varub göreyin ne tayifedür.’ Padişah emrile vardı gördü ol tayife temam dalālet üzere. Geldi 
padişaha haber virdi. ‘Bu nice şeyhdür içlerinde ehl-i ilim yok ve sülehā yok cümlesi ehl-i hevā ve ehl-i 
fesaddur. Bu cemiyyeti dağıtmak vacibdür. Ansızın hücum idecek olursa def idince çok ziyan olur.’ didi. 
 178 
A comprehensive risāle preserved in Milli Kütüphane in Ankara reflects a 
similar attitude.507 The risāle is composed of an introduction (mukaddime), three 
sections (bāb) and a conclusion (hātime) all dedicated to prove the idolatry of 
qizilbashes on religious grounds. The evaluation of the qizilbash issue in this risāle 
deserves to be the subject of an independent study. But the important point for the 
purpose of the present study is that the author of this risāle, Hüseyin bin Abdullah 
Şirvanî, starts the history of heresy in the Safavid family with Shaykh Junayd.508  
Outside the Ottoman realm, Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī’s approach to the 
issue, which has already been referred to partly is not different. Indeed his main focus is 
Shaykh Haydar, who was in open clash with his master Yakub Beg of Aqqoyunlu. 
However, in explaining the heresy of Haydar he makes a brief flashback to his ancestors. 
“Indeed,” says Khunjī, “Haydar belonged to the family of venerable shaykhs, for 
Ardabil was a refuge of sanctity and the place of circumambulation for the righteous. 
The first who raised the ensign of excellence in this family was the unique of the world 
(wahīd-i āfāq) Shaykh Safī al-dīn Ishāq …”509 Then Khunjī recites a tale in order to 
explain why and how the descendants of Shaykh Safī deviated from the true path. When 
the Mongol ruler Uljaytū (1305-16) finished the rebuilding (ta’mīr) of Sultaniye (in 
1305), he convened a thanksgiving meeting at which noblemen, religious scholars, 
                                                                                                                                                
Eyle olsa Padişah emr eyledi icazet yokdur varsunlar yerlerine gitsünler didi. Đnad eylediler padişahın 
buyruğın dutmadılar. Nice olursa olsun biz bu gazadan rücu’ itmezüz didiler. Padişah cānibinden bir 
bölük halk gönderildi. Azīm kıtal oldı. Şeyh Cüneydin başın kesdiler. Halk kırıldı. Cemaatleri dağıldı.” 
Halet Efendi, 818, ff. 97b-98a. 
506 Halet Efendi, 818, f. 98a; Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, pp. 446-7. 
507 See Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-tekfīr-i Kızılbaş, Manuscript, Milli Kütüphane, YzA 695. The risāle is a 
modified Turkish translation of certain Hüseyin bin Abdullah Şirvanî’s fetva originally written in Arabic. 
The date of issue of neither the original fetva nor the translation is specified in the manuscript. But in the 
text the author refers to Bālī Efendi Sofyevī, whose letter is studied above, as his Shaykh’s Shaykh. Thus 
the original fetva must have been issued during the second half of the sixteenth century.  
508 Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-tekfīr-i Kızılbaş, f. 6b.  
509 TA, p. 62. 
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mystics and saints appeared. Shaykh Safī was also invited, however, since “his rectitude 
was opposed to accepting food (navāla) from sultans”,510 the Shaykh made a pretext of 
his age and sent his son Sadruddin. Being a young man “who had not yet plucked a rose 
from the gardens of asceticism”511 Sadruddin did not refuse to partake of the food.    
According to Khunjī, it was this navāla of Uljaytu that passed through 
Sadruddin’s craw that deteriorated the pure mysticism in the line of this family and 
injected the seeds of desire for the worldly throne. He says, “As the author was writing 
the story a thought crossed his mind: what a pity that, while Safī al-dīn preserved his 
being from a doubtful repast, he did not restrain his children from the vanities of this 
world. As a result, his progeny forsook poverty and humility for the throne of a 
kingdom.”512 But the effect of this navāla would appear after three generations. After 
Shaykh Safī, his descendants Shaykh Sadruddin, Hoca Ali, and Shaykh-shah Ibrahim 
followed his footprints. “But when the boon (navāla) of succession reached Junayd, he 
altered the way of life of his ancestors: the bird of anxiety laid an egg of longing for 
power in the nest of his imagination. Every moment he strove to conquer a land or a 
region.”513  
A rare example in Safavid sources points to the change in the teaching and policy 
of the order, as well as its disciple-stereotype, during this period an anonymous history 
of Shah Ismail supposedly compiled in the first  half of the seventeenth century, during 
the reign of Abbas I is available in ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl,. Here Shaykh Junayd is 
described as a man responsible for changing the secret teaching of the order. However, 
                                                 
510 TA, p. 62. 
511 TA, p. 62. 
512 TA, p. 63. 
513 TA, p. 63. Similar arguments are recorded in a letter of Sultan Yakub Aqqoyunlu to Bayezid II. See 
Feridun Bey, Münşe’āt-ı Selātīn, I, Đstanbul, 1274, pp. 300-301. 
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according to the anonymous writer, the change here was not from sunnism to shi’ism, 
which had already claimed to be done under Hoca Ali, but from an ‘orthodox’ shi’ite 
doctrine to an extreme one, which was, furthermore, saturated with political ambition. 
Perhaps as a contingent of this change, Junayd also transformed his disciples from 
quietist mystics to devoted militants.514 Iskender Beg also makes clear references to the 
desire of Junayd for temporal power.515 
To sum up, the above-mentioned sources, most of which were contemporary to 
Junayd and Haydar while the rest being nearly contemporary, leave no doubt that by the 
succession of Shaykh Junayd the Sufi Order of Safavids had split into two branches. One 
was headed by Shaykh Ca’far the brother of former Shaykh Ibrahim and continued the 
traditional way of former Safavid Shaykhs. Some influential khalifas of early Shaykhs 
such as Shaykh Hamid b. Musa, also known as Somuncu Baba (d. 1412), the spiritual 
master of Haci Bayram Veli and the disciple of Hoca Ali (d. 1429), and Abdurrahman 
Erzincānī were representatives of the early phase of the Safavid mysticism in Anatolia. 
The other branch headed by Junayd was decisively different from the traditional picture 
of the order, in terms of both the esoteric doctrine and the socio-cultural landscape of 
disciples. Under Shaykh Junayd’s comparably short leadership (1447-1460), this branch 
of the Order experienced a fundamental transformation from a cultivated, tranquil, and 
ascetic Sufi Order, which was highly respected by the learned class and ruling elites as 
well as the public masses, to a densely mystical but uncultivated, militant, and gulat 
shi’ite movement, which identifiably pursued political aspirations and, perhaps mostly 
                                                 
514 See Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I (1487-1524), Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 18.  
515 AA, pp. 29-30. 
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because of that, was denounced by learned sunni scholars as ‘heretic’.516 Sooner the 
second branch swallowed the whole of the Order, shifting the representatives of the 
traditional line to marginality, and in one or two generations to oblivion. This 
transformation, which started during the Shaykhdom of Junayd and was mostly 
completed under Shaykh Haydar, also laid the fundamentals of Ismail’s state. As a 
modern scholar states, “Following the death of Šaih Ibrāhīm … a sudden and 
tremendous change occurred in the Order of Ardabil and its leaders. With the succession 
of Šaih Ğunaid the Order seemed to be transformed into a militant movement which, 
like a whirlwind, grew in intensity during the period of Ğunaid’s son Haydar, and during 
Haydar’s son Sultān ‘Ali Pādishāh, and which finally carried Haydar’s second son 
Ismā’īl and seated him on the throne of the Safawids at Tabriz.”517  
From this point of view, Junayd’s Shaykhdom, especially his journey to Anatolia 
and Syria was the period during which the seeds of Ismail’s throne were planted. The 
most crucial historical development of this period, for the future of the Safavid Order, 
was without a doubt the attachment of militant Turkomans of Anatolia to the Order. In 
Mazzaoui’s words, “the Anatolian ‘Turks’ who under Osman and Orhan were 
conducting gazā in the west against the Byzantium are now the ‘Turkmāns’ who were 
engaging in similar gāzī activities under Junayd and Haydar against Georgians.”518 In 
                                                 
516 As already mentioned Safavid sources undervalue this transformation, attempting to present a linear 
history of dynasty. Indeed, the ghazā activities of Junayd and Haydar are recorded, but present this new 
area of interest as if it were a normal sufi practice rather than loading some new connotations. (Yet the 
outstanding genuineness of Iskender Beg Munshi must be remarked here. He openly writes the political 
desires of Junayd.) The emergence of shi’ite ideas and the essential change in the socio-cultural bases of 
the disciples during this period is especially not mentioned. Nonetheless, even the epithets that they use 
for the members of the dynasty clearly reflect this transformation. The four heads of the order up until 
Shaykh Ibrahim, employ the epithet “Shaykh” while Junayd and Haydar are called “Sultan”, obviously 
connoting temporal power as well as the spiritual one. For a brief analysis of Safavid historian’s usage of 
the title ‘sultan’ for Junayd and Haydar and its connotations, see Mazzauoi, p. 72.  
517 Mazzaoui, pp. 71-2. 
518 Mazzaoui, p. 77. 
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the following pages I will analyze, mainly basing on Aşıkpaşazāde’s account, how 
Junayd gained the unhappy masses of the Ottoman society, which inclined to break ties 
with the Ottoman administration because of both practical and religio-ideological 
reasons, and because of how successfully the newly maturating ‘Safavid message” had 
been carved into their chests.519       
 
4.2.3. Leaving Ardabil: The Schism within the Order  
Junayd was the sixth son of Shaykh Ibrahim, the forth Shaykh of the order.520 Upon the 
death of Ibrahim in 1447 a quarrel took place between Ca’fer, the brother of Ibrahim, 
and Junayd. Sources are not clear whether the disagreement between Junayd and his 
uncle stemmed from the newly emerging shi’ite ideas of Junayd or from the ambition of 
Shaykh Ca’fer.521 According to Jean Aubin, both are possible. As he states, “les deux 
mobiles sont d’ailleurs parfaitement conciliable.”522 Indeed, there are indications that 
Ca’fer assumed spiritual leadership and tauliyat of the Ardabil sanctuary, both of which 
used to pass down from father to son. On the other hand, attached to the traditional 
teachings of the former shaykhs523, Ca’fer vigorously denied such shi’ite orientations 
within the Order. Furthermore, by his assumption of the leadership, Junayd did not 
hesitate to give clear indications of his desire for temporal power.524 And last but not 
least, the indications of two identifiably different types of disciple images clearly 
                                                 
519 The following chapters of this study delineate how these newly recruiting murids founded the Safavid 
state under the banner of young Ismail.  
520 Walter Hinz, p. 15.  
521 Compare Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 200-201, 205. Roemer reckons the religious controversy a 
possible reason for the quarrel but adds that this argument finds no adequate support in contemporary 
sources. To him, the real cause of the contest was the clashing irreconcilable political ambitions of two 
shaykhs.   
522 Aubin, “Les notables”, p. 46. 
523 See, for example, Aubin, “Les notables”, p. 46. 
524 Compare Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 16.    
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appeared. Consequently, the two Shaykhs fell into struggle for the leadership.525 More 
correct is, perhaps, that two already differentiated groups of disciples fell into struggle. 
The considerable portion of disciples, who were advocators of the traditional line and 
inhabiting at the Tekke, wanted Ca’fer as their head. But there still appeared another 
influential group, recruited mainly from the nomadic tribes of Anatolia and Syria, who 
zealously supported Junayd.  
Seemingly more decisive on the advent of events was that Cihansah Qaraqoyunlu 
(1437-1468), who was ruling the region, was not pleased with Junayd’s presence in 
Ardabil, most probably because of his political desires and of the military strength of his 
disciples.526 If relied on ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl, Cihanshah first wrote a letter to 
Shaykh Ca’fer advising him to block Junayd’s action. Then he wrote a strong letter 
directly to Shaykh Junayd, ordering him to disperse his followers.527 Junayd, after a long 
discussion and consultation with and his prominent disciples, is said to have replied to 
Jihansah’s letter: 
It should not be hidden from the world-illuminating king of Iran that apparently 
your mind is ill and in trouble because of Shaikh Safī’s children. You should 
banish this temptation from your mind and heart. Satan is deceiving you because 
I am in a corner of my ancestor’s resting place and together with my devotees, I 
am praying to God. I have never had the desire to rebel or conquer. If your 
astronomers have frightened you because of a rebellion from Shaikh Safī’s 
children, I am not such a rebel. Such a rebel may come from my children or 
grandchildren. And if the will of God is such that a rebellion should arise from 
                                                 
525 HT, p. 152. But Qādi Ahmed Qumī does not mention shi’ite ideas of Junayd but simply refers to the 
quarrel between Sultan Junayd and his uncle.  
526 According to AA, on being informed of the growing strength of Sultan Junayd, the number of whose 
adherents in Ardabil was increasing day by day, Mirzā Cihanshah “became suspicious of Joneyd’s 
[Junayd] intensions, and apprehensive lest Junayd’s rising power cause his own decline.” See AA, p. 29. 
For a similar account also see HT, p. 152.  
527 In his letter Cihanshah wrote: “When my letter reaches you, you must remove people from yourself and 
your spiritual guidance and remain by yourself. I do not feel safe in regards to you and your Sūfis, since 
they may incite you to rebel and desire sovereignty. In my opinion, if a problem can be solved simply, 
why should it cost the shedding of the blood of innocent people, and the destroying of thousands of lives? 
If you do not accept my advice and do not do as you are told, I will certainly succeed in destroying you 
and your devotees.” Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 19. 
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Shaikh Safī’s children, the whole world will not be able to prevent it. So, be 
relaxed and sure. Leave us by ourselves, because I seek no enmity with you. Be 
sure of our honesty and afraid of God’s punishment. Now, you know what is 
best.528  
 
 Upon receiving Junayd’s answer, Cihanshah wrote a second letter, as reported in 
‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl, saying, “Make preparation, depart from my realm; otherwise 
I will come not only to destroy Ardabil, but also to perform a full-scale massacre.”529 
This strong letter persuaded Junayd that against the powerful coalition530 of Cihanshah 
and Shaykh Ca’fer, Junayd had no choice but to leave Ardabil.531  
A further point to note, as clearly seen above, is that when the Safavid Order split 
into two parties Cihanshah evidently took stand in favor of Shaykh Ca’fer.532 At a first 
glance, when looked at from a religious point of view, his support of Shaykh Ca’fer, 
who advocated the traditional sunni line of the Order, seems somewhat controversial for 
he was not a fanatic sunni ruler – not as much as Uzun Hasan, for example -, even his 
shi’ite tendency is known.533 When considering the bigger picture, however, his 
                                                 
528 ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl’s account is quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 20. 
529 Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 20. Also see Sarwar, p. 23.  
530 This co-operation was further cemented by a marriage between two families: Seyyid Kāsim, one of 
Ca’fer’s sons, married Cihansah’s daughter. See Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü’t-tevārih, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, 
Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of Ahsenü’t-tevārih), pp. 393-4 
531 HS states that Junayd was expelled by Cihanshah from Ardabil since his great number of disciples was 
regarded as a threat to his throne. “Since he [Sultan Junayd] was such a perfect spiritual guide, a huge 
throng of all nations gathered at his threshold to become his disciples. Indeed, the crowd at his assembly 
was so great that Mirza Jahanshah, who was then the ruler of the two Iraqs and Azerbaijan, was afraid that 
he would lose his throne and ordered Sultan-Junayd to leave Ardabil accompanied by many of his 
disciples and headed for Diyarbakir.” See HS, p. 561. HS does not mention the intervention of Shaykh 
Ca’fer in the affairs. AA follows HS. See AA, p. 29. According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, however, Cihansah 
ordered Shaykh Ca’fer to make Junayd leave the Ardabil. See Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 
393. Khunji does not mention any reason but simply records that “when his father Khwāja Shaykh-shāh 
(Ibrahim) departed (d. A.D. 1447), Junayd for some reason or other had to leave the country and travel to 
various parts of Syria, the West (maghrib), and Rūm.” See TA, p. 63.  
532 It is not out of possibility that Cihanshah himself might have played an effective role in the division of 
the order, either by promptly supporting Ca’fer of by provoking him to eliminate Junayd.  
533 Indeed Cihanshah’s religious views are difficult to define. His attitude rather resembles traditional 
pragmatism of Turkish rulers in this issue, not being tied down to any religious creed. Minorsky, after a 
substantive study of his poetry, concludes, “Only on close examination can one discover in the poems a 
tinge of shi’ite feeling and terminology.” (See V. Minorsky, “Jihan-Shah Qara-Qoyunlu and His Poetry 
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behavior appears to be quite reasonable. As most of our sources underline, the main 
concern of Cihanshah was not the religious affiliation of Junayd, but his political 
aspirations and the characteristics of his disciples, whose number proliferated day by 
day. The militant characteristics, which stemmed from their nomadic-tribal nature, of 
Junayd’s disciples obviously reinforced the Shaykh’s desire for temporal power. So, 
Cihanshah’s aim was to eliminate not a sufi Shaykh because of his deviant esoteric 
ideas, but a leader of a political and military movement mingled with mysticism that 
obviously threatened his temporal authority. After repelling Junayd from Ardabil, 
Cihanshah further underpinned the power of Shaykh Ca’fer in Ardabil by appointing 
him controller of the affairs of the shrine of Shaykh Safī.534 Under the patronage of 
Cihanshah, Shaykh Ca’fer enjoyed a prestigious and respectful life in Ardabil. But 
following the decease of the former at the hands of Uzun Hasan in 1467, the star of 
Shaykh Ca’fer, as well as the traditional line within the Ardabil Order was destined to 
disappear in a short while.  
Thus, Junayd’s departure from Ardabil marked one of the most crucial turning 
points in the History of the Safavid dynasty and Order, which would also fundamentally 
affect the history of the Middle East. The established reasoning of this deportation in the 
                                                                                                                                                
(Turkmenica, 9)”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 16, No. 2, 1954, p. 281.) 
Minorsky, says in the same article, “the evidence is clear that they [Qaraqoyunlu] pretended to something 
more than domination based on sheer force and that, in trying to unify their adepts on a shi’a platform…” 
(Ibid, p. 274) The coins of Qaraqoyunlu usually bear the sunni formula mentioning the four caliphs. But 
two coins struck in Baghdad bear the names of Hasan and Husayn instead of four caliphs. Further on a 
coin of Cihanshah the names of four caliphs have been cut off. (See Ibid, p. 279.) On some of Cihanshah’s 
coinage the shi’ite formula “Ali is the walī of Allah” appears alongside the names of four caliphs on the 
reverse of the coins. (For the coinage of Cihanshah see Richard Burn, “Coins of Jahān Shāh Kara Koyunlu 
and Some Contemporary Rulers”, The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Roy. Numismatic Society, 
5th ser., No. 71, 1938, 173-197.) So, as Mazzaoui remarks, his religious views are vaguely depicted by 
sources: neither a perfect sunni nor a shi’ite. See Mazzaoui, pp. 65-6. Savory deems this shi’ism of 
Qaraqoyunlu as a reason for the clash between them and Safavids on ideological ground. (See Savory, 
Iran under Safavids, p. 17) 
534 Sarwar, p. 24; Aubin, “Les Notables”, p. 46.  
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literature, which is summarized above, tends to explain it within incompatible ideas of 
Junayd and Cafer. According to this hypothesis it was Junayd who departed from the 
traditional way of the order and the pursuing shi’ite ideas fell into a marginal path. The 
discrepancy stemmed from the minds of two Shaykhs. However, taking into account the 
later developments, it appears that such reasoning is unsatisfactory to explain the flow of 
history. First of all, the dynasty and the spiritual leadership of the order were continued 
by the offspring of Junayd, while Cafer’s offspring soon after disappeared from the 
scene of history. Secondly during the Shaykhdom period, from Safiyuddin to Shah 
Ismail, the traditional pattern of succession was always from father to son. There was 
only one exception, which was a compulsory result of conditions: after the death of 
Haydar, his elder son Ali succeeded. But soon after, he was killed by Akkoyunlu forces, 
without having a chance to marry. Then his younger brother Ismail became the Shaykh 
of the sufis. Thus, putting aside this exception, the secret of the order was always passed 
down from father to son.  
With the death of Ibrahim this tradition was somehow broken and Cafer became 
the Shaykh of the Tekke. From this point of view, it was not Junayd who broke the 
tradition but Cafer himself. Contemporary sources do not clarify whether Cafer’s 
attempt to capture Shaykhdom stemmed from his personal ambition or whether he was 
forced by some influential disciples to pacify Junayd. What is certainly known is that  a 
sharp incompatibility between the mystical views of the two Shaykhs appeared. One 
advocated the continuation of traditional teaching while the other advocated the grafting 
of some new ideas. It seems that in order to preserve tradition in terms of mystical 
knowledge Cafer was forced to interrupt the traditional pattern of succession.  
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The crucial point neglected by most historians is the stimulating factors that led 
Junayd to combine the mystical teaching of the order with shi’ism. Was it simply a 
result of his personal religious synthesis and spiritual experience? Or did he express and 
formulate the religious sentiment of a certain branch among disciples? In other words, 
was this fundamental change in the doctrine of the order a ‘top-down’ process or a 
‘bottom-up’ one? Most historians followed the former type of explanation. However, as 
already pointed out, such an explanation fails to explain later developments. Thus, one 
should look at the issue from the other side.  
 
4.2.4. Junayd’s Journey to Anatolia: The Merging of Turkoman Culture with 
Safavid Sufism or the Seeds of the ‘Safavid Movement’ 
 
4.2.4.1. Kurtbeli: The Dominance of Tribal Disciples 
Aşıkpaşazāde states that Junayd left Ardabil because he was offended by his uncle. He 
came to Anatolia (Rum), which was under the rule of the Ottoman sultan Murad II. He 
sent an envoy to the sultan with gifts. His gifts were of symbolic connotation: a prayer 
rug, a Qur’an, and a tesbih. They obviously symbolized the dervish life, which can be 
regarded as complementary of Junayd’s request from Murad II. He demanded the region 
of Kurtbeli, a highway passage between Sivas and Amasya, in order to settle down and 
establish a tekke. As Sohrweide has already mentioned, this place in the eastern borders 
of the Ottoman territories was apt to provide a quite favorable situation for Junayd for it 
was on one of the main trade routes; he could easily establish communication lines with 
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Ardabil and with his disciples in other regions as well.535 But the response of Murad II, 
who reached a decision after discussing the issue with his grand vizier Halil Pasha - a 
member of the well-known ulema family of Çandarlı- suggests that Junayd was not 
sincere in his words, which assured the Ottoman sultan that he simply was going to 
conduct mystical deeds there, but rather seems to have attempted to deceive Murad II. 
Relying on Aşıkpaşazāde’s account, we see that Murad II recognized Junayd’s real 
intention, which was much more political than religious, and refused his demand. 
Another sixteenth century Ottoman chronicle, which differs from all the other 
Ottoman sources with its seemingly positive attitude towards Safavids in that it does not 
repeat the clichés of Ottoman historians on Safavid Shaykhs but depicts both Shaykh 
Junayd and Haydar as pious and respected men536, also mentions the Ottomans’ 
annulment of annual gifts to the Tekke of Ardabil. Skipping Junayd’s adventure in 
Anatolia, Haniwaldanus Anonym says he was living in Uzun Hasan’s country. He was 
so famous and revered that all the princes and Turkish begs felt a spiritual dependence 
on him and sent gifts. Ottoman sultans also used to send annual gifts to him under the 
name ‘çerağ akçesi’. It was reported, says Haniwaldanus Anonym, that Timur Han, the 
ruler of the tatars, wanted to visit him and presented 31 captives since he felt deep 
reverence.537 Mehmed II538 stopped sending traditional gifts to the Tekke of Ardabil. 
                                                 
535 Sohrweide, p. 118.  
536 “Ardabil beğinin Allah’a olan sevgisi samimi idi ve bunu başkalarına da öğretiyordu. Onun asıl adı 
Haydar olub dini inancı gereği, ahlāk bakımından kusursuz bir hayat tarzı olduğundan halk tarafından ona 
şeyh denirdi. Babası Cüneyd aynı sebeplerden dolayı şeyh lākabını almıştı.” ANMH, pp. 34-35. 
537 ANMH usually makes mistakes in the details of events especially that took place outside the Ottoman 
land. Its accounts seem to be knowledge picked up here and there by listening rather than first hand report. 
But still it follows quite an appropriate track in essence of events. In this specific case the anonymous 
compiler again confuses: Actually Timur visited Junayd’s grand-father while returning from his campaign 
on Bayezid I in Ardabil. It is reported that Timur presented 30000 captives that he deported from Anatolia 
to the Tekke. (Hinz, pp. 8-9). ANMH recites this visit but confuses Hoca Ali with Junayd.     
538 ANMH makes a mistake here. In 1444 Murad II abdicated in favor of his son Mehmed II. But upon the 
intensifying external threats he re-accessed the throne two years later and remained as the Ottoman sultan 
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Upon not receiving Ottoman gifts in its traditionally established time, Junayd dispatched 
a messenger and asked the sultan why he had not sent their annual ‘çerağ akçesi’. 
Mehmed II’s answer is rather interesting: ‘The old man of the tekke is now dead!’539 
This answer, of course, annoyed Junayd. 
The answer of Mehmed II is actually quite meaningful. He must have referred to 
Junayd’s father Ibrahim by saying ‘the old man of the tekke’ (tekkenin kocası). Thus 
Mehmed II (Murad II) expressed his ideas to Junayd in a symbolic way, ‘you are no 
more a true Shaykh because of your political ambition. The last true Shaykh of your 
tekke was your father and he has already died. It is because of that I have stopped 
sending ‘çerağ akçesi’’. The desire of Junayd for temporal power, at the cost of 
contradicting the tradition in the Safavid historiography, is clearly stated by the historian 
of Shah Abbas the Great: “When Joneyd became established as leader and defender of 
the faith, he gave them spiritual guidance in a way that gave clear evidence of his desire 
for temporal power and kingship. His disciples flocked to Ardabil from all sides, and a 
cardinal point in his spiritual guidance was the incitement of his disciples to raid and 
carry on a holy war against the infidel.”540 
It is well-known that Ottoman administration had always regarded sufi orders as 
their allies and had been generous in granting lands to those sort of fraternities. During 
the formative period especially, the close co-operation between the two sides is 
documented by several historians. Even the Order of Safaviyya, though being far away 
from Ottoman territories, benefited from the Ottoman’s benevolence. It is recorded by 
                                                                                                                                                
until his death in 1451. On the other hand, Shaykh Junayd arrived in Anatolia after the death of his father, 
in 1447 or 1448. So the Ottoman sultan corresponding with Junayd must be obviously Murad II.   
539 “Vallahi tekkenin kocası ölmüştür!” ANMH, pp. 35-36. Compare Hinz, p. 17.  
540 AA, p. 29.  
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historians that the Ottomans dispatched regular gifts and money as a symbol of their 
reverence to Ardabil Tekkesi and its Shaykhs. So considering the traditional Ottoman 
policy towards mystical fraternities, the answer of Murad II then marks a recognizable 
deviation from the traditional Ottoman attitude towards Safavid order.541 The reason 
behind such a deviation must be sought in the political intentions of Junayd skillfully 
kneaded by the mystical tradition of the order. When consulting Halil Pasha about 
Junayd’s demand, Halil Pasha’s answer makes it clear that the Ottoman administration 
was quite aware of the political content in the new orientation of the Safavid order under 
Junayd. He said: ‘No two sultans can fit onto one throne!’542  
Murad II’s negative response, however, must presumably have been due to a 
much more intimate reason for the Ottoman state. As already indicated above, the 
Safavid Order achieved a wide-spread acceptance among the population of many cities 
and towns in Asia Minor, within the Ottoman realm. Up until Shaykh Junayd, since the 
order was a typical sufi order of Islam and since its disciples were barely spiritual 
followers, the Safavid message did not create any suspicion or reaction within the 
Ottoman administrative circles. On the contrary, Ottoman sultans were to dispatch 
annual gifts to the headquarters of the order in Ardabil.543 Sultan Murad II’s refusal of 
Shaykh Junayd’s request marked the turning point in the relationship between the 
Ottomans and the Safavids. The question to be asked at this point is, thus, what had 
happened with the succession of Junayd that the Ottoman policy against the order began 
to change? The answer to this question should be sought in the changing portrayal of 
                                                 
541 One should keep in mind that this was not a cumulative change in the Ottoman policy towards sufi 
orders, but only towards the Safavid order.  
542 APZ, p. 249. Compare Hinz, p. 17.  
543 Hinz, p. 7.  
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Safavid disciples in Anatolia. As the next stops of Junayd’s journey in Anatolia will 
clearly show, the main body of Junayd’s disciples (but not disciples of the Safavid order 
in general) was not composed of city dwellers any more, but nomadic-tribal people of 
Anatolia and northern Syria.  
Indeed, further investigation is required as to clarify when the connection, 
between the order and Turkoman nomads of Asia Minor and Syria, was established 
significantly, and how the Safavid message spread among them. There is a vague record 
in Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā. According to Khunjī, upon Shaykh Safī’s return to Ardabil, 
where he began to direct his followers after ascending high levels in the path of 
devotion, “the amirs of Tālish turned his residence into their refuge and the great men 
(kubarā) of Rum honored him.”544 Even if Khunjī’s account, which was written nearly 
two centuries after the events, is true, it does not include any hint to clarify social 
position of “the amirs of Tālish” and “the great men (kubarā) of Rum”, i.e. whether they 
were settled people representing high Islamic culture or tribal leaders. The argument 
tracing the origin of the establishment of close ties between the Order and the Anatolian 
Turkomans back to the time of Hoca Ali is already delineated. According to Faruk 
Sümer, the large-scale recruitments of these nomadic and tribal elements materialized 
under Shaykh Junayd.545  Sohrweide also draws attention to the considerable number of 
Safavid khalifas in Anatolia and Syria already under the early Shaykhs. According to 
her, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Safavid Order was wide-spread in the 
towns and cities of Eastern Anatolia. She stresses, however, that the main regions in 
which the Safavid khalifas appeared were on the trade routes. She puts special emphasis 
                                                 
544 TA, p. 62. Khunji mentions the adherence of the heads of Talish and the people of Rum to the Safavid 
Family once more while referring to Shaykh Sadruddin. See TA, p. 63.   
545 See Sümer, p. 7, 10. 
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on Erzincan and Sivas; the latter, especially, lied on the crossroads of caravans. 
Sohrweide underscores the point that such places did not provide only for the people of 
different countries a suitable ground of communication and making contact, but also for 
the nomads and sedentary people as well.546 Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, she 
thinks it is not likely that Shaykh Sadruddin and Hoca Ali adopted large numbers of 
disciples from among nomadic Turkomans. Rather during this period the gravity of the 
Order in Anatolia was in cities among educated people.547 
What is apparent in our knowledge is that by the arrival of Juanyd in Anatolia the 
Safavid order had considerable adherents from among the nomadic Turkomans of the 
region548, as well as among the urban population; and the enthusiastic propaganda led by 
Junayd decisively gave impetus to the recruitment of new disciples from within the 
Ottoman realm, especially among tribal nomads.549 For instance, Irène Beldiceanue 
observes on the tahrir-registers of the province of Kirsehir that considerable numbers of 
names mark attachment to Ali and to his family, which might well have indicated 
attachment to the shaykh of Ardabil Hoca Ali as well. She counts some examples: ‘Şah 
Ali, Seydi Ali, Arslan, Şīrī, Sāfī, Şahverdi, Şahkulu.’550 It must be because of the 
                                                 
546 Sohrweide, pp. 115-6. 
547 Some famous khalifas of the early Safavid Shaykhs, who preached the Safavid order among principally 
the townspeople of Anatolia, were Shaykh Hamid b. Musa (d. 1412), the spiritual master of Haci Bayram 
Veli and the disciple of Hoca Ali (d. 1429), and Abdurrahman Erzincānī. Sohrweide, pp. 116-7. 
548 As Roemer states, in explaining Junayd’s adventure in Azarbaijan, Anatolia, and northern Syria, “It 
was thus not fortuitous that Junayd visited precisely these areas on these raids. Here he could be certain of 
support and assistance.” See Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 206. 
549 See Roemer, p. 201; Sohrweide, p. 118.  Sohrweide puts special emphasis on that Junayd’s main 
interest turned towards nomadic Turkomans, whose lifestyle and religious perception were under 
suspicion of urban population. She says, “Verstärkt wurde dieser Eindruck dadurch, daß er sich seine 
Anhängerschaft weitgehend unter Nomadenstämmen suchte, deren Lebensweise und 
Glaubensvorstellungen städtischen Kreisen stets mehr oder weniger verdächtig waren; außerdem nahm er 
anerkannt ketzerische Elemente, wie ehemalige Anhänger Scheich Bedr ed-Dīns, in seine Reichen auf.” 
See Sohrweide, pp. 119-120.   
550 Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les 
Safawides”, Revue des Études Islamiques, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 398. 
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potency of the political and military competition posed by the tribal-nomadic adherents 
of Junayd that led the Ottoman administration to be curious about the young Shaykh. 
But Murad II welcomed Junayd’s envoy and sent them back them with gifts.  
 
4.2.4.2. Konya: Shi’ite Color 
Seeing there was no refuge in the Ottoman territories for him, Junayd moved to the land 
of Karaman, which was the traditional rival of Ottoman power in Anatolia.551 He lodged 
with the Zaviye of Sadreddin Konevi in Konya. The Shaykh of this zaviye, Shaykh 
Abdullatif, was a deputy (halife) of Zeyneddin Hāfī, who was the founder of the 
Zeyniyye Order.552 Shaykh Abdullatif did not warmly welcome Junayd. Aşıkpaşazāde 
reports that he rejected on several occasions Junayd’s demand for a meeting. The 
communication between the two Shaykhs took place through the mediation of Junayd’s 
tutor Mevlāna Hayreddin.553 Aşıkpaşazāde’s narration of the events that took place in 
Konya is quite unreliable. Abdullatif replies to the tutor of Junayd, upon his demand for 
a meeting with Junayd: ‘the former row is former!’554 Then for a while the two Shaykhs 
did not meet, says Aşıkpaşazāde. During this time Junayd prayed behind a window in 
the mosque until the two Shaykhs came together after a mid-afternoon prayer. During 
the first meeting, the two Shaykhs talked for a while and departed from one another with 
the intention of meeting again in thirty days. During this time some scribes copied the 
books of Muhyiddin-i Arabī and Sadreddin Konevī, preserved in the zaviye, for Junayd. 
It was after copying of all the books that they met again. Aşıkpaşazāde needs to declare 
                                                 
551 According to Hinz, Junayd arrived in Konya most probably in 1550. See Hinz, p. 18. 
552 Mükrimin H. Yinanç, “Cüneyd”, IA, p. 243.  
553 Hayreddin was a pupil of Hizir Beg. He later on became the tutors of Mehmed II. See Yinanç, p. 243; 
Tahsin Yazıcı, DIA, “Cüneyd-i Safevî”, p. 124.   
554 “es-saffü evvelü ūlā”, APZ, p. 243.  
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that the copied books were available at this second meeting, which took place in the 
mosque of the zaviye.  
A close scrutiny suggests that this is a quite concise narration of events. 
Aşıkpaşazāde must have skipped important details, which he must have regarded 
unnecessary or he consciously concealed. As stated in the same paragraph, he 
participated in this meeting; thus his knowledge was derived from an eye-witness.555 So 
he had a chance to access all details. Nevertheless, as summarized above, both the 
behavior of Shaykh Abdullatif and the organization style of the meeting seem quite odd. 
These are some questions worth asking: why did Abdullatif hesitate to meet with Junayd 
that he postponed the meeting for as long as possible? What is the meaning of the phrase 
‘the former row is former!’ that Aşıkpaşazāde quoted from Abdullatif? Why did Junayd 
pray behind the window until the meeting with Abdullatif took place? Why did they wait 
for the copying of the mentioned books before a discussion?  
Before attempting to seek possible answers to these questions I would like to 
have a look at what happened in the meeting, which would shed light on the answers. 
Naturally, they must have discussed many issues during this meeting; but Aşıkpaşazāde 
                                                 
555 Ashikpashazāde states that he attended the meeting as a significant participant. His narration makes it 
clear that he took a position behind Shaykh Abdullatif, who was his Shaykh as well. (Köprülü, “Aşık 
Paşa-zâde”, p. 707) But there is confusion in the biographies of Ashikpashazāde about the time of his visit 
to Konya and participation in this dispute. Relying on this own account in Tevārih it is known that 
Ashikpashazāde left Ottoman territories for a pilgrimage in 840/1436-7 and visited Konya during this 
journey. It is mistakenly reported that he participated in the mentioned dispute during this visit. (Köprülü, 
“Aşık Paşa-zâde”, p. 707.) But as obviously seen it is impossible for Junayd to have left Ardabil after 
1447. Thus, Junayd’s stay in Konya must have taken place most probably between 1448 and 1450. 
(Compare Hinz, p. 16.).  One year later we see Ashikpashazāde in Uskub. He states that he returned from 
pilgrimage with Pasha Yigitoglu Ishak Beg and engaged in raids around this city. (APZ, p. 179; APZa, p. د 
). Ashikpashazāde mentions himself again 9 years later. This time he fought in the Battle of Kossovo and 
even received some special gifts from Murad II after the victory in 852/1448. (APZ, p. 188; APZa, p. د, 
Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”, p. 707.) We know again from his history that Ashikpashazāde was present in 
the circumcision feast of prince Mustafa and Bayezid in 861/1457. (APZ, 198; APZa, p. د ; , Köprülü, p. 
707.) In narrating the events of nine years between 852 and 861 Ashikpashazāde does not mention himself 
anymore. So the only possible assumption is that he must have made a second visit to Konya after the 
Battle of Kossovo. Then the most probable date of this meeting appears to be 1449 or 1450. (See also 
Hinz, p. 18.).   
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mentions only one of them. In one of the hot instances of the conversation Junayd asked: 
‘Who is superior for a father, his sons or his friends?’556 Abdullatif answered: “in the 
conditions you meant the friends are superior. For that reason, they are mentioned in the 
Holy Qur’an as “muhācirīn ve’l-ensār” (the man who emigrates and the man who hosts). 
Furthermore the four true sects (mezheb) were derived from the friends but not from the 
sons.’ The response of Junayd to these words was quite frustrating for a sunni Shaykh: 
‘Were you present when those verses (āyets) that you mentioned were descended?’ This 
question ended the already stirred up discussion. Abdullatif said: ‘Now you became an 
unbeliever with this faith (on the verses of Qoran) and those who follow you in this 
belief are unbelievers!’ and abandoned the meeting with Aşıkpaşazāde in his arm. 
Junayd also left the place with his tutor Hayreddin. 
Aşıkpaşazāde summarizes this important debate in a brilliant and concise 
manner. Undoubtedly, the conversation between the two Shaykhs could not have 
consisted of a four-sentence dialogue. Keeping in mind that Aşıkpaşazāde began to write 
his history in 889/1484557, approximately 36 years after the meeting, he may even have 
not been able to remember details. What he remembered was the core theme of dispute, 
which obviously indicates that the quarrel focused on the different convictions of sunni 
and shi’ite sects. Junayd’s question clearly addresses the famous argument of the shi’ite 
sect that after the Prophet the caliphate was reserved to Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, 
and to his offspring, because offspring were superior to friends.  Abdullatif’s answer was 
a conventional sunni argument against the shi’ite attack especially on the first three 
caliphs. He put forth the Qur’an’s praising of friends (ashāb) and their being the source 
                                                 
556 “Ataya eshāb mı evlādur, yohsa evlād mı evlādur?”, APZ, p. 250. 
557 Fuat Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”, ĐA, p. 708.  
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of the four true sects, in which shi’ism was not included. The response of Junayd to 
especially the first part of this argument is quite interesting and pregnant to further 
knowledge about the nature of the shi’ism that Junayd upheld. He obviously propounded 
that the verses praising ashābs were not part of the original Qur’an but were later 
amendments by sunni scholars. It is known that such ideas proposing the alteration of 
the Qur’an was not accepted among shi’ite scholars as well, but had wide-spread 
currency among popular level and ghulat extensions of shi’ite society. On the contrary, 
shi’ites also accepted the available text as whole, unaltered, and the exact original text of 
the Holy Message on the literary level. Thus, we can conclude from this passage that the 
shi’ite ideas Junayd pursued were not affiliated with well-cultivated, ‘orthodox’ shi’ism, 
which was historically impossible, but resemble ghulat convictions, which have been 
attributed to shi’ism mainly by sunni scholars.  
So it appears imperative to clarify the shi’ism of Junayd and his son Haydar and 
its historical background. As Sohrweide states, available sources do not clarify whether 
Junayd pursued Shi’ite ideals already present in Ardabil or whether he appropriated 
militant-shi’ism by the influence of nomadic disciples during his journey in Anatolia.558 
Sümer regards the second case fairly possible.559 Jean Aubin also sees a strong 
connection between the appearance of extremist-shi’ism, alongside the claim of seyyid-
ship, under Junayd and his disciples among Anatolian Turkomans.560 Indeed, the general 
set up of the events has certain suggestions. Studies on the issue point out that Junayd 
                                                 
558 Sohrweide, p. 122. 
559 Sümer, p. 10. 
560 “Peut-être deviennent-ils sayyids un peu avant le milieu du xv siècle. C’est Šayh Ğunayd, en tout cas, 
qui adhère au chiisme extrémiste, qu’il prêche dans les tribus turcophones d’Anatolie. Ces tribus vont 
porter au pouvoir, en 1501, son petit-fils Šah Ismā’īl, un garçon de quatorze ans, de sang princier Aq-
qoyunlu par les femmes.” See Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavudes”, Le Shî’isme Imâmite, 
Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 237. 
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must have been a young man when he embarked on a struggle with his uncle for the 
Shaykhdom.561 His life before 1447 is not known. But one can safely suggest that he 
lived in Ardabil near his father. This being the case, then, one feels the right to ask from 
which sources and how did he derive these elements of the shi’ite faith? His training and 
education must have been performed under the careful auspice of his father and the 
foremost dervishes of the hospice, according to the one and a half century-long tradition 
of the order, which is known as bearing a sunni character. Considering such a career, 
how could Junayd personally have developed a sufi-shi’ite synthesis all by himself? 
Being one of the strongest candidates to the shaykhdom, his every ideas and practices 
must have been closely observed. It is almost impossible for a man in such a situation to 
depart from the traditional mystical way of the order and to pursue such a way that not 
only contradicted but also struggled with the former teachings through only his 
intellectual activities. Even his intellectual activities and cognitive development were 
severely conditioned by the intellectual environment of the hospice.  
Thus the only logical explanation left is to seek the answer in a long socio-
religious transformation process that took place from top to bottom,i.e. that started 
among the disciples and barely transformed the ideas of the shaykhs as a result. This 
point is generally ignored by modern historians, seeking the answers primarily in the 
personal decisions and the strategies of the shaykhs. Mazzaoui, for example, sees this 
transformation on the doctrinal level as very much connected to the newly arising 
political ambitions of the shaykhs. He says, “The religious change was simply a pretext 
for a political ends. The two are inextricably united in the persons of Ğunaid and 
                                                 
561 Hinz, p. 15.  
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Haydar, and Shah Ismā’īl merely carried this to its natural conclusion.”562 Mazzaoui 
truly pays much attention to the arising gazā motif with interest to zeal as a ‘state’ 
policy, instead of the introspective and contemplative Sufism of earlier shaykhs, and 
sees a close connection between the new doctrinal orientation, that is ghulat shi’ism, and 
the rise of gazā. As he rightly points out, “For all of a sudden now, the murīds of the 
Order became the guzāt-i sūfīya”563. 
Nevertheless, as for the dynamics behind these inextricable changes on doctrinal 
and political grounds, Mazzauoi inclines to omit or underestimate the role of the 
decisive change in socio-cultural roots of the disciples; rather his focus in explaining this 
tremendous change in the Order seems to be on the persons of the shaykhs and on their 
personal intentions and decisions. The following paragraphs will attempt to show this 
was not the case, but in fact the opposite.  
There must have been enough of a number of disciples aggregated by the death 
of Shaykh Ibrahim that had recognizably departed from the customary way of the order 
and were not in calm relations with the highly educated dervishes of the hospice. Junayd 
was the representative of this group while Cafer was somehow pushed to the leadership 
of the traditionally educated dervishes of the hospice. The trajectory of Junayd’s journey 
in Anatolia actually indicates the social roots of the former group.  
Sohrweide has truly stated that a significant differentiation between the 
traditional, or early, disciples of the order and the new ‘type’ of disciples especially was 
wide-spread among the nomadic tribes of Anatolia and Syria.  
Das spricht sehr dafür, daß im Ordenszentrum nicht alle Sūfīs den Wandeln im 
Orden gut geheißen hatten und deswegen den Nachkommen Ğunaids feindlich 
                                                 
562 Mazzaoui, p. 73. 
563 Mazzaoui, p. 74. 
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gegenüberstanden. Möglicherweise haben sie sich auch andern Orden 
angeschlossen, wie der verwandten Halvatīza. Man kann jedenfalls nicht 
voraussetzen, daß die Anhänger der frühen Safavīya ohne weiteres den Wechsel 
zur Qizilbaš-Safavīya mitmachten. ... Mit dem Wandel im Orden, angezogen 
durch die militanten Neigungen der Scheiche, trat auch eine andere 
Anhängerschaft in Erscheinung bzw. in den Vordergrund: Angehörige 
kriegerischer Türkmenenstämme, die eigentlichen Träger der Qizilbaš-Safavīya, 
nach deren von Haydar eingefürhter roter Mütze sie ihren Namen „Qizilbaš“ 
trugen.564   
 
As Sohrweide underlines, the Shaykhdom of Junayd was not a period of 
transformation of the whole order; but, by this time, the order experienced a schism. On 
the one hand, the original quietist sufism of Shaykh Safī al-Din was continued mainly by 
those followers settled at home in the neighborhood of Ardabil or by some leading 
khalifas of the early Shaykhs such as Shaykh Hamid b. Musa and Abdurrahman 
Erzincānī, in other towns and cities. On the otherhand, newly growing militant, 
extremist-shi’ite ideals were gaining popularity among rural and nomadic Turkoman 
elements. During the very early phase of this schism the first wing was led by Shaykh 
Ca’fer while the second faction was developed under the leadership of Junayd. In the 
course of time, however, the first wing would be destined to lose its affiliation with the 
Order after one or two generations of khalifas. As Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı points out, apart 
from Junayd’s offspring, another familial line stemming from Shaykh Ibrahim, namely 
Kevākibzāde family, continued to practice the traditional sunni way of the Order in the 
Ottoman territories without any pressure by the state. On the contrary, Ottomans 
recognized their claim to be descended from the Prophetic line and made them fill 
important posts either governmental or scholarly (ulemā) ranks.565  
                                                 
564 Sohrweide, p. 124.  
565 See Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, Kaygusuz Abdal – Hatayî – Kul Himmet, Đstanbul, 1953, p. 15. 
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However, the foot-prints of this doctrinal schism continued to be seen even 
between the descendants of Haydar at least during the first decade of the sixteenth 
century. Likewise, Andrew Morton pays attention to persuasive signs of doctrinal 
differentiation between the members of Safavid family. Basing his work on Fazli 
Isfahani’s Afzal al-tavārīkh, a seventeenth-century Safavid chronicle, he questions the 
generally accepted view of the sixteenth century Savafid sources on the succession of 
Ismail to his elder brother Sultan Ali.566 Differing from other sources, Afzal al-tavārīkh 
argues that Sultan Ali, when understanding his destiny to be killed, divided the 
succession between Ibrahim and Ismail. The related passage runs, “He [Sultan Ali] made 
his younger brother Ibrahim his deputy for the chain of mystical guidance, commanded 
him to transmit guidance and occupied the prayer carpet, and transferred matters of 
military action and kingship over the whole world which, by the grace of God became 
adorned with his [presumably Ismail] noble existence, to Sultan Ismail Mirza, who was 
seven years old. … With his [Sultan Ali] blessed hand he placed the twelve-gored 
Haydarian garment [the tāj] on the head of that fortunate brother [Ismail] and tied the 
thunderbolt-powered sword of Sultan Junayd at his waist … and, making Sultan Ibrahim 
Mirza his heir in transmitting guidance and the ways of his noble-natured grandfather, 
which had come to him in regular succession, ordered the khalifas of the retreat, the 
pīras, tarīqchīs, sayers of zikr and his disciples to serve and obey his dervish-natured 
brother.”567 After reciting this passage from Afzal al-tavārīkh, Morton reminds the above 
mentioned differentiation between Safavid followers by the succession of Junayd, and 
                                                 
566 Andrew H. Morton, “The Early Years of Shah Isma’il in the Afzal al-tavārikh and Elsewhere”, in 
Safavid Persia. The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 
1996, p. 35. 
567 Quoted in Morton, “The Early Years”, pp. 34-35. 
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than asks whether one can assume that Ibrahim represented the quietist faction while 
Ismail the militant. To him, explaining this separation by personal qualities of both 
brothers rather than on ideological ground is more plausible.568 On the other hand, Jean 
Aubin also brings under scrutiny the divergence between sons of Shaykh Haydar in his 
succinct and authoritative article on the advent of Shah Ismail. According to Aubin, 
however, the contest, which started with the death of Sultan Ali, was far beyond mere 
personal rivalry. Rather under both Ibrahim and his other step-brothers a resistance 
against the militant and extremist-shi’ite movement of Ismail appeared.569  
At this point, one should not disregard the role of shaykh’s young age in the 
transformation process of the order. The age of Junayd when he succeded his father is 
not clarified in sources. But as Hinz has already emphasized, he must have been pretty 
young. His son and successor Haydar was yet to be born when Junayd died, and was 
killed when he was twenty-eight. For Haydar’s successors, first Sultan Ali and then 
Ismail, the case was not different. Ismail was a one-year baby at his father’s death. Thus 
by the time of Junayd, Safavid shaykhs were not educated and trained within the 
traditional ideological and mental habitat of the order according to the traditional way. 
One might even argue, the traditional atmosphere in Ardabil came into a rapid process of 
disintegration with Junayd’s departure from Ardabil, or shortly before. This interruption 
in the chain of traditional teaching opened the doors of innovations and changes both in 
the esoteric doctrine of the Order and in the ideological orientation and interests of the 
young shaykhs, whose shaykhdom stemmed merely from familial claims but not from 
                                                 
568 This sort of interpretation is, however, not shared by the present author, who is rather inclined to 
attribute more affective role to the doctrinal differentiation.  
569 See Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides reconsideré (Etudes Sfavides III)”, Moyen Orient &Océan 
Indien, 5, 1988, pp. 103-111.  
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mastership or merit in Sufism. Furthermore, with the departure of Junayd from Ardabil 
these young shaykhs were brought up in the Turkoman socio-cultural milieu. Indeed, 
except for Junayd, they received their education and training under the auspice of these 
Turkoman khalifas, who were principally of nomadic origin. Thus, it would not be an 
exaggeration to argue that since the cognitive process and mental development of the 
Safavid shaykhs of the ‘transformation period’, that is between Junayd and Ismail, was 
surrounded by the cultural and intellectual environment of Turkomans; and thus was 
conditioned by this environment. This leads us to the conclusion that the doctrinal and 
ideological synthesis came out under Junayd and his successors, which is said to be 
ghulat shi’ism, was not a personal choice or production of these shaykhs, but was a 
natural outcome of the marriage of the Safavid Order with the Turkoman culture and 
mentality. Both the ghulat shi’ism and the political aspiration that appeared during 
Junayd’s shaykhdom were the products of this marriage, and were brought to the Order 
not primarily by the shaykh but by the socio-cultural roots of the dominating ‘new type’ 
disciples, that is the nomadic Turkomans.  
  
4.2.4.3. Varsak, Taurus, Aleppo: Consolidating Ties with Tribal and Heterodox 
Elements 
After such a fierce dispute with an influential sunni Shaykh of the region, Junayd must 
have realized that he could no longer take shelter in Konya due to the fact that he left the 
city by the following morning. The third stop in his journey was the Varsak land 
(vilāyet-i Varsak)570. It is well-known that the Varsak were one of the few tribes that 
                                                 
570 APZ, p. 250. The nomadic tribal people of Varsak were living in the mountainous region around Taş-ili 
(Đçel) of South Anatolia.  
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managed to preserve their traditional social structure and way of life – that was tribal 
nomad- against the Ottoman expansion. We always witness them as allies of the 
Karamans in their struggle against the Ottomans.571 But for the purpose of my analysis 
the foremost characteristic of the Varsak was that they were still immune to the high 
Islamic culture culminating among the educated elites of the great cities. Rather they 
were under the heavy influence of the traditional Turkish way of life.572 
Nonetheless, Junayd’s stay in Varsak territories was not a long one. Shaykh 
Abdullatif wrote a letter to Ibrahim Bey, the ruler of Karaman, stipulating that the actual 
aim of Junayd was not mystical, but that he aimed to deteriorate the actual religion 
(sha’ria) and to be a temporal ruler as well. Upon receiving this letter from the most 
prestigious Shaykh of Konya, Ibrahim Bey ordered Varsak tribal chiefs to arrest Junayd. 
Being an ally and vassal of Karaman, Varsak Begs could not resist this order. But it is 
clear enough in the narration of Aşıkpaşazāde that they were quite reluctant to seize 
Junayd. Rather, Varsak leaders somehow allowed him to escape from their region. 
Aşıkpaşazāde indicates an important detail that must be taken note of here. Before 
leaving Varsak territory, Junayd had recruited many disciples from among them.573 
However, one may well propose that he already had disciples from among the Varsak 
before visiting their lands. Anyhow, we have convincing reasons to think that by the 
time of Junayd’s personally visiting the Varsak tribes, the Safavid Order already had a 
                                                 
571 There are many references in Şikârî’a Karamanoğulları Tarihi as well as Ottoman chronicles such as 
Ashikpashazāde, Ananim Tevārih, Neşrî, Kemalpaşazāde, and others depicting Varsaks as an intrinsic ally 
of Karamanoğlu.  
572 For further reading on Varsak tribes see Ahmed Gökbel, Anadolu Varsaklarında Đnanç ve Adetler, 
Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1998; Ali Sinan Bilgili, Osmanlı Döneminde 
Tarsus Sancağı ve Tarsus Türkmenleri: Sosyo-ekonomik Tarih, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001. 
573 APZ, p. 250. 
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strong foot-hold among them. Warriors from the Varsak would be seen, among the ranks 
of Ismail’s enthusiastic Qizilbash fighters, half a century later.574  
Then Junayd went to Mount Ersuz  near Aleppo. He requested a deserted fortress 
in this mountain from the ruler of the region in order to settle down. Having the 
permission of Bilal-oglu, who was ruling the region, he repaired the fortress and made 
there the center of his missionary activities. It is not recorded in sources how long 
Junayd stayed there. The progression of events suggests that it must not have been long. 
It seems that Junayd continued to spread his militant shi’ite ideas and recruit new 
disciples especially from among the Turkoman tribes of the region.575 He sent 
missioners to the tribes of Antakya, Ayıntab, Maraş, and Amik ovası.576 The flow of 
events in later periods shows that the seeds that Junayd sew into the soils of the region 
leafed out in a great degree of success. One interesting group that Aşıkpaşazāde 
mentions among the hinterland of Junayd’s propaganda was the adherents of Shaykh 
Bedreddin. He says many people from the adherents of Bedreddin and others coming 
from Rum-Ili577 gathered around him.578 
Not long had passed since Junayd had settled in Ersuz Mountain (Cebel-i Arus) 
that the political and shi’ite content of his mystical message was discerned by the sunni 
                                                 
574 See Sümer, Safevî Devleti’nin Kuruluşu, pp. 49-50.  
575 For the nomadic Turkomans of the region see Faruk Sümer, “Anadolu’da Yaşayan Bazı Üçoklu Oğuz 
Boylarına Mensup Teşekküller”, Đstanbul Üniversitesi Đktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-50, 
437-508; “XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak’ta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumî bir Bakış”, Đstanbul 
Üniversitesi Đktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-50, 509-569; Đlhan Şahin, “XVI. Asırda 
Halep Türkmenleri”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire, 
Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, 129-154; “XVI. Yüzyılda Halep ve Yeniil Türkmenleri”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde 
Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire, Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, 155-164.   
576 Yinanç, p. 243.  
577 This phrase indicates Thrace and Balkans here. 
578 APZ, p. 250. Also consider Sohrweide, p. 119. For Şeyh Bedreddin and his followers see Abdülbāki 
Gölpınarlı, Simavna Kadısıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin, Đstanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1966; Michel Balivet, Şeyh 
Bedreddin. Tasavvuf ve Đsyan, çev. Ela Güntekin, Đstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000; Müfid 
Yüksel, Şeyh Bedreddin, Đstanbul: Bakış Yayınları, 2002.  
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scholars and the Shaykhs of the region. Among the Shaykhs of Aleppo, Mevlāna Ahmed 
Bekrī and Abdulkerim Halife were the first to realize the danger of Junayd’s movement 
for the sunni establishment. They drew the attention of Memluk ruler Cakmak to the 
danger. Aşıkpaşazāde’s description here is again quite interesting. He reports that the 
two Shaykhs wrote letters to the ruler of Egypt saying that ‘the Deccal has appeared in 
your country!’579 In Islamic literature Deccal is known as the man who will appear just 
before the breaking of doomsday and will diminish the true religious system. He will 
have so much great power that no ruler will be able to resist his devastation, but for the 
Mehdi, the last savior of human being. What is worth recognizing in our context is that 
Deccal has two principal characteristics: one is religious and the other is political. He 
will annul the true religious system of God and establish the order of Satan. Meanwhile 
he will not achieve these devilish accomplishments only through the spreading of his 
religious ideas but also through a social revolution as well.580 
Cakmak immediately dispatched an order to the governor of Aleppo to capture 
Junayd. The governor Kanbay al-Hamzavī581 could not go personally since he was ill, 
but he sent one of his commanders. They attacked Junayd’s camp and killed about 70 
adherents of Junayd, 25 of whom were disciples of Shaykh Bedreddin but Junayd 
managed to escape. He declared that ‘Those who want to meet me will find me in 
Canik.’582 But Junayd was attacked on his way by Üzeyir-oğlı. He could get rid of this 
                                                 
579 APZ, p. 250. 
580 For further information see A. J. Wensinck, “Deccal”, IA, pp. 504-505; Kürşat Demirci, “Deccal”, DIA, 
pp. 67-69. 
581 Yinanç, p. 243. 
582 APZ, p. 250.  
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danger only by leaving behind all his properties. Junayd must have left Syria in 1453, 
shortly before Cakmak’s death.583   
 
4.2.4.4. Canik and Trebizond: Becoming “gāzi”  
Aşıkpaşazāde says he went to Mehmet Beg in Canik. But it is not clear who this Mehmet 
Beg was. Hinz refers to him as the governor of Canik584 while Yinanc argues that he was 
Tāceddin-oğlu Mehmet Beg.585 The truth was that Junayd stayed in Canik for a 
considerably long period between 1453 and 1456,586 and continued his propaganda and 
militaristic activities there as well. He gathered some thousands of armed men in a short 
while.587 The Greek source Chalkokondyles says the Shaykh’s troops were collected 
from everywhere in the east and south and from Samion as well as from some other 
cities.588 Here the question arises of whether Junayd stayed in Canik, which was an 
Ottoman province at that time, for three years?589 Aşıkpaşazāde very briefly says he 
went to the court of Mehmet Beg in Canik (Canikde Mehmed Beg katına vardı);590 he 
does not specify whether Mehmed Beg offered him some sort of protection, thus he 
stayed in his (Mehmed Beg’s) dominion or Junayd left the latter’s court after a short 
while. Remembering Murad II’s refusal of the Shaykh’s request to stay in Kurtbeli, 
                                                 
583 Hinz, p. 19. Khunji says, in Syria he several times revolted against the governors. See TA, p. 63.  
584 Hinz, p. 20. 
585 Yinanç, p. 244. 
586 Following paragraphs in this study.  
587 APZ, p. 250. Most of these adherents of Junayd must have been from the Çepni tribe living in the 
region southwest of the Empire of Trebizond at least by the second half of the thirteenth century.  See Fuat 
Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, trs. Gary Leiser, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1992, pp. 49-50. Compare Sohrweide, p. 121.    
588 The identification of this “Samion” is a controversial issue among historians. According to Hinz, it 
denotes the Pontic harbor Samsun. See Hinz, pp. 19-20. However, Shukurov challenges this argument 
asserting the Samion was nothing but the modification of oriental Sham (Damascus). To him Junayd’s 
stay in the Ottoman territory for such a long term since the hostile attitude of the Ottoman administration 
towards the Shaykh is apparent from Ashikpashazāde’s account. See Shukurov, p. 135.  
589 According to Hinz, the answer is “yes”. See Hinz, p. 20. 
590 APZ, p. 250.  
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however, one feels the right to question the assumption that he stayed for three years 
under the protection of Mehmed Beg, who was either a dependent or a tributary of the 
powerful Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II.591 Indeed, such a query is made by Rustam 
Shukurov. Thinking it was impossible for Junayd to survive in the Ottoman territories, 
he concludes that Junayd must have spent these three years in the vicinity of the 
borderlands, which one might regard as ‘no mans land’, between the Canik Province of 
the Ottomans and Pontus territories.592 
However, Shukurov’s view needs further modification. We know that there were 
influential Turkoman tribes both in the Province of Canik and along the borders of the 
Pontus state. Especially Çepni tribe, which had been established in the region southwest 
of the Empire of Trebizond, had already proved itself in successful battles against 
Pontus troops.593 Faruk Sümer determines that already in 1277 there were numerous 
Çepni594 Turkomans living in the region of Sinop.595 Towards the end of the century 
they moved eastward and captured Ünye. Greek sources record that having established a 
strong foot-hold here Turks raided the whole of the coastal region up until Trebizond.596 
In the first half of the fourteenth century Trebizond was attacked two times by Turks, 
                                                 
591 For an entirely different argument regarding the identification of Mehmed Beg, see Shukurov, pp. 137-
9. 
592 Shukurov, pp. 136-7. 
593 Fuat Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, p. 50. In the second half of the thirteenth century 
Chepnis captured Sinop and towards the end of the century they headed towards east, Trebizond. See 
Faruk Sümer, Oğuzlar, 5th ed., Đstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999, p. 323. For a further 
reading on Chepni tribe see Faruk Sümer, Çepniler: Anadolu'daki Türk Yerleşmesinde Önemli Rol 
Oynayan bir Oğuz Boyu, Đstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992. 
594 Chepnis are one of the famous 24 Oghuz clans. Çepni was one of the four sons (other three were 
Bayındır, Peçenek, and Çavuldur) of Gök Han, who was one of the six sons of Oğuz Han. The word 
‘çepni’ means the man who immediately attacks his enemy whenever and wherever he sees. See Faruk 
Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, Đstanbul, 1992, p. 35.  
595 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 35.  
596 Anthony Bryer, “Greeks and Turkmens: The Pontic Exception”, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XXIX, 
1975, p. 143.  
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first in 1335 and second in 1348.597 In both attacks the Çepnis played an important 
part.598 In 1357, Haci Emir Beg of Çepni raided Macka. In the following year he married 
Theodora, the daughter of ex-emperor Basil, so that Trebizond became safe from his 
raids.599 In 1396-7, his son and successor Ibrahim Beg conquered Giresun from Pontus 
state and in a short while the region around Giresun and Ordu became intensely 
inhabited by Turkoman tribes, especially by the Çepnis.600  
During the reign of Murad II Samsun was conquered by the Ottomans and the 
province of Canik, which was composed of Bafra, Alaçam, and Çarşamba, was 
formed.601 In 1461, Mehmed II first conquered Kastamonu and Sinop, ending the 
sovereignty of Candaroğulları, and then marched on Trebizond, which was surrendered 
without resistance. When the Ottomans came to the region the Görele, Tirebolu, and 
Giresun castles were under the control of Pontus Emperor while the vast area between 
Kürtün, Dereli, Giresun, Tirebolu, and Eynesil was controlled by Çepni begs.602 During 
the reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512) Trebizond became a Prince province. In 1489-90 
                                                 
597 Bryer, p. 144.  
598 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, pp. 36-7.  
599 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, pp. 39-40.  
600 Sümer, Oğuzlar, p. 326; Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 42. For the activities of Turkoman tribes in this region and 
their relation with Trebizond Empire see Anthony Bryer, “Greeks and Turkmens: The Pontic Exception”, 
Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XXIX, 1975, 113-148; Đlhan Şahin, “Osmanlı Döneminde Giresun Bölgesinde 
Konar-Göçerlerin Đzleri”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire, 
Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, 218-224. On the other hand, an anonymous qizilbash history from the early 
sixteenth-century approves that the the Chepni oymaq in Ismail’s ranks originally came from the region of 
Trebizond and Canik. See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, edited and published by Mir Hāşim Muhaddes, Tehran, 
1361 (1982), p. 24. (Hereafter Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān.) This work is an anonymous history of Qizilbash 
oymaqs, reporting the geographical origins and great amirs of each qizilbash oymaq that participated in 
the Safavid Movement. The available copy of the work is dated 1013/1604-5. However, as Mir Hāşim 
Muhaddes states, some expressions in the text suggest an earlier date for the compilation of the work; it 
must have been written between 1598 and 1605. For the most part, the information provided by the 
Anonymous History of Qizilbashes shows a great deal of conformity with the known historical facts. 
Furthermore it provides some valuable information, even if it is not much. Especially its account on the 
geographical origins of qizilbash tribes is of great value in determining the socio-ethnical roots of the 
Safavid Movement.)     
601 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 44.  
602 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 48.  
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Selim I was appointed to the governorship of Trebizond and remained there until 
1510.603    
Sümer determines from the Tahrir registers of the region dated 1468 and 1515 
that in the second half of the fifteenth century almost all the Çepnis settled down in 
villages. Following the conquest, the Ottomans applied the timar regime upon the region 
and allotted all timars to Çepni begs. In tahrir registers Giresun and its neighborhood is 
called ‘Çepni Đli’. In the first tahrir, the majority of the Çepnis were recorded as 
müsellem, those who participate in campaigns with their own facilities but in return do 
not pay tax. In the second register, dated 1515, however, most of them are recorded as 
ordinary peasants or reāya and were deprived of tax exemption. But timar holders were 
still Çepni begs.604  
On the other hand, Çepni Turkomans are known for their heterodox beliefs and 
‘shi’ite’ tendencies. Upon arriving in Suluca Karahöyük, Hacı Bektaş Veli was 
welcomed to the house of Kadincik Ana and her spouse Idris in this village and 
recruitted his first disciples from among the Çepnis who populated the village.605 
Towards end of the fifteenth century a considerable part of çepni oymaqs joined Safavid 
ranks.606 Ottoman Geographer Mehmet Aşıkî (1555-1600) describes the Çepnis as 
having converted to qizilbashism and worshipping Shah Ismail.607  
                                                 
603 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 47.  
604 Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, pp. 48-64.  
605 See Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kızılbash, Historical Bipartition and its consequences”, in her Au 
banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 38; 
“Recherche sur une Baciyan-i Rum: Kadincik Ana”, in her Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au 
coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme, p. 34; Sümer, Tirebolu Tarihi, p. 35. Chepni oymaqs scattered several 
parts of Anatolia. In the sixteenth century, for example, some of them constituted Halep Türkmenleri, 
while some others joined Ulu Yörük living in Sivas-Tokat-Amasya region. On the other hand, a crowded 
branch of Chepni was still living in the region of Trabizond, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, Giresun, Ordu, and 
Samsun. See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 50.  
606 See Faruk Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, pp. 50, 66, 80, 82, 104, 194; Oğuzlar, pp. 322-330; 
Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kızılbash”, p. 38; “Recherche sur une Baciyan-i Rum”, p. 34. However, one of his 
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So, putting these two facts together, it clearly appears that Shaykh Junayd’s 
homage in the Province of Canik was provided by the Çepni and other Turkoman tribes 
that inhabited in the region, which provided gâzi-disciples for Junayd’s troops as well. If 
Mehmed Beg was a dependent of the Ottoman Sultan as intrinsically suggested by 
Kemalpaşazāde, then Junayd’s stay at his court must have been a short visit. Rather, he 
supposedly spent three years from 1453 to 1456 among the Turkoman tribes, engaging 
in the propaganda of his spiritual way and making new recruits. We do not know exactly 
how the response of the Canik governor and the Ottoman administration to his doings 
was. Although no military measure is recorded in contemporary sources, the Ottoman’s, 
Karaman’s, and Memluk’s attitudes to the former actions of Junayd suggest that it was 
not calm.  
On the other hand, failing to realize his political intentions within the three 
Islamic realms – namely the Ottoman, Karaman, and Mamluk –, Junayd turned towards 
a Christian country. He attacked the Trabzon Greek Empire. Junayd’s goal was obvious: 
to construct a temporal power over the ruins of this infidel state in addition to the 
spiritual one. Shaykh Junayd’s attack on Trebizond was also recorded in Greek 
sources.608 Taking advantage of the internal conflicts within the ruling family, Junayd 
achieved considerable success against the Greeks. He defeated the combined army and 
navy of the Greek emperor Yuannis Comminos IV near Kordile (Akca Kale) and 
                                                                                                                                                
other works, where he studied Ottoman tahrir registers related to Chepnis Sümer says there were number 
of people bearing names like ‘Osman’, ‘Bekir’, ‘Ömer’ in Chepni villages thus they were sunnis. See his 
Tirebolu Tarihi, pp. 53-4. 
607 Mehmed Aşıkî, Menâzirü’l-evâlim, manuscript, Nurosmaniye Kütüphanesi, no. 3426, fol. 299a.  
608 For an assessment of Junayd’s campaign on Trebizond mainly basing on Greek sources see Rustam 
Shukurov, “The Campaign of Shaykh Djunayd Safawī against Trebizond (1456 AD/860 H)”, Byzantine 
and Modern Greek Studies, v. 17, 1993, 127-140.  
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besieged Trabzon.609 But some unexpected news forced Junayd to return without a 
decisive result.  
After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 the Greek emperor of Trabzon 
accepted to be the tributary of Mehmed II.610 One may think that Junayd’s attack on his 
vassal state must have annoyed the sultan and made him decide to punish this unusual 
Shaykh. It stands to reason, however, to suggest that this was not the only reason for 
Mehmed II’s decision. Being aware of Junayd’s political intentions and religious 
divergence he must have realized the possible harmful outcomes of Junayd’s maneouver 
for his empire. He commissioned the governor of Sivas, Hizir Beg, to eliminate this 
newly emerging but potentially hazardous power. Upon receiving an order from 
Mehmed II to march on Junayd, Hizir Beg dispatched a powerful army. Junayd had no 
choice but to desert the region for the forth time in his adventure in Anatolia.611 
Although contemporary sources do not record the exact date, the development of events 
suggests that Junayd’s assault on Trabzon must have occurred in 1455, or 1456 at the 
latest.612   
 
 
 
                                                 
609 For further details see Shkurov, pp. 128-30; Hinz, pp. 20-21; Yinanç, p. 244. 
610 Yinanç, p. 244; Yazıcı, p. 124. Walther Hinz gives a slightly different account. To him Comminos 
became a tributary of Mehmed II after Hizir Beg’s campaign. See Hinz, p. 22. Anyhow, Mehmed II’s 
interference forced Junayd to raise the siege and leave the region. Accordingly the Pontus Empire of 
Trebizond came to an end in Mehmed II’s hands when he conquered the city in 1461. See Michel M. 
Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, p. 85.   
611 APZ, p. 250.  
612 According to Hinz, Junayd’s assault occurred in 1456. See Hinz, p. 20. A close study of Greek sources 
led Shukurov to the same conclusion. See Shukurov, p. 134. There are some other suggestions as well. 
But, taking into account the fact that Safavid sources say Junayd spent four years in Diyarbakir, and the 
fact that he was killed in 1460, 1456 reasonably seems to be right date.  
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4.2.4.5. The Aqqoyunlu Palace: Legitimizing Worldly Power 
The next episode of Junayd’s adventure would take place in the Palace of the Akkoyunlu 
ruler, Uzun Hasan. Following the unfruitful assault on Trabzon, Junayd realized that he 
could not find suitable conditions in Anatolia, though he had a number of disciples there. 
The last option left to him was to take refuge in the Palace of Uzun Hasan, who was in a 
state of war with Cihansah, the foremost enemy of Junayd. As Roemer notes, “he rightly 
saw that his opportunity lay in the rivalry between the Qaraqoyunlu and the 
Aqqoyunlu.”613 If we rely on Aşıkpaşazāde, however, he was not warmly welcomed. 
Just like other sunni rulers, Uzun Hasan was uneasy with Junayd’s peculiar mystical 
ideas and militant disciples. He arrested the Shaykh.614 Nonetheless, Safavid sources do 
not mention any skeptical behavior of Uzun Hasan regarding the Shaykh; rather he is 
said to have had him welcomed with pleasure.615 
However, the fruits of Junayd’s adventurous journey had already begun to 
appear. The intense propaganda performed by him and his disciples in central, southern, 
and northern Anatolia created a vast social ground for the new mystical synthesis of 
Junayd. This social ground did not only produce new adherents to the brotherhood but 
armed fighters as well. As will be referred to, the three fundamental characteristics of 
Junayd’s synthesis were mysticism, shi’ite tendency, and politico-militarism. Only the 
first component was the continuation of the traditional Safavid way. But even this 
                                                 
613 Hans R. Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, The Cambridge History of Iran, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993, p. 
201.  
614 APZ, p. 250.   
615 Khunji, a fervent opponent of Junayd and Haydar, for example does not mention such an arrest at all. 
To him, the latter received Junayd generously for he used to pay attention to hermits and dervishes, 
“hoping to catch from his shirt the aura of sanctity of his ancestors.” Also see TA, p. 63. In this issue 
Safavids accounts are parallel to Khunji. See HS, p. 561; HT, p. 153; Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, pp. 394-5; AA, 
p. 30. Also consider John Woods, The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire, Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 1999, p. 83; Sarwar, p. 23; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 22.  
 213 
component experienced an essential metamorphose under the influence of the two later 
added elements. Junayd’s period also marked the shift of the order’s center of gravity 
from traditional dervish groups, who were recruited from different social roots and 
geographical regions and educated according to the high sufi tradition stemming from 
Safiyuddin, to Turkoman tribal sufis, who were chiefly illiterate, culturally uncultivated, 
mostly still bearing old Turkish beliefs, and masters in fighting. It was nothing other 
than this new stem of the order that constituted the Qizilbashs of Haydar and Ismail.  
It is safe to argue that Junayd was not as weak as he had been in Konya or 
Aleppo when came to Uzun Hasan’s palace. Rather, he relied on a considerable number 
of armed disciples, which is reported as twenty thousand by Aşıkpaşazāde.616 Being 
aware of his disciples’ mastery in fight, Junayd proposed co-operation against 
Cihanshan. Uzun Hasan must have realized the efficacy of Junayd’s power that he not 
only freed Junayd but also married his sister Hatice Begum617 to Junayd as well.618 
Hasan Beg’s aim in establishing a warm relationship with Shaykh Junayd, however, was 
not only to benefit from the military capability of his disciples but also to take the 
advantage of the Shaykh’s authority and influence on the people in consolidating and 
perpetuating his own sovereignty.619 
This marriage became another milestone in the history of the Safavid dynasty, 
for being the intersection point of the two dynastic lines one holding spiritual power, 
while the other holding the temporal one. This marriage was an excellent opportunity for 
                                                 
616 APZ, p. 250. 
617 From the marriage of Junayd and Hatice Begum was born Haydar, the successor of Junayd and the 
father of Ismail.  
618 “...Uzun Hasan’a gitti. Uzun Hasan Cüneyd’i dutdı. Cüneyd eyidür: ‘Beni niçin dutarsın? Cihanşah 
gibi bir düşmanın var. Benim silahlı yiğirmi bin sofuya gücüm yeter. Ben de sana yardımcı olayın!’ dedi. 
Uzun Hasan dahi yemin edüb Uzun Hasan’ın kız karındaşın aldı...” See APZ, p. 250. Also see HS, p. 561; 
HT, p. 153; Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395; AA, p. 30.  
619 Compare, Youssef-Jamālī, p. 34. 
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Junayd to legitimize his already embarked on political project.620 From then on the 
Safavid dynasty would not be the master of only the spiritual world but the material 
world as well. A contemporary author marks the importance and echo of this marriage 
that “Junayd’s marriage became known even in the farthest corners of Rūm and Syria 
and, in view of this honor, the Khalifas of the earlier shaykhs wanted to wait on him.”621 
Gaining the favor of Uzun Hasan, Junayd continued his propaganda dispatching 
khalifas to nearby countries while staying in Diyarbakir, but in quite comfortable 
conditions for this time.622 He must have considerably broadened the hinterland of the 
‘new sufi message’ of Safavids during the Diyarbakir days under the protection of Uzun 
Hasan. On the other hand, his armed disciples, who were proliferating day by day, 
engaged in successful battles with the Akkoyunlu troops, naturally by the order of their 
Shaykh. Haniwaldanus Anonym says numerous people and considerable wealth from 
Ottoman territories flowed to Uzun Hasan’s country for the sake of Junayd.623 After 
spending 3 or 4 years in this manner Junayd decided that it was time to return home.624 
He left Diyarbakir for Ardabil with his prominent disciples in 1459.625 Aşıkpaşazāde 
                                                 
620 Compare Savory, Iran under Safavids, p. 17. 
621 TA, p. 64.  
622 See Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 23-4. 
623 ANMH, p. 36. According to ANMH especially the military support of Junayd’s disciples was so 
important for Uzun Hasan that upon Mehmed II’s decision he also got angry. ANMH deems this anger as 
one of the reasons that lead to war between Mehmed II and Uzun Hasan.  ANMH insistently underscores 
the warm relation between Uzun Hasan and Safavid Shaykhs – first Junet then his son Haydar. Hasan-ı 
Rumlu says in Diyarbakir, 12.000 devoted and sincere sufis trod the right path under the auspice of 
Shaykh Junayd. See Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395. 
624 Hasan-ı Rumlu says he lived there for four years. See Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395. According to ‘Ālam-
ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl, he stayed there for three years. See Youssef-Jamālī, p. 23. HS and HT say after living 
there for a while, having grown homesick, he set out for Ardabil. See HS, p. 561; HT, 153. See Also 
Savory, Iran under Safavids, p. 17. According to Savory he stayed in Diyarbakir for three years.  
625 According to Khunji, Junayd’s deportation from Diyarbakir was because of his worldly desires. His 
account reads, “Junayd was not exempt from temerity and showed signs of vehement folly. Every moment 
some evil fancy took hold of him; for example his mind was perpetually haunted by the dream of 
conquering Sharvān. Consequently, after the new honor bestowed on him [establishing kinship with the 
royal family of Aqqoyunlu], he decided to return to Ardabil.” See TA, p. 64. Also consider Yinanç, p. 
244; Yazıcı, p. 124. 
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records that his disciples were so crowded that they could not find enough place in 
Ardabil.626  
 
4.2.4.6. Ardabil Again: Completing the Circle 
Junayd’s arrival excited Ca’fer and his supporters in the Tekke. Using his warm 
relations with Cihanshah of Karakoyunlu, Ca’fer managed to force Junayd to desert the 
city once more.627 On the other hand Cihanshah became uneasy by the arrival of Junayd, 
for, having established kinship with Uzun Hasan, his principal enemy, he posed further 
danger.628 However, Junayd was no more alone, but had a recognizable military power 
as well as a great number of sufi adherents. Yet his power was still not enough to oppose 
the coalition of Ca’fer and Cihanshah. Thus Junayd decided to leave Ardabil.  
He dispatched orders for his adherents to congregate near Ardabil. In a short 
while ten thousand armed men assembled.629 Junayd promulgated holy-war (gazā) on 
Georgia in the same year.630 He passed through Shirvan which was ruled by Halil-Allah. 
Furthermore the territory that Junayd was about to invade was the tributary of Halil-
Allah. Thus he strongly opposed Junayd’s movements and warned Junayd not to invade 
his tributaries.631 According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, Shirvanshah Halil first pursued a warm 
                                                 
626 APZ, p. 251.  
627 HT, p. 153; Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395; Hinz, p. 34; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 24. HS again does not mention 
Shaykh Ca’fer blaming only Cihanshah for forcing Junayd to desert the city. See HS, p. 561. AA repeats 
the same account. See AA, p. 30. 
628 HT, p. 153. 
629 “Couriers were sent in all directions to gather disciples, and in a short while ten thousand fighting men 
had joined Sultan Junayd’s train, determined to battle the enemies of sainthood.” See HS, p. 561; AA, p. 
30. See also HT, p. 154; Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395; Hinz, p. 34; Yinanç, p. 244. The latters gives the 
number of armed disciples twelve thousand.  
630 Inskender Beg Munshi again sincerely indicates Junayd’s worldly concerns in this decision: “… Then, 
in a bid of temporal power, he encouraged his men with promises of booty and the rewards of holy war, 
and ten thousand Sufi gāzīs marched toward Sirvān with the intension of attacking the Circassians.” See 
AA, p. 30.   
631 HS, p. 561; APZ, p. 251; TA, p. 64; HT, p. 154.  
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manner against Shaykh Junayd, but his attitude changed with the intervention of Shaykh 
Ca’fer. To him, Ca’fer wrote a letter to Shirvanshah stating, “A group among the 
disciples of the family of sanctity (hānedan-ı velāyet) recognized Shaykh Junayd as 
murshid and followed him. Nonetheless, he was a liar in this matter. His succession to 
the saintly post and his spiritual guidance is truly false. The best thing to do is to repel 
him.”632 
Yet Junayd was not to change his plan; he spoiled Georgia and returned with 
immense booty. Halil-Allah dispatched an ambassador to express his displeasure. He, 
moreover, demanded Junayd to leave his country. Junayd again did not take these 
demands seriously. He not only decided to spend the winter in Shirvan but also killed 
the ambassador.633 As a last solution Halil-Allah decided to eliminate Junayd by force. 
Two armies confronted on May 3, 1460 near Tabarsaran.634 Junayd on the battlefield and 
his disciples dispersed.635 According to Aşıkpaşazāde his son and successor Haydar 
from Hatice Begum was due in a month.636 Although Junayd’s elder son Hoca Mehmed 
survived, the disciples adhered to Haydar, a new-born baby in a cradle, as their Shaykh, 
possibly because of Junayd’s last demand just before his death.637 
                                                 
632 Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395. Also see Sarwar, p. 24. 
633 APZ, p. 251; Hinz, p. 35. 
634 Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395; Yinanç, p. 244. Yazıcı gives the date as March 4, 1460. HS specifies the 
place where the battle occurred, namely Tabarsaran. See HS, p. 561. Also see AA, p. 30. Ghulām Sarwar 
determines the number of Junayd’s followers in this battle ten thousand, and the number of Shirvan 
soldiers thirty thousand. See Sarwar, p. 24. See also Savory, Iran Under the Safavids, p. 17. 
635 HS, p. 561 ; TA, p. 65; Ahsenü’t-tevārih,IX, p. 395. 
636 APZ, p. 251.  Haydar was born in Amid one month later than the death of his father. See Hinz, pp. 35-
36.   
637 AA, p. 31. APZ reads, “Cüneyd öldüğinden bir ay sonra bir oğlı doğdı. Adını Haydar kodılar 
beşikdeyiken. Şeyh Cüneydün müridleri, beşikde yatur iken ana tābi oldılar. Cüneydün bir oğlı dahi var 
idi. Büyük Hoca Mehmed derler idi. Ona tābi olmadılar. Küçüğüne tābi oldılar.” See APZ, p. 251. Also 
consider Yinanç, p. 245. Junayd’s elder son Hoca Mehmed was not born into the his marriage with Hatice 
Begum. As Sümer remarks, it is not difficult to recognize Junayd’s intention in this succession. By this 
way, Safavid Shaykhs would both secure the support of Aqquyunlu and claim dynastic legitimacy for the 
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Junayd left his son two very important legacies, which would fundamentally 
change the flow of not only Safavid history but also of the history of Anatolia and Iran 
as well. One was the transformed esoteric doctrine of the Order, which was no more 
fitted into the quietist traditional Islamic Sufism but was heavily influenced by ghulat 
shi’ite ideas, and was grafted with intense political aspiration. Another legacy of Shaykh 
Junayd to his son was the large-scale devoted and militant Turkoman disciples recruited 
among Anatolian and Syrian nomadic tribes.  
As delineated in the previous chapter, the early signs of incompetence between 
the economic, political, cultural, and religious habits of these nomadic Turkomans and 
that of the newly arising ‘Ottoman realm’ had already appeared before Junayd’s arrival 
in Anatolia. Junayd’s energetic activities and his khalifas’ enthusiastic propaganda 
among these nomads succeeded in adding most of them to ‘the Safavid cause’. As a 
matter of fact, Junayd successfully sowed the seeds of ‘the Safavid Movement’ in the 
fertile socio-cultural and religious ground of Turkoman nomads. The first outcomes of 
these seeds would immediately sprout during the time of his son, Haydar. In this aspect, 
one may regard Haydar as a gardener who raised the newly emerged saplings. However, 
Haydar’s live would not be long enough to see the fruits. It would rather be his son 
Ismail who gathered the fruits of seeds sown into soil by Shaykh Junayd. It is not a 
coincidence that the army, which would open for Ismail the gates of the sovereignty of 
whole Iran and Azarbaijan, was exclusively composed of Turkoman tribes stemming 
from the regions visited by Shaykh Junayd half a century earlier.638  
                                                                                                                                                
temporal power. See Sümer, p. 11. HS and HT mistakenly say that Haydar was the older son of Sultan 
Junayd. See HS, p. 561, HT, p. 155.  
638 To give a very brief summary, among foremost tribes of Safavid military aristocracy were the Rumlu 
and Ustaclu tribes. The former was most probably composed of the nomads of the Province of Rum. (An 
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4.3.  SHAYKH HAYDAR (1460-1488): THE ZEAL OF ‘GAZĀ’ 
Haydar was yet to be born when his father was killed by Shirvanshah Halil.639 His 
leadership marked the intensification of political desire and military activities. As a 
modern scholar remarks, under Sultan Haydar the Safavid Movement’s “drive to achieve 
temporal power accelerated”.640 But the fulfillment of this achievement would have to 
wait his son and successor Ismail. The contemporary Safavid historian Khwandamir 
writes, “He always encouraged those who were engaged in holy war, …, he raised the 
banner of battle with the infidels.”641 Indeed, in the hands of Junayd and Haydar gazā 
turned into the most influential instrument in transforming the contemplative sufi Order 
of Safavids into the Safavid State, the process which lasted half a century. During the 
transformation period, the benefit of gazā for Ardabil was two-fold. First and foremost, 
these expeditions on infidels further attracted Turkoman tribal elements, mostly living 
                                                                                                                                                
interesting account in APZ hints that Junayd had recruited a considerable number of disciples in the 
Province of Rum. APZ states that when Haydar was four or five years old, a man very much resembling 
Shaykh Junayd appeared in Tokat. Junayd’s disciples said “he is our Shaykh Junayd” and adhered to him. 
The number of these disciples must have been recognizable that Sultan Mehmed II ordered the arrest this 
man and had him brought to his presence. Then he asked his tutor (hoca) Hayreddin, who was the ex-tutor 
of Junayd, whether or not this man was Junayd. When Hayreddin’s testimony revealed the truth he was 
released. See APZ, p. 251.) According to Sümer, the members of this tribe were from Sivas, Koyulhisar, 
Karahisar, Tokat, and Amasya. See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 43. Ustaclu tribe was derived 
from members of a great nomadic group called Ulu Yörük, which inhabited more or less the same region. 
One should remember that this region was Shaykh Junayd’s first station in Anatolia, where he wished to 
establish a tekke. The second important location in Junayd’s trajectory was Konya and Taş-eli region. 
From these regions joined the tribes of Karaman, Turgutlu, and Varsak. One may also add the Tekelu tribe 
that was recruited during Junayd’s propaganda in this region as well. Junayd’s next station was Aleppo. 
We see among the ranks of the Safavid army Şamlu, which was one of the pillars, the Dulkadir, and 
Arapgirlu all from neighboring regions to Aleppo. We should note here that the connection with all these 
tribes was reinforced during Junayd’s stay in Diyarbakir as well. But before coming to Diyarbakir Junayd 
stayed for three years in Canik, which was inhabited by Çepni tribe. As will be delineated, following 
Ismail’s advent, Çepnis also filled the ranks of the young shah’s army. This subject will be evaluated in 
detail in the following chapter. 
639 Haydar was born one moth after the death of his father. APZ, p. 251. 
640 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 18. 
641 HS, p. 561. 
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within the Ottoman borders.642 Secondly, the raiding infidels provided somewhat of a 
legitimate ground for the political desires of the shaykhs, while accumulating further 
military power in their hands.   
Like his father, Shaykh Haydar also does not occupy much space in later Safavid 
chronicles, starting by HS. Especially the extremist beliefs of his adherents regarding the 
shaykh himself are completely ignored by Safavid chroniclers. This is not, however, 
something astonishing. We know that all the Safavid historians,643 except Khwandamir, 
wrote their histories during or after the reign of Shah Tahmasb, when the ‘orthodox’ 
Twelver Shi’ism, which vehemently denies extremist assertions of ghulat shi’a,  had 
already been established in the official sphere of the Safavid state.644 Khwandamir, for 
instance, was born into an old-rooted bureaucrat family of Persia and grew up in a 
highly educated milieu, which was alien and antagonist towards rough and simple 
beliefs of illiterate-nomadic Turkomans. It is evident in these chronicles that they aim to 
                                                 
642 As already delineated, the intensification of the spirit of gazā within the order was chiefly caused by the 
influence of large-scale Turkoman disciples on Ardabil.  
643 For a through description of Safavid sources see Sarwar, pp. 3-16; Youssef-Jamāli, pp. XV-XLV; 
Masashi Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 
1987, pp. 10-28.  
644 The venture of Safavid ideology from extremism to the orthodox shi’ism arguably began as early as 
1508, when Shah Ismail dismissed Husayn Beg Lala, one of ‘the Seven Sufis of Lahijan’ and of the 
foremost representatives of late ‘Safavid Movement’, from the post of wakīl and in his place appointed a 
Persian, Amīr Najm al-Dīn Mas’ūd Gīlānī. (See Jean Aubin, ‘Revolution chiite et conservatisme. Les 
soufis de Lahejan, 1500-1514 (Etudes Safavides II), Moyen Orient &Océan Indien 1, 1984, pp. 9-15; 
Roger M. Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Isma’īl I (907-30/1501-
24)”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, London, 1960, p. 94.) But on the 
ideological plane the main transformation took place under Shah Tahmasb, when prominent Arab 
theologians of Twelver Shi’ism from Jabal ‘Āmil or somewhere else were imported to the Safavid capital. 
On the role of Amili Scholars in transforming the officially approved religious perception of the Safavids 
see Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of Amili Scholars to Safavid Iran”, Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; “An Episode in the ‘Amili Migration to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. 
‘Abd al-samad al-‘Amili’s Travel Account”, Iranian Studies, v. 39, no. 4, December 2006, 481-508; Said 
Amir Arjomand, “Shi’ism as the State Religion under the Safavids”, in his The Shadow of God and the 
Hidden Imam, Chicago, London: University of Chocago Press, 1984, 105-212; Albert Hourani, “From 
Jabal ‘Āmil to Persia”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 49, 1986, 133-40; Andrew 
Newman, “The Myth of Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ‘Ali al-Karakī and 
Safawid Shiism”, Die Welt des Islams, 33, 1993, 66-112.  
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tune down the devoted extremism that prevailed during the shaykhdom of Junayd and 
Haydar – and, ironically, that provided the necessary excitement, energy, and 
enthusiasm necessary for the advent of Ismail, thus for the foundation of the Safavid 
state. Thus the ignorant attitude of Safavid historians regarding Shaykh Junayd and 
Shaykh Haydar is quite understandable. This being the case, they could not totally 
overshadow the political aspirations and military deeds of Shaykh Haydar. Rather, these 
points are more toned by Safavid historians compared to the depiction of Shaykh 
Junayd.   
On the other hand, Ottoman sources are not as informative as they are on Junayd. 
The most informative account on Shaykh Haydar is interestingly, like in the case of 
Shaykh Junayd, provided by a vehement Qizilbash enemy and a sunni zealot, namely 
Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī, the court historian of Aqqoyunlu Yakub Beg. One should, 
however, be very careful regarding his account for his bias is excessively exuberant and 
his effort to depict Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and their followers as ‘heretics’ is 
evident. For this purpose he does not hesitate to exaggerate or even to fabricate 
especially when dealing with the faith of Ardabil sufis, their devotedness and reverence 
to their shaykhs. Yet we learn the most original and interesting details of deeds of 
Haydar from Khunjī.  
 
4.3.1. Haydar in Ardabil 
Haydar grew up in the Aqqoyunlu Palace under the protection and auspice of his uncle 
Uzun Hasan. It was on the return of his victorious campaign on Azarbaijan, which ended 
with the death of his foremost enemy, Cihanshah, and with the annexation of whole 
Azarbaijan, that Uzun Hasan permitted Haydar, who was a child of only seven years, to 
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stay in Ardabil.645 During Haydar’s stay in Ardabil, his father’s khalifas came from 
every direction, presenting their service and unquestioned obedience. Haydar was 
tutored by Shaykh Ca’fer in Ardabil. It seems, however, that as Haydar grew up, the old 
contest between his father and Shaykh Ca’fer re-emerged. According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, 
Ca’fer claimed lots from the gifts brought by the disciples of Haydar in Rum, Syria, and 
other places. Haydar, on the other hand, not only deprived Shaykh Ca’fer of these gifts 
but also forbade him to enter the tekke.646 
Learning from Khunjī, the interest of the Young Shaykh in Ardabil was not 
really focused on the mystical teachings and exercise but rather on the art of war and 
war-craft. In the succinct expression of Khunjī:  
Instead of exercising his pen on the sacred book, he exercised his sword on the 
dogs of Ardabil. In his house the only chilla-gīr was his bow, and in his close 
circle (khalvat) only the sword was engaged in exploits. In the morning, which 
venerable (ābdār) shaykhs greet with heart-burning and rending of breasts, he 
was sowing shields and sharpening arrows. In the evening, when ascetics thrust 
their heads forward (in religious zeal, murāqabat), he, with the sword of 
oppression, struck off people’s heads.647   
   
Haydar spent most of his time preparing swords and lances on one hand, and in 
physical exercises to improve his skill in the art of fighting on the other. As admitted 
even by Khunjī, his most energetic enemy among all historians, he was a brave man by 
nature and acquired great proficiency in archery and the use of the sword.648 Iskender 
Beg Munshī states that Haydar engaged in reviving the customary practice of his 
predecessors, “but his secret aspiration was to have dominion over territories and 
                                                 
645 TA, p. 66. 
646 Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of 
Ahsenü’t-tevārih), p. 579. 
647 TA, pp. 66-7.  
648 TA, p. 68. 
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subjects.”649 Khunjī goes further saying “Shaykh Haydar of Ardabil who wished to rear 
a sultanate by mere masquerade (talbīs), changing the (dervish) cap of poverty (kulāh-i 
gedā’ī) for a crown of worldly domination.”650 His desire for the temporal power was 
further reinforced by his marriage to Halime Begum Aga, known as Alemshah Begum, 
the daughter of Uzun Hasan, who wished to consolidate his connection with the Safavid 
family.651 The mother of Alemshah Begum was the famous Pontus princes Despina 
Khatun, the daughter of the Emperor of Trebizond Calo Johannes.652 This marriage 
obviously augmented the prestige and influence of Shaykh Haydar, whose affairs further 
prospered and whose court was further frequented by both the high and the low.653 John 
Woods calls attention to the point that later Safavid sources deliberately reflect the 
notion that the dynasty founded by Ismail “represented the union of the spiritual 
authority of the Safavid order and the worldly domination of the Aqquyunlu Empire”.654 
Qazi Ahmad Qumī says, for example, “The eminence [Haydar] was the eldest son of 
                                                 
649 AA, p. 31. HS tacitly refers to Sultan Haydar’s political ambition by saying “Sultan Haydar … was 
worthy of both a prayer carpet and throne.” See HS, p. 561.   
650 TA, p. 61. 
651 HS records that this marriage happened after Uzun Hasan’s victory over Cihanshah of Qaraqoyunlu in 
1467. See HS, p. 561. HT follows the same account. See HT, p. 156. Bālī Efendi’s letter includes a purely 
slander history about the marriage of Haidar, into which Ismail was born. Yet this story is valuable for it 
reflects the fanaticism of Ottoman ulemā against father and grandfather of Shah Ismail, as well as against 
Ismail himself. According to the legend, the Persian king (Uzun Hasan) took Haidar in Tebriz after his 
father was killed on the battlefield. Haidar was a refractory youth wandering drunk in the streets, 
strumming his tanburā etc. The contemporary sultan had a widowed sister who did not enjoy a good name 
or good manners. “By chance they fell in love, the pregnancy of the young woman became evident, and 
everybody knew that the cause of it was this young man. This was an undeserved shame for all the chiefs 
and nobles. Consequently they married (Haidar to the widow) and sent him with his wife to Ardabil. A 
short time passed and Ismā’īl was born prematurely. The heretics said it was a miracle, while the doctors 
of law gave a decision proclaiming Ismā’īl a bastard. This term acquired notoriety in those parts, and 
when Ismā’īl grew up this was reported to him. When he asked: ‘Who put out this talk about me?’, the 
answer was: ‘The doctors of the sunnis said so’. Ismā’īl said: ‘Should I find an occasion, I shall murder 
the doctors with various kinds of torture and then uproot the sunnis and, instead, I will spread the shi’a 
creed. I will avenge my father and grandfather’. See Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, pp. 
446-7. 
652 See, for example, BRW, p. 47.  
653 HS, p. 561; AA, p. 31. 
654 John Woods, The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire, revised and expanded edition, Salt Lake 
City: The University of Utah Press, 1999, p. 168.  
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Sultan Junayd and the nephew of Hasan Padishah; and because of these two 
considerations, the luster of sovereignty and guidance radiated from his august brow.”655  
 
4.3.2. Becoming “Qizilbash” 
The name “qizilbash” for the adherents of the Safavid Order, together with the 
introduction of the twelve-gored hat, undoubtedly goes back to the time of Haydar. The 
word is not used in Kitāb-ı Diyārbakriyya656 of Abū Bakr-i Tihrānī, completed in 1470, 
but used by Khunjī, who finished his work towards 1490. The invention of the red head-
gear by Shaykh Haydar is explained by later Safavid sources through a genuine dream of 
Shaykh Haydar.657 According to the tradition, in a dream Haydar was visited by some 
messengers from the unseen world and was instructed to make his disciples wear a hat 
with twelve-gores, indicating the twelve immaculate Imams, as a sign of distinction for 
his followers.658 On awakening, he joyfully changed his ordinary Turkoman hat, which 
                                                 
655 Recited in Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 168.  
656 This is the history of Uzun Hasan written by Tihrānī, a court historian of his. The Persian text is 
published by Necati Lugal and Faruk Sümer, while a Turkish translation of the work was published by 
Mürsel Öztürk. See Abū Bakr-i Tihrānī, Kitāb-i Diyārbakriyya, I-II, yay., Necati Lugal-Faruk Sümer, 
Ankara: TTK, 1993; Ebu Bekr-i Tihranī, Kitab-ı Diyarbekriyye, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.  
657 This tradition in the Safavid historiography is equally reflected in the famous Histoire generale de la 
religion des Turcs of Michel Baudier. According to his account, “Scheidar” for the first time put red head-
gears on heads of his disciples so that by then they were called “Tête-rouge” or kızılbaş. Baudier also 
states that all their “Emirs” and “Sheriphes” were bearing this Turban. See Michel Baudier, Histoire 
generale de la religion des Turcs, Paris, 1625, p. 216. It should be noted that Baudier mistakenly tends to 
regard Shaykh Haydar and his followers as ordinary “Etnazery” shi’ism or Twelver sch’ism. As already 
put by several prominent modern scholars and evaluated throughout the present study one can hardly 
deem the religious stand of Haydar and of the early Qizilbas as ordinary Twelver schi’ism. Yet, a careful 
reading of his account may reveal some peculiar features of the Qizilbash systhesis. On explaining 
contrasts and similarities between the religion of “Perses” (of Safavids or Qizilbash) and Turks (sunni 
Islam), Baudier says regarding the belief in the Supreme Creator and the prophecy of Muhammad both 
parties are the same. However, immediately after Muhammad the “Sofians” add ‘Ali: “leurs inoucations 
portent fouuent ces mots, Halla, Mehemet, Haly, Dieu, Mahomet, Haly [‘Ali].” See Baudier, p. 217. When 
remembered that this expression “Allah-Muhammed-Ali” is known as the ‘motto’ of the Qizilbash way of 
Islam, still today, Baudier’s account becomes rather meaningful.  
658 AA, p.31. The Anonymous History of Shah Ismail, better known as Ross Anonymous, gives a slightly 
different account. “One night the Prince of the throne of Guidance and Sanctity, that is to say the 
Commander of the Faithful (‘Alī), upon whom be the prayers of God, appeared in a vision to Sultan 
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was the customary gear in those days659, and wore the twelve-gored hat, which has been 
called since then the Haydarî hat or Tāc-i Haydarī660; likewise his adherents followed 
him.661 Thus, the followers of the Safavid family distinguished themselves from other 
people and acquired the sobriquet ‘Qizilbash’ or ‘redheads’.662    
 
4.3.3. ‘Gazā’ on Circassia 
Iskender Beg clearly figures the temporal authority which accumulated at the hands of 
Haydar. To him the number of disciples that frequented Haydar’s court increased day by 
day. As a result “Haydar possessed both temporal and spiritual authority. Inwardly, 
following the example of shaykhs and men of God, he walked the path of spiritual 
guidance and defense of the faith; outwardly, he was a leader sitting on a throne in the 
manner of princes.”663 Iskender Beg also underscores the role of amity and concord 
                                                                                                                                                
Haidar, and said to him: ‘Oh my son, the time is now at hand when my children from among your 
descendants shall arise and sweep Infidelity from off the face of the Earth. It now behoves you to fashion a 
cap for the Sūfīs and your disciples, and you must take it of scarlet cloth.’ Sa saying His Sanctity cut out 
of a cap with twelve points [tarlak].” See Denison E. Ross, “The early years of Shah Ismail, founder of the 
Safavi Dynasty”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXVIII, 1896 (from now on Ross), pp. 254-5.  
659 AA, p. 31. Also consider Youssef-Jamālī, p. 38.  
660 “The basis of this crown was a hat made of red wool which was joined to a long red conical shape 
made of wool. This part of the hat, as a sign of the Twelve Imāms, had twelve folds or slits. Round the red 
hat, there was a white or green Turban made of wool or silk.” Youssef-Jamālī, p. 43.  
661 Savory argues that Haydar invented twelve-gored hat, by the instruction of Imam Ali in a dream, 
shortly before his last expedition in 1488. But he refuses the second part of the story, which is related to 
Uzun Hasan’s adoption of Haydarī Tac, since the latter died ten years earlier, in 1478. See Savory, Iran 
under the Safavids, p. 20. 
662 AA, p. 31; Ross, p. 255. According to Ross Anonymous, on hearing Haydar’s doings Hasan Padishah 
requested Haydar to send him one of those caps. Thereupon Sultan Haydar sent him a cap. Hasan 
Padishah was pleased when saw it, kissed it and placed it on his own head. The he bade each of his 
children to do likewise. But his son Yakub refused to do so. “In this manner” says the Anonymous History, 
“he bind round his soul the girdle of hostility towards Sultan Haidar.” See Ross, p. 255. This tradition 
must be a fabrication of later Safavid historians. Likewise, HS does not mention such a dream simply 
saying “On his head Sultan Haydar used to wear a scarlet red hat with twelve folds, and everyone who 
joined him as a disciple was given similar headgear. He always encouraged those who were engaged in 
holy war, and with those holy warriors and Sufis, who because of the red hat became known as qizilbash 
(“redhead”), which name is still applied today to the adherents to the family…” See HS, p. 561.  
663 AA, p. 31. Qādī Ahmad Qumī too makes clear reference to Shaykh Haydar’s combined authority of 
temporal (saltanat) and spiritual (hidāyat). See HT, p. 155. See also HS, p. 561, where the Shaykh’s 
enthusiasm for engaging in holy war against infidels and the strength of his army briefly indicated.  
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showed by Uzun Hasan, who never permitted any action that might disturb his nephew 
and son-in-law, in proliferation of Haydar’s affairs.664  
When Hasan Beg died in 1478, however, his successors did not maintain warm 
relations with the Shaykh. After a short reign of Halil, his brother Yakub usurped the 
throne and managed to stay there for about ten years. Yakup Beg was skeptical on 
Haydar and his murids.665 Besides, Haydar, “whose thoughts were dominated by the 
desire for the rewards of raids against the infidels”666, decided on an incursion in the 
direction of Dagistan and Circassia, whose inhabitants were infidels.667 After taking 
counsel with his sufi emirs he dispatched couriers to mobilize his disciples for the Holy 
War, or gazā. Accordingly, warriors for the faith, who were fully armed and equipped, 
assembled company upon company around his tent.668 According to Rumlu Hasan, this 
                                                 
664 AA, p. 31. 
665 Ross Anonymous relates his hostility as follows: “On account of the hatred he had formerly cherished 
in his heart for Sultan Haidar he warned his subjects saying: ‘Woe unto that man who places on his head 
the cap of Sultan Haidar.’ He thus became an enemy to the children of Shaykh Safī; and he moreover 
issued a decree that the disciples of Shaykh Safī should no longer wear their caps. In thus changing his 
former righteous actions for evil and impious deeds, and in opposing this holy race, Sultan Ya’kūb 
brought about the ruin of the dynasty of the White Sheep...” See Ross, p. 255. It is interesting to note here 
that Anonymous author sees the reason of the decline of Aqqoyunlu Dynasty in their changed attitude 
towards the sons of Shaykh Safī. That sort of interpretation, however, traces back to the beginning of 
Safavid historiography. Shah Ismail’s historian Khwandamir writes, “… as long as the expansionist 
Aqqoyunlu padishahs maintained their devotion to the guiding Safavid house, their fortunes were ever on 
the increase, but when they exchanged their devotion and faith for treachery and enmity, in a short while 
the firm foundation of their rule crumbled and they were scattered to the winds.” See HS, p. 562.   
666 AA, p. 31. 
667 According to AA, Haydar did not consider the conduct of Sultan Yakub while deciding to invade 
Circassia. Nevertheless, earlier sources have clear indications that he first requested the permission of 
Sultan Yakub and obtained the necessary permission as well as a degree addressed to Shirvanshah  
ordering him to provide a safe passage through Shirvan. TA says, for example, Haydar first wrote a letter 
to Yakub Beg demanding his permission for a gazā on Circassia. Although Sultan Yakub was aware of the 
fact that the Shaykh was using gazā simply as a pretext and that his main intention was to find a way of 
capturing temporal power, he gave the permission for it was inconvenient for “the king Defender of the 
Faith [Sultan Yakub] to impede” holy war. See TA, pp. 68-9.  
668 AA, p. 32. Also consider HS, p. 562. Rumlu Hasan gives the numbers of sufi fighters as 6.000. See 
Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 579. TA, however, gives the number 10.000 and depicts them as “brutal men” 
who “from every side streamed into Ardabil and engaged in theft and murder.” TA, p. 67. Faruk Sümer 
says that Haydar’s disciples were mainly poor people of Anatolia. See Faruk Sümer, Safevî Devletinin 
Kuruluşu, p. 13. KPZ depicts the adherents of his son Ismail in the Teke regions in the same manner. See 
KPZ8b, p. 43.  
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was in 1484 and the Shaykh’s real intention was to invade Shirvan but for some reasons 
he firstly directed his followers towards Circassia.669 On the way home, after pillaging 
Circassia, however, he wanted to materialize his intention regarding Shirvan. But some 
influential sufis in his court persuaded him not to do so, arguing sufis needed to have 
some rest and obtain further weaponry.670 So, having created great havoc in Circassia, 
Shaykh Haydar triumphantly returned to Ardabil with a great deal of captives and spoils, 
ordering to spend all the booty in order to reinforce the arsenal of the Tekke.671  
Sultan Haydar waged three more campaigns on Circassia and Dagistan. His first 
two expeditions in 1484 or 1486, and 1487 were not opposed by Shirvanshah 
Farruhyasar, who was the ruler of Shirvan, the territory through which Haydar had to 
cross in order to reach Circassia and Dagistan. After his first successful expedition in 
1484 or 1486, Haydar organized a second incursion, which again ended victoriously 
with many slaves and booty.672 These military successes waxed Shaykh Haydar’s 
prestige while astonishing the rulers of outlying regions.673 Consequently Sultan Yakup 
called him to Tabriz in order to oblige the Shaykh to take an oath to leave the habits of 
kings and to forbid him intercourse with his supporters, especially his khalifas in 
                                                 
669 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 579. Hinz, who used the ninth volume of Ahsenu’t-tevārih, probably relying 
on Venetian sources, writes the date of Haydar’s first expedition as 1483. See Hinz, p. 68. In TA this date 
is vaguely suggested as 1486. (Indeed Khunji does not specify the date of the first incursion. Nonetheless, 
after stating that Shaykh Haydar launched two expeditions in successive years, he records that he returned 
from his second raid in 1487.) See TA, pp. 69-70. Also consider Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 18. 
670 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 580. Also see Hinz, p. 69. 
671 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 580. 
672 TA says Shaykh Haydar returned with 6.000 captives from his second raid. TA, p. 70. Learning from 
Josaphat Barbaro, to whom Vicenzo spoke of it, that Haydar’s expedition reached far beyond Daghestan, 
may be to Darial and Kabarda. See “Haydar’s Second Expedition Against the ‘Cherkes’”, in TA, p. 119. 
Also see Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 582; Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian Travels 
in Persia, edited and translated by Charles Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 44; “The Travels of a 
Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia, edited and translated by Charles Grey, 
London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 185. 
673 TA, p. 69. Here there is a very interesting note in TA: Khunji says, “The Lord of Rum, despite all his 
army and dominions, was afraid of the turbulence (bī-bākī) of the subjects of the Shaykh.” TA, p. 69.  
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Rum.674 At the court of Sultan Yakup, Shaykh Haydar was warned for his king-like 
doings and encouraged to deals with the proficiency of his ancestors.675   
In the next year, however, Haydar managed to get permission from Sultan Yakub 
for a new expedition on Circassia.676 Then his followers began to summon in Ardabil in 
large numbers. In a short while, Haydar’s troops reached the size of an army. When they 
reached the river Araxes, “it was an innumerable levy (hashar) of people of Tālish clad 
in blue, of the ill-starred lot of Siyāh-kūh and of benighted Shāmlu.”677 Shaykh Haydar’s 
last expedition with his fully mobilized zealots would, however, be on Shirvan rather 
than Circassia.678 Haydar first sacked the town Shamakhī, the capital of Shirvan.  
Farruhyasar b. Sultan Halil, realizing that his forces could not resist against the Safavid 
army, he dared not meet the gāzis of Haydar but fled to the lofty fortress of Gülistan, 
from where he dispatched couriers to Sultan Yakub, who was his son-in-law, informing 
him that, although Haydar was ostensibly intent on conducting raids against ‘infidels’, 
his main concern was to conquer Shirvan.679 As Iskender Beg says,  
At the moment,” said Farruhyasar, “Haydar owns no territory, but he has 
mobilized a warlike army, and his ambitions will not be contained within the 
confines of the district of Ardabil. Nor, if he succeeds in acquiring a kingdom 
such as mine, will he for long be satisfied with such a meager empire. On the 
contrary, it will merely whet his appetite.680 
 
                                                 
674 TA, p. 70. Also consider Woods, The Aqqoyunlu, p. 142. 
675 See Hinz, p. 70. 
676 According to TA, Haydar sent his mother, the sister of Uzun Hasan, to obtain this permission. TA, p. 
71. Also consider Hinz, p. 71. 
677 TA, p. 71.  
678 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 583 ; John E. Woods, “Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on 
Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian Foreign Relations”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. 38, no. 1, 
1979, pp. 5-6. 
679 TA, pp. 71-74. 
680 AA, p. 32. For a slightly different version of this message see HS, p. 563; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 583; 
HT, pp. 157-8.  
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Then Farruhyasar finished his letter by demanding military help against 
qizilbashes: “It would be better for you to send an army to assist me to keep the 
Qizilbash from entering this region and diminish their might in battle.”681 Farruhyasar’s 
message excited Sultan Yakub, who had already adopted a hostile attitude toward 
Haydar. Indeed, the anxiety of Farrukhyasar had already been shared by Sultan Yakub, 
for he considered the military strength of Haydar as a great danger for his kingdom. 
Caterino Zeno, a contemporary observer, writes Yakub’s unease as follows: “The king, 
greatly disturbed by these designs of Secheaidare, entertained no slight suspicion of him, 
as it seemed to him that he, by the esteem in which he was held, and his numerous 
followers whom he enriched from the great booty he made, might make himself so great 
in time as to be able to overthrow the kingdom, and establish a dynasty of his own firm 
and safe against any attack.”682 Consequently he dispatched an army of four thousand 
fighters under the command of Suleyman Bijan-ogli to the assistance of the 
Shirvanshah.683 
Haydar and his gāzis entered Shirvan from the north and reached Darband, which 
was a lofty fortress of legendary strength684, by way of Sakki. The inhabitants of 
                                                 
681 HS, p. 563. Also see TA, p. 74; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 583. 
682 Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, p. 45. 
683 TA, p. 77; HS, p. 563; AA, p. 32; HT, p. 158; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, pp. 583-4; Sarwar, p. 25. Muhyî-i 
Gülşenî reports the event as if Haydar revolted against Sultan Yakub. He says, when Shaykh Ibrahim 
Gülşenî was in Sultaniye with Qadi ‘Isā, one of the leading ulemā and statesmen in the court of Yakub, a 
message of Sultan Yakub reached, informing that Shaykh Haydar rose up (hurūc itdi) and ordering them 
to join his court. In the following paragraphs Shaykh Haydar’s action was clearly depicted as a dissention 
(fitne vü fesād). See Muhyî-i Gülşenî, Manâkib-i Đbrâhîm-i Gülşenî, yay., Tahsin Yazıcı, Ankara: TTK, 
1982, pp. 194-5. The revolt of Shaykh Haydar is also reported by an Ottoman envoy to the Aqqoyunlu 
capital Tabriz. See TSA, Document 5943. The facsimile of this document is first published by Tansel in 
TNSB, p. 98, doc. 12. After Tansel, John Woods also published a short article analyzing this document, as 
well as a facsimile of the document. See Woods, “Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on 
Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian Foreign Relations”.  
684 A contemporary Italian merchant describes this fortress as follows: “Darband is a large city, and, 
according to their chronicles and traditions, was built bay Alexander the Great; it is one mile wide and 
three in length, having on one side the Caspian Sea, and on the other a high mountain; no one can pass 
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Darband685 blocked the passage in order to prevent the passage of Haydar’s troops.686 
Then Haydar dispatched troops to capture the city.687 Although he had nearly 
successfully completed the objective the news brought by Qara Pīrī Qājār688, who was in 
charge of the rearguard, made Haydar withdraw from the siege. Qara Pīrī Qājār 
informed Haydar that Shirvanshah, reinforced with Turkoman troops sent by Yakub, had 
crossed the river seeking to battle the Safavid army.689 
The two armies met near Tabarsaran.690 Sultan Haydar appointed Qara Pīrī Qājār 
to command the right wing, Husayn Beg Shāmlu to the left, while himself stayed at the 
centre.691 Sultan Haydar personally engaged in combat. According to a story recited in 
Safavid sources, Haydar recognized Suleyman Bijan-ogli on the battle field and 
managed to unhorse him with his spear. Nonetheless, as Suleyman lay on the ground 
Haydar spared his life. Becoming bewildered, Haydar’s companions inquired the reason 
of their master’s behavior. Then Haydar said, “Suleyman’s allotted life-span had not yet 
come to an end, whereas my life is in decline. I shall be killed in this battle. One can not 
                                                                                                                                                
except through the gates of the city, as on the east is the sea, and on the west a mountain, so steep that not 
even a cat could climb it. … and any one wishing to go into Circassia, must pass through the city which 
borders on that country, and the greater part of whose inhabitants speak Circassian, or rather Turkish.” See 
“The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia, pp. 185-6. For description 
of the strength of Darband fortress also see Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, pp. 44-5. 
685 This place is recorded in HS as Temür Qali and in HT as “Demir Qapi”, meaning ‘iron castle’. See HS, 
pp. 563-4; HT, p. 158. Caterino Zeno says the people of the country call it (the passage of Darband) 
“Amircapi [Demirkapı]” since the place is so strong and secure against attack. See Caterino Zeno, 
“Travels in Persia”, p. 45.   
686 This must be because of that during his former expedition in the previous year Haydar pillaged this city 
and the surrounding area. See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian Travels in 
Persia, p. 185; Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, p. 45.   
687 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 584; Hinz, p. 74. 
688 Qara Pīrī Qājār was one of ‘the Seven Sufis of Lahijan’, or ehl-i ihtisas, the chosen companions, 
guards, and tutors of Ismail during his stay in Lahijan.  
689 HS, p. 564; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 584; AA, pp. 32-3. HT does not mention Qara Pīrī Qājār. See HT, 
p. 159. Also consider Hinz, pp. 74-5; Sarwar, p. 25; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 143.   
690 TA, pp. 78-9; HS, p. 564; HT, p. 159; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 584; AA, p. 32.  
691 Sarwar, p. 25. AA records that Husayn Beg Lala attended this battle but does not specify that he 
commanded the left wing of the sufi army. See AA, p. 33. 
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avoid one’s fate.”692 Likewise, in a short while Haydar was wounded mortally and tasted 
the death on July 9, 1488 at Tabarsaran, only a short distance from the place where his 
father had been killed.693 His death disheartened the gāzis, who soon after gave up the 
struggle.694 Haydar was buried in Tabarsaran by his devoted followers.695 Twenty-two 
years later his corpse was exhumed by Shah Ismail while he was on his second 
campaign on Shirvan and reinterred at Ardabil, alongside the tombs of his ancestors.696 
Hasan Rumlu gives further detail. Haydar’s head was cut off and sent to Sultan Yakub, 
who was in Tabriz. The latter ordered to hang the head of Haydar on the public square 
(meydan) of Tabriz. One person stole the head and hid it until the advent of Ismail. 
When he captured Tabriz this man brought the head of Shaykh Haydar to the Shah and 
obtained great benevolence.697 
                                                 
692 AA, p. 32. The same story is recited in HS, p. 564; HT, p. 160; Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 584. An 
essentially different account of the clash between the two is recorded in TA. In this case Suleyman Beg 
and Shaykh Haydar met during the battle. Certain Hasan Aga Ustaclu of the Shamlu amirs (sic) 
recognized Suleyman Beg and pointed him out to the Shaykh, while Suleyman was looking for the 
Shaykh. Suleyman rushed forward alone, “undeterred by the sufis who were so numerous that their lances 
appeared as a forest. He clashed with the Shaykh and with his lance unhorsed him, after which, prancing 
on his charger and dealing blows right and left, he regained his centre…” TA, p. 80. 
693 See AA, p. 33; HT, p. 161; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 18. The sources unanimously underline 
that sufis fought bravely in this battle. The Italian merchant says, for example, ‘everyone swore to fight 
valiantly” and they fought “like lions.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian 
Travels in Persia, p. 186. Also consider Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts 
of the King Ussun Cassano”, A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia, edited and translated by Charles 
Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 101. Even the fervent sunni opponents of qizilbashes, Fazlullah 
b. Ruzbihan Khunji appreciates the bravery and valor of sufis and Haydar in this battle. He writes, “… but 
the sufis, too, fought bravely. Haydar performed prodigies of valour.” See TA, p. 79. 
694 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX,  p. 584. TA admirably narrates how sufis fought courageously like fidā’īs 
(‘vowed to death’) even after the death of their Shaykhs. TA, p. 81.  
695 HS, p. 564; AA, p. 33.  
696 AA, p. 33. 
697 See Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 585. See Also Hinz, pp. 76-7; Sarwar, p. 26. Caterino Zeno gives the last 
part of this story differently. To him, the Aqqoyunlu Sultan commanded the head to be carried on a lance 
all through Tabriz and thrown to be eaten by dogs. See Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, p. 46. Reciting 
the same account the unknown Italian merchant adds an interesting note, “For this reason, the Suffaveans 
hate dogs, and kill all they came across.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian 
Travels in Persia, p. 186.  
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After the death of Shaykh Haydar, the sufis of Ardabil chose Sultan Ali 
Padishah698, the elder son of Haydar, as their shaykh, although he was very young.699 
The khalifas and disciples of his forefathers frequented his court with gifts. However, 
Sultan Ali’s activities in Ardabil were soon interrupted by the order of Sultan Yakub, 
who esteemed the sons of Shaykh Haydar as a potential threat for his sovereignty. By his 
decree, Sultan Ali, his two brothers Ibrahim and Ismail700, and his mother Alamshah 
Bagum were moved to Istahr and imprisoned there in March 1489.701 They remained 
under custody for nearly four and a half years till the beginning of August 1493.702 
 
4.3.4. The Disciples of Haydar: ‘the People of Rum’ 
Khunjī constantly underscores the disciples of Haydar as mainly coming from Anatolia 
(Rūm)703. After narrating the first two triumphant campaigns of Shaykh Haydar and 
stating that all the kings of nearby countries were astonished by his success, Khunjī 
adds, for example, “The Lord of Rum, despite all his army and dominions, was afraid of 
the turbulence (bī-bākī) of the subjects of the Shaykh.”704 On another occasion, when 
Sultan Yakup called the Shaykh to ban his king-like activities the first thing that his 
counselors advised was to obstruct his (Haydar) connection with his supporters, but 
                                                 
698 Sultan Ali is generally called as ‘Padishah’ by Safavid sources. As Savory underlines, his adoption of 
this title must be a clear evidence of the fact that the claim of Safavid family for the temporal power 
became even clearer. See Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 20. 
699 Haydar left three sons begotten by his marriage with Alamshah Bagum: Sultan Ali, Mirza Ibrahim, and 
Mirza Ismail.  See, for example, HT, p. 156. Two contemporary Italians, Caterino Zeno and an unknown 
merchant state this marriage also produced three girls. But they do not give the names of these girls. See 
Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, p. 43; “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, A Narrative of Italian 
Travels in Persia, p. 185. 
700 Ismail was born on Tuesday, July 17, 1487, to Alamshah Bagum. HS, p. 562.  
701 Ahsenu’t-tevārih, IX, p. 585; Sarwar, p. 26.  
702 Sarwar, p. 26. 
703 Others being coming from Tālish and Siyāh-kuh (Qaraja-dagh). See TA, p. 67. He also mentions 
Shamlus elsewhere. See TA, p. 71. 
704 TA, p. 69. 
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“especially [with] his lieutenants (khalifā) in Rum.”705 Yet in the third case, when the 
fighting flared up between the sufis and combined army of Shirvanshah and Suleyman 
Beg, Sultan Yakub’s commander, in Tabarsaran, it was again the sufis of Rum origin 
who constituted the backbone of Haydar’s army and fought through the most 
enthusiastic ways.706  
Safavid sources also make frequent references to the Rum-origined adherents of 
Shaykh Haydar. Hasan Rumlu states, for example, that when Haydar settled in Ardabil 
in 1467, the disciples of Ardabil from Rum, alongside Syria and some other regions, 
frequented Haydar’s, court offering their various gifts.707 On the other hand, a 
contemporary Venetian observer Josaphat Barbaro, who learned from another 
contemporary Venetian Vicenzo, describes Haydar’s followers in the same fashion, i.e. 
principally originating from Anatolia. While narrating Haydar’s second expedition on 
Circassia, Barbaro reports,  
… out of the territory of the Soldanes (Ottoman Sultan) there came forth a 
certain sect of Muhammadans (animated with) extreme fervour in their religion 
and shouting: “Death to the Christians!”708 And the farther they proceeded 
towards Persia, the more their numbers increased. These ribalds took the road 
towards the sea of Bachu (Baku) and came to Samachi (Shamāckhī), Derbenth 
(Darband), and Tumen (dominions of the Avars?), being in extremely great 
numbers, though partly without arms.709 
 
Another Venetian merchant says, “ There are numbers of them [Shaykh Haydar’s 
disciples] in different parts of Persia, as in Natolia [Anatolia] and Caramania [Karaman], 
                                                 
705 TA, p. 70. 
706 Khunji says, when the intensity of the fight peaked “The sufi unbelievers of Rūmī origin had planned 
that nobody should be bent but their bows, and nobody should fall on the ground but their arrows.” TA, p. 
80.  
707 See Ahsenu’t-tevārih, 9th volume, p. 579. Ottoman archival and narrative sources frequently mention 
such presents of Safavid adherents in Anatolia calling them ‘nezir’.   
708 An unknown Italian merchant also stresses Haydar’s hatred against Christians, saying “… he also bore 
an intense hatred to the Christians.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 5. This is, of 
course, a misperception of the Shaykh’s fervor in gazā by Christian authors.  
709 See “Haydar’s Second Expedition Against the ‘Cherkes’”, in TA, p. 118.  
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all of whom bore great respect to this Secaidar [Haydar], who was a native of this city of 
Ardouil [Ardabil], where he had converted many to the Suffavean doctrine.”710 Suffices 
it to recite these quotations to show how a strong-hold Shaykh Haydar had in 
Anatolia.711  
On the other hand, Khunjī, as a zealous sunni scholar, depicts Shaykh Haydar’s 
followers in quite a pejorative manner. Once he calls them “idolators of Rum”712, on 
another occasion “the fools of Rūm who are a crowd of error and a host of devilish 
imagination”713, yet elsewhere he blames them with their excessive obedience and 
devotedness, as well as with their brutality.714 When compared to the writings of the 
Ottoman ulemā, which will be studied in the following chapters, Khunjī’s attitude and 
depictions shows familial resemblances. In both approaches there appears to be the 
traditional demeaning attitude of learned sedentary towards illiterate and ignoramus 
nomads. Khunjī’s description of Shaykh Haydar’s disciples gathered for his first 
incursion on Circassia strongly resembles the classical view of Islamic ulemā on 
ignoramus nomads. He writes, they were “outwardly sufis and murids, but inwardly 
rebellious demons (dīv-i marīd), … youths, robust (jald) and warlike, sword-slashers in 
clever fighting.”715 Thus a careful study of Khunjī’s description of Haydar’s disciples 
leaves little doubt that they were not cultured inhabitants of cities and towns but 
                                                 
710 “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, pp. 184-5. 
711 Mélikoff notes Safavid shaykhs successfully gained the akhis, gazis, and abdals of Rum. See Irène 
Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam 
populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 33.  
712 TA, p. 61. 
713 TA, p. 65. 
714 TA, pp. 66-7. Suffices it to quote Khunji’s account on how sufis continued fighting after Haydar’s 
death on the battlefield to show the devotedness of Shaykh Haydar’s followers. TA reads, “On seeing that 
the shaykh was dead the sufis at once like fidā’īs (‘vowed to death’) returned to the battle and fought 
courageously. No mortal had ever seen an army fight thus after the loss of the commander.” TA, p. 81.  
715 TA, p. 68. 
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‘savage-like’ pastoral nomads and villagers to some extent, who were ignorant and 
unsophisticated in faith and brutal and war-like in the manner of life; the social class 
which is referred to by Ottoman writers as ‘Etrāk-i bī-idrāk’, or ‘the Turks without the 
ability of comprehension’.  
More important for the purpose of this study is that Khunjī sees a concrete 
correlation between the deviation of Ardabil shaykhs from the right path and their links 
with the “men of Rūm”, which was reinforced under Haydar and his father.716 A close 
scrutiny of Khunjī’s account shows that to him the intensification of the connection with 
the people of Rūm, whom he depicts as foolish, inclined to excessive beliefs,went hand 
in hand with the deviation of the doctrinal trajectory of the Order. One feels legitimate to 
propose that according to Khunjī it was these people of Rūm who were responsible for 
leading the shahykhs of Ardabil off of the true path of their ancestors.717 Indeed, his 
introduction to the chapter dealing with the rise of Haydar and his ‘revolt’ clearly 
reveals Khunjī’s approach. While narrating Sultan Yakub’s deeds in 1488 he mentions 
Haydar’s third incursion on Circassia and his fight with Shirvanshah starting with the 
phrase “Among the events of this year was the revolt of ….Shaykh Haydar … with the 
support of the idolators (literally ‘calf-worshippers’) of Rūm.”718 After clarifying the 
point that Haydar went astray by pursuing the temporal power, he makes a flash back in 
order to better explain how he went astray. He writes, “As some of his actions were 
connected with the plans of his father, we must relate the story of the shaykhs of Ardabil 
and explain their links to the men of Rum and the increase of this connection under 
                                                 
716 TA, p. 61. 
717 He says, for example, “The excessive obedience of the people of Rum moved the shaykh-zāda 
[Haydar] to acquire bad habits and manners.” See TA, p. 66. 
718 TA, p. 61. 
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Haydar and his father.”719 So clear is thus that, to Khunjī, the transformation of the 
Safavid Order into the Safavid Movement very much depended on the ‘increase of the 
connection’ with Anatolian disciples.720  
 
4.3.5. The Qizilbash Beliefs 
The most controversial - and the most wide-circulated as well - account of Khunjī 
concerns the beliefs of Ardabil sufis who adhered to Junayd and Haydar. This is, in the 
meantime, almost the only historical account on the beliefs of early qizilbashes. 
Nevertheless the extreme points of their beliefs are evidently overvoiced by Khunjī for 
he was in an open attempt to position Haydar and his followers in heresy against the 
‘legitimate’ authority of his patron Sultan Yakub. Accordingly, his negative and 
pejorative attitude peaks while narrating the religiosity of the path of Junayd and 
Haydar. Yet he provides valuable information pertaining to the nature of the Qizilbash 
faith before the establishment of shi’ite orthodoxy.  
According to Khunjī, his adherents openly called Shaykh Junayd ‘God (ilāh)’ 
and his son ‘Son of God (ibn-Allāh)’. Even when they saw that Junayd’s corpse was 
covered with dust and blood, they did not denounce such a false faith but said: “He is the 
living One, there is no God but he.”721 Their folly and ignorance was such that, says 
Khunjī, if someone says that any part of his body became missing or he is dead he was 
himself to taste the death. Elsewhere he says his murids considered Shaykh Haydar “as 
their god (ma’būd) and, neglecting the duties of namāz and public prayers (‘ibādāt), 
                                                 
719 TA, p. 61. 
720 One should keep in mind the Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji was both a contemporary and close 
observer of events for he finished his history in 1490 in the Aqqoyunlu Palace.  
721 TA, p. 66. 
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looked upon the shaykh as their qibla and the being to whom prosternation722 was due 
(masjūd). The Shaykh propagated among them the creed of ibādat and the religious law 
of Bābak’s Khurramites.”723  
But the crucial point in his account is that his accusation is much more pointed 
towards the ‘foolish disciples’ than the shaykhs. “The fools of Rūm, who are a crowd of 
error and a host of devilish imagination,” says Khunjī, “struck the bell of the inane claim 
of Christians on the roof of the monastery of the world and, like that nation gone astray, 
exposed their (own) trinity (thālith-i thalātha) to exemplary punishment in the 
nethermost hell. They openly called Shaykh Junayd ‘God (ilāh) and his son ‘Son of God 
(ibn-Allāh)’.”724 Elsewhere he writes, when Uzun Hasan, after conquering Azarbaijan, 
let Haydar stay in Ardabil, the khalifas of his father, who came from every direction, 
foolishly announced ‘the glad tidings of his divinity (ulūhiyat)’; thus their725 excessive 
obedience caused Shaykh Haydar to acquire bad habits and manners.726   
As already warned, Khunjī’s account must be read carefully by toning down his 
exaggerations especially regarding his assertion that their followers assumed deity in and 
worshipped Junayd and Haydar. Recognizing his exaggerations, Roemer reckons this 
assertion of Khunjī not to be accepted at its face value.727 This assertion rather seems to 
be the view of a learned sunni scholar with the zeal of orthodox sunnism, who was also 
directly or indirectly commissioned to blame this group for being heretics728, on the 
                                                 
722 sic 
723 TA, p. 68. 
724 TA, pp. 65-6. 
725 Khunji says here “the obedience of the people of Rum” See TA, p. 66. 
726 TA, p. 66.  
727 Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 208. 
728 This point appears clearly when Khunji explains how and why Sultan Yakup dispatched his 4.000 
soldiers in order to fight with Shaykh Haydar. He attempts to secure the religious ground of Sultan 
Yakub’s decision arguing “In fact, according to the Sharī’at, the shaykh’s behaviour with regard to a 
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excessively emotional devotion of illiterate and ignoramus sufis to their shaykhs. This 
ignorant and passionate devotion of sufis and its influence on their faith is best reported 
by the Venetian ambassador Caterino Zeno, who visited the court of Uzun Hasan, saying 
“So great was his success, that at this time he was considered by all a Saint, and a man 
almost divine.”729 He also gives interesting details denoting Haydar’s affiliation with 
shi’ism: “Secheaidare was a Saint or Master or Prophet, as we should call him, who by 
preaching a new Dogma in the Mohametan creed that Ali was superior to Omar, 
obtained many disciples and people who favoured his doctrine.”730 
Likewise, other contemporary Italian observers, who were usually inclined to 
tune up the extremist and extraordinary practices, depict Haydar rather as a beloved 
shaykh than a divine being. The unknown merchant, for example, depicts Haydar as “a 
lord about the rank of a count, named Secaidar, of a religion or sect named Sophi, 
reverenced by his co-religionists as a saint, and obeyed as a chief. … Indeed, he was like 
the abbot of a nation of monks.”731 Similarly, another contemporary Italian observer 
writes that he was considered by his sufis a saint and followed him as their chief.732 
Vincentio D’Aalessandri, the Venetian ambassador at the court of Shah Tahmasb, 
follows the same line of narration depicing Shaykh Haydar as “a man of great goodness 
and learning, and considered by his people a saint”.733 
                                                                                                                                                
powerful ruler (hākim-i qādir) rendered it a duty to rebel his tyranny and oppression, for in his actions 
Shaykh Haydar was either a rebel (yāghī), or a highwayman and aggressor.” (TA, p. 74.) Blaming such 
rebellious groups for heresy has always become one of the powerful tools in the hands of sunni conformist 
ulema to facilitate their execution. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapters of this thesis the 
situation was essentially the same in writings of the Ottoman ulemā.  
729 Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 43.  
730 I.b.i.d., p. 43. 
731 “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, pp. 184-5.  
732 See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, p. 
100. 
733 Vincentio D’Alessandri, “Narrative of the Most Noble Vincentio D’Alessandri”, in NIT, p. 211. 
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Despites all his sunni biases, his efforts to shift them into heresy, and his 
despising attitude, however, the three points regarding the faith of ‘the early 
qizilbashes’734 become apparent in Khunjī’s account, as well as in Venetian reports. 
Firstly, their adherence and devotedness to Junayd and Haydar was far beyond the limits 
of the liaison between shaykh and murid in the traditional Islamic Sufism. So excessive 
their sense of devotion was, that the line between the spiritual mastership and being of 
the nature of deity became obscure. One should not disregard here the role of the 
cultural milieu of the new type of disciples. The illiterate mind is, indeed, devoid of the 
ability to draw clear-cut lines between ideas.735 Secondly, the followers of Shaykh 
                                                 
734 My intention by this term is the new type sufis of Ardabil emerged under Junayd and were identifiably 
shaped under Haydar.  
735 One might reasonably argue that one of the most revolutionary changes that writing brought the human 
mind is precision. ( For an analysis on how the use of tables and writing shifted human perception towards 
more precision see Goody, The Domestication of Savage Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990 (first published 1977), pp. 72-73.) Exteriorization, visualization, and storage of thought and 
knowledge give way to the dissection, organization, re-organization, analysis, and division into parts of 
the information. Classification exists in the oral mind as well, but is rare and ambiguous. Writing sharpens 
and clarifies the notion of classification in the human mind. (I.b.i.d., p. 105) It was simply by the help of 
the organizational capacity of the writing that human the brain reached the ability to put clear and certain 
lines between several parts of the knowledge corpus. Number of modern anthropological studies among 
illiterate folks, sometimes called ‘primitive society’, showed that the oral mind does not recognize such 
sort of clear separating lines between several segments of human discourse. Though an illiterate man can 
differentiate and identify knowledge pertaining to different things or beliefs, they are not completely 
separated from each other; there is not a net borderline between them. As Goody stated, “the absence of 
writing means that it is difficult to isolate a segment of human discourse.” (I.b.i.d., p. 13)  One can regard 
oral mind as a cloud, which floats with continuous variation. Though being not homogenous and varying 
intensity in different parts, it is not possible to draw a clear-cut borderline between distinct bulks of a 
cloud; to determine a definite line which one side belongs to one bulk and other side belongs to other. 
Rather one can talk about a transition region, whose borderline is still flue.  
Oral culture has a homeostatic economy, in which nothing is well-defined. Even the concept of definition 
is quite alien. The relationship between word, which is simply an evanescent vibration of particles in the 
air, and the meaning attached to it is a very dynamic and uneven one. It thereby changes, though one can 
speak of a certain perpetual core, according to situational context. Thus, even the meaning loaded to a 
word is not well-enshrined with a clear-cut boundary. It is rather like bulks in a cloud. The focus of 
meaning may easily move in the bulk pertaining to it, with regard to present conditions. What a word 
refers to is simply the bulk of meaning, which is obviously not clear. Thus, oral communication is heavily 
context-dependent. One can not attain the exact meaning of any word without participating to the whole 
context, which profoundly includes situational, emotional, historical, and cultural elements. 
Writing, on the other hand, made possible what is called ‘context-free communication’, which was 
principally the result of precision that came with literacy. First of all, letters shifted the container of 
meaning from variable and evanescent aural media to more stable and fixable visual one. Now, with 
writing, it is possible not only to put the word outside the mind and treat it as a thing, but also to allocate 
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Junayd and Haydar evidently attributed to their shaykhs the authority to enact cannons. 
In other words, they regarded decrees of their shaykhs rather more eminent than the 
well-defined orders of Islamic law. Again as in the first case, the role of illiteracy should 
be taken into account seriously when assessing this point. Lastly, early qizilbashes were 
quite ignorant on the officially ratified prayers of shari’at, neglecting duties of namaz, 
fasting in Ramazan etc.  
Khunjī provides enough hints in his explanations on that these deviations from 
the true path of Islam were not simply the personal innovations of Junayd and Haydar; 
rather these two shaykhs were caused to acquire ‘bad habits’ because of the excessive 
obedience of their disciples.736 Thus, the roots of this newly emerging form of faith in 
the Safavid world must be sought in the socio-cultural roots of the new type of disciples, 
who were nomadic Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Syria and who were described by a 
learned and fervent sunni scholar as “the fools of Rūm, who are a crowd of error and a 
host of devilish imagination”737.   
Perhaps the most interesting point in Khunjī’s account is that he does not anyhow 
mention the adoption of shi’ism738 by Haydar and his followers. As delineated before, 
Aşıkpaşazāde clearly states the fact that Shaykh Junayd propagated some shi’ite ideas in 
Anatolia. One would strongly expect that the same sort of shi’ism must have survived 
                                                                                                                                                
certain limits to its meaning. Because sound has no definite confines but visual image has. As Goody and 
Watt have verified, “writing establishes a different kind of relationship between the word and its referent, 
a relationship that is more general and more abstract, and less closely connected with the particularities of 
person, place and time than obtains in oral communications.” (See Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The 
Consequence of Literacy”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 5, no. 3, 1963, p. 321.)  
Thus, literate mind has an ability to distinguish different segments of thought or knowledge, which is 
simply lacking, or very weak, in the oral mind. 
736 I would like to note again the fact, which I think had a considerable part on the advent of events, that 
these two shaykhs, especially Haydar, were very young when they succeeded to the post; thus they were 
open to innovations, especially to those promising excitement, adventure, and outwardly outcomes.  
737 TA, p. 65. 
738 If we disregard his reference to Bābak’s Khurramites.  
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during the Haydar’s term as well. Since this form of creed did not much resemble the 
high shi’ism, however, Khunjī does not deem it attached to shi’ism but a separate 
heresy. So, regarding the religious orientation of Haydar’s disciples one would conclude 
that they can be regarded neither sunni nor Shi’ite in the appropriate meanings of the 
terms.739  
Indeed, the practical reasons do not permit us to suppose that Haydar adopted 
shi’ite theology. Haydar could not see his father even in the cradle and was brought up at 
the court of his uncle Uzun Hasan, in an intellectual and religious environment which 
did not show any bid of tendency towards shi’ite creeds, until the age of eight or nine. 
As Roemer states, during early years in Amid “he scarcely had any religious education 
at all, and certainly not a shi’ī one.”740 When he moved to Ardabil towards the 1470’s he 
certainly did not find a shi’ite atmosphere predominated under Shaykh Ca’fer. Thus one 
can not speak of a direct transmission of ideas between Junayd and Haydar.741 Then we 
should seek another media through which the message of order was transmitted between 
generations. This media was nothing other than the Turkoman intellectual and cultural 
aura that influentially surrounded the Safavid Order during Junayd’s journey in 
Anatolia. While transmitting the doctrinal and esoteric messages of the Order from one 
shaykh to another, who were devoid of direct contact, the media fundamentally 
influenced the nature of the message as well. It is because of that, as Roemer and Elke 
                                                 
739 Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les 
Safawides”, Revue des Études Islamiques, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 398. 
740 Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 208. 
741 Indeed, exactly the same situation was valid for Haydar’s immediate successors. Haydar could not 
transmit any esoteric or doctrinal message to his successor Sultan Ali for the latter was a child at the time 
of his father’s death. Haydar’s sons spent the next seven years in the custody of the Aqqoyunlu, when they 
arguably could not find a convenient atmosphere for religious education.  
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Eberhard suggest, it seems more appropriate to use the term ‘folk Islam’742 or ‘popular 
religion’743 for their religious orientation.744       
 
4.3.6. ‘Gazā’ as a Tool of Legitimization and Propaganda 
By reminding us of Wittek’s gazā thesis, Mazzaoui rightfully argues that the role of 
gazā in the foundation of the Safavid State is comparable to its role in the foundation of 
the Ottoman State under Osman and Orhan Begs.745 It is true that, in both cases gazā 
appeared as an immensely useful and influential ideological tool both in mobilizing the 
war-like Turkoman masses746 and in providing legitimate ground for their claims for 
sovereignty.747 However, Mazzaoui draws attention to three essential differences 
between the two cases. Firstly, the distance to the infidel territories was different. 
Ottomans were just at the frontier and could raid infidel territories without the 
permission of any Muslim rulers while Safavid had to first pass through the lands of 
Shirvanshah. Secondly, Safavid gazis, unlike the Ottomans, had no freedom of action for 
the regions they moved in were formally under other legitimate rulers. And lastly, the 
Ottoman begs and sultans had only temporal claims, i.e. they were only leaders of gazis 
on the battlefield. Safavid shaykhs, on the other hand, had the dual capacity combining 
                                                 
742 Roemer, p. 196. Roemer, however, does not differenciate the crucial change both in theological phrame 
and disciple stereotype of the Order which appeared under Junayd. Rather he deems the religiosity of the 
Order from the time of Shaykh Safī to Ismail’s seizure of power in the framework of ‘folk Islam’, without 
ever having consciously or overtly going over to the Shi’a. To him some seemingly shi’ite indications in 
several Safavid shaykhs, including Haydar, do not necessarily constitute clear signs of shi’ite faith for they 
had always had a stronger or weaker presence in folk Islam.  
743 Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen 
Handschriften, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970, p. 26.  
744 For a similar account also consider Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 31.  
745 Michel M. Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, Iqbāl Review, …., 79-90; 
Mazzaoui, p. 76. 
746 For these Turkomans, as Mazzaoui says, “ghazāh was always an attractive patime!” SeeMichel M. 
Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, p. 89.   
747 Compare Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 203-4. 
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temporal and spiritual authority; they were both commanders of gazis and their spiritual 
masters. In the Safavid experience, this dual capacity both augmented the doctrinal 
strength and concentrated too much power in the hands of the Safavid shaykhs.748    
Besides all the differences, however, one may safely argue that gazā was the 
chief instrument in the hands of Junayd and Haydar in forming the political and military 
ground for Ismail’s state, as well as being closely linked to the new doctrine of the order, 
ghulat shi’a, which was to be pruned gradually after the foundation of the state. 
Accordingly a contemporary Italian observer insistently underscores that numbers of 
volunteers joined Haydar’s ranks in hopes of plunder. He says Haydar’s campaigns in 
Circassia increased his power “by being joined by such multitudes of volunteers for the 
sake of booty, by which means he would soon have become a great lord.”749 It should be 
noted that when Ismail’s hurūc occurred in 1500, he found a ready group of efficient 
sufi-gāzis, who were already the seasoned fighters experienced in several campaigns of 
Ismail’s forefathers. It is thanks to their devotedness in faith and efficiency in fighting 
that Ismail managed to defeat the regional rulers one by one and seated himself on the 
throne of Persia in a short course of time. 
 
4.4.  CONCLUSION   
The fundamental change in both the esoteric doctrine and disciple landscape of the 
Safavid Order, which was initiated by Shaykh Junayd and flourished by Shaykh Haydar, 
                                                 
748 According to Mazzaoui, in the meantime, this dual capacity paradoxically weakened the efficiency of 
gaza activities for it, “tending to the religious needs of their followers, no doubt detracted from the 
efficient execution of the gaza itself. And so it may be argued that assuming divine powers in order to 
rally their followers behind them …, Junayd and Haydar may actually have been hindered rather than 
helped in the execution of their gāzī operations.” See Mazzaoui, p. 77.  
749 See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 185. Also see Roemer, “The Qizilbash 
Turcomans”, p. 32.  
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is perhaps best reflected in a relatively neutral account, namely the anonymous history 
of Haniwaldanus. While narrating Safavid affairs and Ismail’s movement, 
Haniwaldanus Anonym strikingly always traces back to Junayd’s time, but never 
mentions earlier shaykhs of the order. As indicated above, in a quite different manner to 
other Ottoman chronicles, Haniwaldanus Anonym never pursues a pejorative attitude 
neither on Junayd nor on Haydar. Rather he depicts them as highly revered saintly 
persons. Meanwhile, he does not neglect to indicate that these two Shaykhs established a 
‘new’ religious way. While narrating Ismail’s rise to the temporal power, for instance, 
Haniwaldanus Anonym stresses that Ismail’s principal mainstay was the numerous 
Anatolian disciples, who adhered to the religious regulations established by Junayd and 
Haydar.750 Ismail developed his movement on the fundamental principles that were 
established by his ancestors (Junayd and Haydar). He started to summon people on these 
religious bases. One sentence recited from Ismail’s mouth seems to be pregnant to 
further evidence. Ismail says to his man: ‘if you want to be rescued from misery you 
must obey me and my decisions!’751  
It is worth dwelling on three points here: firstly, the anonymous compiler 
obviously indicates something ‘new’: a religious (mystical) path initiated by Junayd and 
advanced by Haydar. Secondly, he narrates as if the history of Safavid order started with 
Junayd; he never mentions former Shaykhs. We know, however, that Junayd inherited a 
well-established spiritual order and a great number of disciples. So why does the 
anonymous source depict it as if the spiritual path was initiated and established by 
Junayd? Haniwaldanus Anonym’s account, indeed, has truth value. What is described as 
                                                 
750 “dedesi Şeyh Cüneyd ve babası Haydar tarafından öğretilen dinî kurallar”. See ANMH, p. 37. 
751 ANMH, p. 38. 
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‘new’ here is nothing other than the new synthesis generated under the leadership of 
Junayd. Thus, what starts with Shaykh Junayd was the ‘Safavid Movement’ but not the 
‘Safavid Order’. Lastly, during and shortly before Ismail’s advent, his disciples are 
depicted in Haniwaldanus Anonym as being miserable,, and he depicts Ismail to be their 
savior:  
[Ismail rose up, gathered approximately ten thousand men, and launched a campaign] 
Böylece o, Đlāhi kanuna ve dine sıkı sıkıya riāyet eden babası ve dedesinin geleneği ile 
hareket ederek yola koyuldu. Fakat ayrıca o, kazanılmış itibarını emniyete almak ve 
adamlarını itaatte tutmak için yeni bir mezhep ve inanç şekli buldu ve bunları kendi 
düşünce, niyet ve arzularına uydurdu. Bundan sonra kendisine hükümdar ünvanını takdı 
ve ‘şah’ dedirtti.752   
 
Ismail therefore, followed the path established by his grand-father and father. But 
after promulgating himself as temporal ruler (hükümdār), it (this mystical path) was not 
enoug to preserve his prestige and to keep his men obedient. Thus, in Haniwaldanus 
Anonym’s words, Ismail found a new sect and form of faith (mezhep ve inanç şekli). 
Here the anonymous author puts a clear line differentiation between the spiritual path, 
which was innovated by Junayd and developed under Haydar, and the sect promulgated 
by Ismail after becoming king. It is obvious that it vaguely indicates the religious basis 
of the transformation of ‘the Safavid Movement’ into ‘the Safavid State’. During this 
transformation, such innovations or metamorphosis of religious affairs was, indeed, 
inevitable, for the state needs literally based and well-organized religious system. The 
next chapter analyzes how Ismail inherited the ‘Safavid Movement’ and turned it into 
one of the most long-lasting states of Iran, principally focusing on the role of Anatolian 
disciples in this process and on the metamorphosis experienced in the political, social, 
and religious affairs of them.   
                                                 
752 ANMH, p. 38. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE RISE OF SHAH ISMAIL  
AND 
ITS ECHO IN THE OTTOMAN ANATOLIA  
 
 
 
Allah Allah din gāziler gāziler din Şah menem 
Karşu gelün secde kılun gāziler din Şah menem 
Uçmakğda tûti kuşuyam ağır leşker er başıyam 
Men sûfiler yoldaşıyam gāziler din Şah menem 
Ne yirde ekersen biterem hande çağırsan yiterem 
Sûfiler elin dutaram gāziler din Şah menem 
Mansur ile dârda idim Halil ile nârda idim 
Musa ile Tur’da idim gāziler din Şah menem 
İsradan beri gelün nevruz idin Şah’a yetün 
Hey gāziler secde kılun gāziler din Şah menem 
Kırmızı taclu boz atlu ağır leşker heybetlü 
Yusuf peygamber sıfatlu gāziler din Şah menem 
Hatâyî’yem al atluyam, sözü şekerden tatluyam 
Murtaza Ali zatluyam gāziler din Şah menem753 
 
 
                                                 
753 Tourkhan Gandjei, Il Canzoniere di Sāh Ismā’īl Hata’ī, Napoli, 1959, p. 22.  
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5.1. THE CONCEALMENT PERIOD: PREPERATION FOR THE GREAT 
HURŪJ  
 
5.1.1. Sultan Ali Padishah 
 “Nothing could appear more unpromising than the position of the three little sons of 
Shaykh Haydar, who were of the moment entirely at the mercy of their father’s 
enemies.”754, writes Edward Browne while explaining the  imprisonment of three 
Safavid princes and their mother in the fortress of Istahr by Sultan Yakub’s men, just 
after the death of Shaykh Haydar. According to Khwandāmir, Sultan Yakub did so 
because of his fear that they would take revenge for Sultan Haydar’s death. He says, 
after Haydar’s death sufis gathered in Ardabil and chose Sultan Ali, the eldest son of 
Haydar, as his father’s successor. “In a short while many sufis assembled to offer their 
congratulations on Sultan Ali’s succession, and some of them were intent upon taking 
revenge for Sultan Haydar’s death.”755 Then Sultan Yakub dispatched one of his great 
commanders to capture the Safavid princes and their mother Halime Begum. When he 
saw Sultan Yakub’s soldiers in Ardabil Sultan Ali, seeing no alternative to submitting, 
                                                 
754 BRW, p. 49.  
755 HS, p. 564. Also consider HT, p. 162; AA, p. 35.  
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did not attempt to oppose.756 A year later, they were moved to Shiraz and imprisoned in 
the castle of Istahr, where they would stay for four and a half years.757 
A fierce civil war among Akkoyunlu princes followed the death of Sultan Yakub 
in 1490-1.758 After a short while Rüstem Beg, the son of Hasan Beg’s son Maqsud Beg 
and the nephew of Halime Begum, who was also among the supporters of Masih Mirza, 
rose up with the assistance of powerful āmir Ayba Sultan. Rüstem Beg managed to 
capture Tabriz without serious opposition assuming the rule of Azerbaijan.759 On the 
other hand, Baysungur Mirza went to Shirvan760 with his prominent begs. Shirvanshah, 
the father-in-law of Baysungur Mirza, gave his allegiance to his son-in-law in his 
struggle against Rüstem Beg providing troops for his army and encouraging him to 
liberate his hereditary kingdom.761  
When Rüstem Beg heard this, he decided to gain the allegiance of the Safavid 
family and to use sufi-fighters against Baysungur Mirza and Shirvanshah, who had 
killed Sultan Haydar a couple of years ago. Therefore, when the news of Baysungur 
Mirza’s move was received, Rüstem Beg ordered the release of the Safavid princes and 
                                                 
756 HS, p. 565.  
757 HS, p. 565; HT, p. 162; AA, p. 35. AA specifies that Yakub ‘s aim in incarnating the Safavid princes 
was to cut off the access of their followers, thus of their support, to the princes. 
758 Following the death of Sultan Yakub and that of his brother Yusuf Mirza in the winter of 896 (1490-
91), strife broke out between Yakub’s son Mirza Baysungur, who was supported by Sufi-Khalil and 
Musullu and Purnak amirs, and Hasan (Uzun) Beg’s son Masih Mirza, who was favored by Bayindir 
chieftains. (HS, p. 565; AA, p. 36. For the civil war between Akkoyunlu princes see Woods, The 
Aqquyunlu, pp. 163.) The battle in Qarabag ended with the victory of Sultan Baysungur, whose forces 
managed to kill Masih Mirza and most of the Bayindir amirs. Sultan Baysungur arrived in Tabriz in great 
splendor and ascended the throne, with Sufi-Halil, one of the most powerful generals, assuming all 
administrative and fiscal matters. (HS, p. 565; AA, p. 36.) But the civil war between Akkoyunlu princes 
did not end. First Mahmud Beg, the son of Amir Hasan Beg’s son Ughurlu Muhammad, who had chosen 
to give his allegiance to Masih Mirza and escaped from the fray on the day his uncle Masih Mirza was 
killed, proclaimed himself king in Iraq and brought most of the two Iraqs under his control. Soon after, 
however, he was defeated and killed by Sultan Baysungur. (HS, p. 565.)  
759 HT, p. 164. 
760 The ruler of Shirvan was the father-in-law of Baysungur Mirza. See HS, p. 566.  
761 HS, p. 566; HT, p. 164; AA, p. 37. 
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in 1493, he welcomed them in Tabriz with robes of honor and much money.762 Sultan 
Ali agreed upon giving his allegiance to Rüstem Beg and fighting against Baysungur 
Mirza. Taking revenge for the death of his father was the foremost, if not only, motive 
that led Sultan Ali to ally with the Akkoyunlu family.763 No sooner had this news spread 
than a great number of disciples and devotees of the Safavid house, who were mainly 
derived from Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Northern Syria, gathered under Sultan 
Ali’s banner.764 
Sultan Ali engaged in two wars against Baysungur Mirza. In the first case, 
accompanied by Akkoyunlu forces under the command of Ayba Sultan, the most 
powerful general of Rüstem Beg, he marched on Baysungur Mirza. Upon reaching the 
Kur River they found that Baysungur’s army camped on the other bank. After an arrow 
fight, however, two armies departed without further engagement, Baysungur turned back 
to Shirvan while Sultan Ali and Ayba Sultan headed back to Tabriz.765 Sultan Ali’s 
second fight with Baysungur Mirza occurred after a short while, following the rebellion 
of the governor of Isfahan against Rüstem Beg in the name of Baysungur Mirza in 
August 1493.766 At the same time Baysungur Mirza left Shirvan. Targeting from two 
sides, Rüstem Beg dispatched Ayba Sultan and Sultan Ali on Baysungur Mirza and Qara 
                                                 
762 HS, p. 566; AA, p. 37; HT, pp. 164-5; Ross Anonymous, p. 257; Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ahsenü’t-tevārih, çev. 
Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of Ahsenü’t-tevārih), p. 600; BRW, pp. 49-50; Sarwar, 
p. 27. Ross Anonymous says that alarmed with the support of Shirvanshah offered to Baysungur Mirza, 
Rüstem beg held council with the Bayindirī chiefs as to how he might resist him. They advised him to 
release the Safavid Princes, underscoring the fact that the adherents of Safavid House were numerous in 
all parts of the world and when they heard of the release of the princes they would soon assemble in great 
numbers. See Ross Anonymous, p. 256. According to Woods, this event occurred in 1492. See Woods, The 
Aqquyunlu, p. 156.  
763 Compare AA, p. 37. 
764 Hasan-ı Rumlu says 12.000 devotees gathered round Sultan Ali Padishah in a short while. See 
Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 600. Also see HS, p. 566; HT, p. 165; AA, p. 37; Sarwar, p. 27;  
765 HS, p. 566; Ross Anonymous, pp. 257-8; Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, pp. 600-601; AA, p. 38. 
766 AA, p. 38; Sarwar, p. 27. Hasan-ı Rumlu mistakenly recites this occasion among events of the year 897 
/ 1491-2. See Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 601.  
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Piri Tovachi767, one of the leading qizilbash āmirs, on the governor of Isfahan 
concomitantly.768 Sultan Ali’s appointment in the battlefield clearly reveals the 
overwhelming tribal characteristics of his disciples. He appointed Husayn Beg Shamlu 
and Rüstem Beg Karamanlu on the right, and Dada Beg Talish – known as Abdāl ‘Ali 
Beg769 - and Khadim Beg Khalifa on the left wing of his army, while he himself 
commanded the centre. Ayba Sultan commanded the skirmishing party.770 Both armies – 
of Sultan Ali and Qara Pīrī - returned victorious, killing Baysungur and Kusa Haji 
Bayindir the governor of Isfahan.771 
When Rüstem Beg relieved his enemies with the help of Safavid princes he gave 
them permission to depart to Ardabil to resume the religious guidance of sufis, which 
had been interrupted for nearly five years. Within a short span of time a huge number of 
devotees gathered in Ardabil to pay homage and serve the House.772 Nevertheless, the 
intrinsic political and military capacity of Safavid tribal disciples always created unease 
in courts of temporal rulers. Likewise, hearing that vast throng of sufis gathered in 
Ardabil, Rüstem Beg’s anxiety arose and he ordered the bringing of the three brothers to 
his camp, where they were kept under close watch preventing them any contact and 
communication with their adherents.773  
Khwandāmir says, “While the three were in Rüstem Beg’s camp, every day a 
large group of their disciples came to offer silver and gold coins, valuable goods and 
                                                 
767 Ross Anonymous gives the name as Qara Pīrī Qajar. See Ross Anonymous, p. 258. 
768 Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 601. 
769 Ross Anonymous, pp. 258-9. 
770 See Ross Anonymous, pp. 258-9; Sarwar, p. 27. 
771 HS, p. 566; AA, p. 38; Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, pp. 601-2; Ross Anonymous, pp. 259-60. As understood 
from Ross Anonymous’s account qizilbash amirs like Husayn Beg Lala and Dada Beg Talish played 
leading role in this victory.  
772 HS, p. 567; Ross Anonymous, p. 260; Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 602; HT, p. 166; AA, p. 38; 
773 HS, p. 567; Ross Anonymous, p. 261; Ahsenü’t-tevārih, IX, p. 602; HT, p. 166; HR, p. 3; AA, p. 38; 
Sarwar, pp. 27-8.  
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other things, but since they were not allowed to remain in the camp, they returned 
home.”774 Without a doubt these disciples were mostly coming from Anatolia and 
Northern Syria. It is interesting to note that a few years before, Rüstem Beg’s 
predecessor Yakub Padishah had forbidden Shaykh Haydar to communicate with his 
disciples, especially with his khalifas in Rūm.775 All this evidence clearly puts the facts 
that 1) the disciples of the Safavid house were no more the quietest mystics but had 
formidable military potency as well, 2) the main stem providing the ‘new type of 
disciples’ to the ‘order’ was in Anatolia, and then in northern Syria. It is because of this 
fact that when Safavid shaykhs emerged as a threat for the temporal authority of 
Akkoyunlu rulers, the first measure they applied was to cut off the connection between 
the shaykh, the head, and Anatolian (as well as Syrian) disciples, the body.776    
In the end, in the middle of 1494, Rüstem Beg grew quite fearful of an attack by 
qizilbashes; he decided to kill Safavid princes on his way from his winter quarters in 
Hoy to his summer pastures.777 Forewarned, Sultan Ali and his two brothers, 
accompanied by chief devotees like Husayn Beg Lala, Dada Beg Talish, Qara Pīrī Beg 
                                                 
774 HS, p. 567. Ross Anonymous writes similarly: “… he [Rüstem Beg] commissioned spies to see that the 
Prince [Sultan Ali] had no communication with the Sūfīs. Nevertheless, his faithful disciples contrived 
secretly to send him gifts of ready money and various stores, thus putting to the test the coin of their 
devotion.” See Ross Anonymous, p. 261. Also see HT, p. 166; AA, p. 38.  
775 TA, p. 70.  
776 One might feel legitimate to ask the question that ‘what was the policy of the Ottoman government 
against Safavid movement during this period?’ We know from the letter of Bayezid II to Akkoyunlu 
Yakub, as an answer to the letter of the former sent upon the death of Shaykh Haydar, that he was 
antagonist against Haydar and his followers. In this letter qizilbashes are depicted as ‘the people who went 
astray’ or gürūh-ı dālle-i Haydariyye. (See Feridun Bey, I, pp. 304-5.) But we do not know of any 
Ottoman measure to prevent Safavid shaykh’s communication with their disciples in the Ottoman 
territories. Furthermore, Ottoman chronicles, except APZ’s account on Shaykh Junayd, are totally silent 
on Safavid matters until 1500, when Ismail came to Arzinjan, the Ottoman border in the East. Thus 
available evidence suggest that the Ottoman government did not apply any effective preventive measure 
against the communication between Anatolian qizilbashes and their shaykhs until 1500. Faruk Sümer 
deems Bayezid II responsible for ignoring the arising danger in the East and for his soft policy against 
qizilbashes, which paved way to the flourishing of qizilbash movement within the Ottoman borders. See 
Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 13.  
777 HS, p. 567; HT, p. 167; HR, p. 3; Sarwar, p. 28; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 156.  
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Qajar, and Đlyas Beg Ayghūr Oghli, escaped from the camp and rode straight to 
Ardabil.778 No sooner was Rüstem Beg apprised of their escape, he dispatched Husayn 
Beg ‘Alikhaniī and Ayba Sultan with 5000 men in pursuit of him. Realizing that he had 
no chance with three hundred sufis against Akkoyunlu forces, Sultan Ali summoned 
leading qizilbash khalifas in Shamasi, a village near Ardabil. He then took of his crown 
(Haydarī Tāc) and put on Ismail’s head, and bound his girdle on Ismail, declaring him 
his successor.779 After laying on Ismail the obligation of avenging his death, and that of 
his father and grand father, and speaking “into his ear those maxims which he had 
received as an inheritance from his noble ancestors”,780 Sultan Ali selected seven men 
from among the most prominent qizilbash āmirs, including Husayn Beg Lala, Qara Piri 
Beg Qajar, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Dada Beg Talish (Abdal Beg Dede), Khadim Beg 
Khalife, Rüstem Beg Karamanlu, Đlyas Beg Aykutoğlu, and ordered them to proceed to 
Ardabil and to protect Ismail in any circumstances.781 Then Sultan Ali returned against 
                                                 
778 Ross Anonymous, p. 261. According to Ross Anonymous, upon being apprised about the conspiracy 
Sultan Ali summoned his chief qizilbash followers and took their advice on what to do. They answered as 
follows: “May we be thy sacrifice! [Kurban olduğumuz!] Arise and let us go to Ardabil, for there and in 
that neighborhood you have many disciples. If Rüstem Pādishāh should wish to pursue us, we will give 
him fight. If, however, he neglects to follow us, we shall remain unharmed.” Also consider HT, p. 167; 
AA, p. 38. 
779 HS, p. 567; Ross Anonymous, p. 262; HT, p. 167; HR, p. 4; Sarwar, p. 28; 
780 Ross Anonymous, p. 262. It is important to recognize here that the transmission of spiritual authority 
was symbolized by three elements: Haydarī Tac, girdle, and secret maxims of the order. On the other 
hand, I would like to remind that at that time Ismail was only seven years old. AA narrates the scene as 
follows: “Since Sultan Ali, by virtue of his saintly insight, had seen the fact of his own martyrdom written 
on the pages of the book of fate, he gathered together all the sufis and partisans of the Safavid family, and 
told them he would lose his life in the coming battle. He nominated his brother Ismail his heir and 
successor, and imparted to him the secret of those mysteries which constituted an integral part of the 
customs and the practices of the spiritual directors of the Safavid house, and which he had inherited from 
his father and his ancestors. Then he placed his own taj on Ismail’s head, and placed him in the charge of 
his trusted companions, and addressed him at length regarding his mission. Speaking with divine 
inspiration, he declared that the light of the house of Ali (the fourth caliph) would shine forth through 
Ismail, and that his speartips would be raised to the skies in triumph, and that the rays of his justice would 
illuminate the faces of mankind.” See AA, p. 39. Also see HT, p. 167. 
781 Ross Anonymous, p. 262; Sarwar, p. 28. ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail describes this scene as follows: “… 
When Sultān ‘Ali Mirza looked over his shoulder, he saw a cloud of dust [the army of Ayba Sultan]. So he 
summoned Ismail Mirza and said: ‘I desire you to avenge me and your ancestors by shedding the blood of 
Hasan Padishah’s children. For the die of Heaven’s choice has been cast in your name, and before long 
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his enemies with 300 qizilbash devotees782, who had joined him en route. Although the 
qizilbashes fought with utmost bravery783, the unequal fight ended with the absolute 
defeat of Sultan Ali, who fell in the battlefield.784 His body was brought to Ardabil and 
buried nearby his ancestors.785  
 
5.1.2. Ismail in Concealment 
Following Sultan Ali’s death Ayba Sultan started a cruel investigation in Ardabil and the 
surrounding region to capture Ismail and Ibrahim.786 In spite of the heavy persecution 
some devotees of the Safavid house, the Dulkadir tribe and some other Turkoman tribes, 
hid Ismail in their houses for a while.787 After a short span of time, however, the heavy 
pressure by the Akkoyunlu governor of the city made it impossible for Ismail to hide in 
                                                                                                                                                
you will come out of Gīlān with a world-conquering sword like a burning sun, and eliminate the color of 
Idolatry from the face of the world forever.’ So he took Haydar’s crown, placed it on Ismail Mirza’s head 
and, fastening his own turban to his waist, whispered to him the advice inherited from his ancestors. Then 
he appointed seven of his best devotees and amirs called: Husayn Beg Lala, Qara Pīrī Qajar, Abdāl Beg, 
Dada Beg Talish, Khādim Beg, Bayram Beg, and Sari Ghūra qūrchī-bashī, to take Ismail Mirza, Ibrahim 
Mirza and Suleyman Mirza to Ardabil and from there to Gīlān to stay there in the service of Padishah of 
Lāhijan until the time of the rising, while he himself stayed where he was to bar the road to Ayba’s troops 
until he was killed.” Quoted in Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh 
Ismā’īl I (1487-1524), Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 79. ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail 
is an anonymous history of Shah Ismail, which occasionally does not refrain of pointing open criticism 
towards Shah Ismail. It has been edited by A. Montazer-Sāhib basing on a manuscript in his private 
possession (Tehran, 1349). The content of the work is similar to that published by Sir Denison Ross, 
which is known as Ross Anonymous. For furher details see Youssef-Jamālī, pp. XXXV-XXXVI.  
782 AA says 700. See AA, p. 39.  
783 As Browne determines, the valor and devotion of qizilbash-sufis is testified by contemporary European 
writers as forcibly as the Safavid historians. One frequently comes across the phrase “The Suffaveans 
fought like lions” in the pages of the Venetian travelers. See BRW, pp. 50-51.   
784 Ross Anonymous and HR report the battle in a slightly different manner. To him, at the beginning of 
the fight Ayba Sultan drove some of his forces into the battlefield but he himself lay in ambush. In the first 
phase of the battle the qizilbashes proved victorious. But when they started to gather booty Ayba Sultan 
attacked them and defeated them. See Ross Anonymous, pp. 262-3; HR, p. 4.  
785 HR, p. 5; Ross Anonymous, p. 263; AA, p. 39. Sarwar, pp. 28-9. According to HT, this event occurred 
in the end of 898 (August 1493).  
786 During this time Ismail was only seven years old. He was born on July 17, 1487, one year before the 
death of his father on July 1, 1488. He was, with his brothers and mother, imprisoned by the orders of 
Yaqub Mirza in March 1489, and released by the orders of Rüstem Beg in August 1493. And in the 
summer of 1494, he was a fugitive wanted by Rüstem Beg. See Sarwar, p. 30.   
787 Ross Anonymous and HR gives a detailed account of this persecution and how Ismail was protected. 
See Ross Anonymous, pp. 283-5; HR, pp. 5-7.  
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Ardabil anymore. Rüstem Beg Karamanlu, the uncle of Bayram Beg Karamanlu, who 
had managed to flee from the battle with eighty qizilbashes and take refuge in a 
mountain in the vicinity of Ardabil, took the princes (Ismail and Ibrahim) at night to 
Korgan, a village in the mountain 9 km. to the north east of Ardabil, and hid them.788 
Taking counsel with Husayn Beg Lala, Khadim Beg, Dede Beg, and other prominent 
sufi āmirs789, Ismail decided to go to Gilan.790 On their way to Gilan, they first visited 
Rasht791, where Ismail met with a goldsmith, named Āmir Najm. From then on Āmir 
Najm became a servant of Ismail and one of his eminent advisors and teachers.792 They 
arrived in Lāhijan towards the end of 1494.793 Ismail, with his elder brother Ibrahim and 
two hundred devotees, was welcomed by the ruler of Lāhijan, Mirza Ali Karkiya, who 
was the most powerful ruler of Gilan and head of one of the most ancient families in the 
region.794  
Khwandamir says after several months Ibrahim decided to return to Ardabil, 
“removing the twelve-fold Haydarī hat, the emblem of the Safavid house, and putting a 
felt cap on his head in the manner of the Akkoyunlu Turcomans.”795 
                                                 
788 Ross Anonymous, p. 285; HR, p. 7.  
789 HR gives the list of these prominent qizilbash amirs as Kipchak Mansur Beg, Husayn Beg Lala, Kīrk 
(Kazak) Seydi Ali, Cholpan Beg, Khulafa Beg (Khadim Beg Khulafa), Kūk Ali. See HR, p.7. Ross 
Anonymous gives the same list but adds Dada Beg too. See Ross Anonymous, pp. 285-6. Also consider 
Youssef-Jamālī, p. 84.  
790 HT, p. 168. According to HR, however, Ismail decided to go to Rasht. See HR, p. 7. Also consider AA, 
p. 40. 
791 According to Ross Anonymous and HR, at the beginning they decided to go to Rasht. See Ross 
Anonymous, p. 286; HR, p. 9. HR says that Ismail and his entourage stayed in a mosque although they 
were invited by the governor of the city to stay in his own house.  
792 See HR, p. 10; Sarwar, p. 31.  
793 Sarwar, pp. 31-2.  
794 HS, p. 567; Ross Anonymous, p. 287; HR, p. 10; AA, p. 40. It is already mentioned in the previous 
chapter that his ancestors were visited by Timur during his return from Anatolia in 1402 and benefited 
from the generous grants of the latter. 
795 HS, p. 567. AA repeats the same account. See AA, p. 40. Also consider Youssef-Jamālī, p. 93.  
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Ismail stayed approximately four and a half years in Lāhijan under the protection 
of Mirza Ali Karkiya. Until his death in 1497, Rüstem Beg on several occasions 
demanded Sultan Ali Karkiya to surrender Ismail but received evasive replies. In 
addition to his protection of the young prince, Sultan Ali Karkiya dealt with the 
education and training of Ismail as well. He appointed Shams al-Dīn Lāhijī796 to instruct 
him in the Holy Qur’an and to teach him Persian and Arabic.797 Furthermore, Āmir 
Najm, the goldsmith of Rasht, who visited the young prince frequently, had certain 
influence on the education of Ismail.798  
On the other hand, during this period the famous qizilbash āmirs, known as 
Sūfiyān-i Lāhijān, were always nearby their young shaykh, whose education and military 
training was mostly under their custody.799 These seven men, who were selected by 
Sultan Ali just before his death and whom Safavid sources used to call ‘sūfiyān-ı 
Lāhijān’ or ‘ehl-i ihtisas’, were among the prominent generals of Shaykh Junayd and 
Haydar and fulfilled important military functions under them, as well as under Sultan 
Ali. With the death of Sultan Ali they became the protectors and tutors of young Ismail. 
Thus they played a very eminent role in maintaining the network between the disciples 
and the center of the order, in the education of Ismail, and in establishing the nucleus of 
                                                 
796 When Ismail ascended the throne in 1501, he became the first sadr, the head of Shi’ite-religious clergy 
and the highest responsible for religious affairs, of the Safavid state. But it seems that neither Ismail nor 
him were prepared for such a mission, the mission of transforming the country into shi’ism, that he could 
find only the book of Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, Qawā’īd al Islām, among shi’ite literature to consult. See 
Jean Aubin, “Etudes safavides I. Šāh Ismā’īl et les notables de l’Iraq Persan”, Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient, 2:1, 1959, p. 53; For further reading on the office of sadārat and early 
sadrs see Roger M. Savory, Savory, Roger M., “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the 
Reign of Isma’īl I (907-30/1501-24)”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, 
London, 1960, pp. 103-105.  
797 Rooss Anonymous, p. 288; HR, p. 11; AA, p. 41; Sarwar, p. 32. 
798 See Ross Anonymous, p. 288; HR, pp. 11-12. 
799 HT, p. 171.  
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the Safavid state during the period of concealment.800 Savory, an eminent historian of 
the Safavids, writes about the crucial role of the sufis of Lāhijān in leading the 
movement and establishing the state as follows:  
It is often assumed that Ismā’īl himself was solely responsible, by his charismatic 
leadership, for bringing the Safavid revolution to a successful conclusion. When 
one considers that Ismā’īl was only seven years old when he took refuge in 
Gīlān; that he was only twelve when he emerged from Gīlān in 1499 to make his 
bid for power; and no more than fourteen when he was crowned Shāh at Tabrīz 
in 1501 as the first king of the Safavid dynasty, it is clear that this could not have 
been so. The responsibility of maintaining the momentum of the Safavid 
revolutionary movement lay primarily with the small band of seven close 
advisers known as ahl-i ikhtisās.801 
 
Although the formula ‘seven men’ is widely used by Safavid sources, there is no 
consensus on the names of these seven men. Later sources even increase the number. 
The plausible interpretation of the information provided by the Safavid sources appears 
to suppose that indeed there were more then seven qizilbash (may be around eighty as 
some sources indicate) around Ismail during his concealment in Lāhijan. Most of those 
qizilbashes were not permanently resident with Ismail but were coming from their tribe 
to present allegiance and obedience, as well as vows and gifts, and returning to their 
homes. Seven - or around seven – men called ahl-i ihtisas, however, were the 
masterminds behind the movement, organizing mystical affairs of the disciples, 
                                                 
800 For a detailed analysis of their role in the Safavid history see Jean Aubin, “Revolution chiite et 
conservatisme. Les soufis de Lāhejān, 1500-1514 (Etudes Safavides II)” , Moyen Orient &Océan Indien 1, 
1984, pp. 1-40.  Also see Roger M. Savory, “Safawids”, EI2, electronic edition.  
801 Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 22. Also see 
his “The Safavid State and Polity”, in Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the Isfahan Colloquium, 1974, 
Part I, ed. R. Holod=Iranian Studies, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 192. For a similar approach also 
see Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, 
Intellectual Studies in Islam, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 32.  
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maintaining the communication and network between sufis and the center, taking care of 
the young Shah, etc., and were permanent residents nearby Ismail.802   
Tribal affiliation of these āmirs is also confusing in sources. Masashi Haneda, 
who studied the Safavid chronicles in a comparative manner, arrives at the following 
conclusion: Husayn Beg Lala was from the Shamlu tribe, Abdal Ali Beg Dede from 
Dulkadir tribe, Hadim Beg Khulafa from the Talish tribe, Rüstem and Bayram Begs 
from the Karaman tribe, Đlyas Beg Aykutoğlu from the Hınıs tribe803, Qara Pīrī Beg from 
the Qajar tribe.804 So, five of these seven most prominent leaders of the qizilbash 
movement were of Anatolian (including one from northern Syria) origin.805  
All the members of the ahl-i ihtisas occupied eminent posts of the Safavid state 
during her early period, especially until 1508.806 Especially Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Ali 
Beg Dede, Hadim Beg Khalifa, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Bayram Beg Karamanlu 
exercised excessive influence during the premier years of Ismail’s reign. They were, 
indeed, to a certain extent, the founder of the state and the ones most responsible for 
shaping the Safavid mysticism during the transformation period from Junayd to Ismail. 
In Aubin’s words, 
Ce sont de vieux dévoués de la fraction chiite extrémiste qu’ont greffée sur 
l’ordre des soufis d’Ardabil Seyx Jonayd, le grand-père, et écrasé, ils ont 
maintenu, depuis leur refuge du Gilan, par leur émissaires clandestines, 
l’attentisme des fidèles. Et plus tard, des cinq, trois sinon quatre, tomberont au 
                                                 
802 For an analysis of the sources in this issue see Aubin, “Sufis of Lāhejān”, pp. 2-3; Masashi Haneda, Le 
Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987, pp. 68-78. 
803 Also see Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 53. 
804 See Haneda, pp. 72-78. 
805 A brief account of Turkoman oymaqs that constituted the Safavid army will be provided below. 
806 For example, following Ismail’s ascendance to the throne in Tabriz in 1501, Husayn Beg Lala became 
wākil, the lieutenant of the Shah, and emiru’l-ümera, the head of the army; Abdal Ali Beg Dede became 
the head of the Special Forces (kurçi başı), Hadim Beg Khulafa became halifetu’l-hulefa, the head of the 
sufi organization of qizilbashes; Bayram Berg Qaramanlu became amir-i divan; and Abdi Beg became 
tovacı-başı. See Aubin, “Sufis of Lāhejān”, pp. 4-5; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâs, pp. 72-77; Roger M. 
Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl (907-30/1501-24)”, 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, London, 1960, pp. 93-101.     
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combat. Comme leur titre l’indique, le dede, le xalife et le lele appartiennent aux 
grades initiatiques de l’organisation religieuse qizilbas. Les deux autres sont 
chefs des tribu, et ces deux chefs ont avec la vénérée famille d’Ardabil un lien 
mondain : ‘Abdi Beg et Bayram Beg sont des gendres ; ils ont épousé des filles 
de Seyx Haydar.807  
 
Ismail’s concealment in Lāhijan no doubt constituted the nucleus of his future 
state. While taking care of young Ismail’s education and training, the seven great 
qizilbahes around him maintained the connection and communication with disciples of 
the Order in several provinces of Anatolia, Syria, and Azarbaijan.808 Ross Anonymous 
and Ahsenu’t-tevārih record that during Ismail’s residence in Lāhijan, sufis from near 
and far, especially from Diyār-ı Rūm (Anatolia), Karacadağ, Tuman Meşkin, came to the 
court of the prince809 in Lāhijan, presenting their gifts and votive offerings (adak) and 
paying their homage. But they did not stay there for a long time simply because of 
security reasons, but rather returned to their home sooner.810 A contemporary Italian 
testimony approves the Safavid chronicles:  
During these five years [in concealment] these boys [Safavid princes] were 
incited by many of their father’s friends, who came to visit them, to assemble 
troops to recover his possessions; having collected five hundred brave and 
faithful men, and the whole country being friendly disposed towards them, they 
elected Ismael their captain, as he was a fiery, brave, and courteous youth.811 
 
                                                 
807 Aubin, “Les souifs de Lāhejān”, p. 4.  
808 Caterino Zeno, a Venetian embassy at the court of Uzun Hasan, states that Ismail sent secret orders to 
his followers instructing them on what to do. See Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 48.  
809 Ross Anonymous uses the term “Perfect Guide”. See Ross Anonymous, p. 288. Also consider Roger M. 
Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, Berlin, 1965, p. 85; Iran under 
the Safavids, pp. 22-23.  
810 Ross Anonymous, p. 288; HR, p. 11; HT, p. 171. AA writes similarly, “Ismail’s place of residence was 
frequented by sufis, and devotees were never absent from his threshold.” See AA, p. 41. 
811 Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, 
p. 103. Giovan Maria Angiolello fell captive to Mehmed II’s army in 1470. He served Prince Mustafa and 
attended the Otlukbeli battle with Uzun Hasan in the Ottoman army. He then obtained his freedom and 
returned to Italy. Between 1499 and 1515 he stayed in Persia for business or a diplomatic mission on 
behalf of the Venetian Republic. See Tufan Gündüz (trs.), Seyyahların Gözüyle Sultanlar ve Savaşlar. 
Giovanni Maria Angiolello – Venedikli Bir Tüccar ve Vincenzo D’Alessandri’nin Seyahatnâmeleri, 
Đstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007, p. 11 
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5.1.3. The Advent (Hurūj) of Ismail 
The strife among Akkoyunlu princes continued during Ismail’s concealment in Lāhijan. 
In the summer of 1497 Ahmed Mirza, the son of Hasan Beg’s son Ugurlu Muhammad, 
killed Rüstem Beg and proclaimed himself as the ruler of Azarbaijan.812 Nonetheless, his 
rule lasted only six months. The powerful āmir Ayba Sultan defeated and killed him in 
Isfahan and read the khutba in the name of Sultan Murad, the son of Yakub Mirza.813 
But he could not expand his rule all over the Akkoyunlu dominion. The two sons of 
Hasan Beg’s son Yusuf Beg, namely Alvand Mirza and Muhammadi Mirza, who were 
in Ahmad Mirza’s entourage during the battle with Ayba Sultan, assumed suzerainty in 
Diyarbakir and Iraq. Although Sultan Murad managed to incarnate Muhammadi Mirza, 
Alvand Mirza proved successful in his struggle against the former. In the end, they 
decided to divide the country among themselves. The provinces of Diyarbakir, Arran, 
and Azarbaijan were ruled by Alvand Mirza while the regions of Iraq, Fars, and Kirman 
went to Sultan Murad, Qizil Azwan River being the line dividing their respective 
territories. Alvand Mirza returned to Tabriz and Sultan Murad to Kazwin.814    
Taking advantage of civil war among the Akkoyunlu princes, young Ismail 
decided that it was time to take action. Despite Sultan Ali Karkiya’s opposition, thinking 
that the conditions did not mature to advent as well as the tender age of the Safavid 
prince, Ismail took council with prominent qizilbash āmirs and left Lāhijan for Ardabil 
in August 1499.815  
                                                 
812 HS, pp. 567-8; Ross Anonymous, p. 298; HR, pp. 17-18; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 158.  
813 HS, p. 568; Ross Anonymous, p. 300; HR, pp. 21-2; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 158.    
814 HS, p. 569; Ross Anonymous, pp. 306-7; HR, pp. 27-32; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, pp. 159-161. 
815 HS, p. 570; Ross Anonymous, pp. 326-7; HR, pp. 33-4; AA, p. 42; Sarwar, p. 33; Jean Aubin, 
“L’avènement des Safavides reconsideré (Etudes Sfavides III)”, Moyen Orient &Océan Indien, 5, 1988, p. 
7.  
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He first visited Daylam and then proceeded to Tarum with seven devotees, 
namely Husayn Beg Lala, Dede Beg Talish (Abdal ‘Ali Beg Dede), Khadim Beg 
Khalifa, Rüstem Beg Qaramānī, Bayram Beg Qaramānī, Đlyas Beg Ayghut-Oghli, and 
Qara Pīrī Beg Qājār.816 The news of Ismail’s march to Ardabil immediately spread 
among disciples living in Anatolia, Syria, Azarbaijan, Iraq, and created great excitement. 
Hearing of his advent, says Ahsenu’t-tevārih, qizilbashes from Anatolia and Syria 
poured into his entourage at every stage of his journey reaching 1500 men by the time he 
encamped at Tarum.817 Ismail then went to Ardabil by way of Khalhal and Kūrī, where 
he spent one month in the house of Melik Muzaffer known as Khulafa Beg, the standard 
bearer of Sultan Ali Padishah.818 But Ardabil was not a place of safety for the young 
prince and his hundreds of sufis819 accompanying him.820  
According to Khwandamir, Ismail’s first intention was to wage gazā against 
Georgia. But since the number of sufi-gāzis present in his entourage was not enough, 
some leading āmirs such as Abdi Beg Tovachi, Husayn Beg Lala, Khulafa Beg, opposed 
this idea suggesting first to send heralds to all devotees ordering them to prepare for a 
holy war and to gather at a specific time in the royal camp, and then, with such 
reinforcement, to wage gazā on the infidels.821 Ross Anonymous repeats the same 
                                                 
816 Ross Anonymous, p. 332; Sarwar, p. 33.  
817 Ross Anonymous, pp. 332-3; Sarwar, p. 33. However, Khwandamir’s account, a contemporary of 
events, challenges this idea. He says that there were no more than three hundred warriors in the royal 
retinue when they arrived in Ardabil. See HS, p. 570. Whatever the number was, however, his move from 
Lahijan mobilized qizilbashes all over Anatolia, Syria, Azerbaijan and other regions.    
818 Ross Anonymous, p. 333; HR, p. 35. 
819 HS gives the number of qizilbash accompanying Ismail in Ardabil as three hundred. See HS, p. 570. 
820 Ross Anonymous and HR say, the governor of Ardabil appointed by Alvand Beg sent a messenger to 
Ismail suggesting him either to leave the city or to prepare for an engagement. See Ross Anonymous, p. 
333; HR, p. 35.  
821 HS, p. 570.  HT follows HS’s account on this issue. Qumī, however, puts a special emphasis on the 
oymaq of Ustaclu. See HT, p. 175. Also consider Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 8-9. Aubin 
deduces from this scene that although Safavid chroniclers write as if young Ismail was the author of all 
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account; but mistakenly narrates as if this happened in the spring of 1500, when Ismail 
moved from Arjuwan.822  
…[Not deeming it wise to remain in Ardabil] He [Ismail] discussed with the 
leading Sūfis what road he had better take. They being all of one mind, suggested 
that before he left his winter-quarters he should send orders by swift messengers 
to the sufis in Rūm and Shām, and then betake himself to the frontiers of 
Arjinjan by way of Gökcha Dengīs, for there he would be near his ‘supporters’, 
who on hearing of his arrival, would the more speedily assemble. Such was the 
most reasonable plan. Having collected an army he might then, with the help of 
Divine favour and the assistance of the Imāms, turn whither he would.823  
 
Accepting this suggestion, Ismail sent swift messengers to the various provinces 
of Asia Minor and Syria carrying his message, which ordered the followers of the 
Safavid house to summon under the banner of the young shaykh in Arzinjan the next 
summer.824 Ismail himself spent the winter of 1499-1500 in Arjuwan, a village near 
Astārā on the Caspian Sea,825 allowing “those sufis, which he had retained in his army, 
to return to their homes, to rejoin him on the New Year’s Day [Nevruz].”826  
 
                                                                                                                                                
decisions, at the beginning of the advent, and without a doubt during the following years, the decisions 
were made primarily by his tutors.  
822 Indeed HS is also not clear about the time of this meeting. Khwandamir is completely silent on Ismail’s 
almost one year stay in Arjuwan. Rather he narrates as if Ismail directly went to Gökçe Deniz from 
Ardabil, and then to Arzinjan. If we accept his account, then it means that Ismail stayed in Ardabil for one 
year, which is obviously impossible, even according to HS’s former expressions. Thus Khwandamir is 
evidently wrong in this matter. On the other hand, Ross Anoymous’s account doesn’t appear to be 
reasonable either. If Ismail dispatched heralds to their disciples in Anatolia and Syria in the spring of 
1500, how could they gather in Arzinjan in a couple of months? This was impossible simply because of 
the technical reasons. So the best conclusion that can be deduced from these accounts appears as follows: 
Ismail sent swift messengers to all disciples in Anatolia, Northern Syria, and Azarbaijan in the summer of 
1499, during his first visit to Ardabil. In the following spring he simply passed through Ardabil on his way 
to Arzinjan, which was determined as the gathering place the former summer. Iskender Beg Munshi, who 
had access to all these sources when he wrote his history a century later, also arrives at the same 
conclusion. See AA, p. 42. Also compare Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 17.  
823 Ross Anonymous, pp. 339-40. One of those heralds was Kıcoğlu Hamza Beg, who was sent to his own 
tribe Ustaclu. See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 17.  
824 In addition to the mentioned Safavid sources also see HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428. 
825 Ross Anonymous, p. 334; Sarwar, p. 34.  
826 Ross Anonymous, p. 337.  
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5.1.4. The vision of Dede Muhammad: The Ideological Background of the Qizilbash 
Movement 
Although it is fiction, an account in Ross Anonymous827 is of highest importance for it 
perfectly reflects the qizilbash mentality: how they perceived the Shi’a and how they 
believed in Ismail.828 Just before leaving Lāhijan, Ismail went hunting with some of his 
disciples. At a place not far away they arrived at the edge of a dense forest, where there 
was a river. Ismail crossed the river and said to his companions: “Not one of you is to 
follow me across this river, but you are to await my return on the other side.”829 Ismail 
then entered the forest alone. No one knew what happened in the forest. But after a 
while Ismail returned as girt with a belt, bearing a sword suspended from a sword-belt, 
and with the other ‘signs’ which Sūfis witnessed.830 
                                                 
827 The same account with minor differences occurs in some other Safavid chronicles as well. See 
Youssef-Jamālī, p. 103.  
828 The religious position of Shah Ismail in the eyes of the contemporary qizilbashes is one of the 
controversial issues of the Safavid History. The question of whether he was regarded as a God, as a 
Prophet, or as a Mahdi by the contemporary qizilbashes’ is not clear enough in available sources.  The 
most informative sources on the subject are reports of Venetian travelers or ambassadors, poems of Shah 
Ismail himself, and accounts of sunni enemies. Contemporary westerner observers used to depict him as 
adored by his followers as if a God. (See for example, “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, p. 206, 
where written that “This Sophy is loved and revered by his people as a god, especially by his soldiers…” 
Furher examples will be presented in Chapter V.) On the other hand, his poetry led modern scholars to a 
similar conclusion. Minorsky concludes, after an analysis of his poetry, for example that Ismail regarded 
himself somehow having the nature of a deity. (See Minorsky, “The Poetry of Shah Ismail I”, Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 1942, 1006a-1053a.) Abdülbāki Gölpınarlı, a 
twentieth century Turkish writer, takes the account of Khunjī by words and argues that his followers 
believed in Junayd as God, in his son as the ‘son of God’. (See his article “Kızılbaş” in IA, 789-91.) 
Savory argues, according to Safavid propaganda Ismail was not only the representative of the Hidden 
Imam but the Hidden Imam himself; he was even apotheosized as a divine incarnation. See Savory, Iran 
under the Safavids, p. 23. For a similar approach also see Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 36-40. 
Roemer stresses Ismail’s exaggerated assumptions regarding Ali. Roemer states, “he must have had a 
well-defined religious sensibility, as can be seen from his divan. Here he calls ‘Alī a manifestation of God 
and proudly asserts that he himself is a descendant of ‘Alī and Fātima who came into the world at ‘Alī’s 
behest. Of course such notions can not be reconciled with the Shī’a or the Shī’ī theology; but they 
originate in the world of the Shī’a rather than in that of Folk Islam.” See Hans R. Roemer, “The Safavid 
Period”, The Cambridge History of Iran, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993, p. 209.   
829 Ross Anonymous, p. 327. 
830 Ross Anonymous, p. 327. 
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The anonymous author then recites the account of Dede Muhammed Rumlu, who 
was a sufi-dervish from Anatolia (Urum-ili) gifted with second sight, and in the year 907 
(1501-2) “had the honor of kissing the ‘Perfect Guide’s’ feet in the market-place called 
Sāhib-ābād in Tabriz.”831 Dede Muhammad was a dervish and a disciple of Hasan 
Khalifa Tekelu,832 who attended the court of Shaykh Junayd and was among the 
prominent khalifas of Shaykh Haydar.833 
In the following pages, the anonymous author of this chronicle narrates how 
Bābā Shahkulu, the son of Hasan Khalifa, sent Dede Muhammad, who was one of his 
most pious dervishes, to pilgrimage in 905 / 1499-1500. The adventure of Dede 
Muhammad, on its own, has a special value not because it merely reflects historical 
events but for the fact that it reflects the qizilbash mentality.  
Following his death, his son Shahkulu succeeded Hasan Khalifa. During this 
time Dede Muhammad, who then became a disciple of Shahkulu, requested the 
permission of his spiritual guide for a pilgrimage to Mekka.    
In the year 905834, Dede Muhammad, who was a disciple of Khalifa, desiring to 
make the pilgrimage to Mekka, asked the permission of Bābā Shāh Kulī, who 
said to him: “You have permission, go; but when you have completed your 
pilgrimage to Mekka you will visit the Holy Shrines (in Babylonia) and thence 
go to Tabrīz. On the first day of your arrival there the time will have come for 
one of the sons of purity and goodness, and he will have become pādishāh, 
having caused coins to be struck and the khutba read in his name; you will find 
                                                 
831 Ross Anonymous, p. 327. 
832 The same story is recited in another chronic, which is studied by Erika Glassen, as well. The main 
difference in the account of the manuscript housed in India Office Library (pers. 1877) comes out in the 
identity of Dede Muhammad Rumlu. Differing from Ross Anonymous, he is depicted as a Bektashi 
Dervish – one of the followers of Haci Bektash Veli in Constantinople. The account of this manuscript is 
published by Glassen. See Erika Glassen, “Schah Ismā’īl, ein Mahdī der anatolischen Turkmenen?”, 
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gessellschaft, band 121, 1971, pp. 61-69.  
833 Hasan Khalifa was the father of Shahkulu who initiated and led a large-scale revolt against the Ottoman 
state in Teke-ili and western Anatolia. For further information see “Shahkulu Rebellion” in this study.  
834 1499-1500. 
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him playing polo in the square [maidān] of Tabrīz. You will go to him and greet 
him from me and give him this ablak to fasten on his crown.835  
 
Dede Muhammad visited the son of purity, but not in material world, rather in a 
miraculous dream. On performing the circuit of Mekka and visiting Medina, he turned 
towards Baghdād. Between Medina and Baghdād the dervish got separated from the 
caravan and fell asleep. On awakening he realized that the caravan had already departed. 
He wandered through deserts for three days. At the end he fell exhausted to the ground.  
When the mid-day sun shone straight down upon him he perceived an Arab 
youth riding towards him, who coming up to him said: “Oh! Dervish, arise, for 
thou art not far from cultivated land.” The dervish indicated by signs that he was 
too feeble to walk. The youth then took his hand, and no sooner was his hand in 
that of the youth than he felt all his strenghth return. So he arose and was led by 
the youth towards a hill; when they reached the summit of the hill he looked 
around and saw that as far (330) as the eye could reach the plains were covered 
with vendure and roses and tulips, and that gold-embroidered tents and silk 
canopies had been spread out. Turning to his companion he said: “Oh! Arab 
youth, no one ever saw such a place as this in the deserts of Mekka and Najaf-i 
Ashraf. What place is this? and who is the lords of these tents and places?” The 
young Arab replied, “You will know afterward?” he then walked by the young 
man’s side, until they came to a place, whose cupola out-rivalled the sun and the 
moon. They then entered, and a delightful apartment met his view, the like of 
which he had never seen. Golden thrones were arranged side by side, and on one 
of the thrones a person was seated whose face was covered with a veil. Dede 
Muhammad, placing his hands on his breast, made a salutation, whereupon an 
answer to his salutation came from the veiled one, who having bidden him be 
seated, ordered food to be brought for him. The like of this food he had never 
seen in his life before. They also brought some cold water, which Dede 
Muhammad drank, nor had he ever tasted such refreshing water. As soon as he 
has finished his repast, he saw that a party of men had entered, bringing a boy of 
about fourteen years of age, with red (surkh) hair, a white face, and dark-grey 
eyes; on his head was a scarlet cap. Being entered he made a salutation and stood 
still; the veiled youth then said to him: “Oh! Isma’īl, the hour of your ‘coming’ 
(hurūc) has now arrived.” The other replied: “It is for your Holiness to 
command.” The prince then said: “Come forward.” He came forward, and His 
Holiness taking his belt three times lifted it up and placed it on the ground again. 
He then, with his own blessed hands, fastened on the girdle, and taking 
(Isma’īl’s) cap from his head, raised it and then replaced it. He wore a Kurdish 
belt-dagger; this His Holiness took from him and threw (331) to the dervish, 
saying: “Keep this, for it will stand you in stead.” His Holiness then told his 
                                                 
835 Ross Anonymous, p. 329.  
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servants to bring his own sword, which, when brought, he fastened with his own 
hands to the girdle of the child. Then he said “You may now depart.” Having 
recited Fātiha he entrusted the child to the two or three persons who had brought 
him in. when they had taken the child away, he made a sign to the young Arab to 
lead the dervish back to his caravan; and having brought him to it, said: “This is 
the caravan from which you were separated.” When Dede Muhammad saw the 
caravan he said: “Oh! Youth, tell me, for God’s sake, who that prince was and 
who the child?” He replied: “Did you not know that the prince whom you saw 
was no other than the Lord of the Age [The twelfth Imam]?”836  
 
Before analyzing the content I would like to call attention to the author and 
authorship of the source. According to Ross, some details in the narration suggest that 
the anonymous author of this history must have participated in most of the events he 
recounts. Ross also deduces that he (the anonymous author) must be closely connected 
with the Safavids.837 A close examination of the narration, indeed, reveals that the author 
was a sincere qizilbash. As for the time of completion, one might feel justified in 
supposing that it was completed soon after the accession of Tahmasp in 930 / 1524, for 
the work ends with a short account of the accession of Tahmasp.838 According to 
Sarwar, however, the work was composed between 1540 and 1548.839 Andrew H. 
Morton, on the other hand, identifies this work with Jahāngushā-yi khākān and suggests 
a 17th-century date of composition.840 Whatever the date was, it appears as a clear fact 
that the aforesaid account should be regarded as a retrospective re-production of the 
ideological frame of Ismail’s huruj by qizilbash authorship. Although the above story is, 
                                                 
836 Ross Anonymous, pp. 329-331. 
837 E. Denison Ross, “The Early Years of Shāh Isma’īl, Founder of the Safavī Dynasty”, Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society, p. 252. The author’s full name is unknown, but Ghulām Sarwar determines from an 
incomplete marginal note that it starts with Bijan. See Sarwar, History of Shah Isma’il Safawī, p. 9.   
838 Ross, p. 250.   
839 See Sarwar, p. 10. 
840 See Morton, “The Date and Attribution of Ross Anonymous. Notes on a Persian History of Shah Isma’īl 
I”, History and Literature in Iran: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P. W. Avery, ed. Charles 
Melville, Chambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1990, pp. 179-212. Also consider his “The 
Early Years of Shah Isma’il in the Afzal al-tavārikh and Elsewhere”, in Safavid Persia. The History and 
Politics of an Islamic Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, pp. 27-28.  
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without doubt, fiction, simply because of this feature it has a value of utmost importance 
for it perfectly reflects the qizilbash mentality and approaches.841  
Returning to the content, the first point to be realized is the position of Ismail in 
the qizilbash cosmology. As Glassen notices, he is depicted neither as God, nor as 
Prophet, but as a contemporary representative and deputy of twelfth Imam.842 His 
legitimacy and spiritual power rests on the blessing of the Hidden Imam, who 
commissioned Ismail to rise against the oppressors of the time, fastening, “with his own 
blessed hands”, Ismail’s girdle, taking his cap from his head and replacing it after he 
raised it, and putting his sword on his belt. Thus the ideological background of Ismail’s 
advent (huruj) rests on the assignment by the Hidden Imam; Ismail was appointed by the 
Hidden Imam as his deputy to fight against the enemy of the faith and to overcome the 
oppression all over the world. As Glassen puts, “Doch Schah Ismā’īl ist nur ein Glied in 
der Kette der Empörer gegen die unvollkommene muslimische Gessellschaft, die immer 
wieder ungerechten und glaubensschwachen Herrschern anheimfällt. Endgültiges Heil 
wird erst die Wiederkehr des verborgenen zwölften Imāms über die Welt bringen.”843 
Here I should draw attention to the role of the Anatolian disciples, who were 
represented by Dede Mohammed in the dream. Dede Muhammad witnessed the blessing 
of Ismail by the Lord of the Age. He had a present (imānat) to give to Ismail, the 
entrusted one of the Hidden Imam on the world. And lastly, the Hidden Imam gave the 
dagger of Ismail to Dede Muhammad giving him (to Ismail) his own sword. Ismail 
                                                 
841 One should remember that most of the Safavid chronicles, thus the history of qizilbashes, were written 
by Persian or ‘persianized’ bureaucrats rather than by qizlbashes themselves. Thus one can hardly 
penetrate to the mentality, world-view, sentiments, and the nature of religious thought of qizilbashes 
through these chronicles. All those Safavid chroniclers, starting with Khwandamir and even including 
Hasan Rumlu, who himself was son of a qizilbash, are apathetic with the cultural and ideological world of 
qizilbash Turkomans.  
842 Compare Glassen, p. 69.  
843 See Glassen, p. 69.  
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would conquer all Iran and Azarbaijan with this sword while Anatolian Turkomans 
would rise up with this dagger against Ottoman authority for the cause of Ismail. As a 
matter of fact, upon hearing of Ismail’s advent his Anatolian followers were excited so 
much, many of them pouring to his court in order to fight against ‘oppressors’. As will 
be evaluated below, these newly arriving qizilbash fighters constituted the backbone of 
Ismail’s army, with which he conquered the whole of Azarbaijan and Iran. In the vision 
of Dede Muhammad, these qizilbash troops joined him, especially in Arzinjan and later 
on, can be regarded as the sword that was fastened to the belt of Ismail by the Hidden 
Imam. On the other hand, the rest of the Safavid followers in Anatolia, who did not join 
Ismail’s army but stayed at their homes, undertook fifth-column activities in favor of the 
Safavid movement in Asia Minor. They gathered money among themselves for the 
Shah, provided logistic supply for Ismail’s forces whenever needed, eroded the Ottoman 
authority through several means, especially by means of insurrection. The rebellion of 
Shahkulu became the most greatest and most effective of those insurrections.844 In Dede 
Muhammad’s vision all these fifth-column activities and pro-Safavid rebellions are 
symbolized by the dagger of Ismail, which was taken from him, replaced by a sword, 
and given to Dede Muhammad, the representative of the Anatolian disciples, by the 
Twelfth Imam.  
In his analysis of the same vision, Rudi Paul Lindner rightly emphasizes on the 
nomadic and militant notions in the story, as well as the fifth-column role of the 
Anatolian followers. As he says, 
                                                 
844 Nonetheless, contemporary evidence does not clarify the exact nature of the connection between 
Shahkulu and Shah Ismail during the rebellion. Was this link merely limited to the ideological inspiration 
of Shahkulu as a Safavid khalif, and of the adherents of the rebellion of course, or was there a more 
concrete relation, such as taking orders from the Safavid center? The answer of this question needs further 
investigation to be elucidated. Compare Sohrweide, p. 148. For further details of this rebellion see 
“Shahkulu Rebellion” in the present study.  
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To the tribal following of the Safavi chief, Dede Muhammad’s dream revealed 
the intimate connection between their sheykh and the messianic fulfillment of 
their expectations. The hidden imam, the scarlet surroundings, the expected 
‘coming’ of a purging savior, the sanctification of swords and daggers, all these 
justify and urge on a militant audience. The head-dress distinguished them from 
an uninitiated enemy. These were men set apart by choice and a mission, … 
Ismail’s kızılbaş or ‘read-headed league’, among whom were the Rumlu and 
Tekeli tribes, were his earlier supporters, his army, forming a fifth column deep 
inside Ottoman  Anatolia. In this dream the Lord of the Ages approves the head-
dress, the ends, and the Anatolian means: he hands Ismail’s dagger to Dede 
Muhammad. This act does not simply imply approval for the dervish’s 
propaganda. It is a call to arms.845  
 
If we return to Dede Muhammad’s account, upon learning the identity of this 
Arab prince Dede Muhammad asks whether or not he could return and beg his blessings, 
kissing the feet of His Holiness. Nonetheless, being refused, he finds himself returned to 
the material world just behind the caravan that he missed. Putting aside Dede 
Muhammad’s account, Ross Anonymous returns back to Ismail and the Sufis on the 
other side of the river. The Sufis were waiting, in obedience to Ismail’s command, on 
the bank of the river near the forest. After two hours had passed in the midst of their 
anxiety, Ismail emerged from the forest “with dignity, with a sword attached to his 
girdle, but without his belt-dagger.” On seeing this, on realizing those ‘signs’ attached to 
the ‘Perfect Guide’, so much overcome were they with awe that the Sufis prostrated 
themselves before Ismail. Having all gathered round Ismail, they decided that it would 
be better to go to Ardabil by way of Tarum.846  
 
 
 
                                                 
845 Rudi Paul Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1983, p. 109.  
846 Ross Anonymous, p. 332.  
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5.2.  ISMAIL’S ASCENDANCE TO POWER, 1501 
 
5.2.1. The Erzincan Congregation: a Turning Point 
When Ismail rose up, the propaganda of Shaykh Junayd and Haidar had already created 
a vast social ground for the Safavid order in Anatolia. Thus his huruj from Lāhijan, and 
especially his coming to Erzincan created deep excitement among Anatolian disciples 
and sympathizers of the order. It must be because of this excitement of Anatolian 
population that Ottoman chroniclers, except Aşıkpaşazāde, first mention sufis of Ardabil 
in 1500, in the context of Ismail’s visit to Erzincan. In these histories, the earlier 
development of the qizilbash movement is usually summarized retrospectively while 
explaining Ismail’s huruj. But still they do not give a detailed account of events. Details 
of the struggle with Safavids usually emerge in Ottoman chronicles during the last years 
of Bayezid II, especially in reference to the famous Shahkulu rebellion. Before then they 
only refer tacitly to some events connected to the Safavid movement. Nonetheless, a 
careful reading of these chronicles reveals that at least by the advent of Shah Ismail in 
1500, Ottomans were quite aware of the rising danger from the east and even levied 
serious measures.  
Contemporary evidence confirms that even before 1500, the relationship between 
Ismail and his Anatolian disciples was intense. His deputies, called ‘halife’, were fairly 
active especially in qizilbash zones of Anatolia.847 On the one hand, they preached 
evolving doctrine and rites of the order and gained further adherents. On the other hand, 
they provided an excellent communication web that closely connected the disciples to 
                                                 
847 “Đsmail adamlarını ülkenin değişik kesimlerine gönderdi ve kararlarını her yere bildirdi. Bu yüzden her 
gün gittikçe daha çok insan onun yanına akın etti. Sonuçta etafında kısa bir müddet zarfında yaklaşık 
10.000 kişilik silahlı bir güç toplandı ve bu insanlarla bir sefer düzenledi.” ANMH, p. 38.  
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each other and to the center. Contemporary sources commonly reports that the main 
body of Ismail’s troops stemmed from the Turcoman tribes of Anatolia.848 Since the 
deputies (halife) of his ancestors were diffused in Anatolia, Hoca Saadeddin reports, 
Ismail’s disciples and ‘friends of ‘Ali’ proliferated very rapidly; their number was 
uncountable.849 Indeed, as Solakzāde points out, the overwhelming majority of Ardabil 
deputies were working in Anatolia850, for the main source of the ‘new type disciple’ 
existed there.  He sent letters to these Anatolian disciples ordering them to gather under 
his banner. Many people warmly welcomed Ismail’s invitation and flowed to his 
entourage.851  
Aşıkpaşazāde vividly describes the enthusiastic devotion of his disciples to 
Ismail.852 
Sonra Haydar’un bir oğlı dahī zāhir oldı, Đsmail adlu. Müridleri ana tābi oldılar. 
Şol kadar oldılar kim cemi’ memleketde olan müridleri birine buluşıcak 
‘selāmun alekkūm’ deyecek yerde ‘Şāh’ derler idi. Hastalarını görmeğe varıcak 
dua yerine ‘Şāh’ derler idi. Ve bu vilāyet-i Rūm’da olan müridlerine ehl-i sünnet 
eyidürler idi: ‘Bunca zahmet çaküb Ardabil’e varacağına Mekketullah’a 
varsanuz, Hazret-i Resūl sallallāhu ‘aleyhi ve sellemi ziyaret itsenüz yeğrekdür’ 
derler idi. Bunlar cevab virürler idi ki ‘Biz diriye varuruz ölüye varmazuz’ 
derler. Ve dahī biri birinin ağzına lafzıyile söğüb yürüler idi. Latīfeleri işbu 
vechileydi. Namaz dahī kılmazlar idi. Ve oruç dahī dutmazlar idi. Ve dahī rafza 
müte’allik kelimātı çok iderler idi. Velhāsıl rafzı āşıkāre eder oldılar. Memleket-i 
Rūm’da olan sofuların hülefāsını ve Ardabil’e varan sofuları Sultan Bayezid 
tahkīr idüb Rum Eli’ne sürdü. Đsmail dahī asker çeküb Tebriz’e yürüdü. Tebriz’in 
                                                 
848 See, for example, HSE3, 345; SLZ1, p. 428; ANMH, p. 45. Hans R. Roemer, in addition to many other 
scholars, stresses the nomadic way of life of these tribes and argues that the “elements were tied together 
not only by ethnic origin and a common language, but much more so by their way of living, namely 
nomadic features peculiar to their vast majority. … The Qizilbash are mostly descendants of Turcoman 
tribes who lived in smaller or bigger unions of federations, mainly as cattle-breeding nomads…” See Hans 
R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, Intellectual 
Studies in Islam, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 28. 
849 HSE3, p. 345 ; SLZ1, p. 428.  
850 SLZ1, p. 428. 
851 HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428. 
852 Aşıkpaşazāde was the first Ottoman historian who attributed religious heresy (rafaza) to the adherents 
of Safavid order during the opening years of the sixteenth century. I would like to remind that the last 
chapter of Aşıkpaşazāde’s history, which pertains to Junayd and later sufis of Ardabil, was finished in 
Safer 908 (August-September 1502), as recorded by Aşıkpaşazāde himself.  
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beği kaçdı. Tebriz’i yağma etdiler. Ehl-i sünnete hayli hakaretler eyledi. 
Müslümanlarun rızkını, malını ellerinden alub, biri birinin avradına tasarruf edüb 
helāldür derler idi.853   
 
Haniwaldanus Anonym demonstrates the role of both his ancestors’ propaganda 
and Ismail’s charisma in collecting so numerous disciples.854 Haniwaldanus Anonym 
also sheds light on the nature of the relationship between Ismail and his disciples, as 
well as the socio-cultural set up of Safavid adherents in Anatolia. The Anonymous 
history states that Ismail’s disciples loved him so much that when they would swear for 
something they swore on the head of the Shah.855 If a law was issues in the name of 
Shah everybody - man, woman, children, and elderly – obeyed; and if something was 
ordered in the name of the Shah they fulfilled it with great pleasure whatever it was. 
When to wish good health for somebody they said nothing other than ‘Let the Shah give 
                                                 
853 APZ, p. 251. Following verses also clearly show that APZ regards Ismail and his disciples as heretics.  
“Muradlar çokluğu gör şeyhi netdi 
Kuşandı safayiçün cehle gitdi. 
Kuşandı ihramı saraya gitmek, 
Ki yumdı gözini ol küfre gitdi. 
Husūsan bu şimdiki şeyh ü müridler, 
Kamunun ‘ilel hep kile bir nice gitdi. 
On iki terk deyüb geydi o şeyhler, 
Müridleri kamu yok sevdaya gitdi. 
‘Aşıkī sen ol beğle bölüğü, 
Ko ordıları rafza gitdi.” See APZ, p. 252; APZa, p. 269.   
854 “[Ismail decided to move from Geylan]. Ülkesinin bütün halkı hem ibadette, hem de dedesi Şeyh 
Cüneyd ve babası Haydar tarafından öğretilen dini kurallara uyduklarından ve dinî hayatın müstesna 
kişileri olan meşhur bu iki kişiye olan derin hürmetlerini muhafaza ettiklerinden, bu işi rahatlıkla 
başaracağını anladı. Bu büyük iki adamın torunu ve oğlu olan Đsmail’i onlar şayanı hayret bir sadakatle 
seviyor ve ona, ellerinden gelen hizmeti yapmaya her zaman için büyük bir zevkle hazır olduklarını 
gösteriyorlardı. Çünkü o, sadece babasının ve dedesinin şöhreti sayesinde itibar kazanmış değil, aynı 
zamanda kendi meziyeti sayesinde de üzerine aldığı bütün görevlerde, hatta övgüye değer bir takdirle, 
onları geçti. O kadar ki, delikanlılık yaşına rağmen, henüz çocukluk çağını atlatmış olmadığı halde, 
kendisine duyulan saygı ve hürmetten dolayı ona şeyh ünvanı verildi; zira her şeyden önce bu ünvan ona, 
dedesinin ve babasının izinden giderek onların düşündüklerine göre, insanlara gerçek ve doğru yolu, 
Allah yolunu gösteriyordu.” See ANMH, pp. 37-38.  
855 “Bütün halk Şah Đsmail’e karşı o kadar büyük bir sevgi besliyordu ki, herhangi bir şeyi yeminle 
doğrulamak istediklerinde Şah’ın başına yemin ederek bizzat doğruluğunu temin ederlerdi.” ANMH, p. 
39. 
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you what you wish, let what he gives bestow you with what you desire in your heart!’856 
Shah Ismail rearranged the worship, in a contradicting manner to the application of the 
Prophet Muhammed. Iranian people, in accordance to his orders, did no more respect; 
rather they cursed them. It is inscribed on one side of his tokens that ‘Lā ilāhe illāllāhu 
Muhammedün resulu’llāhi” and on the others side “Đsmailün halifetu’llāhi’.857 
The same source gives further details on the beliefs and religious practices of 
Ismail’s adherents. After narrating how numerous nomadic Turks (yörüks) of Anatolia, 
who are described as bandits, ran under the banner of Ismail our anonymous author talks 
about their religious stand. The new and latitudinarian religion established by Ismail was 
enthusiastically appropriated by these vagabond people. The freedom and indifference to 
the strict rules of the religion reached such a degree that - contradicting to the Islamic 
tradition - they even abandoned namaz and oruç.858 The following argument put forward 
by the anonymous author is quite interesting. He states, ‘put aside all the other factors, it 
is due to this reason [laxity in religious affairs] that numerous people from the Ottoman 
realm joined the ranks of Ismail.859  
At the beginning of the spring of 1500, having celebrated the festival of New 
Year’s Day (Nevruz) in Arjuwan860, Ismail left that place for Ardabil by the way of 
Gökçe Deniz.861 After paying a short visit to Ardabil he proceeded to Erzincan. On his 
way, Ismail spent a few days in the house of Sultan Husayn Bārānī, one of the grandsons 
                                                 
856 “Birine saadet temenni edilmek istendiğinde, ‘Şah arzunu yerine getirsin ve kalbindeki dileği ihsan 
etsin!’ sözünden başka bir şey söylemeye gerek yoktu.” ANMH, p. 39. 
857 ANMH, pp. 39-40. 
858 ANMH, p. 45. 
859 “Her şeyden önce bu sebepten dolayı Osmanlı vilāyetlerinden çok sayıda insan Şah Đsmail’in etrafında 
toplandı.” ANMH, p. 45.  
860 Ross Anonymous, p. 338. 
861 During the winter of 1499 / 1500, attmpts by both Akkoyunlu rulers and Shirvanshah Farukhyasar to 
seize or kill Ismail were made, but without success. See Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 25.  
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of Jahanshah Karakoyunlu, in Gökçe Deniz. Suspecting of evil intentions of his host, he 
left with his 1500 men at night for Chukur Sa’d and then moved to Dokuz Alam.862  
Khwandāmir reports that when the news of the young shaykh’s emergence 
spread, devotees from all parts of the world poured to his camp to pay homage. Among 
them were a group from Afşar of Araslu and another group from Dulkadır, both of 
whom joined Ismail in the Gökçe Deniz region.863 After a short while Qaracha Đlyas864, 
who had set out with a group of his followers from his homeland in Anatolia, appeared 
at the courtyard of Ismail.865 Having been plundered by a neighboring chief named 
Mentesh in Shoragil on his way, Qaracha Đlyas joined the royal camp in Doquz Alam.866 
The Karamanlu tribe had already met their leader Rüstem Beg and his nephew Bayram 
Beg, who were among sufis of Lāhijan, and joined Ismail’s forces on the plain of 
Moghan at the beginning of the year.867 Being reinforced by newly arriving qizilbash 
fighters Ismail set out for Terjan on the Qaghizman road, and from there he proceeded to 
the summer-quarters of Sarukaya868, inhabited by the Ustaclu tribe. Ismail spent two 
months of the summer of 1500 in Sarukaya, a summer pasture (yaylak) at the south of 
Terjan.869 There he also spent a few days in the house (tent) of Oglan Ummat from the 
Ustaclu tribe. Here the Ustaclu tribe gathered around Ismail with their men and 
                                                 
862 HS, p. 571; HT, pp. 177-81; HR, pp. 42-3; Sarwar, p. 34; Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 18. 
863 Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 9 ; Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 26. 
864 According to HT, he was from Bayburdlu tribe. See HT, p. 182. 
865 HS, p. 571; HT, p. 182; Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 18. 
866 HS, p. 571; HR, p. 44; Sarwar, p. 34; Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhejān”, p. 8.   
867 Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhejān”, p. 8.; “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 9 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les 
Qizilbāš, p. 76.    
868 Some sources mention certain summer-quarter called Sangikul apart from Sarukaya. (HT, p. 182; 
Sarwar, p. 34.) But this place must be a sub-region in the pasture-land (yaylak) of Sarukaya. 
869 HT, p. 182; Sarwar, p. 34; Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 10 ; Sümer, Safevî Devletinin 
Kuruluşu, p. 18. A heroic deed of Ismail performed in this summer pasture is recited by Safavid 
chroniclers. According to the legendary report, in the vicinity there was a fierce bear attacking all passers-
by and nobody could kill him. In spite of his young age Ismail proved his bravery by slaying this 
formidable bear. Then Ismail proceeded to Erzincan. See HS, p. 571; HT, pp. 183-4; HR, pp. 44-5. 
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women.870  Qādi Ahmed Qumī gives further details about this meeting: while staying at 
the camp of the Ustaclu tribe, the leaders of this tribe came to the court of Ismail and 
paid their homage. Their families and possessions were also with them at the camp. The 
conversation between the tribal leaders and the Shah ended with the decision that their 
families would not come with the army, for the security of the women, children, elders, 
and possessions would create additional problems during the combat and would be sent 
to the Ottoman territories in Anatolia. A request to the Ottoman authorities made for the 
transhumance of the Ustaclu women, elders, and children.871 Upon receiving approval 
they inhabited in the region Sivas-Tokat-Amasya.872  
This exemplary case, of Ustaclu tribe, must be valid similarly for the other tribes 
of Anatolia as well. The fighter human sources of these Turkoman nomadic tribes joined 
Ismail’s army while the rest of the tribes - i.e women, elders, children, animals, and 
other properties – were left behind in the Ottoman territories. The former group 
constituted a tribal military aristocracy in the Safavid state after 1501. The military 
aristocracy of each tribe, under their own tribal leader, were running Safavid provinces 
(ulkā) bestowed upon them as prebend called “tiyul”.873 Thus the connection and 
                                                 
870 HS, p. 571; HR, pp. 44-5; Sarwar, p. 34; Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, pp. 
85-6.   
871 Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 9-10, 29. HT says Ismail wrote a letter to Bayezid II for this. 
See HT, pp. 175-6. Sümer cites the same account from Gaffārī’s Tārih-i cihān-ārā and Oktay Efendiev 
from Eli Zeynelabidin’s Tekmilatü’l-Ahbar. See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 18; Oktay 
Efendiyev, “Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah Đsmail”, XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri, Ankara: TTK, 2002, 
p. 90.  
872 Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 54.  
873 See Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 29-31. As Roger Savory rightly points out, qizilbash 
amirs were governing provinces with a certain degree of autonomy, having their own provincial vizier, 
sadr, wakil, and other officials. Savory underscores that the provincial administration of the Safavid state 
was almost exclusively – the only exception was Qādi Muhammad Kāshānī who was appointed sadr in 
909 / 1503-4 and later promoted to the governorship of Yazd, where he was put to death in 915 / 1509-10 
because of his abuse of the extraordinary power in his hands – run by qizilbash amirs. Savory puts it as 
follows: “The government of the provinces of the Safawid empire during the early period was allotted to 
qizilbash amirs, who ruled as pretty princes in their provinces. These assignments were known by the 
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communication between fighting qizilbash troops in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq, and their 
relatives in Anatolia became one of the vital issues for qizilbashes. As will be 
scrutinized below, especially by the year 1501, when Ismail captured the temporal 
power, the policy of the Ottoman government focused on cutting the connection between 
the two sides off.  
Likewise, when heard that Ustaclu tribe had gathered at the court of the Shah, the 
other qizilbash oymaqs, especially from Rūm (Anatolia), Shām, Dulkadir, and 
Diyarbekir, poured to the courtyard of Ismail.874 In the depiction of a modern scholar, 
“The Safawid murīds responded to the call of their leader with enthusiasm, even 
fanaticism.”875 Two additional anecdotes, in addition to the case of Ustaclu, vividly 
illustrate the spirit and enthusiasm of early qizilbashes during the early years of Ismail. 
Qādī Ahmad Qumī on the authority of Shahkulu Khalifa Muhrdar says, the devotion of 
Ismail’s followers was in such a degree that one of them (said to have been from the 
Dulkadir tribe), who heard the news that Ismail had arrived in Erzincan during his 
wedding night, immediately left the bride in the tent, without touching her, and went to 
join the army of the Shah.876 The second anecdote is again related to the Dulkadir tribe. 
Jawāhir al-Akhbār, again on the authority of Shahkulu Khalifa Muhrdar, states, “the 
fermān of the pādishāh (Ismā’īl) was brought to the Dulkadir tribe, stating that he 
needed their help and was marching against Alauddevle Dulkadir (913/1507); if they 
                                                                                                                                                
general term tiyūl. The governor, and the troops which he was obliged to maintain and muster when 
required, consumed the greater part of the revenue; a part only, in the form of presents and certain dues, 
was given to the king. They (the governors) were able to sub-assign the area under them and had complete 
control.” See Roger M. Savory, “Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safawid 
Empire”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXVII, London, 1964, p. 115. 
874 HT, p. 176. But HT mentions these events as if occurred before Ismail’s move to Gökçe Deniz.  
875 Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 85. 
876 HT, p. 184. The same story is recorded in some other Safavid sources as well. See Youssef-Jamālī, The 
Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I, p. 59.  
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wished to demonstrate the true devotion, let them heed the order (hükm) the moment 
they received it. The order reached them in the late afternoon. By  sunset, 5.000 men of 
this tribe had mounted.”877  
In accordance to the decision taken in the previous summer, Safavid disciples 
gathered in Erzincan under Ismail’s banner. By the time followers from the Shamlu, 
Ustaclu, Rūmlu, Tekelu, Dulkadirlu878, Afshar879, Qajar880, and Varsaq tribes, and sufis 
from Karacadağ881 had joined him in this place, the size of the Safavid army had reached 
seven thousand men.882 Among those new-comers were Muhammad Beg Ustaclu and 
                                                 
877 Quoted in Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 86.  
878 Of course this was a group from the Dulkadir tribe, which was ruling in the region of Maraş, Elbistan, 
and Harput under Alāuddevle Beg. It seems from available evidence that Alāuddevle did not, or could not, 
apply any effective measure against a certain branch of his tribe’s adherence to the qizilbash movement. 
Following his death in 1515, the Dulkadir tribe is said to have divided into three parts: One went to Sultan 
Selim, the other to Shah Ismail, and the third group to Ubayd Khan Uzbak. See Muhammad Karim 
Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I (1487-1524), Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Edinburgh, 1981, p. 58. For further reading on Dulkadirlu tribe see Mükremin H. Yinanç, “Dulkadırlılar”, 
IA, vol. 3, 654-62; Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, edited and published by Mir Hāşim Muhaddes, Tehran, 1361 
(1982), pp. 49-51.   
879 For Afshar tribe see M. Fuad Köprülü, “Afshar”, EI2; “Afşar”, IA, vol. 2, 28-38; Faruk Sümer, 
“Afşarlar’a Dair”, Fuad Köprülü Armağanı, Đstanbul, 1953, 453-78.  
880 According to Faruk Sümer, Qajars came from the Boz-ok region (Yozgat) in Anatolia to Gence in 
northern Azerbaijan towards the end of the fifteenth century. Among the most prominent disciples and 
amirs of of Shaykh Haydar was Pīrī Beg Qajar. However during the same period another branch of the 
Qajar tribe served Akkoyunlu rulers. Later on, following Shah Ismail’s seizure of the power they fully 
joined Qizilbash troops. Nonetheless, their achievement of primary rank in the state affairs of the Safavids 
would occur under Shah Tahmasb. See Faruk Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde 
Anadolu Türkmenlerinin Rolü, Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 12, 53-4, 96-8. For further reading on Qajar tribe, 
see Faruk Sümer, “Kadjar”, EI2; M. Longworth-Dames and B. Darkot, “Kaçar (Kacar)”, IA, vol. 6, 33-9; 
James J. Reid, “The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722”, Iranian Studies, 11, 1978, 117-43; 
Robert D. McChesney, “Comments on the ‘The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722’”, Iranian 
Studies, 14, 1981, 87-105. 
881 See, for example, HT, p. 184. Karacadağ is a mountainous region in the north of Tabriz, between 
Tabriz and Aras River.  
882 This force constituted the essential core of the Safavid army, which would conquer the whole of 
Azerbaijan, Iran, as well as Iraq in ten years. Compare Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 10-11; 
Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31. Almost all of the early Safavid sources agree on 
this number. Iskender Munshī, who frequently refers to those early sources such as HS and HR, however, 
interestingly gives the number as three of four thousand. He also says that those sufis came from “Syria, 
Diyarbakr, Sivas, Bayburd, and those regions.” See AA, p. 43.  
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Abdi Beg Shamlu with 200 and 300 fighters from their tribes respectively.883 An 
anonymous history of Shah Ismail recounts the agglomeration of qizilbash tribes in 
Erzincan as follows,  
After Ismail’s arrival to Erzincan, chiefs of the tribes, and leading sufis and 
khalifas of the family of the Imām from Syria, Anatolia, Karaman, and from the 
region around Erzincan came to the royal court. Day after day the number of 
gāzis augmented… After sufis from diverse regions arrived, the tribes 
assembled; and the tribes of the Shamlu, the Ustaclu, the Rūmlu, the Tekelu, the 
Dulkadir, the Afshar, the Varsaq, and the sufis from Karacadağ, as well as 
Muhammad Beg Ustaclu with 200 men from his clan and ‘Abdi Beg Shamlu 
with 300 men from his clan, had the honor of kissing the noble feet. Among them 
the Seigneur of the fortunate conjunction chose 7.000 young sufis884 who had the 
same sentiment and the same objective.885   
 
The point of eminence to be stressed here is that except the Shamlu, which was 
from northern Syria-eastern Anatolia, and the Qajar from Azerbayjan886, these tribes 
were all from Anatolia; and almost all were nomadic Turkomans.887 Among the 
seventeen prominent qizilbash āmirs marching on Shirvan, records Safavid sources, 
there were two Shamlu, two Ustaclu, two Karamanlu, one Bayburdlu, one Hınıslu, one 
Tekelu, one Çekirlu, one Qajar, one Dulkadirlu, and five Afshar.888 During the campaign 
                                                 
883 HR, p. 51. Also consider Sarwar, p. 35. HS interestingly does not mention the reinforcement of 
Ismail’s army by the sufi fighters from these prominent qizilbash tribes in Erzincan. He narrates as if 
Ismail headed towards Shirvan after spending two months in Sarukaya.  
884 This phrase is very interesting. If we rely of this account, the number of qizilbashes summoned in 
Erzincan pastureland was greater then 7000. But Ismail and his prominent amirs chose among them those 
who were most alike fighters. The anonymous history also underlines the focused sentiment and 
ideological alignment of these fighters.  
885 Quoted in Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, pp. 63-64. This is the anonym history housed in British 
Library, Or. 3248, and is used by Denison Ross (Denison E. Ross, “The early years of Shah Ismail, 
founder of the Safavi Dynasty”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, XXVIII, 1896, 249-340.). But Ross 
did not publish this part of the manuscript in his article.   
886 See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, pp. 56-7. Nonetheless, as indicated above their origin was central Anatolia, 
namely Boz-ok region.  
887 As Roemer determines, “on the whole, the non-Turkish Qizilbash [including Persian men of pen such 
as Najm-i Sani and Najmu’d-din Gilānī] were not only in the minority, but were even rare exceptions.” 
See Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 29. For further reading on the origins of these tribes see 
Faruk Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, especially pp. 43-56. Also compare Savory, “The Consolidation 
of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 92.  
888 Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 11. Efendiev recites the names of these amirs from Futuhāt-ı 
Şāhī as follows, Abidin Beg Shamlu, Husayn Beg Lala Shamlu, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Ahmed Beg 
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on Shirvan, Bayram Beg Karamanlu commanded the troops of the Tekelu and the 
Dulkadir tribes.889 During the war with Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar, the Shamlu tribe 
constituted the right wing and Ustaclu tribe constituted the left wing of the Safavid 
army,890 while the Tekelu, Rumlu, and Dulkadir tribes were avant-garde.891 The 
qizilbash army which defeated Alvand Mirza in 1501 was almost exclusively composed 
of these qizilbash oymaqs.892   
To sum up, it is not an exaggeration when Efendiev states that, “L’État safavide 
fut donc crée par l’aristocratie féodale des ces tribus kızılbaš de langue turque.”893 
Masashi Haneda, who conducted a detailed study on the military of the early Safavid 
state, concludes that although there were certain religious figures and statesmen of 
Persian origin, the portion of Iranian element in the early Safavid army is almost 
negligible; he rather underlines the tribal and Turkoman character of this army. As he 
puts, “Il ne serait donc pas exagéré de dire que l’armée safavide se composa, en gros, de 
tribus turkmènes. En effet, l’existence de gens issus de tribus dans l’armée y apporte 
                                                                                                                                                
Sufioğlu Ustaclu, Bayram Beg Qaramanlu, Kılığ Beg Qaramanlu, Qaraca Đlyas Bayburdlu, Đlyas Beg 
Hınıslu, Sultanshah Beg Afshar, Dana Beg Afshar, Halil Beg Muhurdār Afshar, Husayn Beg Sofracı 
Afshar, Lala Muhammad Tekelu, Bekir Beg Çakirlu, Pīrī Beg Qajar, Pīrī Beg Pervāneci Afshar, Salman 
Beg Hāzin Dukadir. See Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31. 
889 Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, pp. 30-31. 
890 Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 11 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 66.  
891 Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 31.  
892 For detailed analysis of Ismail’s army in the early battles, such as that against Shirvanshah, Alvand, 
Murad, Shaybānī Han, and Sultan Selim, see Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, especially pp. 29-47.  
893 Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 33. For a similar approach, which put primary 
stress on the role of Turkoman tribes in the forming of Safavid Military, thus in foundation of the, state 
see Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, pp. 
27-9. Roemer writes, “Obviously, the appearance and success of the Qizilbash are primarily to be related 
to the Turkomans. … First of all, the Safavid state, founded by Shah Ismail, was a Turcoman 
achievement.” Also see Irène Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, trs. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: 
Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, p. 174.  
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quelques caractéristiques typiquement tribales. Lé système des deux ailes existe.894 Les 
troupes se composent des unités tribales.”895  
If we look at the geographical origin of the prominent qizilbash tribes, the very 
eminent link between the movement and the Ottoman Anatolia appears. Among those 
tribes, the Ustaclu, which had already associated with the campaigns of Shaykh Haydar 
on Caucasus, and played an active role during the rise of Shah Ismail,896 was stemmed 
from Ulu Yörük, a great nomadic group living in the region of Sivas-Amasya-Tokat and 
Kırşehir. In the later Ottoman surveys, towards the end of the sixteenth century, we still 
come across the Ustaclu clan among the Ulu Yörük nomads. But their number was then 
quite reduced.897 As mentioned above, Ismail visited their summer pasture and stayed 
there for two months just before the Erzincan congregation. This oymaq produced a 
number of very influential war lords such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu, his brother 
Karahan, and Çayan Sultan.898 
Another very important qizilbash tribe serving Shah Ismail, the Shamlu, was 
composed of nomadic Turkomans from Halep Türkmenleri, so called in the Ottoman 
official registers, which were grazing their herd in Uzun-Yayla, in the south of Sivas, 
                                                 
894 Following the Turko-Mongolian tradition, the Safavid army used to organize as two wings and a center 
in battlefields. If the shah was present, he stayed at the center with dignitaries such as religious 
representatives and statesmen. The right wing had always been dominated by the Shamlu tribe while the 
left wing had been dominated by Ustaclu. Apart from Shamlu, Rūmlu, Tekelu, and Turkmān tribes used to 
fight in the right wing, while Dulkadir, Afshar, and Qajar tribes used to fight in the left wing. For a 
detailed analysis of the organization of the Savafid army based on the Safavid chronicles see Haneda, Le 
Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 48-61. 
895 Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 47. 
896 Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhejān”, p. 9. 
897 See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 44. For Ulu Yörük see Erhan Afyoncu, “Ulu Yörük (1485-
1574)”, Anadolu’da ve Rumeli’de Yörükler ve Türkmenler Sempozyumu Bildirileri, haz. Tufan Gündüz, 
Ankara, 2000, 1-7. 
898 See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, pp. 45-9.  
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and spending the winter-season in the vicinity of Antep and Halep.899 The earliest record 
about Shamlu Turkomans traces back to the late fourteenth century. Bezm u Rezm, the 
history of Kadı Burhaneddin, mentions them grazing their herds in the summer pastures 
(yaylak) near Sivas-Kösedağ.900 Their adherence to the order traces back to Shaykh 
Junayd’s visit of the region half a century ago. And since then the Shamlu tribe had 
became one of the main pedestals of the Safavid order. Husayn Beg Lala, Abdi (Abidin) 
Beg, his son Durmuş Han were some of the influential āmirs of this tribe.  
Among the qizilbash tribes in Ismail’s retinue, the origin of Karamanlu oymaq is 
perhaps the vaguest one. According to Faruk Sümer, they had no connection with the 
Karaman-oğlu tribe of Anatolia, but did have one with an indigenous Turkoman tribe of 
the Errān region, in the north of Azerbaijan, since the time of Karakoyunlu. The name 
was seemingly derived from their eponymous leader Emir Karaman, who governed 
Gence and Berda’ during the rule of Kara-Yusuf of Karakoyunlu (late fourteenth- and 
early fifteenth century, d. 1420). Before the rise of Safavids, this tribe served in the 
Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu armies.901 Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān confirms Sümer’s 
suggestion.902 It counts Karamanlu among Akkoyunlu (ex-Karakoyunlu) oymaqs and 
describes Emir Karaman the greatest among emirs under Kara Yusuf. Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān 
also mentions Bayram Beg Karamanlu, saying he was the governor of Balkh during the 
                                                 
899 See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, p. 8-11; Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 44; “XVI. Asırda Anadolu, 
Suriye ve Irak’ta yaşayan Türk aşîretlerine umumî bir bakış”, Đstanbul Üniversitesi Đktisat Fakültesi 
Mecmuası, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-1950, pp. 511-513, 517; Đlhan Şahin, “XVI. Asırda Halep Türkmenleri”, in 
his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, pp. 131-133; “XVI. Yüzyılda Halep ve 
Yeniil Türkmenleri”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, pp. 156-8. 
900 See Aziz b. Erdeşir-i Esterâbadî, Bezm u Rezm, translated into Turkish by Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara, 
1990, p. 303. Bezm u Rezm is a Persian history of Kadı Burhaneddin, who ruled Sivas and the region 
around in the period between the years 1381 and 1398, and written in 1398. The author was the court 
historian of Kadı Burhaneddin and reported most of the events on his eye witness, which enhances the 
value of his history. 
901 See Faruk Sümer, Kara Koyunlular, I, Ankara, TTK, 1992, pp.26-7; Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, pp. 
12, 54, 106-7.  
902 It should be noted that Faruk Sümer did not use this source.  
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reign of Shah Ismail, married the sister of the shah, and died in the battle of Gujduwan 
with Necm-i Sāni.903  
However, a fifteenth century Anatolian source shows Bayram Beg and his oymaq 
as a branch of Karamanoğulları, which ruled central and southern Anatolia for nearly 
two centuries. We learn from Şikârî’s Karaman-nâme that when Karamanoğlu Kasım 
Bey was killed and the Karaman rule in the central Anatolia had ended by the Ottomans 
in 1483,904 most of former Karaman begs entered into the service of the Ottoman 
dynasty. However, Kasım Bey’s commander in-chief (çeri-başı) Pir Bayram and two 
other prominent Karaman generals, namely Kökezoğlu and Esed Çelebi, refused the 
Ottoman suzerainty. They, with a group of warriors, became brigands conducting 
banditry in several regions including Maraş, Halep, Amid, and Humus.905 On the other 
hand, says Şikârî, Shah Ismail rose up with claim of temporal power, also arguing the 
revenge of his father and grand-father. He gathered an army of 4.000 men from artisans 
and craftsmen. However, one of his wise counselors opposed him arguing that these men 
could not be soldiers and it was impossible to avenge for Shaykh Haydar with them. The 
soldier must be experienced in battle and cut off heads.906 Acknowledging his counselor 
                                                 
903 Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, pp. 37-8.  
904 Kasım Bey was the son of Qaramanoğlu Đbrahim Bey. Following the death of Đbrahim Bey in 1464, 
taking advantage of internal struggle between Qaraman princes, Ottoma troops invaded Qaraman 
territories, mortally demaging the Qaraman rule in the region. During the civil war between Prince Cem 
and Bayezid II, Kasım Bey fought in the ranks of Cem against Bayezid II’s troops. Following Cem’s 
defeat he made a deal with Bayezid II and governed Đçel region as a vassal of Bayezid II. His death in 
1483 marked the end of Qaraman rule in Anatolia. According to Şikârî, he, with his three sons, was 
poisoned by Bayezid II. See Şihâbeddin Tekindağ, “Qaramanlılar”, IA, vol. 6, pp. 326-7. Also consider 
Faruk Sümer, “Karāmān-oghullari”, EI2. 
905 Şikârî, Şikâri’nin Qaramanoğulları Tarihi, haz. Mes’ud Koman, Konya: Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946, p. 
206. A more carefully prepared edition of Qaraman-nâme was recently published by Metin Sözen and 
Necdet Sakaoğlu. However, the ebove cited part, which constituted the last paragraphs of Qaraman-nâme, 
does not exist in the manuscript they used. See Şikârî, Qaramannâme, [Zamanın Kahramanı 
Qaramanîlerin Tarihi], Metin Sözen-Necdet Sakaoğlu, eds., Đstanbul, 2005.  
906 “... Böyle asker ile Şayh Hayder’in kanın alamazsın. Asker cenk görmüş, baş kesmiş bahadır gerekdir”. 
See Şikârî, p. 207. 
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to be right, Ismail decided to return to Gilan. At that moment one of his men informed 
Ismail about a war-lord, who refuted the Ottoman rule and had good profession in the art 
of war: “Ol adem eyder: ‘Karaman Oğlu henüz vefat eyledi. Üç serdar ile bahadır bin 
erleri vardır. Muttasıl erbabı cenkdir [sic], Osman Oğluna tâbi olmadılar. Eğer 
gelirlerse dünyada anın gibi asker olmaz. Birisi kırk bine yetişir. Serdarlarına Pir 
Bayram dirler.’” Then Ismail sent a letter to Bayram Beg and Kökezoğlu, who received 
it in Tekür Yaylağı. Şikâri’s account runs, 
Mektup yazub Meges ile Karamanoğlu askerine gönderdi, gelüb Tekür 
Yaylağında bulub, Pir Bayram’a ve Kökez’e mektubu virdi. Açub okudu, 
dimişki: “Senki Pir Bayram’sın! Đşittim, şahınız vefat itmiş, .... kalmamış, Osman 
Oğluna tabî olmamışsız. Lütf idüb gelüb bana asker olasız, size küllî riayet 
iderim.” Pir Bayram beylerle müşavere idüb Aceme gitmesin makul gördüler. 
Bin erle Kökez, altı bin erle Pir Bayram kalkub, Şahı Acem’e [sic] gelüb, Şah 
bunlara azim riayet idüb, varub Tebriz’i Şah’a alıvirdiler. Horasan cenginde 
Kökez’i ve Bayram’ı ahz idüb helak itdiler.907     
 
Şikâri’s account evidently includes a number of historical errors, thus can not be 
used mot à mot as history; a careful criticism of this account is necessary.908 Besides all 
its deficiencies, however, the very strong point in his account is that it clearly reflects 
one of the fundamental changes in the political scene of Anatolia in the second half of 
the fifteenth century: the traditional Turko-Mongolian political system of tribal 
confederation, which clamped around the Karaman dynasty, failed and totally dissolved 
against the developing bureaucratic empire of the Ottomans. Still more valuable point of 
Şikâri’s account for the purpose of the present study is that following the dissolution of 
the tribal confederation as an effective political and military power, some actors of this 
                                                 
907 Şikârî, pp. 207-208. Bayram Beg Qaramanlu was killed during the battle against Uzbeks in Gujdavān, a 
city in Tranxoxiana, in 1512. See HS, p. 598. Şikârî interestingly does not mention Rüstem Beg 
Qaramanlu.  
908 Whether the story recited here is true or not, it surely indicates some historical facts; as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the connection between Shah Ismail and Qaramanlu tribes of Anatolia is 
envisaged by archival evidence.  
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traditional structure, who were not incorporated into the Ottoman system, resisted 
against Ottoman ‘imperialism’ and sought another powerful axis to save themselves 
from being swallowed by the Ottoman regime. The new synthesis of the Turkoman way 
of life and Islamic mysticism rising in the east, the Safavid movement, became exactly 
the fulcrum of these tribes against the increasing Ottoman power in Anatolia. In addition 
to the case of Bayram Beg Karamanlu, we see the same situation in the Turgut, Varsak, 
and other tribes of Tas-ili region as well.  
Fadlullah b. Ruzbihāni says most of the adherents of Junayd and Haidar were 
coming from Rūm.909 No doubt Ruzbihāni means Anatolia by the word “Rum”. In the 
more specific connotation, however, the Ottoman Province of Rum was a major 
qizilbash zone as well. As a matter of fact, one of the greatest tribal groups in the 
Safavid ranks were the Rumlu, which was composed of sufis from the Province of 
Rum910 - i.e Sivas, Şebinkarahisar, Tokat, Amasya, Canik, Çorum.911 Sohrweide has 
doubts on whether or not the people bearing this name all came from the Ottoman 
Province of Rum, even though considerable portion of them plausibly were.912 
Nonetheless, Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān clearly writes that this oymaq was composed of 
qizilbashes from Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, Karahisar, and Tercan.913 
                                                 
909 TA, p. 61.  
910 For the borders of the Province of Rum within the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire see 
Tayyip Gökbilgin, “15 ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm”, Vakıflar Dergisi, VI, 1965, 51-61.  
911 Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 43. 
912 Sohrweide, p. 137. Sohrweide underlines three peculiarities of this province: 1) it had been the center 
of gâzi milieu tracing down from Danişmend Turkomans, 2) it was the frontier province between Ottoman 
and Safavid states, and 3) it was on the main trade roads connecting the East to Constantinople. See 
Sohrweide, pp. 134-5. 
913 Indeed, Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān mentions two oymaqs: Rumlu and Hınıslu oymaqs. According to Tarīh-i 
Kızılbaşān the members of the former were from Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, and neighboring regions, which 
correspnds to the Province of Rum in the Ottoman administrative division, while the latter was composed 
of tribal people from Karahisar and Tercan. Nonetheless others must have regarded Hınıslu as a sub-clan 
in Rumlu oymaq that they refer to the great amirs like Div Ali, Nur Ali Sultan, whom Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān 
mention with affiliation to Hınıslu, as Rumlu. An interesting point in the account of Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān 
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As for the other tribes, members of the Tekelu came from the Teke region.914 
The Varsaq915 tribe was living in the region of Adana-Tarsus, and the Turgud916 were in 
the Karaman and Taş-eli region. Afshar was a great Turkoman tribe scattered in 
Anatolia (Rūm), Azerbaijan, Fars, Persian Iraq, Kirman, Khorasan, and Arabian Iraq.917 
To conclude, it obviously appears that an overwhelming majority of Ismail’s followers 
were coming from the Ottoman territories.918 
There is a complete list of Ismail’s army, possibly during the battle of 
Çaldıran919, in Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman920 housed in Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi. 
Şahnāme says when Shah Ismail rose up, a great number of people from several 
countries gathered around him. Then the Shah assigned a person as the leader of each 
                                                                                                                                                
pertaining to Rumlu is that only for this oymaq it needs to bring an expression that some of this oymaq 
were nomads and some of them were sedentary. See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, pp. 11, 25-6.  
914 Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān gives the homeland of this oymaq as Menteşe Đli, Aydın Đli, Hamid Đli, and 
Germiyan Đli. See Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, p. 27. After 11 years, the qizilbashes of Teke would revolt against 
the Ottoman authority in the name of the Shah. This revolt will be evaluated in detail.   
915 It is said that several folk-singers at Shah Ismail’s court used to sing Varsaqī songs in order to arose the 
motivation of warriors. See Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I, p. 60. Faruk 
Sümer states it is recorded with red ink in the Ottoman survey registers (tahrir) during the reign of 
Suleyman the Magnificent that many Varsaq from the region of Adana and Taurus became qizilbash and 
went to Iran. See Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, p. 50; Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, p. 40. For further reading 
on Varsaq see Faruk Sümer, “Çukur-Ova Tarihine Dâir Araştırmalar”, Tarih Araştırmaları, I, sayı. I, 70-
98; Ali Sinan Bilgili, Osmanlı döneminde Tarsus Sancağı ve Tarsus Türkmenleri: sosyo-ekonomik tarih, 
Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001; idem, “Tarsus Türkmenleri (Varsaklar)”, Anadolu’da ve 
Rumeli’de Yörükler ve Türkmenler Sempozyumu Bildirileri, haz. Tufan Gündüz, Ankara, 2000, 9-49; Đlhan 
Şahin, “Kırşehir Bölgesinde Varsaklar”, in his Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler, Đstanbul: Eren, 2006, 
165-172. 
916 For further reading on Turgud see M. Zeki Oral, “Turgut oğulları, eserleri-vakfiyeleri”, Vakıflar 
Dergisi, 3, 1956, 31-64; “Turgut oğulları”, IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 1948, Ankara, 1952, 140-158; Faruk 
Sümer,  “Turgutlular”, IA. 
917 Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, pp. 98-100; Youssef-Jamālī, The Life and Personality of Shāh 
Ismā’īl I, p. 54. (Quotes from Bustān al-Siyāha); Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān, pp. 51-6.   
918 For further discussion of geographical, cultural, and ethnical origins of those tribes constituting the 
backbone of Ismail’s army see Sümer, Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu, pp. 43-56; Youssef-Jamālī, The Life 
and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I, pp. 48-64.  
919 See footnotes below.  
920 Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārī eş-şehir bī Ta’līkī-zāde, Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman, manuscript, Topkapı 
Sarayı Kütüphanesi, III. Ahmed Kitaplığı, 3592. Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman, alias Şemāilnāme-i Āl-i Osman is 
a book devoted to explaining the virtues of the Ottoman Sultans until Murad III (1574-95). The author 
writes his name in fol. 9a as Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārī eş-şehir bī Ta’līkī-zāde. He says he was 
assigned as court historian (şehnâmeci) by Murad III. Thus his work must have been completed in the 
period between 1574 and 1595. Ta’līkī-zāde died in 1599-1600. See Fehmi Edhem Karatay, Topkapı 
Sarayı Müzesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu, Đstanbul, 1961, p. 371.  
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arriving group (tribe or oymaq) and the others were put under his command. By this 
way, the Shah founded his army.921 According to Şahnāme, Ismail’s army was 
composed of a total of seventeen oymaqs, each providing Kurçis922 and ordinary soldiers 
to the army. The complete list is given in Table 5.1.923  
 
 
 
Table 5.1. The List of Qizilbash Oymaqs 
 
                                                 
921 Şahnāme, fol. 87a.  
922 For “Kurçi”, see following paragraph.  
923 See Şahnāme, fols. 87a-87b.  
OYMAQ NEFERAN KURÇIYAN 
Ustaclu 6100 400 
Ekrad-ı Seyyid Mansur 845 150 
Afşar 7400 400 
Bayburtlu 375 400 
Bayatlu 1500   
Tekelü 5000 300 
Ereşlu ve Talişlu 6500 150 
Türkman 6700 400 
Çepni (neferan+kurçiyan) 1300   
Hacılar   1200 
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Şahnāme, without specifying time and space, says that Shah Ismail had in total 
54.000 soldiers.925 His army was composed of two essentially different kinds of 
troops.926 One consisted of the Shah’s immediate retinue (kapıkulu) receiving their 
salary directly from the Shah. They were called Kurçi or Korucu. The other part of the 
army was composed of the (tribal) retinues or oymaq soldiers of Qizilbash khans (tribal 
leaders). Şahnāme states that at the head of each oymaqs was a han and some three or 
four sultans. These khans were governing provinces and possessed tax revenues; and 
they had their fellow tribal troops under their command, which constituted the main 
                                                 
924 An archival document dated July 21, 1516 (TSA, document E 11996) says, “During the battle of 
Caldiran the shah had three thousand kurçis. Later the number of kurçis reduced to one thousand and 
seven hundred. Now [in June 1516] he there left one thousand kurçis.” This document gives a list of the 
qizilbash army, indicating each amir with the number of soldiers they commanded. According to this 
document the overal total was approximately eighteen thousand soldiers. It is not clear in the document 
whether this was the inventory of the whole qizilbash army or of one bunch of it. When compared to other 
contemporary sources, however, it clearly appears that this must have been the inventory of only one 
bunch of the Safavid army.  
925 According to the list above, the size of Safavid army appears 57870 soldiers in total. This number 
seems compatible with the other Ottoman sources describing the Safavid army during the Battle of 
Caldiran. However, it should be noted here that this was not the whole of Safavid army for “large 
qizilbash forces were tied down on the eastern marches of the the Safawid empire, where some of the 
leading qizilbash amīrs remained at their posts to guard against a sudden Uzbeg incursion into Khurāsan: - 
these included Dīw Sultān at Balkh, Zaynal Khān Shāmlū at Harāt, and Amīr Sultan Mawsillū at Qāyin.” 
See Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, p. 87.   
926 As one would immediately note, the immediate retinue of the Shah, the Kurçi, was also composed of 
tribal soldiers. Furthermore, the Kurçi troops of each tribe were most probably had their own tribal 
commander directly responsible towards the Shah.  
Şamlu 5100 400 
Dulkadirlü 6300 500 
Arapkirlü 1000   
Garipler 350   
Kaçar 3300 300 
Karadağlı (neferan+kurçiyan) 1000   
Varsak   500 
TOTAL 52770 5100924 
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body of the Safavid army. Each han and sultan had soldiers according to their countries. 
From the central treasury only some barley for the horses of these soldiers and wheat for 
themselves as well as some money for their needs were provided. Apart from that 
neither the Shah gave anything to these tribal chiefs and provincial governors at the 
same time, nor did they give to the Shah. However, the korucus of each oymaq used to 
receive clothes from the shah according to their merit and skill.927 As obviously seen, 
qizilbash khans enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in political, military, and fiscal 
affairs, which was pretty compatible with the tribal mode of organization.928 
What immediately comes to mind at this point is the question of what the 
response of the Ottoman government was when Ismail rose up, especially when he came 
to Erzincan. Ismail arrived in Erzincan in the summer of 1500, when Bayezid II was 
engaged in the conquest of Moton, Coron, and Navarin. Thus he could communicate 
with Anatolian disciples without serious obstacles. As already delineated, numerous 
qizilbash fighters from several Turkoman nomadic tribes living within the Ottoman 
borders joined Ismail’s army there. Kemalpaşazāde calls attention, for example, to the 
fact that the eastern borders of the empire were not well protected since the army was 
occupied in war with Venice. Because of that Ismail could congeal a great number of 
fighters from Ottoman territories.929   
                                                 
927 See Şahnāme, fols. 87a-87b. 
928 Şahnāme’s account reads, “Kızılbaş-mecusi me’āş cümle vaz’-ı evvelde elli dört bin leşkerdür. Bu dahi 
iki nev’ üzeredür. Dergâhidür ki kapıkuludur Şahdan tonluğı vardur. Ya’ni ulûfeye mutasarrıfdur. Biri 
hanlar sultanlar nökeridür. Onlar ülkeye mutasarrıflardur. Ya’ni bir veche timar karyeleri vardur. Bu 
icmalin mufassalı ve bu kelamın mahsulü budur cümle kızılbaş on yedi oymaqdur. Aslı budur ki Şah Đsmail 
zuhur itdükde her diyardan adem gelüb cem’ olan eşhasın birin baş eyleyüb sāyirini āna tābi’ iderdi. ... 
Bu zikr olunan oymaqlarun her birinin bir hanları üçer dörder beşer sultanları olub her hanın ve sultanın 
ülkesine göre neferātı olub bu neferātın atın arpa ve gendüye buğday virüb vemā yehtāc içün birer mikdar 
nesne virür. Ne Şah’dan bunlara bir akçe virilür ve ne bunların karyelerinden ve ülkelerinden Şah’a bir 
akçe gelür. Amma bu oymaqānun yine kurçıları ki vardur anlar şahdan tonluk yirler, nev-rūzda liyākatine 
göre hil’at giydirilüb şanına göre tümen hisabınca tonluk virülür.” See Şahnāme, fols. 87a-87b.  
929 KPZ, p. 277. 
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Similarly, Hoca Saadeddin also reports that Ismail came to Erzincan in order to 
recruit fighters from among his disciples, who were ‘uncountable’ in the Ottoman 
territories.930 Ottoman administration, however, carefully followed Ismail’s movement. 
In the case of possible qizilbash assaults Anatolian forces were alerted. Bayezid II 
ordered Yahya Pasha to move to Ankara with Anatolian troops (sipāhis of Anadolu 
Beylerbeyliği). Karaman and Rumiye-i Suğra931 troops were also alerted.932 But Ismail’s 
plan was not to fight with the Ottomans. Rather he aimed to gather qizilbash fighters 
from Ottoman territories. When convened some thousand qizilbashes he returned to 
clash with his enemies in the east, i.e. Shirvanshah and Akkoyunlu. Since the intention 
of the Shah appeared as just to recruit soldiers, Ottoman forces relaxed.933 Aşıkpaşazāde 
states that when he came to Erzincan Ismail realized that the Ottoman army was already 
on alert. Then he sent an ambassador to the sultan explaining his intention, which had 
nothing to do with the Ottoman territories. Aşıkpaşazāde says that Ismail’s ambassadors 
explained his aim as if to take the revenge of his ancestors, but not to seize temporal 
                                                 
930 HSE3, p. 345. 
931 For the Province of Rum in the Ottoman administrative division, see Ahmet Şimşirgil, “Osmanlı Taşra 
Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği”, Marmara Üniversitesi, Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi, 5, 1990, 289-99. 
932 HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428. Also consider Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und 
scine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, p. 141. 
933 “Böylece bütün Haydāriye tāifesini toplamakla nice azgın yaradılışlı ve rafızī mezhebinde olan dev 
yapılı türk yanına derilmiş bulunuyordu…. Atalarının halifeleri Rum diyarına yayılmış olmakla Ali 
dostları ile müridleri sayıya gelmez ve hesaba sığmaz ölçüye ulaşmıştı. Bu nedenle Rum ülkelerine 
mektuplar gönderip yanına çağırdı. Bu haber üzerine Rum’dan pek çok kimse gidip ona ayak uydurup 
buyruğuna bağlandılar. Ama sürekli savaşlar sonunda bir çok adamları telef olduğundan yardımcıları 
azalınca yeniden adam derlemek için Rum ucundan girerek Erzincan’a geldi. Cennet mekan Padişah 
Sultan Bayezid ol kıyıcı kişinin bir mazarrat yapacağından kuşkuya düşmekle Yahya Paşa’yı Anadolu 
askeriyle Ankara yöresine göndermişti. Qaraman askeri Aksaray’da toplanıp Rumıye-i Suğra cerisi de 
Sultan Ahmed Han yanında yer almışlardı. Azgınlığı yol edinen Şah ise Rum’dan nice bin sersemi 
toplayınca geri dönüp Bayındır’la döğüşmeye girişti. Rum ucuna gelmekten muradı tek asker toplamak 
idüğü belli olunca sefere hazırlanan kahraman orduya destur verildi.” HSE3, pp. 345-6.  
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power.934 By pretending so, Ismail reduced the wrath of the Ottoman sultan. Ottoman 
response and measures will be further delineated below. 
Another important point to be noted here is that the Erzincan congregation 
initiated a process within the Safavid movement that would have a deep impact on the 
future of Ismail’s state. It was the emergence of tribal military aristocracy against the 
selected elite of the order, namely sufis of Lāhijān. Masashi Haneda underlines the 
remarkable difference between these two groups in the early years of Ismail. One was 
composed of the personage who had served the Safavid dynasty during Junayd’s and 
Haydar’s time and continued their service under Ismail especially during the 
concealment in Lāhijan. As pointed out earlier, Safavid sources traditionally call this 
group ‘sufis of Lāhijan’.935 The second group, which principally joined the royal camp 
in Erzincan in 1500, was constituted of tribal leaders and their fellow tribesmen coming 
from Anatolia, Syria, and Azerbaijan. Of course both groups were disciples of the 
Safavid shaykhs.  
As Haneda indicates succinctly, there were remarkable contrasts between these 
two factions. One of the prominent differences comes out in the dominance of tribal 
character. Although the members of the first group also stemmed from certain tribes, the 
                                                 
934 “Andan asker leşker cem’ idüb Rūm’a teveccüh itdi. Öyle olsa Rūm padişahı dahi mütenebbih oldı. 
Anadolı beğlerbeğisine ‘Engürü’ye var, asker cem’ eyle, otur didi.’ Ve dahī etrafını Acem beyleri ihāta 
eyledi. Kendüsi dahı Erzincan’a geldi. Ahır her taraftan ihāta eylediler. Aciz kaldı. Rūm sultanına 
tevāzu’lar ile, temelluklar ile, hediyeler ile bir halife göndürdi. ‘Ben kandan sizin vilāyetinizde asker 
çekmek kandan? Bu Şark vilāyetine etdüğümüz ecdādımızın kanın taleb etmek içindür. Ve bizim 
muradımız yine dervişlikdür.’ dedi. Bunlar dahī kelimatlarına göre cevap verdiler. Elçilerini yine 
göndürdiler.” APZ, pp. 251-2. But APZ mistakenly narrates this event after the capture of Tebriz by 
Ismail. Ismail marched twice towards Ottoman territories: one was in the very early phase of his rising 
(hūrūc) and the other was to fight with Alauddevle. In the former he came to Erzincan in order to summon 
Anatolian disciples in the summer of 1500. His later entrance in Ottoman territories occurred just before 
his attack on Zulkadir in 1507. At the end of the chapter APZ states these events took place in Safer 908 
(August-September 1502). So what he talks about must be obviously Ismail’s former visit to Erzincan, 
which occurred before his capture of Tebriz.  
935 For a detailed account of this group see Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”.  
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main factor governing their attitudes and behaviors was never their tribal connection. 
Rather, being the closest personage to the Shaykh, they constituted a kind of spiritual 
and administrative high cast, a sort of intermediary between the ‘Perfect Guide’ 
(Mürşid-i Kâmil) and the disciples. As Haneda puts, they formed the elite of the Safavid 
order.936 Accordingly, their function in the spiritual and administrative system of the 
order preceded their tribal affiliation. It must be because of this fact that they are always 
mentioned in sources with their titles such as lala, dede, and khalifa. One should notice 
that their tribal affiliations are also mentioned occasionally showing that they maintained 
their tribal connections. Nevertheless the overtly toned attribution to these sufis is 
always their function, i.e. lala, dede, or khalifa, rather than their tribal affiliation. This 
attitude of Safavid historians most probably reflects the fact that the tribal liaison of 
them became inferior to their office or function.937 
The second group, on the other hand, took part in the movement with their tribal 
identity, putting over-toned stress on lineage. The leaders of these tribes became the 
Safavid āmirs and generals. It should be noted, however, that their role and function was 
almost exclusively confined into the sphere of military affairs. Furthermore, there was 
no transition between tribal units. Rather the tribes acted as a compact and autonomous 
socio-political and military entity. The tribal troops were always commanded by their 
own hereditary leaders. After the Erzincan congregation, the influence of tribal leaders 
                                                 
936 Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, pp. 67-8. 
937 Another indication of this fact might be that their tribal affiliations are usually confusing in the sources. 
Husayn Beg Lala, for example, is reported to be from the Shamlu tribe in some sources, while some others 
writing he was from Ustaclu tribe. The tribal affiliation of Abdal Beg Dede is also fluctuating in sources: 
he is mentioned as Dulkadirlu in some chronicles and as Talish in some others. As for Hadim Beg 
Khulafa, Talish and Rūmlu are proposed by several sources. (For a discussion of the tribal affiliation of 
these great qizilbash sufis and amirs see Haneda, pp. 68-75.) The tribal affiliations of second group amirs, 
on the other hand, are quite consistent in the sources. Muhammad Beg, for example, is always mentioned 
as ‘Ustaclu’.  
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such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, Div Ali Rumlu, Nur Ali Khalifa 
Rumlu gradually increased while the absolute superiority of the sufis of Lāhijan eroded. 
It suffices to indicate the augmenting eminence of tribal qizilbash leaders saying that 
Shah Ismail married his three sisters; these being the three most powerful qizilbash tribal 
leaders: Muhammad Han Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Bayram Beg Karamanlu.938 
Especially by 1508, when Husayn Beg Lala was dismissed from the post of wākil, and in 
the next year from the post of āmir al-umarā,939 the influence of the ‘Sufis of Lāhijan’ 
reduced irreversibly in  Safavid politics.940 Instead, two other groups captured the 
dominance in state affairs: the military was in the hands of tribal war-lords while the 
bureaucracy and religious clergy shifted under the control of the Persian elites.941  
In sum, during the concealment period and early years of Ismail’s reign, the sufis 
of Lāhijan were indisputably dominant in the decision making mechanism. As a natural 
result of this fact, they occupied principal offices of the new state. But their power and 
brilliant reputation did not last long; but they sooner lost their privileges. In Çaldıran, for 
                                                 
938 Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 93, 76. From the reign of Shah Ismail onwards, the kinship ties 
between these tribal aristocracies and the Safavid dynasty always became an important part of Safavid 
polity. For an exemplary study on the kinship ties between Tekelu tribe and the dynasty see, Maria 
Szuppe, “Kinship Ties between the Dafavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in Late Sixteenth-Century Iran: a 
Case Study of the Political Career of Members of the Sharaf al-Din Oghli Tekelu Family”, in Safavid 
Persia, The History and Politics of an Islamic Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, 
79-104.  
939 In the same year Abdal Ali Beg Dada was also dismissed from his post. After the conquest of Khorasan 
in 1510, Husayn Beg Lala, Dad Beg, and Bayram Beg Qaramanlu were appointed governors of several 
cities in the region: Husayn Beg Lala to Herat, Deded Beg to Marv, Bayram Beg to Balh. Needless to say, 
this was a kind of exile for them. See Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 15-19 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les 
Qizilbāš, pp. 72-84.  
940 Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 9-15 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, p. 84. Haneda follows their 
paternal and maternal lines through available sources and concludes that the descendants of the sufis of 
Lāhijan could never play primary role neither in the military nor in politics. They are even scarcely 
mentioned in the Safavid chronicles. As Haneda states, “Il est curieux, et il peut même sembler anormal, 
que des mentions des descendants des soufis des Lajigan, qui avait travaillé avec tel dévouement pour la 
fondation de l’Etat safavide, n’apparaissent ainsi peu dans les chroniques.” See I.b.i.d., pp. 82-3.     
941 Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 9-11 ; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, pp. 93-5. For the 
increasing influence of Persian notables in the Safavid statecraft see especially Jean Aubin, “Etudes 
safavides I. Šāh Ismā’īl et les notables de l’Iraq Persan”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient, 2:1, 1959, 37-81.  
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example, we see Muhammad Han Ustaclu and Durmuş Han Shamlu, the son of Abdi 
Beg Shamlu, discussing the war strategy at the court of Shah Ismail. Nevertheless none 
of our sources mention any idea of Husayn Beg Lala at this meeting, although he 
attended.  
How should we understand this sharp change? The analysis of Masashi Haneda 
deserves closer attention here.942 According to Haneda, this change was a natural result 
of the transformation of the administrative structure of the order. Before 1500, the 
organization of the Safavid order was composed of two different elements: a) the core in 
Ardabil, spiritual supervisors and directors who had certain privileges, and b) the 
provincial disciples, which were principally members of several tribes. The first group 
constituted a kind of spiritual elite functioning as a link between the Perfect Guide and 
the corpus of disciples. It was exactly this function that provided them certain privileges 
and administrative power. After the great meeting of Erzincan, however, the situation 
was totally changed. The tribal disciples could directly get in touch with their mürşid, 
thus the function of intermediary became useless. Consequently, sufis of Lāhijan, who 
were selected elite of the first group, gradually lose their superiority. On the other hand, 
the leaders of tribes became more and more influential for they took the control over 
their fellow tribesmen, who constituted the backbone of the army.943 In other words, 
parallel to the Shah’s meeting with his tribal disciples, tribal character dominated the 
newly emerging army and state; and consequently, tribal affiliation became more 
eminent and tribal leaders more powerful. It is interesting to note that since the first 
group held the position of spiritual guidance, which could be acquired only through 
                                                 
942 Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbāš, pp. 97-100. 
943 See, for example, Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid 
Theocracy”, p. 27. 
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education and training, their privileges did not pass on to their descendants. As for the 
tribal war lords, however, the situation was totally different. In accordance to the 
hereditary principles of the tribal tradition their descendants, as leaders of their own 
clan, continued to fill the military posts of the Safavid state.      
 
5.2.2. Ismail’s First War: the Revenge of Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar  
Upon forming a tribal army of some seven thousand men in two months, Ismail mounted 
and set out for Azerbaijan. After discussing with his advisers what direction they were to 
take, the final decision comes out that they were “to proceed first to Shirvan, and 
unsheathing” their “vengeful swords, deal with the Shirvnshāh.”944 In Yāsin on the way, 
Khulafa Beg was ordered to take a contingent and proceed directly to Georgia. Khulafa 
Beg returned triumphant and laden with booty, which was distributed by the shah 
amongst the gāzis.945 Around the same time Đlyas Beg Aygutoglu was dispatched to re-
conquest Mantash’s fortress. Đlyas Beg was equally successful.946  
Ismail then marched to Hasanabad, where Mantash came to his court and 
apologized for his previous conduct.947 On the way after Hasanabad Āmir Najmu’d-Dīn 
                                                 
944 HS, p. 572. Khwandamir attempts to give a holy ‘hue’ to this decision. He says, after hearing several 
suggestions of the prominent qizilbash chiefs, he decided to take an augury at night seeking the approval 
of the spirits of the Imams.  The following morning all were summoned and the shah said: “Last night, by 
the assistance of the spirits of the Twelve Imams, it was vouchsafed that the best course of action is none 
other than to proceed first to Shirvan and, unsheathing our vengeful swords, deal with the Shirvanshah.” 
Hearing this, the amirs unanimously acquiesced. HR follows HS in this account. See HR, pp. 51-52. 
Savory sees two motives that influenced Ismail’s decision to march on Shirvanshah rather than invading 
Akkoyunlu territories: “the practical desire to test his army against a less formidable enemy before risking 
a pitched battle with Aq Quyunlu; and a psychological motive, namely, the desire to avenge the deaths of 
his father and grandfather at the hands of the rulers of Shirvan.” See Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 
25. Among Ottoman historians see, for example, HSE3, p. 345.  
945 HS, p. 572 ; HR, p. 52; Sarwar, p. 3; Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 13.  
946 HS, p. 572 ; HR, p. 52; Sarwar, p. 35 
947 HR, p. 52. 
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Mas’ūd948, the goldsmith of Rasht, arrived at the camp and was taken into service.949 
Ismail’s army crossed the river Kur in December 1500950 and turned his reins to 
Shamakhi. On the way, he was reported that Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar was preparing 
for battle in Qibla951, with 7.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry.952 After sending one of his 
court servants, Quli Beg, to Shirvan to announce the good news of amnesty to the 
inhabitants, Ismail arrived in Shamakhi, where he learned that Shirvanshah was camped 
in a forest that lay between the Gulistan fortress and the citadel of Bigharu.953 
Both sides met at Jiyānī near Gulistan and arranged their armies in battle array. 
In the qizilbash army, the Shamlu took the right wing and the Ustaclu took the left wing 
while the Tekelu, the Rumlu and the Dulkadir constituted the skirmishing party. Ismail 
himself stayed at the centre.954 After a fierce battle, Shirvanshah was killed on the 
battlefield and his army dispersed. The large booty fell into the hands of the victors and 
was distributed amongst the gāzis.955 On the qizilbash side, Mirza Beg Ustaclu, the 
                                                 
948 From then on he became one of the most influential counselors of Ismail. Following the dismissal of 
Husayn Beg Lala in 1508 he succeeded the post of wakil, the highest position, after the shah of course, in 
the Safavid state apparatus. See Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhijān”, pp. 11-12.  
949 Sarwar, p. 35.  
950 Sarwar, p. 35. Safavid sources describe the shah’s crossing of the river in a legendary manner. 
According to the tradition, already before arriving at the river Ismail dispatched Bayram Beg Qaramanlu 
with a contingent from the Tekelu (in HT Ustaclu) and Dulkadir tribes to cross the river and to discover 
the possibility of safe passage for the army. When Ismail arrived he found that some of Bayram Beg’s 
contingents were gone to gather boats and ships while some others were preparing rafts and floaters. 
Realizing the insufficiency of these measures, Ismail “rode a short way upriver and then turned his reins 
and charged directly into the water, which the wise and experienced had thought impossible to cross 
without boats. He crossed like a breeze traversing the desert, and the army, following him, spurred their 
mounts into the water, and all crossed safely – and because of this event the soldiers’ faith in the shah 
increased.” HS, p. 572. Also see HR, pp. 52-3; HT, pp. 188-9.    
951 HS, p. 572; HR, p. 53; HT, p. 189.  
952 HS, p. 573 ; Sarwar, p. 35. According to HR, 6.000 infantry 20.000 cavalry. See HR, p. 53. HT says 
6.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry. See HT, p. 192.   
953 HS, p. 573; HR, p. 53; HT, p. 190. Also compare Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 49-50.  
954 Sarwar, p. 36 ; Haneda, p. 31.  
955 HR, pp. 54-5; AA, p. 43. A Venetian merchant, who spent three years between 1507 and 1510 in the 
region, puts a particular stress on Ismail’s generosity when distributing booty. He says since Ismail was 
dividing all the booty among his men, keeping nothing for himself, he was joined by numerous fighters, 
even those who were not sincere sufis, flocking to his standard in hopes of receiving gifts. See “The 
 294 
father of Muhammad Han Ustaclu, fell in the battlefield. Ismail is alleged, though less 
than fourteen years of age, to have fought in front ranks in this battle.956 Needless to say 
that Ismail’s bravery and the qizilbashes’s devotion and heroic deeds were most 
responsible for such a victory, against an army of 27.000 soldiers with 7.000 tribal 
fighters, possible. This constituted the first circlet on the chain of the glorious victories 
of the qizilbash fighters under Ismail’s banner.  
After receiving the congratulations of his āmirs and distributing favors to them, 
Ismail returned to Shamakhi.957 On receiving the news that Shaykh Shah, the son of 
Farrukhyasar, who had escaped from the battlefield, was making preparations for the 
battle, he dispatched Khulafa Beg against Shaykh Shah. But since the latter escaped to 
Gilan no engagement occurred; Khulafa Beg was appointed governor of Shahrinaw. 
Ismail himself proceeded to Mahmudabad to spend the winter.958 Here Muhammad 
Zakariya, who worked as the prime-minister of Akkoyunlu for many years, came to the 
royal court and was taken into service.959  
On the other hand, Ismail sent two prominent qizilbash chiefs, namely 
Muhammad Han Ustaclu and Đlyas Beg Aygutoglu, to conquer the fortress of Baku. 
                                                                                                                                                
Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 188. Caterino Zeno follows a similar line of argument. See 
Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 49.  
956 HR, p. 54; HT, p. 193; Sarwar, p. 36. Indeed, Ismail’s bravery and mastery in the art of fighting, in 
addition to his many other distinguished aptitudes, provided him with a great charisma and immense 
influence on the emotions of his followers. As Roemer writes, “He was the one who knew how to implant 
into his Turcoman warriors and to preserve in them enthusiasm for his cause, readiness for struggle, 
courage to face death, and unrestricted loyalty. The magnet which attracted masses of new adepts was the 
young God-king Isma’il.” See Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 32.    
957 HR, p. 55. A contemporary Italian observer writes “The fame of victories and generosity of Ismael 
spread throughout Persia and Natolia [Anatolia], so that everyone became a Suffavean [sufi] in hopes of 
advancement.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 189. This merchant does not mention 
his name in his travel account. However he specifies that he was in Persia and Eastern Anatolia between 
1507 and 1510. He spoke Persian, Turkish, and Arabic, and was well acquainted ohe  regional culture. 
Thus his could deeply penetrate the contemporary events. Especially his account on the events of the years 
1507-10 is quite accurate and authentic for it is mainly derived from eye-witness accounts.    
958 HS, pp. 573-4 ; HR, p. 55; HT, pp. 195-6; Sarwar, p. 36.  
959 HR, p. 64; HT, p. 197; Sarwar, p. 36. 
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However, the conquest of this strong fortress had to wait for the arrival of the shah in the 
following spring.960 After spending the winter in Mahmudabad, Ismail personally came 
and laid siege to the fortress. Fierce struggle took place between the two sides. In the 
end, the qizilbashes captured the fortress. Khulafa Beg was ordered to go into the 
fortress in order to take the treasure of Shirvanshah, which was distributed among the 
soldiers by him. In the excess of zeal he also exhumed the bones of Shirvashah Khalil961, 
father of Farrukhyasar, who had killed Shaykh Junayd forty-five years ago, and burnt 
them to ashes.962 His acts must have pleased Ismail so much that when he returned, as 
Khwandāmir states, he was promoted to the highest rank among all the āmirs.963  
Ismail then set out for the fortress of Gülistan, where many Shirvan soldiers were 
resident. Ismail first sent a messenger to the soldiers in the fortress offering amnesty if 
they would surrender without trouble. Trusting on the strength of the fortress, which was 
known as impregnable, they refused to submit or pay homage.964 Although qizilbash 
incursions started in a short while, the news brought to Ismail made him give up the 
siege. It was reported to him that Alvand Mirza of Akkoyunlu was at Nakhjuwān with 
30.000 men and dispatched some of his generals to Shirvan, Karacadağ, and Ardabil to 
check the advance of the shah’s army.965   
                                                 
960 HS, p. 574 ; HR, pp. 55-6; HT, p. 197; Sarwar, p. 37. 
961 Exhuming the bones of dead people as a sign of revenge or insult was a usual practice of Shah Ismail 
and the Qizilbashes.  As J-P Roux sates; the origin of this practice traces back to ancient Turko-Mongolian 
traditions. See J-P Roux, “Un survivance des traditions turco-mongoles chez les Séfévides”, Revue de 
l’histoire des religions, 183, 1973, 11-18. 
962 HS, p. 574; HT, pp. 202-203; HR, pp. 56-7 (HR does not mention Khulafa Beg in this context); Sarwar, 
p. 37; Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 125-6.  
963 HS, p. 574. 
964 HS, p. 574; HT, pp. 203-204. 
965 HS, p. 575 ; HR, p. 69; AA, p. 44; Sarwar, p. 37. HR gives a rather superstitious reasoning for Ismail’s 
ending of the siege. According to HR, during the siege Ismail saw one of the Twelve Immaculate Imams 
in his dream ordering him to end the siege and to proceed to Azerbaijan. In the morning he gathered 
prominent amirs like Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Beg Dede, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, 
and Hadim Beg Khalife, and asked them whether they wanted the Gulistan fort or Azerbaijan. They 
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5.2.3. Ismail’s Second War: the Turn of the Fortune 
Paying close attention to Ismail’s advance in Shirvan, Alvand Mirza sent Hasan Beg 
Şikaroğlu as a forward detachment to Shirvan. Upon learning of the approach of 
Akkoyunlu troops just after passing the river, Ismail dispatched Qara Pīrī Qajar to deal 
with Hasan Beg Şikaroğlu, who fled back to Nakhjuwān without engagement.966 Ismail 
then proceeded in the direction of Nakhjuwān, sending Qara Pīrī Qajar ahead with a 
contingent as a reconnaissance party. On the other hand, Alvand Mirza sent one of his 
commanders, called Osman, to oppose Qara Pīrī Qajar. But he was taken captive in a 
skirmish and sent to the court of the shah, where he was executed. Upon being appraised 
of this, Alvand Mirza moved from Nakhjuwān and camped in Sharur, a village by the 
side of the river Aras, arranging his army of 30.000 soldiers in battle array.967 Ismail 
followed him via Nakhjuwān and the two armies met at Sharur in the summer of 
1501.968 
The disposition of the Qizilbash army was as follows: the right and left wing 
were commanded by the chief qizilbash āmirs, namely Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Ali Beg 
                                                                                                                                                
answered that they wanted Azerbaijan. Then Ismail raised the siege and marched against Azerbaijan. HR, 
pp. 57-8. A very similar account is in HT, pp. 204-205.  
966 HS, p. 575; HT, pp. 207-208; HR, p. 69. This event occurred in May 1501. See Sarwar, p. 37. 
967 HS, p. 575 ; HT, p. 209; HR, pp. 70-71; AA, p. 44.  
968 ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail contains a correspondence between Ismail and Alvand Mirza, which is not 
recorded in any other Safavid sources. According to this account, Alvand Mirza wrote to Ismail 
suggesting him to maintain the peace and warm relationship. In his answer Ismail said, although the 
descendants of Hasan Padishah disgraced the descendants of Shaykh Safī without any reason, he was not 
intending to avenge his ancestors’ blood; and he did not aspire to the throne as well. His sole object was to 
propagate the religion of his ancestors, the immaculate imams. Ismail says in his letter, as recorded in 
Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail, “As long as I am alive, I will draw my sword for the sake of God and his 
Immaculate Imams and the true religion until justice will be confirmed in its right place. You [Alvand] 
should ask help from the pure spirits of the Immaculate Imams with sincere belief and you should repeat 
and profess: ‘Ali is the friend of God’ constantly in order to receive salvation in both worlds and become 
the most prosperous king among all others.” (Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 131.) Ismail finishes his letter 
by declaring that if he (Alvand Mirza) would profess Shi’a then could regard him as his elder brother. 
Upon receiving the negative and arrogant answer of Alvand Mirza he marched towards Nakhjuwan. See 
Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 131-2.   
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Dede, Hadim Beg Khalifa, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Bayram Beg Karamanlu, Abdi Beg 
Shamlu, Qaraca Đlyas Bayburdlu, Qara Pīrī Beg Qajar, Đlyas Beg Helvacıoğlu 
(Bayburdlu), Saru Ali Beg Tekelu Mührdar, Đlyas Beg Aykutoğlu, and Ali Beg Rumlu 
(also known as Div Sultan), while Ismail himself commanded the centre, fighting 
enthusiastically.969 Safavid sources narrate how young Ismail displayed his courage in 
the battlefield by fighting in the front rows, and personally putting many Akkoyunlu 
chiefs to the sword, while Alvand stood and watched from the top of a nearby hill.970 
Thanks to the zeal and devotion of Ismail’s disciples that at the end of the day 7.000 
qizilbashes defeated the Akkoyunlu army of 30.000 soldiers in  the fall or summer of 
1501.971 A contemporary Italian testimony depicts the devotion and appearance of 
qizilbash warriors, which was, without a doubt, primarily responsible for these victories 
against four-five times greater (in number) armies, as follows: 
This monarch is almost, so to speak, worshipped, more especially by his soldiers, 
many of whom fight without armor, being willing to die for their master. They 
go into battle with naked breasts, crying out ‘Schiac, Schiac’, which, in the 
Persian language, signifies ‘God, God’. [This is evidently wrong] Others 
consider him a prophet; but it is certain that all are of opinion that he will never 
die.972 
                                                 
969 HR, p. 71.(The last two are not mentioned in HR). Also consider Haneda, pp. 32-3; Sarwar, p. 38.  
970 Khwandamir writes, for example, “During the fray the shah, like a cloud shedding rain that settles the 
useless dust, or the sun banishing the forces of darkness, unsheathed his sword and charged the enemy 
lines, felling several men with his mighty arm and raising the banner of victory. The shah and his men 
continually made concentrated attacks on the enemy as they brandished their weapons.” HS, p. 576. Also 
see HT, p. 211; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 133.  
971 HSE3, p. 345. Solakzāde’s account is again similar. SLZ1, pp. 428-9. Also consider Aubin, 
“L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 16; Woods, The Aqquyunlu, p. 163.  
972 After stating that “While I was in Tauris [Tabriz] I heard that the king was displeased with this 
adoration, and being called God.”, Giovan Maria Angiolello’s account continues with the depiction of 
appearance of qizilbash warriors: “…Their custom is to wear a red caftan, coming half a cubit over the 
head, which widens at the part which covers the head; it gets narrower towards the top, and is made of 
twelve fringes, a finger in thickness, symbolizing the twelve Sacraments [Imams] of their religion; neither 
do they ever shave their beards or moustachios. They have made no change in their dress; their armour 
consists of cuirasses of gilt plates made of the the finest steel of Syras [Shiraz]. Their horse-armour is of 
copper: not like ours, but in pieces like those of Soria [Syria]; they also have helmets or head-pieces of a 
great weight of metal. Everyone of them rides on horseback: some with a lance, sword, and shield; others 
with bow and arrows, and a mace.” See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts 
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Alvand Mirza barely managed to flee from the battlefield and took refuge in 
Erzincan. A great deal of booty, “so many horses, camels, beasts of burden, valuable 
goods, and gold and silver vessels”973, was left in the hands of victorious qizilbashes.  
Although Alvand could escape from the battlefield, he started to gather another 
army in Erzincan, and Murad was waiting undefeated in the south with a large army, the 
victory of Sharur was decisive. This victory brought Azerbaijan under Ismail’s rule, and 
opened the doors of the whole of Iran and the two Iraqs as well. In half a century, the 
Safavid movement, which had started with Shaykh Junayd in the mid-fifteenth century, 
eventually came to a successful end. By Ismail’s brilliant victory against Alvand Beg, 
the dream of Junayd turned into an accomplished fact.974  
 
5.2.4. Ismail’s Ascendance to Power 
Following his decisive victory against Alvand Mirza, Ismail set out for the Tabriz on the 
next day, to occupy the vacant throne of Azerbaijan.975 In the middle of 1501, he was 
                                                                                                                                                
of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 115. For a similar account also see “The Travels of a Merchant in 
Persia”, in NIT, pp. 206-207.  
973 HS, p. 576. Also see HR, pp. 72-3; “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 190.  
974 Savory, regarding the whole history of the order as oriented towards a political revolution, says, 
“Safavid revolution, after two centuries of preparation, was an accomplished fact.” See Savory, Iran under 
the Safavids, p. 26. The present thesis, however, follows a different line of argument. The first four 
Safavid shaykhs, though having a relationship with temporal rulers, seemingly did not have political 
ambition for the sake of their own temporal rule. If we should talk about a ‘Safavid revolution” it started 
by the shaykhdom of Junayd and continued under his successors until his grandson Ismail, who 
culminated the revolution.      
975 HR, p. 73. The contemporary Venetian merchant talks about the slaughter that Ismail conducted in 
Tabriz. “… [Ismail] then advanced on the city of Tauris [Tabriz], where they met with no resistance, but 
massacred many of the inhabitants. All the kinsmen of Jakob [Yakub] Sultan were put to the edge of the 
sword, and even pregnant women were slaughtered with their unborn offspring. The tomb of Jakob Sultan, 
and those of many lords who had been present at the battle of Derbant where Ismael’s father was killed, 
were opened, and their bones burnt. Three hundred public courtesans were then arranged in line, and their 
bodies divided in two. Then eight hundred avaricious Blasi who had been brought up under Alumut 
[Alvand] were beheaded. They even slaughtered all the dogs in Tauris, and committed many other 
atrocities. … From the time of Nero to the present, I doubt whether so bloodthirsty a tyrant has ever 
existed.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 190-91. Giovan Maria Angiolello repeats 
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crowned king of Azerbaijan, for the time being, to be known henceforth as Shah 
Ismail.976  
During its early years, Ismail’s state equally bore the tribal characteristics of his 
disciples. The most important and efficacious offices of the new state were bestowed to 
the sufis of Lāhijan, who were in many aspects the main architect of this result. Husayn 
Beg Lala became wākil, the lieutenant of the Shah, and emiru’l-ümera, the head of the 
army; Abdal Ali Beg Dede became the head of the Special Forces (kurçi başı), Hadim 
Beg Khulafa became khalifatu’l-hulefā, the head of the sufi organization of qizilbashes; 
Bayram Beg Karamanlu became āmir-i divan; and Abdi Beg became tovacı-başı.977 The 
bureaucratic affairs of the state and clerical issues, however, were entrusted to the 
Persian literati. Shamsu’d-Din Lāhijī, who was the tutor of young Ismail in Lāhijān, was 
made the sadr978 and the comptroller to take charge of all religious endowments. 
                                                                                                                                                
more or less the same account adding, “… all the city wore his ensign, that is, the red caftan.” See Giovan 
Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 105. 
For another very similar account see Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 52.  
976 In explaining Ismail’s coronation, Khwandamir refers to a famous prophetic saying that “God sends at 
the beginning of every century someone to renew the faith” and continues “the foundation of the Prophet’s 
religion be reinforced by the Safavid shah’s efforts, never, since the sun of his rule had risen, had victory 
turned its back on him – or would it ever. …he mounted the throne and placed the crown of the caliphate 
and world conquest on his head.” HS, p. 576. Also see Sarwar, p. 38.  
977 See HS, p. 576; Aubin, “Sufis of Lāhejān”, pp. 4-5; Haneda, Le Châh et les Qizilbâs, pp. 72-77; Roger 
M. Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl (907-30/1501-24)”, 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII, London, 1960, pp. 93-101.     
978 The religious affairs in the Safavid state were organized as two separate systems: on one hand there 
were sufis, the disciples of the Safavid order, spread in several provinces of the Ottoman Anatolia, 
northern Syria, Azerbaijan and adjacent regions. This group constituted the man resource for the armies of 
Junayd, Haydar, Sultan Ali, and finally of Ismail; thus it is not an exaggeration to say that the state was 
founded on their enthusiasm, devotedness, zeal, and swords. These sufis were already organized 
clandestinely by the hierarchical system of khalifa. Each khalifa educated and trained at the court of the 
shaykh was dispatched to ‘qizilbash zones’ with the mission of organizing disciples there and conducting 
the propaganda of the order. At the top of this system was the khalifatu’l-hulefā. (For the office of 
khalifatu’l-hulefā see Roger M. Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safawids”, Journal 
of the American Oriental Society, vol. 85, no. 4, 1965, 497-502.) On the other hand, by the proclamation 
of Twelver Shi’ism as official sect, the ordinary, one might called ‘orthodox’, Twelver shi’ites of Iran also 
became a part of the system. At the beginning, in 1501, this group was very few in number and less 
powerful in state affairs. As time went on, however, they became the most affective ideology-makers of 
the Safavid state. (For this process see, for example, Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of Amili 
Scholars to Safavid Iran”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; “An Episode in 
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Muhammad Zakariya, who had been the former prime minister of Aqquyunlu rulers and 
had been accepted to Ismail’s service after the victory against Shirvanshah, was brought 
to the vizierate and the office of chief of divan.979 
Among first deeds of Shah Ismail as a state founder was the proclamation of 
Twelver Shi’ism not only the approved and encouraged official sect but the only 
tolerated one.980 During the Friday prayer Ismail read the khutba in the name of the 
twelve Immaculate Imams. In Hasan-ı Rumlu’s words, the phrase “I witness that Ali is 
the Friend of God, come to the best of deeds”, which was rubbed out in the Islamic 
realm by the coming of Sultan Tuğrul Seljuk to the power “five hundred and twenty 
eight years ago”981, is again affixed to the prayer call.982 Ismail ordered the cursing of 
the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman, in public areas; he also ordered the 
                                                                                                                                                
the ‘Amili Migration to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. ‘Abd al-samad al-‘Amili’s Travel Account”, Iranian 
Studies, v. 39, no. 4, December 2006, 481-508; Said Amir Arjomand, “Shi’ism as the State Religion under 
the Safavids”, in his The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, Chicago, London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984, 105-212; “The Clerical Estate and the Emergence of a Shi’ite Hierocracy in Savafid Iran”, 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 28, 1985, 169-219; Albert Hourani, “From 
Jabal ‘Āmil to Persia”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 49, 1986, 133-40; Andrew 
Newman, “The Myth of Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ‘Ali al-Karakī and 
Safawid Shiism”, Die Welt des Islams, 33, 1993, 66-112; Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: From 
Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi’ism”, Iranian Studies, v. 27, no. 1-4, 1994, 135-61.) The office of sadr 
was the head of religious institution. As Savory puts, “The main function of the sadr under the early 
Safawids was to impose doctrinal unity by directing and accelerating the propagation of the Shi’ī faith. 
Upon the successful imposition of doctrinal uniformity depended the smooth operation of the temporal 
arm of the government and the ability of the state to survive hostile attacks by its Sunnī neighbors. As a 
corollary, the sadr was responsible for the rooting out of heresy.” See Savory, “The Principal Offices of 
the Safawid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl”, p. 103. Nonetheless, under Shah Tahmasb I, the sadr rather 
assumed to consolidation of the newly establishing official faith, the Twelver Shi’ism, which was yet alien 
even to the founders of the state, that is to the Qizilbash. See Savory, “The Principal Offices of the 
Safawid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I (930-84/1524-76”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, XXIV, 1961, p. 81.  
979 HS, p. 576; HR, p. 64. (HR narrates as if the appointments of these two were occurred following the 
victory over Shirvanshah.) 
980Compare BRW, p. 53.  
981 HR, p. 74. Hasan-i Rumlu makes a mistake in this calculation. Tugrul Beg entered Baghdad in 447 / 
1055 and finished the Shi’ite Buyids’ domination on the Islamic Khalifate. (See, for example, David 
Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040-1797, London and New York: Longman, 1988, p. 27.) So when subtracted 
447 from 907, it makes 460. For a similar, but not identical, calculation see BRW, p. 54, footnote, 2. 
982 HR, p. 74. Also see HT, p. 213. 
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decapitation of those who opposed doing this or who do not repeat the curse.983 The 
coins of the Shah were struck with the inscription “Ali wali-Allah”.984 The contemporary 
historian of Ismail writes the first acts of the Shah as follows, 
And since the shah’s entire concern was the propagation of the Imami sect and 
strengthening of the Prophet’s law, at the beginning of his coronation a regal 
degree was issued that all preachers in the realm of Azerbaijan pronounce the 
khutba in the name of the Twelve Imams, that the leaders of prayer in all places 
abrogate all despicable, heretical practices and that the muezzins of all mosques 
and places of worship would add to the cry for prayer the words “And I profess 
that Ali is the Friend of God.” Furthermore, any soldiers or warriors who 
witnessed any action contrary to the White Nation would decapitate the 
perpetrator. Consequently the qualities of the Immaculate Imams and the prayer 
for the perpetual continuation of the shah’s reign were pronounced from the 
pulpit, and the coinage was graced with the names of the Imams and the titles of 
the Shah. Those who were attached to the sect of Ali and followed the rite of 
Ja’far now loosened their tongues against their opponents who could not mention 
the Imam’s names with veneration, and the sunnis who made a show of 
religiosity and fanatical Kharijites fled in all directions in fear of the vengeful 
swords of the great warriors, while the hopes of shah’s servants were fulfilled in 
the best possible manner.985    
 
When Ismail imposed Shi’a doctrine on his subjects two-thirds of the people of 
Tabriz were sunnis.986 Because of that his counselors warned him that the introduction 
of distinctively Shi’ī clause to the prayer and profession of the Faith, and especially the 
cursing of the first three caliphs might cause serious resistance to his sovereignty. 
Having excessive confidence in his charisma and in the military strength of his zealots, 
however, Ismail replied, “God and Immaculate Imams are with me, and I fear no one. 
By God’s help if the people utter one word of protest, I will draw the sword and leave 
                                                 
983 HR, p. 74; HT, p. 213; AA, p. 45. Those who hear the cursing of first three caliphs had to say “May it 
be more, not less!” Otherwise he/she would suffer death. See BRW, p. 22, 53-4. For a detailed analysis of 
this subject, see Rosemary Stanfield-Johnson, “The Tabarra’iyan and the Early Safavids”, Iranian Studies, 
vol. 37, no. 1, 2004, 47-71.  
984 AA, p. 45 ; Sarwar, p. 3; Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 138-145.  
985 HS, p. 576. 
986 BRW, p. 22. 
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not one of them alive!”987 As Browne states, “he was as good as his word”988 that the 
religious demography of Iran would fundamentally change in a short course of time.   
However, the Shi’a that Ismail and his qizilbash devotees professed was far away 
from the well-cultivated ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’īsm.989 As Hasan-ı Rumlu records, 
when Ismail proclaimed Twelver Shi’īsm as the only creed of his realm, there was a 
shortage of works on Shi’ite jurisprudence and shortage of Shi’ī ulemā; a book on the 
Shi’a creed and jurisprudence in Tabriz could not be found, except the Qawā’idu’l-Islām 
(Rules of Islam) of Shaykh Cemaleddin Mutahhar Hillī, found in the private library of a 
local qādi called Nasrullah Zeytūnī.990 The ideological trajectory of the Safavid state is 
not among primary concerns of this study. I would like to be content with only saying 
that by proclaiming Shi’ism as the official religion, Ismail differentiated his domain 
                                                 
987 Quoted in BRW, p. 22 and p. 53. ‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail writes the sequence of events as follows: 
“Shah Ismail said: ‘By the help of God, I will ascend the pulpit next Friday to preach the Twelver way.’ 
But he himself was irritated because he knew that the amirs were right. As he fell asleep he dreamed of 
Hadrat-i Ali who told him: ‘O son, do not be disturbed in your mind; order all the Qizil-Bash to wear 
armour under their army uniforms and order that one of them should stand between every two people 
present at that ceremony. Then preach the sermon. If anyone moves while you are preaching the khutba, 
the Qizil-Bash should kill him. By this means you can perform the public sermon.’ Then Shah Ismail 
awoke and called his amirs and Husayn Beg Lala to him. He described his dream and the amirs accepted 
this idea and said: ‘It is true that without this instruction it can not be performed.’” Quoted in Youssef-
Jamālī, pp. 135-6. For the same account also see Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 29. 
988 BRW, p. 22.  
989 See, for example, Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 30. However, the extremist Shi’ite creed of 
Ismail and his qizilbash followers, and the process of the dominance of ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism in the 
public sphere, especially during Shah Tahmasb’s reign, had been long discussed and is well-known among 
scholars. So I will not repeat here. For a ground reading see Jean Aubin,“La politique religieuse des 
Safavides” in Colloque de Strasbourg, Le Shi’isme imâmite, Paris, 1970, 235-244; “Etudes Safavides I, 
Sah Ismail et les notables de l’Iraq persan”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, II/I, 
1959, 37-81; Said Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, Religion, Political Order, 
and Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran from Beginning to 1890, Chicago, London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984; “Two Decrees of Shāh Tahmāsp Concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh ‘Ali Al-
Karakī”, in Authority and Political Culture in Schi’ism, edited by Said Amir Arjomand, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1988, 250-262; Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash 
Islam to Imamite Shi’ism”; Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs. Cultural Landscape of Early Modern Iran, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2002; Andrew Newman, “The Myth of 
Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ‘Ali al-Karakī and Safawid Shiism”, Die 
Welt des Islams, 33, 1993, 66-112; Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of Amili Scholars to Safavid 
Iran”, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; “An Episode in the ‘Amili Migration 
to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. ‘Abd al-samad al-‘Amili’s Travel Account”, Iranian Studies, v. 39, no. 4, 
December 2006, 481-508. 
990 HR, p. 74.  
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from - and provided immunity against the interference of - the powerful sunni Ottoman 
empire. So the Safavid state could attain distinctive territorial, political, and ideological 
identity, creating a sense of unity among her subjects.991   
 
5.3. REPERCUSSION AMONG ANATOLIAN TURKOMANS AND THE 
OTTOMAN RESPONSE  
 
5.3.1. Echoes in Anatolia and Ottoman Measures 
The testimony of a contemporary Venetian merchant, who made business in Safavid 
lands between 1507 and 1510, even met Ismail himself, clearly shows how strong the 
connection between the Safavid power and Anatolian Turkomans was: “During my stay 
in Tauris [Tabriz]992, men were continually flocking to his standard, from all parts of the 
country, but especially from Natolia [Anatolia], Turkey, and Caramania, Ismael 
presenting gifts to them all according to their rank and condition.”993 Needless to say, 
thus, Ismail’s success rose upon the swords of his warrior Turkoman disciples mostly 
coming from Ottoman territories. Moreover, these tribal disciples did not constitute 
simply the body of the conquering ‘war machine’ of Ismail, but they, - especially sufis 
of Lāhijan and some newly joined tribal leaders such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu and 
Abdi Beg Shamlu - were also at the head of the movement heavily influencing all the 
vital decisions of Ismail. As already indicated, the qizilbash army was commanded by 
                                                 
991 A. K. S. Lambton, “Quis custodiet custodies”, Studia Islamica, VI, 1956, p. 126; Savory, “The 
Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 84; Iran under the Safavids, pp. 29-30.  
992 Our merchant was in Tabriz in 1509-10 and met Ismail in person. See “The Travels of a Merchant in 
Persia”, in NIT, p. 201, pp. 205-206.   
993 “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 194. Throughout his travel book this unknown 
Venetian merchant repeatedly stresses Anatolia and Qaraman as regions from where Ismail and his 
forefathers derived their followers.  
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those great āmirs during both battles against Shirvanshah and Alvand Mirza. Although 
Safavid historians attempt to depict Ismail as responsible for all, the decisions were 
indeed made by significant contributions of the prominent qizilbash āmirs. Thus it is not 
an exaggeration to assert that the successful outcome of the Safavid movement started 
by Junayd was more than anything else the deed of tribal Turkoman adherents, of both 
ordinary sufi-gāzis and their tribal leaders. As Efendiev states, “L’État safavide fut donc 
crée par l’aristocratie féodale des ces tribus kızılbaš de langue turque, mue par des 
intérêts de classe. Ce sont ces tribus qui, parvenues au pouvoir, s’emparèrent de toutes 
les ressources matérielles du pays et se partagèrent entre elles la plus grande partie du 
territoire.”994  
Accordingly, every step of Ismail, especially those towards the west, created a 
vast wave and excitement among Anatolian adherents, thus deeply influencing the social 
tranquility of the Ottoman dominion. The social stirring that Ismail’s movement created 
among Ottoman subjects was so wide-spread that in early 1502 it was rumored in 
Istanbul that there were five hundred qizilbashes in the city. All gates were closed for 
five days to prevent their escape.995   
Then the main question arises: what was the Ottoman response and what was the 
situation in Anatolia, the home of Ismail’s devoted gāzis? As referred to earlier, Bayezid 
II was skeptical, even antagonistic, against the Safavid movement already during the 
time of Haydar, whom and whose adherents he depicted as people who had gone astray 
in his letter to Yakub Akkoyunlu.  Following Ismail’s ascendance to the throne in 
                                                 
994 Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 33.  
995 FSH, p. 92. ANMG gives the number over than two hundred families and states that their houses were 
set on fire while they were in. ANMG, p. 179. But Ottoman sources do not mention any qizilbashes in 
Istanbul during this time.  
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Tabriz, Bayezid II sent another letter to Alvand with his special messenger Mahmud 
Aga advising him to finish the struggle between Akkoyunlu princes and to devote their 
energy to finish qizilbash peril. Furthermore, he promised to provide every kind of 
assistance whenever necessary.996 So the advent of Ismail was observed in 
Constantinople with anxiety, but without any effective attempt to stop it.  
For the Ottomans, however, the problem was not limited to Ismail’s conquests in 
Azerbaijan and Iran. The trouble was rather deep-rooted - so deep-rooted that could not 
be solved any more -. Qizilbashes of Anatolia were continuously either immigrating to 
the lands of Shah or providing every kind of logistic support they could. Kemalpaşazāde 
describes the situation vividly:    
Teke diyārınun dike burun bī-bāk fettakları ser-i hayl-i Ardabil Şah Đsmail’ün 
a’vān u ensārı onlar idiler. Zaman-ı fetrette fırsat eline girüb, iki üç yüz kişi ile 
baş kaldırub, hurūc idicek yoldaşı ve yārı onlar idiler. Takaddümle tağarrüb 
bulub mukaddem-i hadem ü haşem olub ziyāde ra’bet tahsil itdiler. Yerlerinde 
ra’iyyet idiler, onda vardılar devlete irdiler ve esbāb-ı şevketi tekmīl itdiler. Ol 
tā’ifenün kalanı dahī terk-i diyar itmek istediler. Ölüsü dirisine yüklenüb cümlesi 
çıkub gitmek istediler.  
Bey-i türkī li-mü’ellifi: 
Türkler terk idüb diyarların  
Satdılar yok bahāya davarların997 
........ 
Şah Đsmail-i gümrāh Būm-ı şūm gibi Gīlan vilāyetinde künc-i hümūlde sinüb 
otururken Bayıdır beğlerinün fetreti zamanında fırsat bulub Erzincan’a ki geldi, 
Anadoluda olan hulefā vü ehibbāya ādem saldı. Tekelü etrākinün dike burun 
füttāklerinden yanına varanlar takaddümle takarrüb bulub, Kızılbaş içinde 
merdānelik ve yoldaşlığ ile meşhūr oldılar. Ömründe timār yimeyen, diyārında 
kendüyekimse ādem dimeyen bī-kārlar tümen beğleri olub hadden ziyāde itibar 
buldılar. Đşinden çıkdı giti, mevhūm yerden ötürü muhakkak yirin yurdun terk 
idüb, çiftin çubuğun dağıttı, evin ocağın yıkdı, yakdı harāb itdi. Anda varan 
beğler olurmış diyu zikr olan tā’ife-i hā’ife kalanları dahī kemān-ı intikam 
                                                 
996 See Oktay Efendiyev, “Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah Đsmail”, XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri, 
Ankara: TTK, 2002, p. 90; BRW, p. 68. In this letter Ismail’s followers are defined as ‘rebellious hordes 
of qizilbashes’ (tā’ife-i bāğiye-i kızılbaşiyye). Nonetheless, we do not have clear evidence on his help to 
Akkoyunlu princes. As a matter of fact, it was not easy for Bayezid II for he was at war with Venice.  
997 KPZ8a, p. 233. 
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kurmışlardı. Zalām-ı şām-ı fitne būm-ı Rūmı kaçan tuta diyü eyyām-ı fetrete ve 
hengām-ı fırsata nāzır u muntazır turmışlardı.998  
 
Thus, cutting off the communication and connection between the Anatolian body 
of the Safavid order and its head in Iran999 emerged as an issue of primary importance 
for the Ottoman administration, which levied strict measures to impede Ismail’s 
disciples passing through the borders. The governors of the frontier provinces were 
instructed to cut off the communication and mass transportation between Shah and his 
Anatolian disciples.1000  Haniwaldanus Anonym states that Bayezid II sent orders to both 
governors (sancak beyleri) and qādis of Anatolia to put watchmen on borders and to 
prevent passages of Ismail’s disciples. He also ordered the killing of all the men who 
wanted to join Ismail. Local governors fulfilled the sultan’s order and executed quite a 
great number of runaways. But the enthusiasm of Ismail’s adherents was in such a 
degree that no punishment could prevent them from going to their shah.1001 
                                                 
998 KPZ8b, p. 43. As further examined elsewhere, KPZ’s depiction of qizilbashs murids of Ismail in 
Anatolia suggests that they were overwhelmingly nomads. This is indeed a commonly agreed 
phenomenon among historians specialized in qizilbash and Safavid history. Jean Aubin says, for example, 
“… c’est bien dans les milieu turkmène d’Anatolie orientale, parmi ces nomades qui vont être connus sous 
les nomes de « Têtes-Rouges » (qizilbaš) du fait de leur coiffure rituelle, que prennent corps le 
mouvement safavide, l’idéologie safavide. Populations très frustes, sans contact avec les milieu urbain, ni 
même véritablement avec les milieu rural, et qui gardent encore vivaces coutumes ancestrales et pratiques 
chamaniques.” See Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavudes”, Le Shî’isme Imâmite, Colloque 
de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 236.   
999 This description was first used by Faruk Sümer. See his Safevī Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde 
Anadolu Türklerini Rolü, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 12. “...tarikatın başı Azerbaycan’daki Ardabil şehrinde, 
gövdesi de Anadolu’da idi.” 
1000 “...Uç beylerine gereği yapılması buyrulan emirlerde bundan sonra sufi adında bir kimseyi sınırlardan 
geçirmemeleri, yolları tutmaları ve kesmeleri bildirildi. Bunun sonunda o pis kalabalık Rum diyarında 
kapatılmış ve Ardabiloğlu kendisine taraf olanların gelmelerinden umudunu kesmişti.” HSE3, p. 346. 
However, as we learn from imperial edicts, which will be analyzed in the following pages, HSE is not 
really right in his last opinion. Although the Ottoman administration applied strict preventive measures, it 
could not totally finish the communication and mass transportation between two sides. On this issue see 
also SLZ1, p. 429. 
1001 ANMH, p. 45.  
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 We can also follow from archival evidence, namely the records of the imperial 
council1002 (dīvān), how the Ottoman administration took the issue seriously and levied 
severe punishments. The collection includes copies of imperial decrees addressed to the 
governors of Sivas, Amasya, Kastamonu, and Konya. In these decrees Bayezid II 
ordered the governors of mentioned provinces, who were all princes except the governor 
of Sivas, to incarnate and execute those who endeavored to pass the borderlands for the 
sake of the Shah.  
One of these decrees was addressed to the governor of Sivas and was issued in 
evāhir-i Zilkāde 906 (8-17 June, 1501). It refers to a former order already issued about 
the sufis of Ardabil. According to the former order, which does not currently exist but its 
content can be deduced from the text, the central government had strictly ordered the 
governor of Sivas that the sufis of Ardabil who were caught while going to the other side 
(Iran) would be executed (siyāseten salb oluna) and their possessions would be given to 
those who caught them. It is seen from the next sentence that one of the princes1003 sent 
                                                 
1002 In the Ottoman archives there are not many documents concerning the acts of the imperial council 
before mid-sixteenth century. It was after then the collections of Muhimme Defterleri, copies of the orders 
issued by the imperial council, came into view. For the first half of the sixteenth century and earlier 
periods we have limited sources in the archives. This is, however, not because the proceedings of the 
council were not recorded, but because of the fact that these registers were not preserved. There are only a 
few exceptions. One of these exceptions is a collection of orders issued by the imperial order, which is 
preserved in BOA, Bāb-ı Asāfi Dīvān (Beylikçi) Kalemi, BA, A.DVN, no.790. This collection includes 
copies of imperial orders issued in between evāhir-i Zilkāde 906 and evāhir-i Zilhicce 906 (8-17 June 
1501/ 8-17 July 1501). The whole collection was published by Đlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen. Đlhan 
Şahin and Feridun Emecen, Osmanlılarda Dīvān- Bürokrasi- Ahkām. II. Beyazıd Dönemine Ait 906-1501 
Tarihli Ahkām Defteri, Đstanbul, 1994. (From now on Ahkām Defteri) Seven orders in this collection are 
directly linked to the prohibition of qizilbash’s communication with Iran, which is usually called ‘Yukarı 
Cānib’ in these documents.  In a recently published article Gilles Veinstein discussed these documents in 
the historical context. See Gilles Veinstein, “Les premières mesures de Bâyezîd II contre les Kızılbaş”, 
Syncrétismes et hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIV-XVIII siècle), Actes du Colloque du 
Collège de France, octobre 2001, Sous la direction de Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, pp. 225-136.   
1003 It is not clear to which prince is referred to here. But it stands to reason to suppose that he must be 
Ahmed, then the governor of Amasya. Firstly, only Ahmed could dare to intervene in imperial orders for 
he was regarded as the apparent heir of the throne by leading statesmen and by Bayezid II as well. 
Secondly, later developments would show that he had relationship with sufis of Ardabils in one way or 
another.    
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a messenger to the governor of Sivas and declared that the death sentence of those sufis 
arrested during the passage to the other side could be turned into a fine. (Anların gibi 
sufilerin siyāseti ta’zir bi’l-mal olmak vech görüldü) This prince also determined the 
fine as four hundred akçe for sufis and two thousand akçe for khalifas. But the governor 
of Sivas had not put these instructions of the prince into the practice but sent a 
messenger to Istanbul to confirm whether or not such a re-arrangement was levied by the 
central government.  
The existing order was actually the answer of the center to the governor. Bayezid 
II reaffirms his former order concerning sufis. He strictly bans any laxity in this issue. 
According to his order any sufis, who went to Ardabiloğlu and were detained either 
during arrival or during return must definitely be executed. The possession and clothes 
of detained sufis would be given to the one who had done the detaining. Bayezid II 
warns the governor that he must be careful. No one should excuse any detained sufis for 
the sake of money. The sultan repeats his ultimate aims that these sufis will be cut off 
from the other side. Lastly Bayezid II instructs the governor of Sivas to report how many 
sufis were detained, how they were detained and executed since receiving the present 
order. The governor was expected to send this report back via the centre’s returning 
messenger.1004  
Approximately ten days later, the central government sent another decree to the 
governor of Sivas. As seen in this document, the governor of Sivas had sent spies to the 
east in order to scrutinize the state of affairs of Ismail, Murad Han of Akkoyunlu, Ebu’l-
feth Mirza, and the son of Shirvanshah Gâzi Bey. The governor had sent the intelligence 
divulged by these spies to Istanbul. At the beginning of the decree it is stated that his 
                                                 
1004 See Ahkām Defteri, p. 8, decree 27.  
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report on eastern affairs was received. Then the governor was ordered to continue 
inspecting the state of affairs of the ‘other side’ and to report to the Porte.1005  
Another decree issued in evāhir-i Zilkāde 906 (June 7-17, 1501) was addressed 
to Prince Mahmud, the governor of Kastamonu. At the beginning, the former prohibition 
is repeated: 
Bundan evvel memālik-i mahrūsemde bazı sufiler yaraklarıyla Öte Taraf’da 
Ardabiloğluna varub ol tarafta şekavet idüb ol zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkıyānun 
enva’-ı şeneatleri zāhir olub ol tāifenün Yukaru gitmesi men’-ü def’ olunub nice 
defa men’le memnū’ olundukları ecilden mezbūr sufilerden ol tarafa giderken 
yolda ve izde, varışda ve gelişde dutulanun soygunu dutanun olub gendüler 
siyaseten salb oluna” diyü emr idüb ol babda ahkam-ı şerifeler irsal 
olunmışdı.1006 
 
Here we see the real reason why the Ottomans wanted to cut off the 
communication and visits between the two sides. It is reported, says the decree, that 
some of my subjects had gone to the other side with their arms and conducted banditry 
there. It is because of that their going to the other side was prohibited. The decree 
obviously refers to the qizilbash tribes that joined the forces of Ismail, especially in 
Erzincan.1007 
 Then Bayezid II warns his son: I have heard that my definite order on this 
mutinous group (ol tāife-i eşirrā) is not applied but they are set free by taking money in 
return. We have heard that my state agents, who are responsible to execute my orders, 
do not put to death the detained sufis but set them free by receiving money in return, 
four hundred akçe from sufis and two thousand akçe from khalifas. This laxity gives 
way to the continuation of their connection with the other side. It is said that they pay 
the mentioned fee, go to and come back from the other side. It continues:   
                                                 
1005 See  Ahkām Defteri, p. 92, decree 330. 
1006 See Ahkām Defteri, p. 21, decree 71. 
1007 See Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 232.  
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Eyle olsa ol taifenin hakikat-i hāli hod temam mālumdur. Anlarun şirret ve 
fesādları tamam zāhir olub her yirde nasıl hareket ve şene’āt itdükleri, pāye-i 
serir-i a’lāma arz olunub ef’āl-i kabīhleri ve şirret-ü fesādları mümted oldığı 
merraren istima’ olınmışdur. Anların cüzi nesnelerine iltifat idüb emrim 
mucebince siyaset olunmamak bir türlüdür. Đmdi emrüm kemākān ol bābda 
mukarrerdür. Buyurdum ki, ol tāifeden şunlar ki yukarı tarafa teveccüh ideler, 
bāb-ı sa’adet me’ābında olan hüddāma ve sipāhiye ısmarlayasız ki, yolları görüb 
gözedeler, anların gibi sufiyūn tāifesinden her kim benim hükmüme muhalefet 
idüb yukaru tarafa giderlerse dutub muhkem bend ideler. Soygunu ve esbabı 
dutanun olub sen dahi mecal virmeyüb dutulan sufileri siyaseten salb idesiz ve 
bu hükm-ü şerifim vasıl olduktan sonra ne denlü adem dutulub salb olunursa 
karşu bu tarafa i’lam idesiz. Amma bu bābda ademlerine ve sipāhilerine te’kiden 
ısmarlayasız ki bu kaziyyeyi heman bir kizb-ü kār idinüb, ol sufilerin esbablarına 
ve mallarına tama’ idüb dutulan sufileri salıvermeyeler. Ve illa istima’ olunursa 
anlara i’tab-ı azīm olub siyāset olunur. Şöyle bilesiz.1008 
 
Ten days later another decree was dispatched to Mahmud.1009 It again reiterates 
the sultan’s former definite orders to put to death (siyāseten salb) detained sufis and not 
to desire greedily their money to free them. The decree states that it is still heard that 
some officials condone sufis’ round trip to and from the other side in return for a certain 
fee, four hundred akçe for sufis and two thousand akçe for khalifas. Then Bayezid II 
underscores: ‘It is not my order to receive money and I definitely do not approve of the 
taking of money! [instead of the death penalty]’1010 Bayezid II again warns Mahmud to 
make all state agents in his province apply sultanic orders without any negligence and 
tolerance. Those sufis who were detained on the way to the other side, on arrival, on 
return, or who were arrested in his house but whose arrival is in anyway proven, must be 
absolutely put on death without regarding whether he is sufi or khalifa. Any tolerance 
towards them in this affair is not tolerated.1011  
                                                 
1008 See Ahkām Defteri, p. 21, decree 71. 
1009 At the end of the document it is written that the same decree was sent to Ahmed, Alemshah, and 
Selimshah as well.  
1010 ‘Akça alınmak benüm emrüm değildür ve akça alınmağa kat’a rızam dahı yokdur’. See See Ahkām 
Defteri, pp. 78-9, decree 281. 
1011 “Elbette elbette dutulan sufi siyāset içün salb olup emrüm yerine varmak gerekdür. Bir kaç aydan 
sonra yarar ādemler ve mūtemed kimesneler gönderüb bu husussiyyātı alâ vechin bi’l-ihtimam teftiş 
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The central government seriously warned provincial governors to overlook any 
bribery or preferential treatment on this affair.1012 Inspectors were commissioned to 
investigate the situation. The Porte insistently ordered local governors to report 
periodically how many sufis were detained and executed. In one decree issued in evāhir-
i Zilhicce 906 (8-17 July 1501), Prince Şehinshah, the governor of Konya, was ordered 
to record and report to the Porte how many sufis had been detained and put to death 
since the former decree, which explained the definite order of the sultan to detain and 
execute sufis arriving to and returning from the upper side, had arrived. He was also 
ordered to report monthly how many sufis had been put to death.1013    
This decree indicates another interesting point, which is absent in the others. It 
gives details on judicial aspects of these executions. It is explained that any claims of 
executed sufis’ relatives would not be accepted by Ottoman trials. Thus, those officials 
in charge of executing sufis should not worry on that. No demands of executed sufis’ 
relatives would be regarded as lawful.1014  
                                                                                                                                                
itdürsem gerek. Şöyleki bunların siyāseti bābında ihmal olunmuş bulunacak olursa senün lalalarından 
olsun Hüdavendigar-enarallahu burhanehu- ruhiyçun azille konmayub mu’ateb bi’l- mu’akab olurlar ve 
ger subaşılardan ve sipāhilerden ve senün bāb-ı sa’adet me’ābun halkından olsun ve sair halktan olsun ol 
halās itdükleri kimesne yirine gendüleri salb itdürsem gerekdür. Şöyle bileler. Ve sen dahi her üç ayda bir 
taht-ı hükümetünde vilayeti teftiş itdürüb kaziyye ne vechile olub ve kaç nefer-i sufi salb olındığını malum 
idinüb dahı tefāsiliyle yazub dergāh-ı mu’allāma i’lām eyleyesiz. Ve subaşılardan ve sipāhilerden her kim 
benüm emrim yerine koyub ol sufileri siyaseten salb ide, anun bu hizmeti benüm ‘izz-i huzūrumda 
pasendīde vāki’ olub enva’-ı ināyetümle mer’ī ve mahzūz olalar. Şöyle bilesiz, alamet-i şerife i’timad 
idesiz!” See Ahkām Defteri, pp. 78-9, decree 281. 
1012 See, for example, Ahkām Defteri, pp. 78-9, decree 281: “Bir kaç aydan sonra yarar ādemler ve 
mūtemed kimesneler gönderüb bu husussiyyātı alâ vechin bi’l-ihtimam teftiş itdürsem gerek.” 
1013 “Bundan evvel hükm-ü hümāyun gönderüb “Yukaru tarafa varan Ardabil sufilerinden varışda ve 
gelişde bulunanun siyāset idesiz” diyu buyurmuşdum. Ol bābda hāliya şöyle buyurdum ki ihtimam-i tam 
üzere olub sabıka gönderilen hükm-i hümayunum mucebince amel idüb mezbūr sufilerden ele girenün 
mecal virmeyüb siyāset itdüresiz. Ve ol bābda gönderilen hükm-ü hümāyunum tarihinden şimdiyedek ne 
denlü sufi siyaset olunmuşdur defter idüb dergāh-ı mu’allāma gönderesiz. Ve bundan böyle ayda bir, iki 
ayda bir, ne denlü sufi siyāset olunursa defter idüb göndermek ardınca olasız. Fi’l-cümle ol bābda 
gönderilen hükm-ü hümāyunı icra idüb emrümü ihmal itmeyüb yirine komak ardınca olasız!” See  Ahkām 
Defteri, p. 126, decree 454. 
1014 Veinstein regards this sentence as a part of judicial arrangements of Ottoman law regarding tribal 
affairs. “…La dimension tribale de l’affaire ressort une nouvelle fois ici: l’exécution des consignes du 
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Zamanla akrabası demin dava etmekde hazer eylemeyeler. Emr-i şerifim budur 
ki ol asıl sufilerden her kim siyāseten salb oluna hiç bir zamanda anun demi 
hususunda olan dava mesmû’ olmaya. Şöyle ki atabe-i alem-penahımdan gelüb 
bir suretle teftişe hükm dahı alurlar ise, ol hükümle dahı amel olunmaya. Elbette 
elbette dutulan sufi siyaset içün salb olup emrüm yerine varmak gerekdür.1015 
 
Another edict dated evāhir-i Zilhicce 906 (July 7-17, 1501) was addressed to 
Prince Ahmed, the governor of Amasya. It includes three orders, two of which were 
directly linked to the qizilbash affairs. The first is related to a spy report on the affairs of 
Ismail and Akkoyunlu that had already been sent by Ahmed to Istanbul. Ahmed reported 
that Shah Ismail resided on the other side of the river Kur; there appeared epidemic in 
farms of Shirvan; Akkoyunlu resided on this side of the river and controlled gateways. 
The central government orders Ahmed to collect further information on these affairs and 
to report to the Porte.1016  
The second decree is quite interesting. It is stated in the decree that they (central 
government) received a letter from the governor of Karahisar. The governor reported in 
his letter that certain Zinnūn Beg among the begs of the East sent a messenger to him 
explaining Zinnūn’s request to take refuge in the Porte (āsitāne-i saādet). The central 
government states that Zinnūn’s request would be refused since they had warm relations 
                                                                                                                                                
sultan était entravée, au moins pour une part, par les règles en vigueur dans le milieu tribal.” See Veinstein 
“Les premières mesures”, p. 234. But his approach is open to criticism. It must be rather assessed within 
the framework of the Ottoman-Safavid political rivalry. As a matter of fact, we do not see such harsh 
measures against tribal groups in the other parts of the empire. In this case the judicial base of the Ottoman 
policy lays in the concept of rebel and heresy rather than tribal affairs.  
1015 See Ahkām Defteri, pp. 78-9, decree 281. 
1016 “Şimdiki hālde dergāh-ı mu’allāma mektub ve ādem gönderüb Yuraru Şark diyārına gönderilen 
ādemden biri gelüb: “Sufi tāifesi Kür suyınun öte kenarında oturub Şirvan vilayetinün ekin yörür 
ovalarında taun hastalığı vāki’ olub, Akkoyunlu bu canibde oturub memerrleri hıfz iderler” diyu 
bildürmüş, malum oldı. Eyle olsa gerekdür ki bundan böyle dahī dāim yarar ādemler gönderüb tecessüs 
itdürüb hakikat-ı hāl ne vechile zahir olursa yazub dergāh-ı ālem-penāhıma i’lām idesiz!” See Ahkām 
Defteri, p. 125, decree 453. 
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with the Upper Eastern Side (Yakaru Cānib).1017 If they would accept Zinnūn’s 
application this might damage their good relations.1018   
It should be noted that according to these decrees it was not merely being a sufi 
of Ardabil that instigated the penalty but also communication with the other side, more 
precisely visiting the Shah there. Furthermore, these documents do not mention 
immigration. Rather they mention the effort of individual sufis to maintain their 
communication and connection with the other side, i.e. Safavids. The crime is always 
formulated as an arrival to and return from the other side (öte tarafa-yukaru cānibe 
varub gelmek). We observe that the sufis did not aim to immigrate to Iran, the land of 
the Shah, but provide support for their Shah from Ottoman territories. Of course there 
were numerous men, especially young fighters of tribes, who joined the Shah’s army. 
But their relatives were still living in the Ottoman territories.    
The central government obviously regarded the prevention of sufis visiting the 
other side as a matter of utmost importance. But local governors seemed to overlook it. 
That might be either to make money or because of their sympathy. But one point attracts 
attention. In spite of the strict ban of the Porte on turning the death penalty into fee, there 
emerged a standardized tariff. The first decree includes some clues about the origins of 
these abuses. Prince Ahmed and his retinue must be responsible for such laxities. And 
the role of Safavid sympathizers among sipāhis should not be overlooked as well. It 
seems that although nominally sultanic orders strictly premised death penalty for 
                                                 
1017 Ottoman documents and chronicles usually use this terms for the country of Shah Ismail.  
1018 “Ve Karahisar sancağı beyi mektub gönderüb Şark beylerinden Zinnūn Bey nām kimesne kendüye 
adem gönderüb Asıtāne-i sa’ādete iltica itmek istedüğin i’lām itmişsiz. Eyle olsa Yukaru Şark tarafiyle, bu 
canibün aramızda dostluk ve muhāleset-i tâmme vardur. Şimdi ol taraftan bu tarafa ādem kaçub gelüb 
kabul olunursa aralıkda bürûdete ve küdûrete sebeb olur. Mezbūr sancak beyine mektub gönderüb 
ısmarlayasız ki, ol dahı haber göndere ki, mezbūr Zinnūn bu tarafa gelmek lazım değildür, gelmeye!” See 
Ahkām Defteri, p. 125, decree 453. 
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communication with the other side, a modus vivendi was established between local 
governors and sufis.  
But still the preventive measures of the Ottoman administration must have 
seriously reduced the mass flow from Anatolian tribes to the Shah’s territory as Ismail 
sent a letter to Bayezid requesting the permission of his disciples to visit their shaykh. 
The sultan said in his answer that the motive of many of these pilgrims for going to the 
Tekke of Ardabil was not the desire to fulfill a pious duty, but to escape from the 
obligation of military service; many of them using pilgrimage to Ardabil and visiting 
‘the friends of God’1019 as a pretext to abandon the country. But he still expresses his 
warm sentiment for receiving Ismail’s letter, which he (Bayezid II) deemed a sign of 
friendly relationship between the two states. Thus Bayezid refused Ismail’s request in a 
polite and diplomatic manner.1020 The dates of these letters are not specified in Münşeāt. 
However, they are placed just after the fetih-nāme (letter of conquest) of Moton and 
Coron. Since these cities were conquered in 1501, the correspondence under scrutiny 
must be dated in or after 1501.1021 Ottoman chronicles also report Bayezid II’s refusal of 
Ismail’s request. Hoca Saadeddin says, for example, after the deportation of Ardabil 
sufis in Teke region, the passage of qizilbashes through borders was strictly banned. 
Upon the prohibition of the sultan, Ismail wrote a letter bagging him to permit his 
disciples to visit himself.1022 The above mentioned deportation occurred in 1502. Thus, 
                                                 
1019 Bayezid II uses this term for Safavid shaykhs. 
1020 Feridun Bey, I, pp. 338-39. Also see BRW, p. 68; Efendiyev, “Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah Đsmail”, p. 
93; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, pp. 19-20. 
1021 It is well-known that Feridun Bey follows a chronological order in organizing his work.  
1022 “....Bu maksatla kapıya nāme gönderip zavallılığını ortaya koydu. Atalarının dostları için Acem 
diyarına geçiş izni tanınması ricasında bulundu ise de sözüne değer verilip dileği yerine getirilmedi.” 
HSE3, p. 346.  
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this correspondence must have taken place in the same year.1023 Solakzāde also gives the 
same date, 908/1502.1024 But some historians trace this date back.1025 
Some important points to be noted in these imperial decrees are that the terms 
‘sufi’ and ‘khalifa’ are being used with quite a specific connotation in these edicts. 
Accordingly, it stands to reason to presume that these terms had already acquired their 
specific meaning within the order and social organization of qizilbash society so that 
Ottoman administration recognized their specific connotations.1026 The orders were sent 
to the border provinces, which are known as parts of qizilbash zones. But surprisingly no 
order seems to have been sent to the governors of Teke or Taş-eli. Or, to be more 
precise, at least this collection does not contain such orders.1027    
In these decrees sufis were not clearly mentioned as nomads. But there are some 
clues. Some phrases such as “zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkıyā” invoke nomadic 
connotation.1028 We know from other sources that the Ottoman government uses these 
                                                 
1023 Also consider Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, p. 20, footnote, 27. 
1024 Solakzāde narrates it in the same manner: “Hudud kumandanlarına hükümler tebliğ olundu. Bundan 
böyle sufi nāmı ile hiç kimsenin Anadolu’ya geçmemesine ve yolların zabt olunmasına dāir emirler verildi. 
Çünkü bu çirkin kalabalık Anadolu diyārında bu vechile mahbūs oldu. Şāh Đsmail ashāblarının 
kendilerine ulaşmasından me’yūs olunca, bizzarure, 908 (1502) yılında Der-i Devlet’e ubūdiyet-nāmeler 
gönderdi. Miskinliğini arz iderek itāat yüzünü gösterdi. Babasının ahbablarının Acem diyārına 
gitmelerine icāzet verilmesini rica eyledi. Amma onun bu ricalarına hiç bir sūretle iltifat olunmadı. 
Kabūle karin kulağı ile işidilmedi.” SLZ1, p. 429.  
1025 According to Gaffârî, for example, it must be written in late 905 or early 906 / middle of 1500. (See 
Ahmed Đbn Muhammed Gaffârî Qazvinî, Târikh-i Cehân Ârâ, ed. M. Minuvî, Tehran, 1953, p. 265.) 
Allouche, basing on textual analysis of the letter, follows Gaffârî’s account. To him this letter must have 
been written just before embarking on the campaign over Shirvan. (Allouche, p. 89.) 
1026 Solakzāde states Ismail made his soldiers wear red-caps and his soldiers became famous as qizilbash. 
We know that this term is actually derived from Haydar. Then how should we read this passage in 
Solakzāde? “Şah Đsmail Tebriz’de saltanat mülkünün tahtına oturdu. Kendisine de Şah namını takdı. 
Askerlerine kırmızı çukalardan tāclar giydirdi. Kızılbaş nāmı ile şöhret ve şan kazanmalarına vesile 
oldu.” SLZ1, p. 428. This passage obviously refers to the turning point of the Safavid Order from a mystic 
order into a state. SLZ mentions his disciples as qizilbash for the first time. In the former paragraphs he 
referred, as other sources, to them as ‘sufi’. In the Ottoman sources ‘qizilbash’ is used during 1510s in the 
context of rebellions and war with Ismail. And this term has clear politico-religious connotation.  
1027 Compare Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 229.  
1028 See Chapter III and Chapter VI in this study.  
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terms usually nomadic tribes because of their disobedience.1029 Haniwaldanus Anonym 
clearly puts that the great number of people gathered under the banner of Ismail from 
several regions of Anatolia were nomadic Turkomans (yörük).1030 Their description also 
strongly affirms this idea. The chronicle describes them as looters (çapulcu), which was 
one of the principal bases of the nomadic economy.    
 
5.3.2. Excitement in Teke Region and Mass Deportation to Morea. 
I have already delineated that Junayd’s propaganda achieved brilliant success in the 
Taurus region of southern Anatolia. A number of disciples had already served in the 
court of Junayd, Haydar, and Sultan Ali during the pre-state period.1031 The rise of 
Ismail further excited the qizilbash population of the region, especially in Teke and 
Hamid-ili.  
The Ottoman government took measures to preserve social tranquility in the 
region and to prevent the immigration of the qizilbashes to Iran. According to 
Kemalpaşazāde, Korkud was appointed as governor of Antalya in order to establish 
social tranquility and control the underground activities of Ismail’s agents.1032 He says 
that when it obviously appeared that the mentioned region became the source of 
                                                 
1029 Müneccimbaşı mentions the rebellious disciples of Ismail in Teke as ‘Türkmen”, which traditionally 
refers to the tribal-nomadic Turkish population in Ottoman chronics. KPZ describes them as ‘menba’-ı 
buğāt ve mecma’-ı tuğat’. KPZ8a, p. 233. APZ uses the adjectives ‘baği’ and ‘taği’ for Turgud and Varsak 
tribes. To sum up, in the Ottoman official language and in the language of writers who might be regarded 
as spokesmen of the official view these adjectives and the term ‘Türkmen” are nearly identified with 
nomadic tribes. 
1030 ANMH, p. 45.  
1031 One of them was Hasan Khalifa, the father of Shahkulu. See “Shahkulu Rebellion” in this study.  
1032 “Ma’mūre-i mezkūrenün menba’-ı buğāt ve mecma’-ı tuğāt idüği āşikār olıcak ol diyārun bed-kirdār 
nā-bekārları şi’ār-ı ‘isyān u tuğyanla iştihār bulıcak rāyet-i zāhire vü siyāset-i kāhireyle ol vilāyeti 
himāyet mühimm oldı. Đçinde bir nāsıb-ı rāyet-i şevket, sāhib-i haşmet ü iktidar serdār olmak lāzım oldı. 
Ol esnāda ittifak şehzāde-i āsümān- ‘azamet serv-i āzāde-i bostan, saray-ı cihān-ārā-yı 
saltanat...Cihangīr Kotkud sipihr-i kerem...Saruhan diyārından ferāgat gösterdi. Altalya’da olmağa 
rağbet gösterdi.” KPZ8a, pp. 233-4.   
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insurgence and meeting place of rebels, to protect this province became of primary 
importance. To achieve that appointing a strong and skilful governor there to put issues 
in order turned out to be of utmost necessity. Prince Korkud, who was then the governor 
of Manisa, accepted this mission and was assigned to Antalya.1033 According to 
Kemalpaşazāde, Korkud took severe measures against qizilbash activities and managed 
to take events under control.  
Riyāset-i kāmilesinün siyāset-i şāmilesiyle ol diyār mazbūt olub etrāf u eknāfuna 
bāl-i ikbāli mebsūt olub āsār-ı envār-ı ‘adliyle deycūr-ı şerr ü şūr zāyil oldı. Ayağ 
üzerine gelen serkeşleri yürütmeyüb fi’l-hāl pāymāl eyledi. Kimseye boyun 
eğmeyen gerden-keşler tav’an ev revān emrine imtisal eyledi. Dādiyle bilād ü 
kurrāyı ābād eyleyüb, adliyle ehl-i fesād u gavgāyı korkutdı. Mülhid-i i’tikād(u) 
müfsid-nihādların kimi kırılub, kimi ırılub ol diyār (tohtüşdi) karār tutdı. Mukīm 
ü musāfir huzūr bulub, ragat oldı. Ol iklimün nāhiyeleri emn ü āmān toldı.1034  
 
Kemalpaşazāde does not give the exact date of these events. But we understand 
from the following paragraph that they must have occurred in 908/1502. Following the 
appointment of Korkud as governor of Antalya, Saruhan was allotted to ‘Alemshah, 
another son of Bayezid II. However, soon after his move to Saruhan, ‘Alemshah died. 
Kemalpaşazāde gives the date of ‘Alemshah’s death as 908.1035 Furthermore, we know 
from archival sources that Korkud was appointed to Antalya in 908/1502.1036  
                                                 
1033 KPZ8a, pp. 233-4. KPZ narrates as if Korkud voluntarily accepted to leave Manisa. But we know from 
other sources that he was forced by his brother Ahmed, who was the most favorite prince to the throne, to 
do so. See ULCY1, p. 58; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Korkut”, IA, p. 856; Feridun Emecen, “Korkut”, DIA, p. 
205.     
1034 KPZ8a, p. 234. 
1035 MNB also gives the same date. See MNB, p. 442. 
1036 ULCY1, p. 58, footnote 6. Ulucay mentions the gravestone of Korkud’s mother, which is in Antalya 
and dated 908. He also quotes from a document preserved in TSA. According to this document, which is 
an imperial decree issued by Bayezid II, the Province of Hamid was additionally given to Korkud, who 
was then the governor of the Province of Antalya, in Zilka’de, 908 (May, 1503). The documents reads, 
“Kabza-i tasarrufunda olan Antalya sancağından bedel Hamid vilayeti taleb itdüğü ecilden mumaileyh 
oğlum tulullahi ömrühu Menteşe vilayetinde olan tasarrufunda olan haslarunu geru ibka edub ve 
Antalyada olan 837090 akçalık haslardan bedel zikr olunan Hamid ili sancağın 841363 akçalık hass ile 
tevfiz kılınub…” TSA, document E 6536. On this issue consider also Gökbilgin, “Korkut”, p. 856.   
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Kemalpaşazāde reports that some of rebels were killed and some others were 
deported in order to re-establish tranquility. But he does not clarify where these 
rebellious qizilbashes were exiled to. Later historians, however, specifies this point. 
Hoca Saadeddin, for example, explains how the number of Ismail’s sympathizers in 
Anatolia, especially in Teke and Hamid-ili, had increased when Ismail rose up, captured 
Tabriz and consolidated his temporal power as well as his spiritual one. As already 
mentioned in the previous pages, the majority of his fighters were recruited from several 
region of Anatolia and the Ottoman Provinces of Teke and Hamid-ili were among the 
foremost regions where qizilbash activities were intensified.1037 Ottoman administration 
tried to prevent qizilbash’s passing over the borders.1038 Nevertheless, the danger was 
not limited to some subjects’ abandoning their home lands, but, according to Ottoman 
sources, the remaining qizilbashes were also disturbing the social order.1039 The final 
solution, then, came out as a quite severe one. The famous qizilbashes of the region were 
exiled to the recently captured coastal cities of Morea, Modon, Coron, and Lepanto.1040  
Before Hoca Saadeddin, however, this deportation was reported by 
Aşıkpaşazāde, who was already an old man then. As indicated earlier, the last section 
(bāb) of his history is directly connected to the deportation of Safavid disciples from 
Anatolia to Moton and Koron. The subtitle and introductory sentences of this section 
                                                 
1037 HSE3, p. 345. 
1038 See, for example, ANMH, p. 45.    
1039 KPZ8a, p. 233-4. Seventeenth century historians, such as Müneccimbaşı and Solakzāde, usually recite 
Saadeddin’s account on this issue. Among them Müneccimbaşı explicitly states the risk of anarchy that the 
remaining sufis could possibly create as a reason of the deportation. “Teke ve Hamid Đli’nde bulunan 
Türkmenlerden çoğu Şah Đsmail’in ordusuna katıldıklarından kalanların bir fitne çıkarmasından korkuldu. 
Bunlar Sultan’ın emriyle Modon ve Koron bölgesinde iskān edildiler. Serhad muhafızlarına da bunlardan 
memleketlerine dönmek isteyenlere mani olmaları emr edildi.” See MNB, p. 417.    
1040 HSE3, pp. 345-6. Solakzāde repeats Saadeddin’s account. See SLZ1, p. 429.  Consider also TNSB, pp. 
237-8 and HAM2, p. 369. The deportation of qizilbashes is recorded in contemporary Italian sources as 
well. See FSH, p. 92. 
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actually include indications on the issue. The section is entitled ‘This section explains 
the reasons why the sūfis of Ardabil were forced to emigrate to Rumelia.’1041 The first 
sentence explains the reason: ‘it was because of the fact that religious scholars (ulemā) 
declared them to be unbelievers. Thus, they fell victim to the sultan’s wrath. As a result 
they were forced to emigrate to Rumelia.’1042 Following this sentence Aşıkpaşazāde asks 
a question, which seems to reflect some of the question marks in the public mind: ‘They 
were sufis and disciples of Shaykh Safi, who followed the religion of Muhammed in 
their mystical path. While this being the reality what became the reason for accusing 
them of being unbelievers?’1043 The whole section (bāb) 161 of his history is devoted to 
answering this question.  
After establishing peace with Venice, the rise of Safavid power and the activities 
of their disciples in Anatolia became the foremost matter of the Ottoman government. It 
was not an easy task to punish these sufis since they were Muslim as well. Actually, 
Aşıkpaşazāde was the first to lay the issue on the table and establish a religious ground 
for the measures to be taken by the Ottoman administration. Soon after, foremost 
religious scholars such as Muftī Hamza, Kemalpaşazāde, and Ebussuūd would issue 
severe fetvās about these groups. During the first years of the sixteenth century, 
however, the issue was not sharpened yet, but still appeared as a crucial problem both in 
terms of politics and religion. We see from the question Aşıkpaşazāde asks in his chapter 
on the Safavids that especially among the lower and middle-classes, who were the 
audience of Aşıkpaşazāde’s history, there were a recognizable number of people who 
                                                 
1041 APZ, p. 249. 
1042 ‘Bu oldu kim ūlemā küfürlerine hükm etdiler. Padişah anlara gazāb etdi. Rum eline sürdüler.’ APZ, p. 
249. 
1043 ‘Sual: Bunlar hod sofılar idi. Şeyh Safi müridlerinden idi. Tasavvufdan Şer-i Muhammedî sallalahu 
‘aleyhi ve sellem üzerine olurlar idi. Bunları tekfir etmeğe sebep ne oldı?’ APZ, p. 249. 
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were confused about the disciples of Ardabil. The Safaviyya order had been known as 
one of the appreciated sufi orders within the boundaries of sharia for long time. We 
know from the wide-spread fame of Shaykh Safi among Anatolian mystics that the 
mystical path of Safi had been revered by the Ottoman population as well. So being the 
situation, the mass deportation of Safavid disciples must have raised question marks in 
public opinion. Among our known sources, Aşıkpaşazāde was the first to attempt to 
clarify this issue.  
Another point to underscore here is that Aşıkpaşazāde declares sufis of the 
Safavid order as heretic. He says, “the scholars of religion decided that they are outside 
shari’a.” Historians generally accepted that Bayezid II pursued moderately a tolerant 
policy against sufis of Ardabil. Only after Selim’s ascendance to the throne did the 
Ottoman government take harsh measures. The earliest religious sanction, or fetvās, 
accusing Safavids of being heretic or unbelievers is known as the one issued by Hamza 
just before embarking on a campaign on Ismail. But this passage in Aşıkpaşazāde’s 
history shifts that sort of religious declaration by Ottoman ulamā back to the beginning 
of the century. If this section was not a later edition, then we have to accept that 
qizilbashes had already been recognized and declared as heretics one decade before 
Hamza’s fetvā, when Ismail founded his temporal empire.        
There is enough reason to suppose that the mass deportation was not limited to 
the provinces of Teke and Hamid-ili. Aşıkpaşazāde does not mention, for example, any 
specific province when explaining the reasons why the sufis of Ardabil were deported. 
Rather he states the leaders of Ardabil sufis, and those who visited Ardabil among them, 
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were denigrated and exiled from the country of Rūm (memleket-i Rūm) to Rum Eli.1044 
Neither the province that sufis were deported from, nor the one they were exiled to is 
specified by Aşıkpaşazāde. Thus it is reasonable to think that the mass deportation from 
Teke and Hamid-ili to Moton and Coron was only an example among many others. But 
it must have been the greatest since historians needed to put special emphasis on this 
case. Aşıkpaşazāde recites the deportation just before his narration of Ismail’s march on 
Tabriz.1045 One can deduce, thus, from his account that Ismail captured Tabriz after the 
exile of many sufis from several parts of memleket-i Rūm. As delineated above, the 
deportation from Teke occurred after the appointment of Korkud in 1502, when Ismail 
had already entered Tabriz.1046 Thus what Aşıkpaşazāde mentions must be not 
necessarily the well-known exile of Tekean sufis but some others that took place earlier 
than 1502. 1047  
Haniwaldanus Anonym confirms such an assumption.  It states, Bayezid II 
dispatched orders to his governors in eastern borders to arrest and execute those who 
wanted to join Ismail’s forces. But such measures could not prevent the qizilbash flow to 
Iran. He, then, inspected sufis wearing red-caps (kızıl tāc) all over Anatolia. Upon his 
order the adherents of Ismail were executed. But those who were sympathizers but still 
hesitant were deported, with their children and spouses, to Morea. For this purpose many 
messengers were sent to Anatolia; so many people were executed and exiled that many 
                                                 
1044 “Memleket-i Rūm’da olan sofılarun hülefāsını ve Ardabil’e varan sofuları Sultan Bayezid tahkīr edüb 
Rum Eli’ne sürdi.” APZ, p. 251.  
1045 APZ, p. 251. 
1046 Ismail captured Tebriz in the summer of 1501. See Allouche, p. 82. 
1047 For a similar approach consider Veinstein, “Les premières measures”, pp. 230-32. Veinstein comes 
out with the same conclusion on the basis of a totally different source. He analyzes a decree of Bayezid 
issued in June, 1501, which is published in AD. The decree is addressed to the qadi of Ankara and orders 
to arrest certain Fethullah, who was deported to Moton but returned to Ankara without permission. The 
qadi was expected to capture and imprison him.      
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villages became devoid of people.1048 As seen evidently, the anonymous author reports 
that people were arrested and deported from the whole of Anatolia and Rum-ili 
(meaning the Balkans and Thrace). Italian sources also agree upon that not only from the 
region of Teke but from the whole of Anatolia groups of ‘heretics’ were deported to 
Greece and Albania.1049   
One further point to be noticed in Haniwaldanus Anonym’s account is that the 
mass deportation is reported as the B-plan of the Ottoman administration. Bayezid first 
tried to prevent the flow of his subjects to Ismail’s entourage by levying severe 
punishments. But this measure failed to cut off the connection between the shah and his 
disciples. It was after then that Bayezid exiled sufis to recently captured Morea, which 
was the western frontier of the empire. Bayezid’s aim is obvious: he wanted to make 
them totally torn off from Ismail and other sufis of Anatolia. Haniwaldanus Anonym 
draws attention to one additional concern of the Ottoman administration: they would 
protect the borders against [Christian] enemies.1050  
Haniwaldanus Anonym also sheds light on some aspects of the deportation. It 
states that so many people were deported that villages and towns became for the most 
part devoid of people. A close scrutiny of other sources discloses that they also tacitly 
indicate that the deportation was comprehensive. It seems, for example, from the 
commentary of Aşıkpaşazāde that it created displeasure among a certain portion of 
                                                 
1048 “Bunun üzerine [sınırlarda alınan önlemlerin sufilerin geçişine engel olamaması üzerine] Bayezid bu 
kötü duruma başka bir care buldu. O, Anadolu bölgesini inceden inceye arattırarak ele geçen kırmızı taçlı 
herkesi yakalatıp idam ettirdi. Fakat henüz kararsız olan ve açıkça sufilerin mezhebini Kabul etmiş 
görünmeyenler, karıları, çocukları ve taraftarları ile birlikte Mora’ya sürülerek burada deniz kıyısında 
ikamete mecbur tutulacak; böylece düşmandan gelecek baskınlara her an maruz kalacak biçimde silah 
altında bulundurulacaklardı. Bu maksatla Anadolu ve Rumeli’ye ulaklar gönderildi ve yakalananların 
çoğu idam edildi; ayrıca çok kişi de sürgüne gönderildi. Bunun sonunda köyler ve kasabalar büyük ölçüde 
insandan arındırılmış bir hale getirildi.” ANMH, p. 45.    
1049 See FSH, p. 92. 
1050 ANMH, p. 45. 
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society; the attitude of the government was regarded as either as too harsh or entirely 
oppressing. Indeed, it must have been this discontent that forced Aşıkpaşazāde to add the 
last section of his history, which summarizes the deeds of Junayd. His question at the 
beginning of the section reveals the fact that a considerable number of people, possibly 
even among the high circles of Istanbul, were confused with the deportation of Safavid 
adherents, who seemed still to be well-regarded sufis. The answer of Aşıkpaşazāde aims 
exactly to resolve this question. He attempts to explain the essential change in the 
doctrinal basis of this mystic order in order to prove to his audience that the Order of 
Safaviyya was no more regarded as an ‘approved’ mystical path from the Islamic point 
of view.1051  
 
5.4.  THE KARAMAN UPRISING, 1500 
A certain Mustafa1052, pretending to be a member of Karaman dynasty, rose up against 
the Ottoman authority while Bayezid II was occupied with the conquest of coastal 
strongholds in Morea such as Lepanto, Modon, and Coron. The tribes of the Taş-eli 
region such as Turgutlu and Varsak immediately gathered around him.1053 Aşıkpaşazāde 
declares that the actual reason of the uprising was the increasing taxes imposed over the 
region. Ottoman government commissioned a bureaucrat to re-register the tax sources of 
the province of Karaman in 906 / 1500-1. The new register (tahrir) doubly increased the 
administrative and military responsibilities of the timar holders while their allotted 
                                                 
1051 APZ, p. 249. 
1052 Idris and ‘Ali gives his name as Đbrahim. “....vilāyet-i Qaraman’da Đbrahim nām bir mechūlü’n-neseb-
i mezmūmü’l-haseb nedir ki ‘Ben Qaraman-Oğlı Đshak Beğ’in ferzend-i reşidiyem’ diyu zuhur eyledi.” See 
ALI, p. 900. Also consider TNSB, p. 123, footnote 43. Solakzāde says his name was Mustafa and he was 
the son of Hacı Hamza, who was the son of Qaramanoğlu Đbrahim Bey. Müneccimbaşı, however, argues 
that Hacı Hamza was the son of Đbrahim Bey’s brother Mirzā Bey. Both of them agree on the fact that 
Mustafa had fled to Iranian lands during his infancy and grew there. See SLZ1, p. 429; MNB, p. 412.   
1053 KPZ8a, pp. 210-11. 
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revenue sources remained the same. At that point Aşıkpaşazāde’s account differs from 
later histories. To him the rebellion was initiated by those timar holders who were 
charged with heavy incumbency. They brought someone, who was pretending to be 
from Karaman dynasty, to the leadership of the rebellion. But Aşıkpaşazāde repeatedly 
argues that Mustafa was not a member of Karaman dynasty.1054 Throughout his narration 
of several stages of the rebellion, he never mentions the Varsak and Turgut tribes. But at 
the end of the rebellion, when Mustafa fled, timar holders and Karaman begs, he says, 
came to Mesih Pasha; they expressed repentance and vowed not to betray any more.1055 
Later accounts, however, do not mention the role of timar holders in the rebellion. One 
feels legitimate within available evidence to take into account both groups, timar holders 
and local tribal leaders.   
Leaving aside the proportion of timar holders and tribal begs in the rebellion, 
what is known is that they rose up and to lead the uprising they invited Mustafa Bey, 
who was the grand-son of Mirza Beg, a brother of Kasim Beg, and at that moment was 
living in Iran. Mustafa Beg came to Đçel and formed a government there.1056 They 
pillaged Larende and surrounded the citadel of the city. Upon hearing these 
developments, Prince Ahmed who was the governor of Amasya, sent a messenger to 
Muhammed, the son of Prince Şehinşah and governor of Beyşehri, ordering him to 
march on rebels. Ahmed himself also moved towards Larende as well. Upon hearing that 
an Ottoman army was on the way towards him, Mustafa Beg returned to Taş-ili. 
Although Ahmed followed them for a while, since Mustafa Beg’s forces took shelter in 
                                                 
1054 Even the title of related section in Aşıkpaşazāde’s history is “Anı beyan ederkim düzme Qaramanoğlı 
ne suretde geldi neyledi” See APZa, p. 260.   
1055 APZa, p. 261. 
1056 UZC2, p. 109. Also consider HSE3, p. 318;  
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the steep mountains of Taş-ili and the winter was about to begin, he had to return 
without a confrontation.1057  
In the following spring (Ramazan 906/May-April 1501) Bayezid II, who had 
already returned from Morea, commissioned Mesih Pasha to resolve the Karaman 
problem. Mesih Pasha surrounded rebellious forces in Bulgar Mountains. If we trust 
Hoca Saadeddin, some tribal leaders around Mustafa Beg regretted and began to 
communicate secretly with Mesih Pasha. They pleaded for forgiveness and pledged to 
obey.1058 Thus, shortly after the arrival of the Ottoman army the tribal forces around 
Mustafa beg began to fall apart. Mustafa himself had to flee to Aleppo.1059 But 
Aşıkpaşazāde and Kemalpaşazāde, two contemporaries of the events, do not mention 
such an implicit coalition between tribal comrades of Mustafa Beg and Mesih Pasha. 
Aşıkpaşazāde states that it was after the siege of rebellious troops by the Ottoman army 
in Taş-ili and the fleeing of Mustafa that tribal begs and timar holders begged 
forgiveness.1060  Kemalpaşazāde gives a similar story: Mesih Pasha besieged Mustafa 
Beg’s forces in Bulgar Mountains and killed a number of them, especially from the 
Varsak tribe. The rebellious troops could not resist and scattered soon. Mustafa Beg 
fled.1061 An imperial decree issued in evāil-i Zilhicce 906 (18-27 June 1501), and 
addressed to Mesih Pasha, confirms that Mustafa Beg escaped from Taş-ili and first 
went to Tarsus, then disappeared. He might either arrive in Damascus or go to Eastern 
                                                 
1057 HSE3, pp. 319-320; MNB, p. 412.  
1058 HSE3, p. 320. ‘Ali and Müneccinbaşı repeats the same idea. See ALI, p. 901 and MNB, p. 413. 
1059 Uzunçarşılı relies on Hoca’s account. See UZC2, pp. 109-110. 
1060 APZa, p. 261. 
1061 KPZ8a, pp. 211-212. An imperial decree issued in evāil-i Zilhicce 906 (18-27 June 1501)  
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Side (Şark Cānibi), i.e. Iran.1062  Later sources say, he was, upon request of Bayezid II, 
arrested and imprisoned by Memluk governor of Aleppo.1063  
The uprising of Mustafa Beg constituted the last confrontation of Karaman and 
Ottoman forces. The Karamanid dynasty, which resisted against Ottomans for two 
centuries, was totally diminished by the repression of this uprising and did not rise 
again.1064 One accomplishment of Mesih Pasha was that after suppressing the rebellion 
he built a castle in Taş-ili and stationed a group of janissaries in it. The reason for this 
was the idea that these soldiers would intervene and prevent similar insubordinate 
activities in the region.1065  
In order to better assess the events of the year 1500, a short glimpse into the 
international power relations is necessary. In 1500, when Ismail rose up, the seven-year 
long struggle with Mamluks had already ended in 1491 and since then the Mamluks and 
the Ottomans had been relatively friendly. The newly rising power in the east further 
cemented warm relations between the two. Bayezid sent his daughter to the sultan of 
Egypt for marriage in 1501. In the next year, ambassadors discussed the affairs of Persia 
                                                 
1062 ‘Şimdiki hālde dergāh-ı mu’allāma mektub ve ādem gönderüb  
Karamanoğlı adına olan müfsid Taşili’nden çıkub Tarsus cānibine gidüb akabince Ankara Sancağı beyin 
gönderüb mezbūr Karamanoğlu adına olan mesfurı Kuştemiroğlı deniz kenarından geçürmiş, Şam 
tarafına veyahud Şark canibine gidüb veyahud ol yirde pinhan oldığı ma’lum olmadı diyu bildirmişsiz. 
Eyle olsa gerekdür ki, bu bābda kemal-i ihtimām ve hüsn-ü ikdām zuhura getürüb ol müfsidün ne yire 
varub ve ne yire iltica itdüğün temam tahkīk idüb bilmeyince olmayasız ve hakikat-ı hāl temam ma’lum 
olduktan sonra yazub dergāh-ı ālem-penāhıma i’lam idesiz!’ See Ahkām Defteri, pp. 67-8, decree 240. 
Ten days before, another decree had been sent Şehinshah to inform the Port on affairs concerning 
Karamanoğlu. See Ahkām Defteri, p. 32, decree 111. 
1063 See for example SLZ1, p. 422. Fisher deduces from contemporary Italian sources that Ismail requested 
the Governor of Aleppo to free the Qaramanian leader. But the Mamluk sultan sided with Bayezid. He not 
only refused Ismail’s request but also sent three thousand mamluks to Aleppo to prevent his release and to 
guard frontier. See FSH, p. 92.   
1064 TNSB, p. 125. 
1065 “Ve ol Taş-ili içinde bir kale yaptılar, kapıkularından içinde biraz kul kodılar, artuk bir ānın gibi 
haramzāde haramilik idüb kaçub Taş-iline girmesün deyu”. See APZa, p. 261. For a similar account also 
consider KPZ8a, p. 212. 
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and the Syrian frontier.1066 On the other hand, the ruler of Egypt preferred to preserve 
the distance in his relations with Ismail. He refuted Ismail’s request to free Mustafa of 
Karaman, who was arrested by the governor of Aleppo. He also did not accept Ismail’s 
offer to make an alliance against the Ottomans,1067 and rather pursued a pro-Ottoman 
policy against the Safavids. A letter of Hayr Beg, the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, 
addressed to the Otttoman sultan evidently indicates that Mamluks preferred to move 
together with the Ottomans against rising shi’ite danger. In his letter Hayr Beg states that 
he had received a letter from his sultan ordering to help Ottomans against qizilbashes. 
He also explains that he had already ordered his generals to join Ottoman forces and he 
himself was ready to perform any mission that would be delivered by the Ottoman 
sultan.1068   
 In the opposite camp, there was Venice and Ismail. There are reasons to suppose 
a connection between these two powers and the uprising of Mustafa. Indeed, Ottoman 
sources do not suggest any link between the Karaman uprising and the qizilbash 
movement, neither ideological affiliation nor concrete co-operation between the two. 
Furthermore, Safavid sources never talk about neither Mustafa Beg nor his uprising 
against the Ottoman authority. Meanwhile Sydney N. Fisher, relying on Italian sources, 
argues many of the tribes summoned under the banner of Mustafa were qizilbash.1069 
Adel Allouche follows the same approach. To him the concurrence of the Karaman 
uprising and Ismail’s westward march in the summer of 1500 was not accidental. They 
appear to have acted in complete co-operation. Allouche develops his idea further and 
                                                 
1066 FSH, p. 93.  
1067 FSH, p. 93. 
1068 TSA, document E 5483. This document is partly published by Selahattin Tansel. See TNSB, p. 232.  
1069 FSH, p. 91. 
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argues that the real reason of Ismail’s visit to Erzincan was not solely to summon his 
Anatolian disciples, as widely accepted by historians, but to enter into the Ottoman 
territories from there and to join in the Karaman uprising. But since he could not 
summon as many fighters as as he expected in Erzincan, he had to turn on a weaker 
enemy, which was the ruler of Shirvan.1070  
Allouche calls attention to Venice’s effort to establish a coalition against the 
Ottomans on the eastern front. It seems from contemporary reports of Italian diplomats 
that diplomatic relations between Venice and Ismail had already been established in 
1502.1071 Upon the request of Ismail, Venice sent Constantino Laschari from Cyprus to 
promise aid and artillery.1072 Furthermore, Laschari was commissioned to convey the 
message of Venice not only to ‘Nuovo Profeto’ (Ismail) but to Karaman and Persia as 
well.1073 Thus, Allouche deduces, this letter must have been written before the summer 
of 1501 since Ismail became the ruler of Persia from then on. If it was written after this 
date then Venice should not address Ismail and Persia separately.1074 Consequently, 
Venice, Ismail, and Mustafa acted in coordination against the Ottoman Empire in the 
summer of 1500. But this coalition did not survive long since Venice was defeated on 
Morean coasts on the one side and Ismail could not gather enough warriors from the 
Ottoman territories on the other. After signing a treaty with Venice in the following 
                                                 
1070 Adel Allouche, Osmanlı-Safevî Đlişkileri. Kökenleri ve Gelişimi, çev. Ahmed Emin Dağ, Đstanbul: 
Anka Yayınları, 2001. (Originally published in English: The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-
Safavid Conflict (906-962 / 1500-1555), Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983.), p. 93. It should be noted, 
however, that the available evidence does not support Allouche’s argument.  
1071 Allouche, p. 90. The attempt of western powers to establish good relations with Shah Ismail against 
the Ottoman Empire is a well-known historical fact. In addition to Venice, Portugal also sought ways of 
co-operation with the new monarch of Iran. On the other hand, Ismail also pursued a policy to maintain 
warm relationship with Venice, Portugal and other western states. For the diplomacy between Shah Ismail 
and Portugal see Jean Aubin, “Les ambassades portugaises à la cour de Châh Isma’il”, Journal of 
Azerbaijani Studies, 1, 1998, 20-29.  
1072 FSH, p. 92.  
1073 Allouche, p. 91. 
1074 Allouche, p. 91.  
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summer, Bayezid dispatched an army on Mustafa and eliminated the Karaman threat. 
Ismail then had to abandon his territorial interests in Ottoman lands if he had any and 
turned towards Iran.1075   
Although Allouche’s indication on the possible connection between these three 
concurrent events and on the corroboration between the three rivals of the Ottomans 
deserves attention, his argument on Ismail’s territorial ambition within Ottoman borders 
is open to criticism. He argues that Ismail did not come to Erzincan for the purpose of 
gathering Anatolian disciples for he could have well done this in distance from the 
Ottoman border. And he gives an example: Certain Karaca Đlyas, who came from 
Anatolia, joined with his man to the Shah in Chukur Sa’d.1076 That sort of analysis fails 
to explain psychological dimension of the issue. The stirring effect of Ismail’s rise 
among Anatolian disciples was augmented by his westward mach towards Anatolia. He 
had, indeed, been expected by his followers as a savior from Ottoman oppression.1077 
Furthermore, keeping in mind the difficulties in transportation, the affect of 
geographical vicinity in collecting more men should not be underestimated. Indeed, 
Allouche himself recites that only 1500 men gathered around Ismail when he entered 
Ardabil towards the end of 1499 summer. In the next summer, when he arrived in 
Erzincan, his forces outstripped 7000 armed men1078, which constituted the core of 
Ismail’s army that would seize in a couple of years the entire Azerbayjan, Iran, and 
greater part of Iraq.  
                                                 
1075 Allouche, pp. 85-92. 
1076 Allouche, p. 89. 
1077 For expressions of qizilbash sentiments in many occasions see “Shahkulu Rebellion” in this study.  
1078 Allouche, pp. 80-81. 
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Nonetheless, the connection between the two movements must not be 
underestimated. Allouche and Fisher actually proved this connection relying on Italian 
accounts. But the content and the nature of this relation between Ismail and Karaman 
uprising still needs further investigation. However the first point to emphasize is that the 
same tribal groups, such as the Varsak and Turgud, were close associates of both the 
Karamanoğlu dynasty and the Safavid order.1079 
 
5.5.  THE DULKADIR CAMPAIGN, 1507 
Ottoman sources are considerably silent on qizilbash issues until Ismail’s campaign on 
the Dulkadir in 1507. The reason must be that during this period Shah Ismail was 
engaged in extensive conquests in Fars and Iraq; thus he was far away from the Ottoman 
borders. The seemingly friendly but suspicious relation between two states is reflected in 
the Ottoman chronicles as silence. A short passage in the history of Kemalpaşazāde 
sheds light on Ottoman attitudes towards Ismail and his state and on the Ottoman eastern 
policy as well. Kemalpaşazāde states that Bayezid II was well aware of the dangerous 
storm arising in the east in 911/1505; Ismail’s power was growing day by day. It appears 
from his explanation that the Ottoman administration regarded Ismail as a serious 
enemy. But this was not just because of his fifth column activities in the Ottoman realm 
but because he was threatening the Ottoman borders with his growing army as well. 
Ottoman administrators took seriously the possibility of the Shah’s attack on Ottoman 
territories into account. Because of that, as Kemalpaşazāde states, the Ottoman army in 
                                                 
1079 Both Allouche and Fisher draw attention to this point but do not dwell on the important role of these 
tribes on the contemporary affairs. See FSH, p. 92; Allouche, p. 83.   
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eastern borders was reinforced and continuously stood ready for battle.1080 After Ismail’s 
capture of Bagdad, Bayezid II ordered the reinforcement of the fortress of Sivas.1081  
Meanwhile, Ismail maintained warm relations with Bayezid II. He dispatched 
various ambassadors to the Porte during these five years in order to express his friendly 
attitude and regards. Bayezid II in his own part also preferred to avoid conflicts with his 
new rival neighbor in the east. In the meantime, as we learn from Ottoman sources, he 
was always suspicious of Ismail’s acts. Kemalpaşazāde summarizes Bayezid’s policy as 
follows: “Gerçi ol tāc-dārun bāb-ı hilāfet-me’āba ilçisi gelür giderdi. Cenāb-ı kām-yāb-
ı sultān-ı cihāna izhār-ı ihlās u ihtisās iderdi. Emmā kavline i’timād itmelü değil 
mekkārdı.hayl-i bād kirdārla leyl ü nehār işi ilgārdı.”1082 
    Bayezid dispatched an ambassador, who was carrying his letter, to 
congragulate Ismail on the conquests of Fars and Iraq. In his letter, Sultan Bayezid, 
addressed Ismail as ‘my son’ and advised him to be a just ruler, not to persecute the 
sunni population of his country, not to desecrate mescids and tombs of sunni saints, and 
to maintain a warm relationship between the two states.1083 They were dismissed with 
robes of honor and Ismail’s friendly sentiments. It is reported, however, that his envoy 
was compelled to witness several executions, including that of leading sunni 
scholars1084, and to eat pork.1085 In the summer of 1505, Ismail dispatched an envoy to 
Istanbul. There were three issues on his agenda: to assure his peaceful intentions toward 
                                                 
1080 “Ser-i hayl-i Ardabil Şah Đsmail’ün şevk-i şevketinün hiddeti ve şiddeti günden güne izdiyādda idi. Ol 
‘adū-yı kinecūy nāgāh kadem-i şūmla būm-ı Rūm’a hücūm ve kudūm ide diye asker-i mansūra ... tefrika 
virmeyüb hāzır olmışdı...” KPZ8a, p. 243.   
1081 KPZ8a, p. 278. 
1082 KPZ8a, p. 243. 
1083 Efendiev, “Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah Đsmail”, pp. 91-2. 
1084 BRW, p. 57. 
1085 FSH, p. 94.  
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the Ottoman Empire1086, to protest the hostile activities of Prince Selim in Trabzon, and 
to guarantee that his soldiers would respect Ottoman lands during his upcoming 
campaign on the Dulkadir.1087 Bayezid did not show an open disapproval, but remained 
suspicious. An interesting event reported in Italian sources shows how suspicious and 
distrustful the Ottoman administration was of Ismail. Ismail’s ambassadors were 
guarded closely in Istanbul and prevented from communicating with the public. ‘Even 
the money which he spent in Istanbul was afterwards collected and the holders of it were 
reimbursed, in order that the heresy inscribed upon it could not circulate in Turkey.’1088   
On the other hand, the close connection between Ismail and his disciples in 
Anatolia proved to be intense during this period as well. Hoca Saadeddin, while 
narrating Selim’s reasoning of his campaign on Iran, places a special emphasis on the 
fifth column activities of Ismail’s khalifas and disciples within the Ottoman realm. 
According to his testimony, the impercipient Turks (Etrāk-i bī-idrāk) of Anatolia 
somehow adhered to him (Ismail) without knowing his true character; they began to 
sacrifice their possessions and sons for the sake of the Shah. Those who had the 
opportunity used to visit him (Shah Ismail) carrying uncountable presents and vows 
(adak); those who did not have chance to visit him were sending their vows and presents 
via the Safavid khalifas working in Anatolia. To Hoca Saadeddin, the primary stimulus 
of the qizilbashes’ such practices was that they regarded the Porte of the Shah as the 
door of need and wish (hācet kapısı) believing that the Shah would fulfill their wishes 
through spiritual or supernatural means; the nature of their belief in the Shah was 
                                                 
1086 He was expressing in his letter: “Benüm Pādişah-ı ālem-penāh hazretlerinin memālik-i mahrūselerine 
kal’en dahl ü taarruzum yokdur”. TSA, document E 325. Regard also TNSB, p. 240.  
1087 FSH, p. 94. 
1088 FSH, p. 94. 
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reflected in their practice that when hearing the name of the Shah they used to prostrate 
immediately.1089 He seems to have been exaggerated, however, in asserting “they did not 
hesitate to offer their daughters or sisters to the naughty men of the Shah.”1090   
After conquering Fars and Iraq, in the summer of 1507 Ismail decided to march 
on Alauddevle, the ruler of the Dulkadir.1091 The reason of this campaign is reported 
differently in contemporary sources. Some say Murat Akkoyunlu fled to Dulkadir 
territories and was planning an attack on the Safavids with the help of Alauddevle, who 
was his father-in-law.1092 Others report that it was because of the fact that Ismail wanted 
to marry Alauddevle’s beautiful daughter; but his request was refuted.1093 Yet some 
others argue that it was because of the bad treatment of Alauddevle towards Ismail’s 
ambassador.1094 A contemporary Venetian observer presents a completely different 
reason: the men of the Dulkadir were in the habit of making frequent incursions into the 
province of Diyarbekir, which was under the rule of Muhammad Han Ustaclu, one of the 
prominent qizilbash khans. Muhammad Han Ustaclu attempted on several occassions to 
                                                 
1089 HSE4, p. 171.  
1090 HSE4, p. 171.  
1091 HSE mistakenly gives the date as Ramazan 913 / December 1508-January 1509. See HSE3, p. 350. 
SLZ, as usual, follows him. See SLZ1, p. 432. 
1092 HS, p. 582; HR, p. 115; AA, p. 50; Sarwar, p. 52; TNSB, p. 241; Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, 
in NIT, p. 53. 
1093 HSE says Alauddevle first inclined to accept Ismail’s request. But he soon realized religious laxity of 
Ismail and decided to refuse his demand. HSE3, p. 350. Also consider ALI, p. 908; SLZ1, p. 432; ANMH, 
p. 40.  
1094 Alauddevle imprisoned Oğlan Ümmet Çavuşlu, the envoy of Shah Ismail. See Sarwar, p. 52. 
Kemalpashazāde writes, “Mezkūr tād-dārun mezbūr diyāra inmesine ‘illet bu idi ki, Zü’lkadir Oğlı 
‘Alāü’d-devle Begle aralarına ‘adāvet düşmüşdi. Ol serdār kendüye i’tibār itmeyüb, il içinde ilçisine 
ta’zīr ü teşhir itdüği-çün nār-ı ‘ārla kār u bār-karārı dutuşmuşdı. Hayl-i cerrārla seyl-vār akmış gelmişdi 
ki, harmen-i düşmeni yile virüb, ilin günin yıka, yaka Zü’lkadirlü Türkmānınün hānümānın harāb u yebāb 
idüb ol diyārun üstünden girüb altından çıka.” KPZ8a, p. 250. Also consider TNSB, p. 16; UZC2, p. 228.  
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capture some principal Dulkadir fortresses, but failed. Consequently Ismail was 
determined to march in person to destroy Dulkadirlus.1095  
Ismail’s trajectory in this campaign is also a topic of controversy.1096 Instead of 
directly entering Dulkadir territory, which was shorter in distance, he first entered 
Ottoman territories, via the route of Erzincan, Sivas, and Kayseri, and attacked the 
Dulkadir.1097 Ismail had already sent a letter to Bayezid II and informed him about his 
campaign and affirmed not to cause any damage to Ottoman subjects.1098 During his 
movement within Ottoman borders Ismail carefully protected Ottoman subjects and their 
possessions from any usurpation.1099 He arrived in Sivas and stayed there for a while.1100 
His goal in visiting Sivas, as reported by Kemalpaşazāde, was to gather further fighters 
from his Anatolian disciples.1101 But he could not find what he planned since the 
                                                 
1095 NIT, p. 195. The unknown Venetian merchant also says Ismail moved with an army of 60.000 towards 
Erzincan. See NIT, p. 196. For a similar account also see Giovan Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short 
Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 108. 
1096 Consider Sohrweide, p. 142.  
1097 Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 53. 
1098 HSE writes, “Ancak Dulkadirli ülkesine gidebilmek için Osmanlıların bakımlı ülkelerinden geçmek 
gerekiyordu. Bunun için de Şah Đsmail mutlu gölgelikler salan ulu otağa rica mektupları gönderip parlak 
hükümlerinin yürüdüğü korunmuş ülkelerden geçmek zorunda kaldığından özür diledi. Geçtiği topraklara 
da bir zarar dokunmasın diye adamlarının soyguncu ellerin tutup ağaçtan bir yaprak koparanı yokluk 
yollarına yolcu ederek durağı yüce padişahın memleketini dikkatle korudu. Sıkı yasağ ile, birlikte olan 
azgın fesatçılara nefes aldırmadı.” HSE3, p. 350. Also see SLZ1, p. 432. The contemporary unknown 
Venetian merchant affirms Ottoman sources. He says, during his stay in Erzincan, on the way to Dulkadir, 
Ismail “sent two ambassadors, one named Culibec [Kulu Beg] to the Ottoman in Natolia (sic), and the 
other named Zachariabec [Zekeriya Beg] to the Soldan of Cairo, swearing solemn oaths to these 
monarchs, that he intended no harm to their dominions, but only wished to destroy his enemy Aliduli.” 
See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 196. The same account is repeated in Giovan Maria 
Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 108.  
1099 HS, pp. 582-3; HR, p. 115; Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 54.  
1100 KPZ8a, p. 251. According to ALI and SLZ, Ismail moved ahead till Kazābād near Tokat. ALI, p. 908; 
SLZ1, p. 432. 
1101 HSE does not mention such a goal of Ismail. To him Ismail followed this route since it was the only 
way to enter Dulkadir territories. See above footnote. HSE3, p. 350. SLZ follows this assertion. SLZ1, p. 
432. Hoca’s account is obviously deficient since he could have well entered Alauddevle’s country from 
eastern fronts – through Diyarbekir for example – instead of wandering through northern borders, which 
was evidently longer in terms of territorial distance. KPZ’s account stands seemingly more reasonable on 
this issue. Đsmail H. Uzunçarşılı states, Ismail’s aim in following this route might be to surprise 
Alauddevle and to take from him the opportunity to prepare for a battle. He also calls attention to the aim 
of exciting qizilbash society in Ottoman realm. See UZC2, p. 228, footnote 2.  A contemporary Venetian 
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Ottoman administration had taken effective measures in preventing the movements of 
Ismail’s adherents since the year 1500. Upon learning of Ismail’s westward march, the 
Ottomans increased their preventive measures. Consequently Ismail could not recruit as 
many fighters as he planned from Anatolia during his stay in Sivas.  
Diyārbekr içinden dahī gitse olurdu. Ol yoldan da varır maksuda vusūl bulurdı, 
ammā rindāne deprenüb, bir taşla iki kuş urmak istedi, bahāne ile gelüb serhadd-i 
Rūmda bir zaman turmak istedi. Ta ki Anatolınun Kızılbaşı ve sāyir evbaşı ol 
şem’-ı bezm-ı fitnenün kenāra geldüğin duyub, her tatarftan yanına cem’ ola. 
Süvār u piyāde bende vü azāde her kanda varsa ālet-i rezmle ‘azm ide vara, 
kendünün haşmeti artub, ziyāde şevket bula. Emmā umduğın bulmadı, ol didüği 
iş olmadı. Đçinde kızılbaş olan vilāyetlerin ra’iyyetleri boyunlanub birbirine 
merbut olmışdı. Mecāl-ı ‘ubūr ve ihtimāl-i mürūr merfū u medfū’ olmuş ve 
mesālik-i memālik mazbūt olmışdı. Sipāh-ı keşver-penāh ayağ üzerine gelüb, kişt 
ü bağ, deşt ü rağ, sahra vu tağ tolup turudı. Cüyūş-ı seylāb-cūş u sehāb-hurūsun 
mehābetinden kuş uçmaz ve kolan yürimez olup dururdı....Yarağla ayağ üzerinde 
buldukları Kızılbaşun arkasından kumaşın soymağla komazlar, başın alub fitne 
menba’ını soğuldurlar ve yaşın kurudurlardı. Mazanne-i fesād ve mienne-i ‘inād 
olan bed-nihādları bend-i pulāda çeküb cānlarına a’zāb u ‘ikāb iderler ve 
tenlerini zindān içinde çürüdürlerdi.1102 
 
In fact never trusting in the words of Ismail, Bayezid mobilized his Anatolian 
army towards the eastern borders of the empire. Ahmed was ordered to protect the 
gateways between Tokat and Amasya while Karagöz Pasha, the beylerbey of Anatolia, 
moved to the Çubuk valley ready to battle.1103 Kemalpaşazāde argues that Ahmed’s 
forces completely blocked the communication between the Shah and his disciples. They 
arrested those who traded with Ismail’s men and tortured them. They detained anyone 
                                                                                                                                                
observer, however, puts forward a more simple reason. He says, “It is only four days’ march from 
Arsingan [Erzincan] to the country of Aliduli; but Ismael took another route, passing by the Turkish city 
of Cesaria [Kayseri] in order to obtain supplies which he intended to pay for honesty.” NIT, p. 196.  It is 
to be noted here that this Italian source does not mention Ismail’s visit to Sivas.  
1102 KPZ8, pp. 251-252.  
1103 KPZ8a, p. 253. 
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who was found on the way going to Ismail. They put those who were seized with arms 
to death.1104  
It is not clear from available sources whether or not Ismail intended to attack the 
Ottomans. Some modern historians advocate that this was highly possible. Tansel marks 
out, for example, that trusting in his disciples living in Ottoman lands Ismail disregarded 
border-lines. According to Tansel, it is reasonable to think that if he could gather enough 
disciples from Anatolia he would invade Ottoman territories.1105 Fisher also argues that 
Ismail was planning to attack Ottomans if opportunity would arise.1106  
Indeed, Ismail’s policy against the Ottomans was quite difficult to asses. He 
always pursued respectful policy in his correspondence with Bayezid, repeatedly 
declaring his friendly sentiments regarding the Ottomans, avoiding any open clash with 
this power of the region.1107 Yet in practice he did not hesitate to show hostile-like 
behaviors on some occasions. Some of these practices were part of unavoidable conflicts 
between the two states. The major source of Ismail’s man power, that is the qizilbash 
tribes, was in Ottoman territories. The relatives of soldiers fighting under the banner of 
the shah were living in this country. Overall, Ismail had to maintain relations with these 
tribes for they provided future fighters. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, 
                                                 
1104 “Ol diyārda Türk ve Türkmānla satubazar itmeğe çıkan bed-kirdārları perçe-i pür-şikence-i ‘ikābla 
‘ukāb-vār kaparlar, gelürler giderlerdi. Ol bed-rāyleri göç üzerinde bulsalar alaylarınun serpindisini 
yürütmezler, tutarlardı. Ordu kurup konmuş bulsalar, hayme vü hargāh arasından çıkan gümrāhları nār-ı 
demārla üterlerdi. Şehzāde-i mezkūr yanındağı asker-i mansurla düşmen-i ye’cūc-ūca karşu Sedd-i 
Đskender olub turdı.” KPZ8a, p. 253.  
1105 TNSB, pp. 242-3. 
1106 FSH, p. 94. 
1107 Hoca Saadettin explains, for example that Ismail sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan (before attacking 
the Dulkadir) expressing his respect to the sultan’s superiority. Hoca’s account runs as follows: “Öte 
yandan devlet kapısına gelen rica mektubunda kendisini bu kapıya bağlanmış, özünü padişahın buyruğuna 
sunmuş gibi gösteren nice sözler etmişti. [But Bayezid did not trust on his words] Böyle olmakla beraber 
iklimlere padişah olan sultan Bayezid sultanlara yakışır ihtiyat tedbirlerini almakta gecikmemişti.” HSE3, 
p. 350. Ismail’s message, expressed his peaceful sentiments regarding the Ottomans and his intentions to 
punish Alauddevle, also see ANMH, p. 42.  
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could not accept such a situation because of the apparent reasons. Consequently, a fierce 
but unspoken struggle was going on along the borders: the Ottoman administration 
levied every possible measures, even the most severe ones, in order to cut off every sort 
of connection between the shah and his Anatolian disciples while qizilbashes resorted to 
every possible means to maintain communication with the ‘other side’. It was because of 
this that Ismail’s every westward movement was stirring both the qizilbash groups of 
Anatolia and the Ottoman administration. Meanwhile, the correspondence between the 
two rulers had been carried on in a peaceful and respectful frame. Some of Ismail’s 
actions, however, seem to be deliberately intended to jeopardize some of his plans, 
which would displease Bayezid II. His treatment against Bayezid’s ambassador, whom 
he forced to witness the execution of some leading sunni scholars and to eat pork, might 
be regarded in this perspective. His policy was, indeed, not a stable and straight forward; 
but he pursued quite a pragmatic strategy, fluctuating in accordance to the 
circumstances.  
As for his intentions on the Ottoman territories, without a doubt he had ambitions 
on some Ottoman provinces, especially on the regions that his disciples intensely 
populated. But sources do not record any deliberate attacks by him. In fact, it was not 
logical for Ismail to attack such a great power in a period which he was still 
consolidating his power. A rather pragmatic strategy was to maintain peace on the one 
hand, and to carry on ‘fifth column activities’ among Ottoman subjects on the other. 
This was the exact policy that Ismail followed against the Ottomans. So it doesn’t seem 
very probable that Ismail planned an invasion within Ottoman lands in 1507. 
Nonetheless, whether he planned to invade Ottoman provinces or not, what is certain 
from contemporary sources is that the Ottomans perceived such a threat. Comprehensive 
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military measures in eastern provinces evidently show that Ottoman administration 
considered this possibility seriously.1108 But Bayezid II, for some reasons, did not pursue 
a decisive policy against Ismail. Contemporary accounts clearly reveal that he had 
serious suspicion of Ismail’s faith, actions, and intentions. Nevertheless, the Ottoman 
Sultan always avoided open confrontation with the young ruler of Persia, perhaps 
fearing the possible ideological influence of the shah on his own soldiers.1109  
After staying one month in Sivas, Ismail realized that he could not meet 
Anatolian disciples. Kemalpaşazāde states that neither any cavalry nor any infantry 
joined Ismail’s army.1110 He returned disappointedly and marched on the Dulkadir 
territories. He first arrived in Kayseri, then entered Maraş and Elbistan.1111 Alauddevle 
did not have enough force to oppose Ismail and fled to Turna Dağı. It was almost 
impossible to capture the fortress on this mountain for it was very precipitous. Ismail 
surrounded the mountain. Although Alauddevle had enough provision, the winter was at 
the door and snow had already fallen on the mountain. If Ismail would have kept the 
siege long, Alauddevle’s situation might have gotten worse. He appealed for help from 
both Bayezid and the sultan of Egypt. The Mamluk sultan did not respond to this appeal 
for he was afraid of Ismail’s possible attacks on his own country.1112     
Thanks to Bayezid’s decision to take more dissuasive measures against Ismail’s 
rising power, Alauddevle escaped from the wrath of the Shah. Bayezid II replied to his 
                                                 
1108 Compare TNSB, pp. 242-3. 
1109 As wee learn from contemporary sources, the doctrinal influence of the shah was not ignorable 
especially among akinci gāzis. See “Çaldıran” in this study.   
1110 “Muhāliften ve muvāfıktan süvār ü piyāde kimse varmaz gördi” KPZ8a, p. 254. 
1111 Ismail entered the country of Dulkadir on July 29, 1507. See NIT, p. 197. 
1112 KPZ8a, p. 256. 
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father-in-law’s1113 request1114; he moved Rumelian soldiers and 4000 janissaries1115 
toward the eastern frontiers under the command of vizier Yahya Pasha. We learn from 
Kemalpaşazāde that Bayezid’s concern was not merely to rescue the Dulkadir country 
from Ismail’s invasion but to crush the shah’s rising power, which was causing damage 
to the Muslim countries of the region.1116 As indicated above an army composed of 
Anatolian troops had already been located in the Çubuk Valley near Ankara. Bayezid 
did not order this force to help Alauddevle but dispatched a much stronger army 
composed of Rumelian troops and Janissaries. This was the first time that the Ottomans 
pursued an offensive policy against the Safavids; and it was the greatest military might 
that Bayezid had ever sent on Ismail, which was possibly the sole one that aimed to 
                                                 
1113 Bayezid II married Alauddevle’s daughter Ayshe while he was governor of Amasya and Selim I was 
born into this marriage. 
1114 Actually it is not clear enough whether Bayezid dispatched this military in order to respond to 
Alauddevle’s request or to accomplish his own plan, which had been already determined. As will be 
delineated, according to some later Ottoman sources Yahya Pasha was sent to Anatolia when Ismail was 
still in the province of Rum. See ALI, p. 909; SLZ1, p.432. Although KPZ’s account, which was 
contemporary of events, appears to be the most reliable one, it stands to reason to suppose that Bayezid’s 
aim in this comprehensive military operation was not solely to help Alauddevle.     
1115 HSE records 5.000 Janissaries. HSE3, p. 350. 
1116 “...Emmā hazret-i pādişāh-ı hilāfet-penāh ol mazlūmun girihānını ve mükinün dāmenini düşmen-i bī-
meyl ü amānun elinden kurtarmağa ikdām eyledi. Kızılbaş-ı berhāş-kārun ki, yağīlik ayağı üzerine turup, 
dār-ı Đslām’a nār-ı gāret ü hasāreti urmuşdı. Zarar-ı āmın def’ u ref’a ihtimām eyledi. Kasd itdi ki ol 
mutlaku’l- ‘inānun kaydın göre. Dīvān-ı cihāndan nām ve nişān-ı defterin düre....hazret-i sāhipkırān-ı 
cihān zimām-ı ihtimāmı hayl-i bī-meyl ü amān-ı Kızılbaşı Türkmān üzerinden def’ ve kenār-ı gülzār-ı 
memleketden ol hārı ref’a sarf itdi. Anatolınun Rumilinün mevākib-i kevākib-şümārına Vezir-i sāyib-tedbir 
ve emīr-i sahib-i şemşīr Yahya Paşa’yı sipahsālār idüb ol hizmete gönderdi, gitdi. Çün sultān-ı cihān ve 
Süleymān-ı zaman ol hurūc iden ve tāc-dārlık mi’rācına ‘urūc iden bed-kirdārun tedmīri tedbirine 
ihtimām itdi. Rumili leşkerine ve uç beğlerine dān-ı āsitān-ı āsümān-nişāndan ahkām gitdi ve hass ü 
‘āmme Anatolıya sefer haberini i’lām itdi. Ümerā-yı rezm-ārāy, pür-hazm ü rāy sāz u seleb-i āheng-i 
cengi bī-kusur u fütur mükemmel ve müretteb gönderdiler.....Yahya Paşa buyrıldı. ‘Asākir-i ferhunde-
me’āsire baş oldı. Asitān-ı āsümān-nişāna lazım olan mevākib-i kevākib-şümārdan dört bin Yeniçeri 
koşuldı ve atlu bölüklerden dahi bir nice koşun yol-dāş oldı. Mezkūr düstūr dergāh-ı āsümān iştibāh-ı 
sultān-ı cihān-penāhdan mihr-sipihr gibi ‘alem-i ‘ālem-gīri kaldırdı ve yürüdü. .....the army was so great 
and so numerous that Ak Deniz ve Kara Denizün boğazları henüz gāzilerün atlusı ve yayası-yla tolup 
dururdı. Đstanbulun ve Gelibolunın iskeleleri hadem ü haşemün bakāyāsi-yle māl-ā-māl olup dururdı ki 
‘asker-i ye’cūc-hurūcun ucı vardı Kaysariyye’ye irdi....” KPZ8a, pp. 256-7. ANMH confirms KPZ’s 
account. It states upon receiving Ismail’s letter expressing his peaceful attitude towards Ottomans, 
Bayezid answered that Alauddevle was under his auspices, thus he (Ismail) should leave Dulkadir 
terrotories; otherwise his (Bayezid’s) army was ready to battle. ANMH, p. 42.    
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confront Ismail’s forces.1117 Hoca Saadeddin, who wrote events more than half a century 
later, however, does not point out Bayezid’s offensive objectives. To him, Yahya Pasha 
was ordered to interfere whence Ismail’s forces engaged in ‘inappropriate affairs’ 
(uygunsuz davranış) such as the spilling of innocent blood and assaulting on probity (ırz 
ve namus) of the subjects. The Ottoman army would watch the borders and protect the 
country from any possible assault of Ismail’s troops.1118 Ali, on the other hand, confirms 
Bayezid’s offensive intentions. He states that Bayezid commissioned Yahya Pasha to 
punish the commander of the seditious troops that entered his country without 
permission.1119  
Yahya Pasha arrived in Ankara where the Anatolian troops commanded by 
Karagöz Pasha had already garrisoned.1120 He sent one thousand cavalries from Rumeli 
soldiers to the Kayseri region in order to take captives (dil almak) and to derive 
intelligence.1121 Basing his work on Italian sources Sydney Fisher writes that in Ankara 
there were about 70.000 men under Yahya Pasha. At the same time in Aksaray 10.000 
men under Prince Şehinşah, in Kayseri 23.000 men under Karagöz Pasha, and in 
                                                 
1117 As already delineated, the military moved to Ankara under the command of Yahya Pasha in 1500 and 
aimed to protect the frontiers in case of Ismail’s attack on Ottoman territories and to block communication 
and transportation between the Shah and his Anatolian adherents.   
1118 HSE3, pp. 350-51. 
1119 But he confuses the chronology. He narrates as if Yahya Pasha moved while Ismail was in Ottoman 
territories. According to his account it was upon the advance of Yahya Pasha towards the eastern frontier 
that Ismail deserted Ottoman lands and entered the country of the Dulkadir. The related passage in 
Kitabu’t-Tarih-i Künhü’l-Ahbar reads: “Fe-ammā bu kıssa [that Ismail’s entrance into Ottoman land 
without permission] ki, ma’ruz-ı Şehriyāri oldı, Rūm-ili ve Anatolı leşkeri ve vezir-i kihter ve şecā’atle 
nām-ver ve büzürg-ter olan Yahya Paşa’yı sipeh-sālār nasb itdiler. ‘Đcāzetsiz memlekete duhūl iden ser-
dār-ı zümre-i Celāli’nin hakkından gelinmesi lāzımdır’ diyu gönderdiler. Vaktā ki, bu ahbār mesmū’-ı 
Şāh-ı zü’l-iştihār oldı, ‘Hodāvendigār-ı milk-i Rūm, benim vālid-i mācid-i büzürg-vārımdır ve anların 
that-ı tasarrufundaki merz u būm ne benim murād u matlūbum ve ne maksūd u muhtārımdır’ diyū cevāb-
nāme gönderdi ve gendüsü bilā-tevakkuf o nāhiyeden göçüb ‘Alāu’d-Devle memleketine duhūl eyledi.” 
ALI, p. 909. SLZ repeats same mistake. See SLZ1, p.432.  
1120 KPZ8a, p. 258; HSE3, p. 350.  
1121 KPZ8a, p. 258.  
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Amasya 12.000 men under Prince Ahmed were ready.1122 Fisher argues, however, that 
they were ordered not to come to blows with Ismail’s forces.1123 He also calls attention 
to the point that Bayezid was not desirous to engage in an open clash with the shah’s 
army. It was not because Ismail’s military power surpassed that of the Ottomans, but 
because of the fact that considerable numbers of soldiers in Ottoman troops were not 
willing to battle with the shah.  
Bayezid greatly feared the Sofi because of the nearness of his army and even 
more because of the great number of Ottomans, both soldiers and civilians, who 
were deserting the Porte and joining the Sofis. In fact, one of Bayezid’s sons 
wrote to Istanbul that it would be impossible to form an army against the Sofi if 
the sultan did not come in person.1124   
 
Nevertheless, Ismail was not yet ready to encounter with powerful Ottomans. 
Hearing that a great Ottoman army was approaching, Ismail raised the siege and 
retreated back towards the river Fırat. Hoca Saadeddin records, Ismail thought that his 
actions created mistrust in the minds of the sultan of Rum. Upon the suggestion of 
Necm-i Geylāni, who was his vizier and counselor, he retired to Persia.1125 Alauddevle’s 
forces followed Ismail until they crossed the river; but they could not continue 
further.1126   
                                                 
1122 FSH, p. 95, footnote 41. 
1123 FSH, p. 95. 
1124 FSH, p. 95. Fisher recites this account from Deposition of Priamo Malipiero dated August 24, 1507. 
The he explains his comment, “It appears that, without the presence of the sultan, the power of Ismail’s 
attraction in the way of Bektashi ideology, generosity, and common Turkish customs, was more than the 
Ottoman timarjis, janissaries, and Anatolian Turkish feudatories could withstand.” His account, however, 
needs further revision for we do not know exactly the nature of relations between Bektashis and Ismail 
during that time.   
1125 HSE3, p. 351.  Also regard SLZ1, p. 432. An anonymous history of the period Byezid II and Selim I 
(Vakāyi-i Sultan Bāyezit ve Selim Han, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, 1416 ) confirms this idea: “Sultān-ı 
Rūm’un hatırına şüphe hutūr itmesün içün veziri olan Şeyh Necm-i Geylāni’nin tedbiri ile taraf-ı āhardan 
Acem diyārına doğru çekilüb gitti.” Re-cited in TNSB, pp. 245-45, footnote, 93.  A Venetian travel 
account gives the date of the retreat of Ismail as the middle of November, 1507. See “The Travels of a 
Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 197. Caterino Zeno gives the same date stating Ismail remained there from 
the twenty-ninth of July to the middle of November. See Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 54.   
1126 KPZ8a, p. 259.  
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The Ottomans, on the other hand, kept up the preparations to defend the empire 
against an invasion by Ismail in 1508. The fortification in frontier cities was 
reinforced.1127 As Fisher deduces from Italian sources,  
Camps remained at Bursa and various places in Anatolia and all the sanjakbeys 
of Rumelia were ordered to be in readiness to cross to Asia if the need warranted 
it. Guards were posted along the southern and eastern frontiers to keep a vigilant 
eye on the movements of the Sofis and to report and punish any defection of the 
border tribes. Within the empire the heterodox Sofis were ferreted out and either 
executed or deported to Europe.1128     
 
As observed in contemporary Ottoman and Italian sources, Ottoman cautions 
against Safavid danger reached its peak during and after the Dulkadir campaign of the 
shah. Although the Ottoman administration had always perceived Ismail’s movement as 
a threat from its very beginning, until then their primary concern was rather isolating the 
qizilbash sympathizers of Anatolia from Persia. But in six years until 1507 Ismail gained 
brilliant victories in Persia and consolidated his power. Although he passed through both 
Ottoman and Mamluk territories during his invasion of the Dulkadir, neither the 
Ottomans nor Mamluks were decisive to wage war against Ismail. Rather they preferred 
to employ diplomacy to seek a peaceful solution. It is clearly seen that Ismail had 
already become a decisive power of the region in 1507. Thus, realizing this fact, Bayezid 
II saw that there was no choice for him other than to pursue more a vigilant and 
offensive policy against Ismail. The mobilization of a large-scale army and all the 
preparations were part of this changing policy. But, the great chance of Ismail was that 
Ottomans could not successfully carry on this policy since Bayezid II’s health was 
                                                 
1127 KPZ records, for example, the fortress of Sivas was repaired and reinforced after the shah’s capture of 
Bagdad in 1508. KPZ8a, pp. 278-9. 
1128 FSH, p. 96. 
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getting worse and the struggle between princes for the throne was about to appear.1129 
Ismail would have 5 golden years in which the Ottoman administration could not pursue 
a determinant policy against him.  
The most concrete result of the Dulkadir Campaign was the annexation of 
Diyarbekir to the Safavid territories.1130 Muhammed Han Ustaclu was appointed to the 
governorship of this province as a reward for his outstanding services; he held the post 
until his death in the battle of Çaldıran.1131 But after his retirement from the Dulkadir 
campaign, Ismail was not to plan any attack on the Ottomans for he had to engage in 
eliminating another threat rising from the east: Tatars invaded the eastern provinces of 
Ismail’s country. After annexing the Arabian Iraq in the next year1132 Shah Ismail turned 
east to meet Shaybāni Khan of the Uzbeks.1133 Because of the new enemy Ismail 
resorted to diplomacy on the western front. His ambassador arrived in Istanbul in 1508, 
at the same time when Shaybānī Han’s envoy was also at the Port.1134 The objective of 
both envoys was the same: to gain the support of Bayezid II. The sultan honored both 
embassies but did not take stand in favor of any.1135 On the agenda of Ismail’s 
ambassador, however, there were other issues as well. He complained about Selim’s 
war-like actions in the borderlines of the two states. He stated that Ismail had always had 
peaceful and respectful attitudes toward the Ottomans; he had been fighting Alauddevle, 
                                                 
1129 Compare TNSB, p. 247. 
1130 HS, p. 583; HR, p. 116 ; AA, pp. 51-2; Aubin, “L’avènement des safavides”, p. 25.  
1131 HS, p. 583; HR, p. 116 ; Şerefhan, Şerefnâme, trs. From Arabic to Turkish M. Emin Bozarslan, 
Đstanbul: Hasat Yayınları, 1990, p. 471; Aubin, “L’avènement des safavides”, p. 25; Sarwar, p. 53; Roger 
Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, p. 76. In is interesting to 
note that Ismail appointed to the governorship of Diyarbakir the beg of Ustaclu tribe, whose home was 
Sivas-Tokat-Amasya region, but not a beg from Shamlu tribe, whose zone of seasonal migration included 
Diyarbakir.  
1132 HS, p. 585; HR, pp. 127-8.  
1133 HS, pp. 589-592; HR, pp. 137-50; FSH, p. 96. 
1134 FSH, p. 96. 
1135 FSH, p. 96. 
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not the Ottomans. This being the case, Selim attacked him and robbed him of artillery. 
The ambassador asked for the restitution of the stolen armaments. As Fisher puts, “…the 
request was tactfully ignored, but the ambassador was laden with gifts and departed with 
peace and friendship expressed between Ismail and Bayezid.”1136 In the next few years 
the relation between the two was relatively quiet and seemingly friendly. It was 
primarily because of that Ismail engaged in the annexation of the rest of Iran and Iraq, 
and in war with the Tatars while Bayezid II was occupied with health problems and 
internal troubles.  
On the other hand, Ismail wished to maintain an alliance with Venice against 
their common enemy, the Ottomans. His envoy arrived in Venice the following year.1137 
His object was to secure artillery and to consolidate the cooperation against the 
Ottomans. But Venice was in no position to attract the anger of the sultan for she was 
occupied with the Italian wars.1138 Thus Ismail’s ambassador could not obtain any 
concrete benefit but only a warm reception and a few valuable presents. Leonardo 
Loredano, the head of the government, sent a letter to Ismail. He expressed their 
gladness because of his hostile attitude towards the Ottomans. But he also stated that 
they were not in a relaxed state and could not break the peace with Bayezid II, at least 
for the time being.1139     
 
 
 
                                                 
1136 FSH, p. 96.  
1137 FSH, p. 96; Allouche, p. 101. Tansel states, Ismail’s envoy arrived in Venice in 1508.  
1138 FSH, pp. 96-97. 
1139 See 16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, ed. Şerif Baştav, Ankara: Ankara 
Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1973, p. 179; TNSB, pp. 245-46.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
ANATOLIAN QIZILBASHES IN ARMS: ŞAHKULU REBELLION, 
1511 
 
 
 
The most extensive, influential, and successful outcome of the Safavid propaganda 
among Anatolian population appeared as the rebellion lead by Şahkulu. The importance 
of this rebellion for the history of qizilbashes and the Ottoman empire was not limited to 
the fact that it for the first time, and to the largest scale ever recorded, not only 
mobilized and organized already excited qizilbash masses against the Ottoman rule in an 
armed resistance, but also became one of the most decisive factors in Ottoman domestic 
politics. Paradoxically, the qizilbash uprising in search of a better life in the Ottoman 
realm, made Prince Selim’s accession to the Ottoman throne possible, which at the 
beginning of the civil war between the princes was quite unlikely. This chapter will 
examine the ideological background, social bases, Safavid connections, and 
consequences of the Şahkulu rebellion. And its decisive role in providing the legitimate 
 346 
ground for the enthronement of Selim I, the most merciless and harsh Ottoman sultan 
against qizilbashes, will be evaluated in the following chapter. 
The development of Şahkulu rebellion is well-documented in TSA. Çağatay 
Uluçay extensively used these documents in his series of articles on how Selim I became 
the sultan.1140 In the first of these three articles, Uluçay explained the phases of the 
rebellion from the beginning to the end. After Uluçay, Şahabettin Tekindağ published an 
article exclusively devoted to the rebellion.1141 His article however hardly adds 
something new – neither in terms of archival evidence nor in terms of interpretation – to 
the article of Uluçay.  Apart from them, Selāhattin Tansel devotes some pages to the 
rebellion in his book  Sultan II. Bāyezit’in Siyasī Hayatı.1142 Although the itinerary and 
military development of the rebellion is more or less delineated in these works, none of 
them pay enough attention to the ideological and socio-religious content of the rebellion. 
The scholar who briefly touched upon the ideological content of the rebellion was Hanna 
Sohrweide, who studied the repercussion of the rise of Safavids among Anatolian 
qizilbashs in the sixteenth century.1143 Although meriting to be deemed among classics 
in the field, Sohrweide’s analysis on the Şahkulu rebellion is mainly based on the 
articles of Uluçay. Furthermore she pays much more attention to the political and 
military development of the rebellion than its ideological and social dimensions. Thus 
her discussions on the ideologico-religious content of the rebellion and its socio-cultural 
basis are rather limited.  
                                                 
1140 See ULCY1; ULCY2; ULCY3.  
1141 This article is published in two parts. See Şahabettin Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, 
Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 3-4, 1959, 34-39; 54-59.  
1142 See Selahattin Tansel, Sultan II. Bayezid’in Siyasi Hayatı, Đstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966, pp. 
248-256. 
1143 Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und scine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten 
Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, 95-221. See especially pp. 145-156.  
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My intention here is to focus on the socio-religious aspects of the rebellion, on its 
connection with the Safavid movement in general and qizilbash insurrections in Anatolia 
in particular. Accordingly I will try to designate the movement of Şahkulu in the broader 
framework of qizilbash movements in Anatolia during the early sixteenth-century. Yet 
many unknown details of the political and military advent of the rebellion will also be 
discovered. My analysis will also explore the dominant tribal characteristics of the 
rebels. 
 
6.1. PRELUDE TO THE REBELLION: THE ERA OF CORRUPTION AND 
CALAMITY 
As Đnalcık states, Ottomans created an administrative organization “to be totally devoted 
to the person of the Sultan.”1144 Thus being at the center of state organization and 
political perception, the personality of the sultan was decisively effective not only on 
state issues but on the whole social body as well.1145  As a matter of fact, in the Ottoman 
Empire during the early sixteenth century, all critical decisions were still between the 
lips (on the tip of the tongue) of the sultan even though there was a considerably 
developed bureaucratic governmental apparatus.1146 Thus any deficiency in physical 
being of the sultan directly resulted in drawback in functioning of the state machinery. 
Moreover, this dependency on the personality of the sultan was not just at the practical 
and operational level. Rather it had a philosophical base as well. The Sasanian political 
theory, which was one of the fundamental pillars of Ottoman polity, envisaged a 
                                                 
1144 Halil Đnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, Studia Islamica, 2, 1954, p. 120.  
1145 See Halil Đnalcık, “Pâdişah”, IA; “Osmanlı Padişahı”, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi,13, 1958, 1-
12; Franz Babinger, “Pādishāh”, EI2. 
1146 Halil Đnalcık, “Decision Making in the Ottoman State”, in Decision Making and Change in the 
Otoman Empire, ed. Caesar E. Farah, Kirksville: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993, 9-18.  
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stratified social structure on top of which sits the just ruler. The ruler was not only the 
leader of his subjects but also fulfilled the role as mediatory between God and people as 
well. Though using a corpus of scribes, priests, generals and traders to maintain social 
harmony, the ruler was always alone in making final decisions, which were also his 
responsibilities against God.1147  
Towards the end of his reign in the early sixteenth century, Bayezid II was not 
only too old to lead the army and deal with state affairs, but also had serious health 
problems. It is commonly recorded by Ottoman historians that he left state issues to his 
viziers during his final years.1148 The most explicit information about the sultan’s disease 
is found in Haniwaldanus’s anonymous history. It is recorded here that Bayezid II’s 
illness was nikris, which causes severe pains in the feet and legs. In 912/1506-7 the pain 
reached such a degree that he could not participate in campaigns.1149 In three years he 
became bed-ridden. He could not move his legs.1150 
Selim-nāme authors usually tend to use this fact to create a legitimizing ground 
for Selim’s seizure of the crown by force. It is not a coincidence that they establish an 
explicit correlation between the illness of Bayezid II and the corrupt practices of high 
officials. A closer examination of these contemporary accounts, however, suggests that 
they also presumed a certain –direct or indirect- link between the weakness in the 
                                                 
1147 See, for example, Halil Đnalcık, “The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System”, in his The 
Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600, London, 1973, 65-9; “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max 
Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity”, Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies, no. 1, 1992, 49-
72; “State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I”, in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman 
Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 70-94; 
"Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig” In The Middle East and the 
Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society, Bloomington: Indiana University 
Turkish Studies, 1993, 1-18.    
1148 See for example KPZ8b, p. 39; IDRS, p. 87; CLZ, p. 95;  
1149 ANMH, p. 34. KPZ also mentions the sultan’s disease as nikris. See KPZ8b, p. 39.  
1150 ‘...Sultan Bayezid nikris hastalığından muzadarip olarak ve belden aşağı hiç bir uzvunu kullanamayıp 
bir kütük gibi yatağında yatıyordu, ve iyice zayıflamıştı.’ See ANMH, p. 46.  
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personal decision making mechanism of the sultan –both psychological and physical- 
and calamities such as earthquake, famine, torrent, and wide-spread uprisings.    
Between the spring of 1509 and 1510, when Korkud was in Egypt, the Ottoman 
authority in the province of Antalya declined seriously. The Porte was so much occupied 
with the problem of succession that other state affairs fell into secondary rank of 
importance. Taking advantage of weak central authority, local governors engaged in 
increasing their own profit, thus, in abuses. Contemporary Ottoman historians 
commonly point harsh criticisms towards the viziers and high officials who sold state 
posts via bribery, rather than delivering them according to merit. In short, the state 
apparatus was completely malfunctioning and just about to collapse. Being devoid of its 
governor, the province of Antalya was certainly among those regions of the empire that 
was bitterly experiencing such disorder and turmoil.  Consequently, the qizilbash 
propaganda, which had been effective since the Shaykh Junayd’s visit of the neighboring 
regions, accelerated in the Province of Antalya, especially in the mountainous Teke 
region. Kemalpaşazāde states that the symptoms of rebellion had already appeared while 
Korkud was in Egypt. Although local bureaucrats had well-discerned the danger and 
reported to the Porte, the viziers, who were much occupied with the effort to bring 
Ahmed to the throne, did not inform the sultan on the issue. Furthermore they dispatched 
orders to the local representatives to keep this information unknown. He says,   
Dahi Sultan Korkud Mısırda iken kara’īn-i hāricīye inzimāmi-le ol havāricün 
hurūca ikdām itmelerini ol cevānibün hükkāmı bilmişlerdi; zikr olan ma’nā-yı 
menhīye irtikābları vuku’ bulmadan devlet-i ebed-peyvendün menhīleri vākıf 
olub, bāb-ı sa’ādet-me’ābda olan nevvāb-ı kām-yāba i’lām kılmışlardı. Emmā 
ihtilāf-ı ahvāl-i eyyāmī olmağın ol kazāya ‘alā mā cerā Hüdāvendigāra ‘arz 
olınmadı; Antalya hisārı dizdārına ve kādısına ādem gönderilüb, ol haberün sıdkı 
ve kizbi aslı ve faslı tahkīk kılınmadı.1151 
                                                 
1151 KPZ8b, p. 44. 
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According to the Ottoman court historians, the abuses of viziers and other 
officials, who got enough opportunity to do that by the deterioration of Bayezid’s health, 
were responsible before all for creating so many Safavid adherents and sympathizers in 
the Ottoman realm. Their attempt to create a devr-i sābık, an era of dissonance, in order 
to legitimize Selim’s grasp of the throne via unusual means sometimes led them to 
exaggerate the deficiencies of the former administration. But still their accounts seem to 
have sizable credibility in the assessment of the social, religious, and political ground, 
which was quite fertile for the cause of Ismail and eventually produced strong religio-
political qizilbash opposition.  
On the other hand, one should not underestimate the stimulating role of natural 
catastrophes that occurred during this period, as well as the corruptions within the 
administrative body. As Sohrweide already pointed out, the first decade of the sixteenth 
century, that is the last decade of Bazeyid II’s reign, was a catastrophic era in the 
Ottoman realm not only in terms of abuses in governmental mechanism but also natural 
disasters as well.1152 The health problems of Bayezid II, corruptions in the distribution of 
state offices and tax collections, and natural catastrophes created a pessimistic mood in 
public opinion. The influence of the first two factors in creating alternative expectations 
in public opinion is already well-treated by both contemporary and modern historians. 
The role of natural disasters in catalyzing these expectations, however, seems to have 
been underestimated.  Taking into consideration the average man’s mentality of the 
Middle Ages, which regarded concrete interactions between natural events and the 
                                                 
1152 “Das letzte Jahrzehnt der Regierung Bāzezīds II. stand für die Bevölkerung des Reiches unter keinem 
glücklichen Stern. Vor allem Anatolien wurde von Naturkatastrophen, Hungersnot und Seuchen 
heimgesucht, die sich über Jahre hinzogen und zahllose Todesopfer unter der Bevölkerung fordeten.” See 
Sohrweide, p. 139.   
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activities of human being, the influence of torrents, famine, and earthquakes 
exceptionally followed one by another, in creating grounds for messianic expectations 
must be further evaluated.   
‘Ali records a wide-spread plague in Recep, Şaban, and Ramazan (May, June, 
July) of 897/1491. It was fatal especially in Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, and generally in 
the territories of Rûm (memālik-i Rum).1153 ‘Ali says that in territories of Rûm several 
thousand men died per day; in the capital city of Rūm (pāy-ı that-ı Rum), for example, 
one thousand men died in the first five days, then twenty thousand men in the following 
ten days, and thirty thousand men in the following seventeen days. In Cairo, on the other 
hand, the plague prolonged extremely strong for thirty three days and six hundred and 
twenty five thousand men died.1154  Solakzāde states that the plague continued for three 
years and the famine for six years without interval. The people of Bolu survived without 
bread eating whereby herbs for two months.1155 After the plague and famine, intense rain 
started in Anatolia. The Konya plain was completely covered by water. This extreme 
rain continued between the years 907 and 910.1156 
The whole of Anatolia and the Balkans were trembled by a great earthquake on 
the night of Cemāzi I 26, 915 (September 11, 1509)1157. It continued for forty five days. 
The destruction of the earthquake was so great that contemporary sources call it ‘small 
                                                 
1153 The term ‘Rum’ was used for two regions in Ottoman sources: one was for the province comprising 
Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, and Çorum, the other being westerns parts of Thrace, which was specifically 
referred as ‘Rum-ili’. ‘Memālik-i Rum’ here must be the former region. For a parallel interpretation see 
UZC2, p. 233. For the limits of the Province of Rum in the sixteenth century see Tayyib Gökbilgin, “15 ve 
16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-I Rûm”, Vakıflar Dergisi, 6, 1965, 51-61. 
1154 ALI, p. 868. 
1155 SLZ1, p. 430.  
1156 SLZ1, pp. 430-1. 
1157 KPZ8b, p. 36. ALI gives the date as Rebī’ II 25,  915 (August 12, 1509). 
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doomsday’.1158 The people of Anatolia and the Balkans could not sleep in their beds for 
two months; they slept in gardens. Many constructions were demolished in Edirne. Two 
quarters of Çorum were completely sunk under the ground and all of the mescids and 
minarets in this city were pulled down.1159 But the most destructive results of the 
earthquake were seen in Constantinople. A number of mosques, minarets, castles, 
ramparts fell to the ground. One thousand and seventy houses collapsed and five 
thousand people passed away.1160 It created such awful air in Constantinople that 
Bayezid II decided to move to Edirne. But a second earthquake took place on 9 Receb 
915/23 October 1509 in Edirne, which was as strong as the former one.1161 
A third earthquake appeared on 3 Şaban 915/16 November 1509, which was not 
much weaker than the former two. This earthquake was followed by intense rains and 
torrent started on 19 Şaban 915/2 December 1509. The river of Tunca overflowed; 
Yenişehir was sunk into the water. ‘Ali records that not such a torrent had been seen 
around the region since the founding of Edirne.1162    
The sources do not include clear indications of how people of the empire 
interpreted all these natural disasters. But there are some accounts on how Bayezid II 
himself interpreted them. An anonymous history records that after these earthquakes  
Bayezid II summoned known astronomers and specialists on natural sciences and asked 
them the possible hidden reasons of this wrath of the ground. He also demanded whether 
or not these catastrophes might include clues for the future. The present scholars said 
that there would be fierce wars all over the world and that much blood would pour on 
                                                 
1158 KPZ8b, pp. 36-39; ALI, p. 920. 
1159 ALI, p. 920. 
1160 Ottoman chronicles give details of destruction. See KPZ8a, pp. 279-280; ALI, pp. 920-21; ANMH, p. 
43; SLZ1, pp. 435-6; ANMB, pp. 157-159. Consider also UZC2, pp. 233-4.  
1161 ALI, p. 921. See also TNSB, pp. 8-11. 
1162 ALI, p. 921. 
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the ground; further natural disasters and climate deterioration would appear and that all 
of these catastrophic events would take place in order to punish human beings.1163 The 
account of Solakzāde is more interesting. He summoned viziers and generals and spoke 
as follows: ‘It is the lament of the oppressed, which is a result of your oppression and 
corruption that reached God and ignited his wrath. This disaster is nothing other than the 
result of your oppression!’1164 While the Ottoman horizons were filled with dark clouds, 
the star of Ismail was rising day by day.1165  
Indeed, for the rebels’ thoughts, attitudes, and sentiments, unfortunately there is a 
scarcity of sources. We can only get an idea through the writings of their opponent. For 
example, a short passage in the conversation between Ismail and the rebels1166, which 
was cited in Hoca Saadeddin’s history, gives an idea of their sentiments and incentives. 
When answering Ismail’s question about the reasons of their uprising, the leader of 
rebels is reported to have said,  
Ol pādişāh yaşlandığından vücudunun rahatsızlığı ülkenin kargaşasına yol açtı. 
Ülkeye düzen getirecek önlemleri almaktan el çekti. Vezirlerin ellerini 
uzatmalrıyla ortaya nice zulümler çıktı. Anların ettiklerine dayanamayıp bu yolu 
seçtik. Özellikle Şah hazretlerinin kapısına yüz sürmek ve güzel varlığını görmek 
de muradımız ve gönlümüzün tek dileği idi. Kapılarına kul olmayı hora geçer 
hizmet sanıp kalkıp geldik.1167  
 
Before endeovering interpretation of these words, one should keep in mind that 
this passage is a re-production of the memory and mind of Hoca Saadettin, who was a 
leading representative of Ottoman religious scholars in the sixteenth century and 
                                                 
1163 ANMH, p. 44. 
1164 SLZ1, p. 437. 
1165 Sohrweide, p. 140. In addition to all these natural disasters and administrative corruptions, there 
appeared corsairs pillaging coastal towns and villages. (SLZ1, p. 431.) One of these corsairs, Kara 
Turmuş, was captured and executed in 1504. But this execution could not reduce the number of corsairs. 
See HSE3, p. 348; MNB, pp. 418-9. 
1166 As will be delineated below at the end of the rebellion rebellious qizilbashes went to Iran, to the court 
of Shah Ismail. 
1167 HSE4, p. 67.  
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rigorously deem both Ismail and the rebels as heretics. Thus what we read is the version 
of an authentic event that could have passed through the intellectual filter of Hoca. 
Indeed, it is highly likely that the factual event was not only filtered but also eunderwent 
metamorphosis while being reformulated in Hoca’s mind. Even so, two incentives of 
rebels clearly appear in this account. Hoca Saadeddin makes the leader of the rebels 
articulate firstly the oppression of the Ottoman regime, and secondly their enthusiastic 
devotion to the Shah.1168 
No less decisive than the above-mentioned two reasons was that the 
incompatibility of Turkoman tribal organizations and the bureaucratic-state organization 
of the Ottoman Empire had already appeared. It is known that the Taurus region was 
densely populated by nomadic Turkoman tribes such as Turgutlu and Varsak. This 
region had long been the center of tribal resistance against Ottoman imperial expansion. 
Thus this socio-cultural discrepancy had already created alienation between ottoman 
bureaucrats and the nomadic subjects populating the region.  
                                                 
1168 The sentiment of qizilbash population is better seen in the oral productions of this milieu. A poem of 
Pir Sultan Abdal, a qizilbash ozan (poet-singer) of the sixteenth century, is pregnant to the sentiment of 
qizilbashes against Ottomans. It reads, 
“Lānet olsun sana ey Yezid Pelid, 
Kızılbaş mı dersin söyle bakalım! 
Biz ol āşıklarız ezel gününden, 
Rāfızī mi dersin söyle bakalım. 
Ey Yezid geçersen Şah’ın eline, 
Zülfikārın çalar senin beline. 
Edeple girdik biz kırklar yoluna. 
Kızılbaş mı dersin söyle bakalım. 
Yuf etti erenler ey münkir size, 
Đftira ettiniz  sizler de bize, 
Muhammed sizleri taş ile eze, 
Rāfızī mi dersin söyle bakalım. 
Pir Sultan’ım eder lānet Yezid’e, 
Müfteri yalancı yezidler size, 
Đşte er meydanı çık meydan yüze, 
Rāfızī mi dersin söyle bakalım.”  
See Cahit Öztelli, “Pir Sultan’ın Hayatı Đle Đlgili Yeni Şiirleri”, Türk Dili  Dergisi, 34, 1954, p. 587. The 
whole text of this poem also recited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, p. 34.  
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Ottoman historians depict the disciples of Şahkulu as rebellious, people who stir 
up trouble, vagrant, vagabonds, good-for-nothing, and heretics. These are frequently 
phrases employed by Ottoman historians and reporters for the adherents of the rebellion: 
‘ehl-i tuğyan’, ‘müfsīd’, ‘bağī’, ‘evbāş’.1169 An anonymous history from the sixteenth 
century best summarizes the Ottoman perception of Şahkulu rebels. It reads, “They 
deviated from the avenue of obedience and fixed their foot on the route of heresy; they 
wholly agreed on performing strife and sedition.”1170    
The attitude of theOttoman administration towards the nomadic Turkish 
population was quite pejorative. The common phrases often applied by the court 
historians, who were high officials and representatives of the high Ottoman bureaucracy 
and intelligentsia as well, for these groups are ‘Etrāk-i bī-idrāk’ (the Turks without 
capacity to perceive), ‘Ertāk-i nā-pāk’ (the dirty Turks), ‘dike burun’ (the man who does 
not obey), ‘bī-bāk fettāk’ (the man without fear and kills many people).Their description 
of these Turkomans  especially in the context of the Şahkulu rebellion clearly reflects 
the view of the Ottoman bureaucrats regarding nomadic subjects. Kemalpaşazāde, for 
example, depicts the adherents of the rebellion, who defeated the Ottoman army under 
                                                 
1169 An anonymous history recounts the early phase of the revolt as follows: “…Ol bed-ahterlerden bir 
nice evbāş-ı huffāş-ittikāş ki her biri ismen ve resmen mechūl ve hilkat-ı pür-nekbetleri habāsetle mecbūl 
idi. Đhmāl ve eskāl infi’alle ol bed-fe’ālun vücūdları kendu boyunlarında bār-i girān olmağın terīk-i fesād 
ve dalāletde cān u baş terkini tahfīf-i me’net bilürlerdi. ..Sene seb’a ‘aşere ve tis’ami’e Muharreminin 
evāyilinde zikr olan ehl-i tuğyāndan birkaç müfsīdler yolda giderken şehzādenin hazāin ve emvāline 
ta’arruz idüb sūret-i bağī izhar eylediler...” ANMB, p. 173.   
1170 “Cādde-i itā’atden çıkub tarīk-i dalāletde sābit-kadem olmağla mu’āhede eyleyüb cem’isi fitne vü 
fesāda el-bir itmişlerdi.” ANMB, p. 174. It is interesting to note that HR, completely contrary to the 
Ottoman sources, depicts Şahkulu and his followers as “the people on the right path” while accusing  
Ottoman troops “those in favor of the darkness”. See HR, p. 154.   
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the command of Karagöz Pasha and spoiled their possession, as ‘the dirty Turks with 
wooden feet who never mounted a horse’.1171  
Celalzāde’s depiction suggests that nomadic Turkomans constituted the majority 
of the rebels. He says, the whole of the naughty, mischievous Turks, vagrants, and 
nimble-robbers living in cities, towns and villages, mountains, summer pastures 
(yaylak), and winter pastures (oba) of the region joined the ranks of Şahkulu.1172 Hoca 
Saadeddin depicts them in the same fashion. He argues that the Turks living in this 
region were naughty by birth and disobedient by nature. The bad temperament was part 
of their disposition. Their hearts were full of dissension and desire for evil actions; 
outwardly they appeared human-like but their true nature was animal-like.1173 Hoca 
Saadeddin depicts Şahkulu with the phrase ‘aşağılık herif’, the man deprieved of any 
respect and virtue.1174   
Ottoman historians generally depict the Anatolian disciples of Ismail in the same 
manner: stressing their poor appearance and their disobedience as a disposition, their 
impercipience and insensitivity etc. Once, Hoca Saadeddin says for example, “Başına 
tāc aldı çıktı ol pelīd / Đtdi duygusuz Türkleri mürid.”1175 Hoca Saadeddin insistently 
depicts the adherents of the rebellion as ‘heretic by birth’.1176 He also describes them as 
                                                 
1171 “Ömrü piyādelikle geçmiş ağaç ayaklu etrāk-i nā-pāk” See KPZ8b, p. 45. ANMB employs the same 
phrase in the same context. See ANMB, p. 177. HSE’s account is similar: “...Zamane dünyasında yaya 
dolaşmakla ömrün geçiren bir nice çulsuz işssiz güçsüz, pırlanta gibi atlara....biner oldular.” HSE4, p. 46.  
1172 “Şehirlerde ve kasabat u kurrāda, cibālde ve yaylaklarda ve obada ne denlü eşirra vü etrāk ve ne 
mikdār levend u nuhusted (nuhūset) ve çalak varısa....” CLZ, p. 121.  
1173 “Ama ol dıyārda yaşayan Türklerin varlıkları doğuştan yaramaz olup, yaradılışlarından dik başlı 
olduklarıından başka, huysuzluk da onların aşağılık yapılarında bir huy gibiydi. Ol insanlıktan eksik 
kişilerin nifākla dolu yüreklerinde bin bir türlü fesād gömülü olub her biri insan biçiminde laf anlamaz 
hayvana benzer kişilerdi.” HSE4, pp. 42-3. 
1174 HSE4, p. 43. 
1175 HSE4, p. 171. 
1176 “....ol ‘yaradılıştan sapkın’ kişiler kendlerine boyun eğmeyenleri demir kılıçlarla tepeleyip ol yörede 
oturan Müslümanların ırzlarını berbat edip pis bulutlarla gelen fesat ve kargaşa cemrelerini sert ve yakıcı 
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enemies of the religion (din düşmanları). When narrating the death of Karagöz Pasha in 
the battle of Kütahya, Hoca Saadeddin deems his death in the hands of these ‘enemies of 
the religion’ as proof of his highly appreciated place in Heaven.1177 Somewhere else he 
describes rebels as tramps with naked feet and hatless heads, who took off the yoke of 
obedience from their necks.1178  
After narrating how Ismail interrogated and punished the leaders of the rebellion, 
Hoca Saadeddin records that some people of the rebellious group were set free with their 
women and children.1179 This phrase suggests that there were women and children in the 
camp of the rebellious qizilbashes as well. In a similar vein, Ebu’l-Fadl Mehmed Efendi 
records that after defeating Karagöz Pasha’s commander Nokta on April 16, 1511, 
20.000 müfsids entered Burdur with their families, properties and animals.1180 Tekindağ 
states on the authority of Kemalpashazāde that during the engagement between Ali 
Pasha and Şahkulu in Çubuk the families and children of qizilbashes also attended the 
battle.1181  
As a result, considerable portion of the rebels, if not all, left their homeland with 
their families, which obviously reflects the fact that their hope of a sustainable life in the 
                                                                                                                                                
gurur rüzgārı ile tutuşturarmak için nice ‘kötü yaradılışlıları’ da kendilerine uydurmuşlardı...” HSE4, p. 
44.   
1177 “... ahiret yurdunda değeri ölçüsüne bu din düşmanları eliyle öldürülmesi kanıt oldu.” HSE4, p. 45.  
1178 HSE re-phrases Ali Pasha’s words about qizilbash rebels. Upon learning the defeat of Karagoz, Pasha 
Ali Pasha, who was not willing to agree on the achievement of rebels, interpreted the defeat as a result of 
improvidence of local governors. He said, “Bütün bu olanlar beylerbeyilerin yüreksizliklerindendir. 
Birkaç Teke Türkü’nün nice hakkından gelemezler. Yohsa başı kabak, ayağı çıplak haylazların neleri var 
ki boyunlarındaki bağlılık tokunu çıkartub başkaldıralar ve bunca zarara cesaret ideler.” HSE4, p. 47.    
1179 HSE4, p. 68. 
1180 Ebu’l-Fadl Medmed Efendi, Selimşāh-nāme, Lālā Đsmail Efendi Kütüphanesi, no. 348, f. 48a. Cited in 
Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 4, 1959, p. 54.  
1181 “Bir düz yerde müdevver bir hendek-i amik edüb, harbgāh durmuşlar imiş. Paşa’nın erdüğün görüb 
ānı ol hendeğin içine tir ü tüfenge māyil tedbirin itmekiçün, olayı tamam bir nice bin deve çökerdiler, dahī 
kamu mühmelāt-ı evrāt ve ebnā vü benātiyle içine girüb tahassun eylediler, gāfilāne cümle etfāl ve 
avrātıyle ol develer ardından cenge hazır hazır oldılar...” Đbn Kemal, Selim-nāme, Hazine Ktp., no. 1424, 
f. 25b. Cited and quoted in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 4, 
1959, p. 58. 
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Ottoman realm had totally vanished; they left Ottoman land with no intention returning. 
Furthermore, this can also be regarded as a proof that the majority of rebels were tribal 
nomads, who could easily move their families and possession with themselves. Indeed, 
qizilbashes are reported to have come with their families in many campaigns, including 
Çaldıran.1182      
Another point to be emphasized is that Ottoman sources insistently reports that 
the stimulating groups among rebels were adherents of the Safavid order. ‘Āli, for 
example, phrases the title of the related section of his history as follows: “The story of 
vagrants and adherents of Qizilbash who advent in the Province of Teke and killed 
Karagöz Pasha, the beylerbey of Anatolia.”1183 
Furthermore, the depictions of rebels in archival documents and in histories of 
contemporary authors clearly put that the main body of rebels were from disgraced – by 
Ottoman officials of course - social classes.  They are described in the report of one 
inspector, who was commissioned to look over the rebellion, for example, as follows, 
“His [Şahkulu’s] soldiers apart from sipāhis are quite poor…Their clothes are rather 
awful. If you crush his cavalries the rest can not further resist.”1184 CLZ reports, when 
learned of, qizilbashes fled from Kızılkaya Ali Pasha.  His commanders said, “…ardına 
düştüğümüz düşmene ne i’tibār, bir bölük murdar cimrīler, Türkler, Kızılbaşlardır, 
kaçdılar. Hemān piyāde olan yeniçerilerden bir mikdarını atlandurub müfsidleri 
kaçurmayalım, deyu tedbir itdiler...”1185          
                                                 
1182 See Chapter VIII in this study.  
1183 “Teke eyāletinde zuhūr iden Anatolı beğlerbeğisi Karagöz Paşayı katl iden evbaşlar ve Surh-ser 
tāifesine mütāba’at gösteren kallaşlar kıssasıdır..” ALI, p. 926. See also ANMB, p. 176. 
1184 “...Sipahi taifesinden gayri askeri gayet cimri şekildir. ....Giyecekleri hor ve hakīrdir. Atlusunda 
mukābil olursa ziyade dayanmaz...” TSA, document E. 6187. 
1185 CLZ, p. 132. Another sixteenth century historian ‘Âli describes early qizilbashes as follows: “Yini 
yaka oldukları zaman ve henüz zuhūr u hurūc itdükleri evān olmağın bir çift çahşırı iki kişi giymek ve bir 
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We learn from Kemalpaşazāde,1186 when Ismail rose in 1499, the Turkomans of 
Teke were among his foremost supporters. Kemalpaşazāde’s description - such as 
disobedient-stubborn, fearless, and killers - suggests that they were overwhelmingly 
nomadic-tribes. We also learn from Kemalpaşazāde that they were not deemed as being 
respected (kendüye kimse ādem demeyen), but rather esteemed among lower classes of 
the society in their homeland. They were far away from state posts, but always had been 
simple subjects. In short, they were distanced from the Ottoman state organization in 
such a degree that they could not benefit from any favor of the state; rather regarded by 
the bureaucrats - the state agents – as second class subjects. 
On the other hand, they found, as Kemalpaşazāde put forward, honor and respect 
in the court of Ismail. They became attached to the dignity of state and achieved high 
posts near Ismail while they were ignorable subjects in their homeland. Those who had 
never been acquainted with any state functionary in their life became the commanders 
and generals. Kemalpaşazāde also hits on an important point to be underscored: the 
Turkomans of Teke were among the firsts who joined Ismail’s forces when he moved 
from Gīlan. Thus they acquired superiority among qizilbashes. They also acquired fame 
with their bravery and obedience (merdānelik ve yoldaşlık).1187  
Kemalpaşazāde argues it was because of the respect and opportunities they found 
under the banner of Ismail which caused many Turkomans of the Teke region to leave 
their home and immigrate to Persia. They sold all of their possessions even at very low 
prices. One should not disregard, however, that this is not the whole picture; it was not 
                                                                                                                                                
çift āstini iki yini yaka rūstāyi bölüşmek, ya’nī ki iki çahşırı bir uğurdan temellüke kādir olmayanları birisi 
ile iktifā itmek ve beğleri ve bellü başluların ekseri ol tarīka gitmek şi’ār u disārları Đslām ve imanları gibi 
şatr-ı vāhid ile kanā’at sūretini göstermek üzre idi.” (ALI, p. 1086.) 
1186 KPZ8b, p. 43. 
1187 KPZ8b, p. 43. 
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only the temporal benefits offered by Ismail that attracted Turkomans. Rather they were 
tied to Ismail, just like to the former shaykhs of the Safavid order, with mystical and 
religious bonds for he was their spiritual guide. The temporal benefits must be regarded 
only as supplementary incentives for the sincere adherents of the order. They were, 
however, influential in gaining discontent population, which was not yet a sincere 
adherent of the spiritual reasons, and especially dismissed sipāhis against the revolt. 
Kemalpaşazāde states those who had not gone to Persia prepared for revenge. They 
began to wait for suitable conditions to appear. (Zalām-ı şām-ı fitne būm-ı Rūmı kaçan 
tuta diyü eyyām-ı fetrete ve hengām-ı fırsata nāzır u muntazır turmışlardı.) The 
preparation was speeded up while Korkud was in Egypt. And the most suitable time was 
believed to have arrived when Korkud left the city in a hurry. 
Another point emphasized both in archival documents and chronicles is that they 
were sackers; they plundered the properties of Muslims1188 and killed many of them 
throughout the rebellion.1189  If we trust Idris-i Bitlisī, 50.000 people were killed from 
both sides since the outbreak of the rebellion to the death of Ali Pasha on July 2, 1511, 
which marked the end of the rebellion.1190 Ottoman sources unanimously report the 
outbreak of the Şahkulu rebellion as great turmoil and disaster for the  ‘Muslim’ 
population of the region. Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman says, for example, when they 
rose up, they looted the properties and chastity (ırz) of Muslims who did not join 
them.1191 They set the villages on fire. All the vagabonds of the region joined them.1192 
                                                 
1188 See, for example, SLZ1, p. 445; MNB, p. 428; ANMB, p. 49. 
1189 See, for example, TSA, document E 2829. “…Elmalı’ya azimet düb anda dahī bir iki bin askerler cem 
olub dururmuş. Buluşub anları dahī sıyub mübalağa tayifesin şehid eyleyüb ve Elmalı’ya dahi kezālik 
vurub malın ve rızkın alub kendulara yaramayanı kırub Müslümanların ehl-ü ‘iyāllerine bir vech ile 
hakaret etmişdir ki demek olmaz…” 
1190 IDRS, p. 89.  
1191 See TSA, document E 2829. Also consider HSE4, p. 44. 
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Their number increased significantly so that they even began to dream of a temporal 
suzerainty. They were pillaging villages and towns, killing all the people and spoiling 
their properties.1193 Some of the people living in this region were killed and some others 
could save their life only by fleeing over mountains.1194  
One interesting point in the testimony of an arrested sufi dispatched by Korkud, 
draws attention. According to this testimony, after defeating Karagöz Pasha’s army 
outside Kütahya and executing him, qizilbashes toasted three people.1195 The testimony 
does not specify, however, why they toasted these three people and what they did with 
toasted corpses.1196 Another extreme practice attributed to the rebels by Ottoman authors 
                                                                                                                                                
1192 HSE4, p. 44. 
1193 HSE4, p. 44. 
1194 ANMB, pp. 174-5. CLZ narrates events more or less in the same manner. But a couplet of him is 
worth to cite here. He says, “Şarab u hamr içildi āşikāre / Harāmī başladı sayd u şikāre.” See CLZ, p. 
121. Also see HSE4, p. 44. A contemporary inspector reports the early phases of the rebellion as follows: 
“Hurūc edeliden bu demedeğin gālib budur ki ricalden ve etfalden ve avretden on binden ziyade nefs 
katlolunmuşdur. Efvāh-ı ricalde hod ziyade mübalağa ederler. Hāsıl-ı kelam bir gün önden memleketin 
ahvāline tadārik gerekdir. Gāyet gerekdir. Asıl Kızılbaş kendi gelse bu kadar āfet olmazdı. Kendudan 
eşeddir. Bu zalim uğradığı yerlerde ricalden ve avretden ve etfalden ne bulursa kırar. Hatta kendu 
maslahatından ziyade koyun ve sığır olsa cümlesin kırar. Kediyi kırar, tavuğu kırar. Kütahya’da talan 
etdüğü esbabı, mahbub kaliçalar ve sayir esbab her ne var ise cem edüb oda yakmuş. Hāsıl şerh olunur 
zalim değildür. Ve bazı ahvāl ve kelimāt vardır yazılmak edeb olduğu sebebden yazılmadı. Çavuş Đskender 
bendeniz cümleye vakıfdır, mahfice teftiş oluna. Cengin evvelinden ahārına cemī’ ahvāla vākıfdır. Takrir 
eyleye. Çok namus eksikliği oldu. Ve memleket halkı, hususa Kütahya şehirlisi rızıkların 
yağmalatmışlardır, kurtaramamışlardır. Müslümanların halleri gayet mükedder olmuşdur, hayf 
olmuşdur.” See TSA, document E. 6187. 
1195 TSA, document E 5035.  
1196 Indeed, contemporary sources often refer to cannibalistic practices of qizilbashes, both in Anatolia and 
in Iran. For example, On May 13, 1504, Ismail captured Amir Husayn Kiyā Chulāwī, the Shi’ite ruler of 
Fīrūzkūh and Damāwand and confined him in an iron cage. On the return march, however, Amir Husayn 
Kiyā managed to commit suicide. His corpse was burnt in meydān at Isfahān. (Sarwar, pp. 48-9) 
Furthermore, two of his officers, Murad Beg Jahānshānī and Sāylatmish beg were roasted alive. As a 
warning to others, Sūfīs ate them as a kebāb. Roger Savory determines, Ismail was alleged to have given 
the order, “whoever is a convinced believer, let him eat a morsel of this kebāb.” (Roger Savory, “The 
Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, p. 74.) As recorded in one Safavid 
chronicle, such was the zeal of the gāzis neither fleshes nor bones remained. (Khwurshāh b. Qubād al-
Husaynī, Tārikh-i Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 451a, cited in 
Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 74.) Jean Aubin also calls attention to 
some cannibalistic practices of qizilbashes. He reminds, for example, that Ismail made the skull of 
defeated Ozbek Sheybāni Han goblet and with it drunk wine. He also indicates that Shah Ismail invented 
new methods of torture such as coating captives with honey and posing to wasps, putting in a boiling 
caldron. See Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavudes”, Le Shî’isme Imâmite, Colloque de 
Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 237. Still more unfortunate 
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is that they set fire to even cāmis and zāviyes; they trampled on the words of God and set 
it on fire.1197    
The violent reaction of the rebel qizilbashes to the Ottoman regime, which was 
intermingled with the sunni-Hanefi interpretation the Islamic law (şeriat), was best 
manifested in their attitude towards qādis, foremost representatives of this regime. They 
treated qādis of the cities the most awfully and those that they captured they tortured to 
death. Prince Osman reports, for example, upon capturing Gölhisarı that the qizilbashes 
had detained the qādi of the city, killed him with severe torture, took his money and 
smashed his body into pieces. Prince Osman also reports that their wrath was not only 
against qādis but also against subaşıs and elites of cities and tows as well.1198     
 
6.2.  ON THE NATURE OF THE REBELLION 
 
6.2.1. The Ideology of the Rebellion 
As delineated above, the Şahkulu rebellion had not only religious character but also 
ideological and social dimensions as well. Sohrweide detects similarities in this rebellion 
                                                                                                                                                
was Muhammad Karra, who rebelled and took possession of Yazd. He was confined in a cage and 
smeared with honey so that the wasps tormented him. Finally he was also burnt alive in the square 
(meydān) of Isfahan. (BRW, p. 56.)  
Ottoman historians also occasionally mention cannibalism conducted by the Shah’s soldiers. HSE says, 
for example, Shah Ismail ordered to make two grandsons of Alauddevle, who were captured during his 
campaign on Dulkadir, and his followers ate them. (HSE3, p. 351.) ‘Âli recites their cannibalism in more 
exaggerated manner, “Dem olurdu ki, Şah-ı nev-sipāh bir şahsa gazāb eylerdi, karşusunda hazır bulunan 
hezeleye “Yen bunı!” diyū söylerdi. Fi’l-hāl ol behāyim sıfatlu etrāk ol dermendin ağzını burnını koparub 
çāk çāk iderlerdi. Lisān ve beynini kelle-i kūsfend ve dili gibi tatlu tatlu hora geçürürlerdi. Ke-ennehū 
segān ve gurkān gibi merdum-hordeliği hisāl-i hamīdeden bilürlerdi. Kendüsi dahī bu yüzden icrā-yı 
fermāna mahzūz olurdı. Bu hāleti kuvvet-i kāhiresinden ‘add idüb tefāhur kılurdu.” (ALI, p. 1086.) 
1197 “…Ve şehri dahi yer yer oda koyub mescidleri ve zāviyeleri bile yakmışdır. Ve haşā buldukları 
kelamullahı ve kitapları oda vurub tabanlayub mahvederlermiş…” TSA, document E 2829.  
1198 “…Gölhisar üzerine düşüb gelgüği gibi fil-hāl hisarı alub kadısın dutub ellibin akçesin aldıkdan sonra 
enva’-i ceza ile katl edüb meyyitin der-pare eyleyüb dört köşede asub ve subaşısın bile öldürüb ekābirden 
ve āyandan mübalağa ādem kılıçdan geçürüb…” TSA, document E 2829.  
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with those of shi’ite rebellions within sunni realms since the early periods of Islam, 
especially with extremist shi’ite movements.1199 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak follows a similar 
line of argument. Ocak analyses the rebellions in the Ottoman Empire under two 
categories: in the first group, the rebels simply aimed to acquire their goals through 
armed struggle without basing it on any ideological framework; the second group 
rebellions, however, bear dominant ideological character, that is revolutionary messianic 
insurgence.1200  
Ocak determines the four fundamental features of messianic insurgences as 
follows: 1) a discontent or oppressed social segment, usually nomads or peasants 
following an heterodox form of religion, 2) a strong belief in a divinely commissioned 
savior (Mahdi) who would soon appear and save those oppressed people1201, 3) the 
belief that the savior would bring them not only the worldly welfare but the heavenly 
salvation as well, and 4) a myth, regarding the savior, produced by the collective mind 
of the group.1202   
He argues that most of the uprisings led by nomadic Turkomans including those 
qizilbash revolts in the sixteenth century were rested upon the ideology of revolutionary 
                                                 
1199 Sohrweide, p. 146. For a concise look at to the issue of ‘heresy’ or rafada contests in Islamic societies 
see, for example, Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations on the significance of Heresy in the History of 
Islam”, Studia Islamica, I, 1953; Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites. The Ghulat Sects, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1988;   
1200 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Kutb ve Đsyan: Osmanlı Mehdici (Mesiyanik) Hareketlerinin Đdeolojik Arkaplanı 
Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler”, Toplum ve Bilim, 83, 1999-2000, p. 49.  
1201 The claims pertaining to the identity of Mahdi usually appears vaguely and fluctuating. The leader 
may claim to be the representative of Mahdi or in another occasion to be Mahdi himself. As will be 
delineated contemporary Ottoman reports depict Şahkulu exactly in this manner: “…Gāh mehdilik davasın 
eder gāh Şah öldü ānın vilāyeti bana değdi memleket benimdir der. Gāh birkaç günlük ömrüm vardır 
memleket benimdir deyu birbirine muhalif kelimat eder...” TSA, document E. 6187. Shah Veli, the leader 
of another Qizilbash uprising in 1520, commonly known as Celāli uprising, is reported as first claimed 
himself to be the representative of Mahdi, then Mahdi himself. See HSE4, pp. 347-8.  
1202 Ocak, Babaîler Đsyanı, p. 144; “Syncrétisme et esprit messianique : le concept de qotb et les chefs des 
mouvements messianiques aux époques seldjoukide et ottomane (XIIIe-XVIIe siècle)”, in Syncrétismes et 
hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du Collège de 
France, octobre 2001, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 2249-57. 
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messianism.1203 It is not coincidence that most of the charismatic leaders of those sort of 
rebellions were affiliated with mysticism. These leaders usually lead an ascetic life 
secluded in a cave, which created great respect mingled with the fear among folk, before 
launching the insurrection.1204 Şahkulu also, as well as Baba Ilyas 260 years ago, spent a 
couple of years in a cave just before raising the banner of revolt. As Ocak puts,  
Aux époques dont nous parlons, il faut certainement qu’il y ait un idéologie 
religieuse se nourrissant des croyances traditionnelles des révoltés. Et c’est 
précisément sur ce point que le chef soufi du mouvement ou de la révolte joue 
son rôle fondamental. Ce chef suofi et souvent le stimulateur d’une idéologie 
messianique, mettant à profit sa personnalité charismatique de caractère 
mystique. Ce caractère mystique prend la forme du mahdî – une forme qui est 
très familières aux peuples musulmans médiévaux.1205  
 
On the other hand, the discourses used by the leaders of rebellions are nearly 
identical. As Ocak has already showed, Şahkulu carried on an astonishingly similar 
propaganda to that spread by Baba Ilyas two and a half centuries earlier. Furthermore, 
the socio-economic backgrounds of two revolts, as well as of other similar but smaller-
scale revolts in the Ottoman realm, were also more or less the same. Like Baba Ilyas, the 
followers of Şahkulu were mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkomans affiliated with 
a ‘heterodox’ form of Islam. The roots of rebellion, indeed, stemmed from the socio-
economic conflict between nomadic groups and the Anatolian Seljukid regime rather 
                                                 
1203 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Mesiyanik Hareketlerin Bir Tahlil 
Denemesi”, V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve Đktisat Tarihi Kongresi (Tebliğler), Đstanbul, 21-25 
Ağustos 1989, Ankara, 1991, 817-25; “Babīler Đsyanından Kızılbaşlığa”, p. 153; “The Wafā’ī tarīqa 
(Wafā’īyya) during and after the Period of the Seljuks of Turkey: a new Approach to the History of 
Popular Mysticism in Turkey”, Mésogeios, 25-26, 2005, p. 243; “Tarihsel Süreç Đçinde Türklerin Đslâm 
Yorumu (Tarih Boyunca Türkler ve Đslâm Problemine Genel Bir Bakış Denemesi”, in his Türkler, Türkiye 
ve Đslam. Yaklaşım, Yüntem ve Yorum Denemeleri, Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 47; “Un aperçu 
général sur l’hétérodoxie Musulmane en Turquie: Réflexions sur les origines et les caractéristiques du 
Kizilbashisme (Alévisme) dans la perspective de l’histoire”, Syncretistic Religious Communities in the 
Near East, eds. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, Anke Otter-Beaujean, Leiden, New 
York, Köln: Brill, 1997, pp. 202-3.  
1204 Ocak, Babaîler Đsyanı, pp. 157-8; “Kutb ve Đsyan”, p. 51.  
1205 Ocak, “Syncrétisme et esprit messianique”, p. 252.  
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than the religious contest between heterodox Islam and Sunni Islam.1206 The main 
stimulus of this revolt was the hatred of Turkoman elements for the alienated (Iranized) 
state elite.1207 But the ideology of the rebellion was constructed on a deep-rooted belief: 
millennialism.1208 Ocak determines the three dominant characteristics of Babāī 
movement as messianic, syncretic, and mystic.1209 As will be discussed below, 
contemporary sources clearly envisage the same characteristics in the case of the 
Şahkulu rebellion;especially the messianic and mystic character of Şahkulu’s movement 
is evidently reflected in almost all sources.    
Both Safavid and Ottoman sources depict the father of Şahkulu, Hasan Khalifa, 
as one of the foremost khalifas of Shaykh Haydar. He even attended the banquets of 
Shaykh Junayd. But his main spiritual training was developed under the auspice of 
Shaykh Haydar. On fulfilling his spiritual maturation, Shaykh Haydar sent him to the 
Teke region for the purpose of preaching the mystical message of the Safavid Order 
among the Turkoman population of the region. A contemporary Safavid source gives 
valuable information on Hasan Khalifa, 
Hasan Khalifa, also a darwish (who dwelt between the Tike Ilī [Teke-ili] and the 
Arūm Ilī [i.e. Anatolia]), was a disciple of the Safavis. He had once waited on 
Sultan Junayd, and twice on Sultan Haydar, who had sent him with forty sufis to 
a chilla-khāna, where each had a jug of water and a loaf of bread as their 
sustenance during the period of fasting (chilla). When this period was over they 
came out of the chilla-khāna. All of them had consumed their provisions, 
excepting only Hasan Khalifa, who brought his untouched to ‘His Holiness’ 
(Sultan Haydar) who then sent him back to Teke Ili,1210 having first given him a 
promise with regard to the appearance and coming of Isma’īl. When he returned 
                                                 
1206 See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Babaîler Đsyanı, genişletilmiş ikinci baskı, Đstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1996, 
pp. 147-52; Irène Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, trs. Turan Alptekin, Đstanbul: Cumhuriyet 
Kitapları, 1999, pp. 68-72.  
1207 Ocak, Babaîler Đsyanı, p. 142; Mélikoff, Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe, p. 69.  
1208 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Babīler Đsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da Đslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve 
Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, Belleten, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 136-7.  
1209 Ocak, Babaîler Đsyanı, pp. 79-82. 
1210 For the same account until that point also see HR, p. 157.  
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to the aforesaid Il he performed many miracles and uttered prophecies, 
repeatedly announcing to pious sufis the coming of Isma’īl. On leaving this 
world he bequeathed his ‘throne’ to his son Bābā Shāh Kulī, who was also a 
revealer of mysteries and worker of wonders, and gave him an ablak1211 saying: 
“In the year 9071212 our Guide will mount the throne of Iran in Tabrīz. This is a 
present entrusted to me [imānat] for that prince – give it him with my 
salutations.” So Bābā Shāh Kulī awaited the appointed time.1213   
 
The following paragraphs of Ross Anonymous deal with how Hasan Khalifa’s 
son, Şahkulu, approved of the pilgrimage of Dede Muhammad, who was among the 
purest and most religious dervishes of the Safavid khalifas in Teke region (i.e. of Hasan 
Khalifa first, and after the death of his successor Şahkulu). This account is already 
analyzed in the present study while evaluating the rise of Shah Ismail. What is important 
for the present purpose is that the activities of the qizilbashes of Teke region are 
presented as an extension of Ismail’s hurūj in the vision of Dede Muhammad. As was 
already analyzed the fifth-column activities of Anatolian sufis, including armed uprising, 
are represented by the dagger of Ismail, which was taken off of him and given to Dede 
Muhammed by the Hidden Imam, while Ismail’s hurūj was represented by a sword 
girded again by the Hidden Imam.  
One subsequent but important detail deduced from this account is that Şahkulu 
was already actively leading the qizilbash population of the Teke region before the 
advent of Ismail; and he had certain connections with the center of the Order. Hasan 
Rumlu records an interesting detail: when Hasan Khalifa, upon the directive of Shaykh 
Haydar, arrived in the Teke region, the sufis of Sultan Haydar were in a meeting. One of 
them, namely Pīre Sinan announced the arrival of Hasan Khalifa; but he added, “He 
                                                 
1211 Denison Ross interprets this ablak as a precious stone of some sort, probably of changing colors. See 
Ross Anonymous, p. 328, footnote, 6.  
1212 1501-2. 
1213 Ross Anonymous, p. 328.  
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brought a burning fire to Teke-ili.”1214 Then, continues Hasan Rumlu, God bestowed 
Şahkulu Baba to Hasan Khalifa, who used to spend winter among the tribe of Teke 
Yahırlu and the summer among the tribe of Tekermeşlu. HR also adds that since he 
demonstrated keramet or supernatural deeds, many people of the region became his 
adherents.1215     
Ottoman sources sometimes refer to him pejoratively as Şeytankulu, literally ‘the 
slave of Satan’, or Karabıyık-oğlı1216, and unanimously relate to him as the son of Hasan 
Khalife. Ottoman sources clearly put that Hasan Khalifa and his son Şahkulu were 
deputies and propagandists of Safavid shaykhs in the Teke regions. Hasan Khalifa was 
engaged in mystical life and asceticism in a cave in Kızılkaya, near the village of 
Yalınlu in the province of Teke. His ascetic experiences and mysterious life extended his 
fame, thus, the influence of Safavid order. Some sources record, Hasan Khalifa’s fame 
became so wide-spread that Bayezid II sent him 6000-7000 akças annually.1217 He was a 
close disciple and khalifa of Shaykh Haydar and was commissioned to preach the 
Safavid ideals in the region.1218 Upon his death, Şahkulu succeeded his father’s spiritual 
post. Şahkulu also pursued an ascetic life in the same cave.1219  
                                                 
1214 HR, p. 157.  
1215 HR, p. 158.  
1216 ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, p. 445.  
1217 TNSB, p. 248. ANMH states, in addition to annual money, Bayezid constructed an hospice for 
Şahkulu. See ANMH, p. 48. But this must be confusion with the famous Tekke of Abdal Musa in Elmalı 
since none of the other sources mention such a tekke.   
1218 TNSB, p. 248. 
1219 KPZ, for example, depicts Şahkulu as follows: “Şahkulu dimeğle ma’rūf mülhid ü müfsīd, ki Şāh-ı 
gümrāhun dā’ilerinden mezheb-i bī-asl-ı Şi’ayı şāyi’ itmeğe Rūma gelen sā’ilerindendi, Teke Etrākinün 
dike burun füttāklerinden Gazāl-oğlu ve Çakır-oğlu ve Ulema ve Kara Mahmūd nām müfsīdler, ki fesād 
pınarlarınun başlarıydı, mezkūr Şahkulu ile ittifāk ve ‘ahd ü misāk itmişlerdi. Cem’iyetle hurūc idüb Şaha 
gideler, önlerine gelen ehl-i Đslamla cidāl ü kıtāl ideler. Bu kazīye vāki’ olıcak, birbirine haber idüb, ‘azīm 
cem’iyyet itdiler; civarlarında olan re’āyanun māl u menālin ve ehl ü ‘iyālin kendülere mübāh bilüb 
bildükleri fesādı idüb ziyāde şene’āt itdiler.” See KPZ8b, pp. 43-44. CLZ describes Şahkulu in a more 
pejorative manner, “...meğer zikr olunan Teke vilāyetinde bir bed-baht-ı ser-nigün, bir dalālet-şi’ar 
müfsīd-i fesād-meşhūn var imiş. Đsmine Şeytankulı dirlermiş. Bir mağarada sākin, tarīk-i şerre sālik, bir 
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According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, Şahkulu rose up with the aim of going to the 
shah’s realm.1220 Ottoman sources, on the other hand, present a different picture. They 
all agree that Şahkulu arose not only with spiritual assurance but also with claims of 
temporal power as well.1221 ‘Āli states, Şahkulu rose up with the claim that “I am the 
deputy of Shah Ismail, who is the owner of advent (hurūc). From now on the state and 
the sovereignty are mine!”1222 Solakzāde replicates ‘Āli’s account pertaining to Şahkulu 
affairs. But a small addition in his work is of utmost importance in order to envisage the 
mentality of rebellious sufis. To him, Şahkulu said to his adherents, “It is inspired to me 
from saintly persons [to raise the banner of revolt]. I am the deputy of Shah Ismail!”1223 
‘Āli also describes Şahkulu as a ‘qizilbash khalifa’ and a ‘great unbeliever (mülhid)’.1224 
Müneccimbaşı also deems him unbeliever (zındık-mülhid).1225  
‘Āli’s account runs,  
Bināen ‘alā zālik Teke sancağından Elmalu nām karyede sākin ser-keşler ve 
gümrāhlar içinde Karabıyık Oğlı diyū hīle-ver biri müte’ayyin, sūret-i salāhda 
Şeyh nāmına mezkūr, sorhlı ashāb-ı fesād u şürūr olan bed-baht, nedir ki, ‘Ben 
sāhibzuhūr olan Şah Đsma’īl bin Haydar’ın helifesiyem’ diyū hurūc eyledi. 
                                                                                                                                                
kūh-sār-ı mezellet-medārda mutavattın, hazīne-i fesāda mālik imiş...” CLZ, p. 120. ALI gives his name as 
Karabıyık Oğlı and states he was living in Elmalı, a village near Teke. ALI, p. 927. ALI, just like other 
Ottoman court historians, pursues quite negative attitude on Şahkulu. To him Şahkulu was a khalifa of 
Ismail and unbeliever: “kızılbaş halifesi nāmındaki mülhid-i a’zām”; and his followers were rebels: “tāife-i 
bāğıye”. See ALI, p. 928. Also regard SLZ, p. 445; MNB, p. 427. MNB uses the word ‘zındık’, the man 
who divorced from the faith, for Şahkulu.  
1220 HR, p. 154. 
1221 CLZ writes, for example, “...Şehzādelerin harekātı ve inkılaplarını işidüb, görür ki, memleket hāli 
hāris yok, meydān-ı saltanatta kimesne görünmez, fāris yoki tabi’atında şehriyārlık tama’ları gālib 
görinür. Tavakkuf itmeyüb, hemān havālisinde vāki’ olan erbāb-ı fesādla kalkub hurūç eyledi. Rāyāt-ı 
şeytanı kadırub, a’lām-ı iblīs-i pür-telbīsi āşikār eyledi...” CLZ, p. 120.  
1222 “Ben sāhibzuhūr olan Şah Đsma’īl bin Haydar’ın helifesiyem. Min ba’d devlet ü saltanat benimdür.” 
See ALI, p. 927. 
1223 “Bana erenlerden işaret olmuştur. Hālā ortaya çıkmış olan Şah Đsmail’in halifesiyim!”. See SLZ1, p. 
445. 
1224 ALI, p. 928. For similar depictions also consider SLZ1, p.446; Hadîdî, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman (1299-
1523), haz. Necdet Öztürk, Đstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991, pp. 359-62.  
1225 MNB, p. 427, 428. For the meaning of these terms in the Ottoman context see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, 
“Türk Heterodoksi Tarihinde ‘Zındık’-‘Hāricī’-‘Rāfızī’-‘Mülhid’ ve ‘Ehl-i Bidat’ Terimlerine dair Bazı 
Düşünceler”, TED, XII, 1981-2, 507-20; Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar), 
3. baskı, Đstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003, pp. 6-15.  
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‘Ale’l-fevr niçe bin gümrāhı başına cem’ idüb, ‘Min ba’d devlet ü saltanat 
benimdür’ diyū söyledi. 
Nazm: 
Oldı ashāb-ı fesādāta imām 
Didi ‘Hep birdurur helāl ü haram’ 
Gāret itdi her diyārı bī-hisāb 
Köyleri kıldı harāb ender-harāb 
Didi ‘cāhil kavlidir fi’l-i nikāh!’ 
Oldı her ‘avret rıza ile mübāh. 1226  
 
During the early phases of the rebellion an official inspector reported to the Porte 
that they (rebels) were spoiling the properties of Muslims, killing them without 
regarding whether those they kill are children or women, setting fire to villages and 
towns. The inspector also recorded, the rebels were preaching among people, “the Shah 
himself also will come by ‘the time of peach’1227, from now on the country is our.”1228 
The unknown reporter calls special attention to the inconsistent attitudes of Şahkulu 
regarding his own status: ‘In one instance he claims to be the Mahdi himself, while in 
another instance he says ‘the Shah died and his country became mine, the country is 
mine’. Still on some other occasions he says ‘I will die in few days, the country is 
mine’.”1229 Prince Osman, on the other hand, portrays him as pretending to be Mahdi, 
who claimed “from now on the country is our”.1230  
Haniwaldanus Anonym’s account is rather interesting in this respect. According 
to Haniwaldanus Anonym, One day Şahkulu gathered his disciples and uttered to them a 
                                                 
1226 ALI, p. 927. SLZ repeats ALI’s account on this affair. See SLZ1, p. 445. 
1227 The time when peaches maturate, which roughly corresponds to early summer. Remembering that the 
rebellion started in early April the rebels seem to have moved with the hope of meeting their shah at the 
end of their movement.   
1228 “...Cemi’ ‘alem halkına avāze yapmışlardır ki zerdalu vakdında Şah da gelse gerekdir. Memleket 
bizimdür deyū mühmelat söylerler...” TSA, document E. 6187.  
1229 “…Gāh mehdilik davasın eder gāh Şah öldü ānın vilāyeti bana değdi memleket benimdir der. Gāh 
birkaç günlük ömrüm vardır memleket benimdir deyu birbirine muhalif kelimat eder...” TSA, document E. 
6187. 
1230 “...Varub Teke’nin tamam kaydın gördükden sonra mezkūr bedbaht mehdilik davasın edüb bundan 
sonra memleket bizimdür deyu da’va edüb andan göçüb Hamid sancağına duhūl edüb...” TSA, document 
E 2829.  
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sermon. During his sermon the shaykh argued, the days of Ottomans that were granted 
to them by the fate were about to finish; they could not rule the people forever; a great 
revolution, at the end of which the sovereignty of the world would be given to him, was 
about to occur; a sword would be given to him from the heavens and he would secure 
the obedience of all people with this sword; and finally it was time for him to declare 
this good news (müjde). He also asserted that from then on the number of his adherents 
would not decrease but augment; they would present their obedience with their own 
will.1231  
Haniwaldanus Anonym reports, after declaring these ‘crazy’ ideas his disciples 
further motivated Şahkulu by assuring him that all people would follow him with great 
pleasure. Then Şahkulu ordered his disciples to gather people in the following festival 
(panayır). His speech in this festival, as reported in Haniwaldanus Anonym, is of utmost 
importance for discovering the ideology of the rebellion and the socio-psychological 
orientation of the adherents, even if does not reflect historical reality. Şahkulu said,  
I have invited you to this gathering because I wished you to hear from my mouth 
that the bliss (saadet) that was bestowed to Ottomans by the God had 
diminished. Now their fortune is finished, and we will sooner see great changes. 
Sultan Bayezid is lying like a trunk because of his illness and could not use his 
organs efficiently. His sons, as contrary to the traditional ‘love of brothers’ 
(kardeş sevgisi), are nourishing enmity one another. The power of the state is 
weakened because of strife and civil war. Their rule can no longer prolong. The 
God gave me a sword from the heavens in order to found a new state. Because of 
that come and follow me as your ruler! I will provide you wealth and peace and 
make you happy.1232    
 
Of course, this passage from Haniwaldanus Anonym does not give us the proper 
historical event. But the governing idea of the narration pertaining to the claims of 
Şahkulu must be regarded seriously. Şahkulu obviously presented himself as the 
                                                 
1231 ANMH, p. 48.  
1232 ANMH, p. 49. (Translation is mine) 
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legitimate heir of the suzerainty predestined by God. His claims were not limited to 
temporal power, but he also claimed divine support. Thus his adherents attributed to him 
supernatural power, which was reinforced by successive victories over Ottoman armies, 
as well. The letter of the qādi of Antalya includes further extreme claims. The qādi 
mentions a disciple of Şahkulu called Salih Fakih who preached among people “he 
(Şahkulu) is God; he is Prophet; and the resurrection will occur in front of him; those 
who do not obey him will pass away without faith.”1233         
Indeed, even the descriptions of Ottoman reporters and historians occasionally 
reflect his spiritual influence over the folk. An inspector says, although his soldiers are 
rather poor and disregarded he managed to save himself from each assault of the 
Ottoman soldiers; we do not know whether he is acquainted with magic or ability to 
control jinns.1234 Kemalpaşazāde’s account on the end of Şahkulu during the battle with 
Ali Pasha also follows a similar manner: “…He disappeared in the battlefield; nobody 
knew whether the ground opened and he fell in or he ascended to the sky!”1235    
 
6.2.2. The Organization of the Rebellion 
A close examination of the sources unveils that, in the 1510s, the qizilbash society of 
Anatolia was already remarkably organized and well-communicated with each other. The 
architects of this web of communication and socio-religious organization were khalifas 
                                                 
1233 “...Subaşı Hasan bendenüz gönderilüb mezkur Şahkulu ele girmeyüb musahiblerinden yirmi nefer 
kimesne ele girüb tutulub habs olundu. Zikr olunan mahpuslardan Salih Fakih nām kimesne mezkur 
Şahkulu içün halka telkin edüb haşa Allah budur ve Peygamber budur ve sūr-ı hesab bunın önünde olsa 
gerekdür. Buna itaat etmeyen imansız gider dedüğü bi-hasebişşer sābit olub salbolundu…” TSA, 
document E 632. 
1234“ ...Amma bilmeyüz ki sihri mi vardur teshīr-i cin mi bilür her ne defada ādem sıymış ise uğraş 
olmadan sıyub kaçmışdır...” TSA, document E. 6187.  
1235 “…Mezkūr paşa düşicek Şeytan Kulı didikleri müfsīd-pelīd cenk içinde nā-bedīd oldı, yer delindi yere 
mi girdi, göğe mü çıktı, kimse bilmedi...” KPZ8b, p. 55. 
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of the Order. One feels legitimized in supposing that the success of the qizilbash 
resistance against severe Ottoman pressure came from the clandestine socio-religious 
organization of the society, whose religious institutions were, at least in terms of their 
principal basis, already structured. 
A careful analysis of the sources makes it clear that this was not simply a social 
explosion resulting from discontent of a social segment. Rather it rested on a well-
organized social body, which had both ideological principals and the ability to move 
coherently. Ottoman archival sources occasionally mention meetings of Şahkulu with his 
adherents shortly before the rebellion. He appeared, indeed, as the foremost 
representative of the Safavid Order in Anatolia and clandestinely organized the qizilbash 
opposition against the Ottoman government.1236 
Archival evidence clearly points out that the Safavid disciples of the region were 
organized under the leadership of Şahkulu, who was also the khalifa of the order. The 
qādī of Antalya1237 underscores that Şahkulu did not behave like a mystical guide but 
like a political leader. He assembled a council (divan), which was among foremost 
indications of being a temporal leader, and attempted to grasp the suzerainty. His 
political ambitions, however, were not overlooked by state agents. The Subaşı, the 
person who was responsible for the public security, of Antalya attacked them, captured 
20 adherents of the rebellion, but missed Şahkulu.  
                                                 
1236 A letter from the qādi of Antalya to Prince Korkud, dated May 29, 1511, reads: “... Şimdiki hālde bu 
diyarda olan Erdebil halifelerinden Hasan Halife nām kimesnenin Şahkulu nām bir oğlu zuhur bulunub 
Antalya’da Dervenbaşı(?) nām menzilde temekkün edüb ve bu diyarda olan Erdebil halkı ona etba’ edüb 
emirāne bir ‘āli divanhāne ve evler ve matbah yapuverüb ittifakla memlekete hükmetmeğe kast eyleyecek 
Subaşı Hasan bendenüz gönderilüb mezkur Şahkulu ele girmeyüb musahiblerinden yirmi nefer kimesne ele 
girüb tutulub habs olundu.” TSA, document E. 632.  
1237 See above-footnote. 
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Another document1238, which is the interrogation report of a sufi captured and 
sent by Korkud, sheds light on the preparations of the rebellion and on social groups 
who supported it. The interrogated sufi testified that when Korkud left Antalya they said, 
“The country is now empty, let’s seize it!” and they summoned in Döşeme Dervendi 
near Kapulukaya. After staying there for three or four days they dispersed into the region 
in order to procure arms and food. According to the testimony of this sufi, the most close 
assistants of Şahkulu were certainly Dede Ali and Hızır. Upon the inspector’s question 
“since when do they know each other?”, the sufi replied while Sultan Korkud was in his 
province. This testimony clearly supports the fact that the leaders of the rebellion had 
already known each other and moved collectively before 1509, when Korkud left his 
province. Indeed, a careful reading of the contemporary sources suggests that the roots 
of this movement in some sense traces back to the second half of the fifteenth century.  
Another document sheds further light on the clandestine organization of 
qizilbashes in the Ottoman realm. This is a report written by the sancakbey of Filibe to 
the Porte. The governor of Filibe snatched one of the spies dispatched by Şahkulu and 
reported the information provided by this spy, Pir Ahmed, to the Porte.1239  
                                                 
1238 “Sultan Korkud tāle bakāhudan gelen sofının kable’l-örf ettüğü ikrārın beyanıdır ki zikr olunur. 
Memleket hālidir fırsat bizimdir gelin cemi’ memleketi zabt idelim; yürüdüler. Kapulukaya’da Döşeme 
Dervendinde cem’ olub dört beş gün oturdular. Sonra  etrafa dağılub yarağa ve azığa mukayyed 
oldular…. Yanında gāyet mukarribleri kimlerdir? diyecek, Dede Alisi ve Hızır nām kimesnelerdir. Ne 
kadar zamandır bunlar tanışık ederler? diyecek dahi, Sultan Korkud tāle bakāhu sancağında iken.” TSA, 
document E. 5035. Another document, which was also a testimony of sufi spy, gives names of two other 
close men (mukarrīb-yarar ādem) of Şahkulu as Sefer and Đmamoğlu. “Ve Şahkulu Antalya kurbunda 
Yalunlu nām karyenin yanında bir mağara olurdı. Ve mevlûdu de o karyede idi. Ve sen orada iken 
Şahkulunun yarar ademisi kimler idi deyicek, biri Sefer ve biri Đmamoğlu nām kimesnelerdir.” See TSA, 
document E. 6636. This report was the testimony of a spy snatched in Filibe.  
1239 The full text of the document reads, “Filibe Sancağı beyi Sofu Şahkulu’nun casusu Pir Ahmed nāmın 
etdüğü ikrarın beyanıdur ki zikr olunur: …Ve sen Şahkulu’nun yanından ne vakit gittin deyu sual olıcak 
geçen yılın Safer ayında gittim. Kaç kişiydiniz deyu sual olıcak dört kişiydik dedi. Her birimize yirmişer 
kāğıt verdi. Ol kimesnelerin adları nedür  deyicek: Biri Sefer ve biri Đmamoğlu ve biri Taceddin ve biri 
dahī mezkur Pir Ahmed. Ve bunlar nereye vardı deyicek Hızır Serez’e vardı, Đmamoğlu Selanik’e vardı, ve 
Taceddin Zağra Yenicesi’ne vardı. Mezkur Pir Ahmed Filibe’de Đmaret mahallesinde Kara Habib nām 
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   We learn from this document that Şahkulu dispatched spies even to Rumelian 
provinces to organize Safavid sympathizers.1240 There was a concrete communication 
and connection between qizilbash communities living in different parts of the empire. 
According to the testimony of the spy recorded in the aforementioned document, he 
visited Şahkulu in Safer 916 / May-June 1510, approximately one year before the 
outbreak of the rebellion in Teke.1241 And he was not alone in this visit, but there were 
three other spies as well. Pir Ahmed gives the names of his comrades: Sefer, Đmamoğlu, 
and Taceddin. The statements of arrested spies, however, indicate that they were also 
commissioned with the same mission. 
The whole testimony does not include any indication of rebellion, or preparation 
for a rebellion. Meanwhile, a close examination suggests that to prepare the society for 
an upcoming rebellion was at least part of their mission. Pir Ahmet admits that Şahkulu 
delivered twenty papers to each of the four spies addressed to the well-known – by 
Şahkulu - khalifas of the Safavid order.  
A closer scrutiny of the whole testimony suggests that the principal mission of 
the spies was to deliver Şahkulu’s ‘papers’ to the addressed khalifas.1242 Pir Ahmed’s 
                                                                                                                                                
halifeye kāğıt verdi. Mezkur Kara Habib imaret-i mezkūrede himem ve müstaiddir. Ve Sofya’da Taceddin 
ve Şuca ve Şeyh Çelebi ve mezkūrun imamı Muhiddin halifelere kağıdlar verdüm. Ercanlı halifeye kāğıt 
verdim. Ve esbābım ve bazı kāğıtların Ercanlı Halifede emanet kodum. Ve Dice nahiyesinde Rasullü nam 
karyede alaybeyi Yusuf bin Mehmed ve ve Ethemī Mehmed nām halifelere kāğıtlar verdim. Ve Yalınacak 
nām karyede timar eri Đlyas Halifeye kāğıt verdim. Ve Pörtlü (Pirenli?) nām karyenin imamı Muhyiddin 
nām halifeye kāğıt verdüm.” TSA, document E. 6636. The transcribed text of the document first published 
in ULCY1, pp. 62-63, footnote, 12; The facsimile copy of the document was later published by Şahabettin 
Tekindağ. See Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 3, Aralık 1967, p. 
36.  
1240 However, Rumelian disciples could not participate in the revolt or support it. As Uluçay put forward, 
the reason should have been Selim’s existence in Rumelia during this time. See ULCY1, p. 63. 
1241 The document is, indeed, undated. But the course of events mentioned in the document suggests that it 
must be sent to the Porte during the rebellion, i. e in early 917 / March 1511. Moving from this 
supposition I felt legitimized in dating the visit of Pir Ahmed to Şahkulu as Safer of 916.  
1242 Hızır went to Serez, Đmamoğlu to Selānik, and Tāceddin to Zağra Yenicesi in order to deliver the 
papers. Pir Ahmed gives further details pertaining to his own itinerary. He first visited Khalifa Kara Habib 
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testimony unveils a fact: Şahkulu was not simply one of the khalifas spread over all the 
empire but the one superior to other khalifas, at least to those khalifas in certain parts of 
the Ottoman Empire. One may surmise that the ‘papers’ he dispatched to several 
khalifas in Rumelia must have been pamphlets written in the aim of teaching pillars of 
the spiritual path and instructing what to do.  
One might reasonably infer that Pir Ahmed was only one of many sufi spies 
circulating in the Ottoman realm. Accordingly his activities recorded in this document 
are simply a cross section of the clandestine qizilbash organization. It would not be 
wrong to assume that the agitation of Safavid khalifas in both Anatolia and Rumelia had 
already been wide-spread and intensified at the threshold of the sixteenth-century. As 
some sources - though being scarce – imply, this propaganda was not fruitless; rather it 
was met by a great audience. The Safavid propaganda achieved considerable success in 
Rumelia as well as in Anatolia. An account in Haniwaldanus Anonym, which is totally 
absent in other chronicles envisages that the khalifas had already created an organized - 
even armed - society, which was considerably immune to the interference of the 
Ottoman administration. It is written in Haniwaldanus Anonym that in Dobruca so many 
weapons were found that could arm whole people of the region in case of any rebellion. 
These weapons were sent by those men who called themselves ‘şeyh’1243 in order to arm 
people when the arrival of Shah Ismail who would according to the propaganda of 
                                                                                                                                                
(Ceyib) in the distcrict of Đmāret in Filibe and handed over ‘paper’ to him. He then proceeded to Sofya, 
where he visited Tāceddin Khalifa, Şuca Khalifa, Şeyh Çelebi Khalifa, and Muhyiddin Khalifa, delivering 
papers to them. He then gave papers to Ercanlı Khalifa, whose accommodation is not clear. Pir Ahmed put 
some of his clothes and papers in trust of Ercanlı Khalifa and moved to his next destinations: Alaybeyi 
Yusuf the son of Mehmed, and Ethemī Mehmed in the village of Resullu of the nāhiye of Dicle, Ilyas 
Khalifa in the village of Yalınacak, and finally in the village of Pörtlü (Pirenli) Muhyiddin Khalifa, who 
was the imam of the village. 
1243 Evidently refers to khalifas of the Safavid Order. 
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khalifas, launch a campaign on Ottoman lands, was heard. By propagating such ideas 
they (şeyhs) won the crowd and prepared the weapons for a rebellion.1244  
The anonymous history does not specify the date. In the meantime, one might 
convincingly infer from the context that it must be sometime in the early years of the 
sixteenth century. The event is mentioned just after the qizilbash deportation in 1502-3, 
and before the appointment of Suleyman, son of Selim, to Kefe, in 1509. So, if relied on 
Haniwaldanus Anonym, Safavid khalifas, most of whom were working under the 
direction of Şahkulu as indicated above, had already started the preparation for an 
upcoming rebellion a couple of years before the famous Şahkulu revolt. As obviously 
put forward by our anonymous author, the propaganda of khalifas aimed to prepare the 
community to help Ismail when he marched on the Ottomans.     
With the available evidence at hand, it is not possible to determine whether or 
not Ismail ever intended to invade Ottoman territories; but what is known is that he 
never attempted to engage such an adventure. Nonetheless, whatever his intention may 
have been, it is obvious from the above-mentioned evidence, and from some other 
sources, that his deputies (halife) were propagating among disciples in Anatolia and 
Rumelia that the Shah would arrive soon and deliver them from the oppressing Ottoman 
power; and they should have been ready to bear arms and stand up when the time came. 
Needles to say, this propaganda kept the motivation of the qizilbash mass alive. As all 
sources agreed on, when Şahkulu revolted in Teke, his supporters from several regions 
                                                 
1244 “....Dobruca ....ovasında bir ayaklanmada çabucak bütün halkı silāhlandırabilecek sayıda kılıç 
bulundu. Bunları, her yerde Osmanlı tebaasını, Şah Đsmail’in varış haberini alır almaz ona yardım etmek 
üzere, silāhlandırmalrı yolunda kendilerini şeyh diye adlandıran adamlar gönderdi; çünkü Şah Đsmail 
yakınlarda bir sefer düzenleyerek Osmanlı ülkelerini hākimiyetleri altına alacaktı. Böylece onlar vaadleri 
üzerine halkı kendi yanlarına aldılar ve silāhların her an hazır tutlduğu bir depo meydana getirdiler.” 
ANMH, p. 46.  
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of Anatolia, especially from western and southern Anatolia, outnumbered some tens of 
thousands.1245  
 
6.2.3. Sipāhis in the Rebellion 
Contemporary sources leave no doubt that not only tribal people but also villagers, 
townspeople, some literati, and even some Ottoman officials took part in the qizilbash 
uprisings in the period between the years of 1510 and 1514. As a matter of fact, our 
sources describe the disciples of Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and Shah Ismail (until 
his rise to power) almost exclusively as tribal people.1246 However, as long as the 
uprisings of the Anatolian qizilbashes, which were closely interconnected with the 
power struggle within the Ottoman Empire, are concerned the sources frequently 
mention settled subjects and some members of the askerī class among qizilbash 
ranks.1247 As will be delineated in the next chapter, the number of non-tribal people in 
the qizilbash movement considerably increases in the Province of Rum, which had been 
governed by Prince Ahmed. Although not totally rejecting the existence of sincere 
qizilbash adherents among villagers and townspeople, this thesis inclines to interpret the 
support provided by askerīs such as sipāhi and qādi to the qizilbash movement within 
                                                 
1245 Idris-i Bitlisī gives the number of rebels 20.000. See IDRS, p. 87.  
1246 This issue is already discussed in detail in Chapter IV and Chapter V.  
1247 To give an example, the profession of the khalifas whom Pir Ahmed, the spy of Şahkulu, delivered 
‘papers’ are as follows:  
Kara Habīb in the district of Imāret (Đmāret mahallesi) in Filibe: staff of the imāret in the mentioned 
district.  
Muhyiddin Khalifa in Sofya: imām, the man who leads the public prayer in cāmi, and religious head of 
district or village. 
Yusuf son of Mehmed in the village of Rasullu: alaybeyi, an officer in Ottoman military system. 
Ilyas Khalifa in the village of Yanacak: timar eri,  
Muhyiddin in the village of Pörtlü: imām of the village. TSA, document E. 6636. 
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the framework of the Ottoman domestic politics, rather than religious or ideological 
affiliation.   
It has been shown that the corruption within the Ottoman administration towards 
the end of Bayezid II’s reign is severely criticized by Selimnāme1248 authors. The 
criticism, however, is usually pointed towards the viziers and other high bureaucrats, 
whom Bayezid II entrusted the state affairs because of his tiresome health condition.1249 
A contemporary source states, for example, that Bayezid, in his last years, pursued a 
religious life and entrusted the state to the viziers. Therefore, he was not aware of the 
state of affairs of his subjects.1250 Then the unknown author points his condemnation 
                                                 
1248 Selim’s acquisition of the throne by force from his father was an unprecedented event in the Ottoman 
history and contradictory to the tradition. Thus, during his reign to justify and to legitimize his usurpation 
became foremost issue of the Ottoman ideology makers. It is because of that so many histories dedicated 
to the eight-year reign of Selim were written. This special genre within Ottoman historiography is 
generally called ‘Selimnāme’.    
1249 “Hakān-ı sa’īd merhūm Sultan Bāyezid’ün müddet-i hizmeti, ki otuz iki yıldur, ihtimāma karīb oldı, 
vücūd-ı şerifini, ki merkez-i dā’ire-i hilm ü cüddür, cünūd-ı ‘ilel her cānibden ortaya aldı, dest-i takdir 
pençe-i tedbirin burup, (ayak) zahmeti huzūrın uçurub nikris zahmeti, ki maraz-ı mevrūsiydi, hudūs 
bulmış, mizācına tamam müstevli olmuşdı....Ol sebepeden cihangirlik rikābından ayak çeküb, ‘inān-ı 
‘ālem-sitānı elden komışdı, būm-ı Rūmda husūm-ı kudūmla nerd-i neberdi gāyibāne oynayub bis’āt-ı pür-
nesātı rezmün temāşāsından göz yummış, el yumışdı. Ol sebepten sarsar-ı nekbet-eser-i sūr u şeş-cihāt-ı 
heft-kişver toldı; huffāş gibi müstetir olub, būm-ı şum gibi bir bucağa baş sokub, zalām-ı şām-ı fitne būm-ı 
Rūmı kaçan tutar diyu muntazır olub, cerād-vār etrāf-ı bilāda münteşir oldı...” KPZ8b, pp. 38-9. 
Celalzāde follows the same line of argument. But a uniquie account of him is worth to state here. He 
argues Bayezid entrusted high state posts – without regarding whether or not they meritted - to the 
bureaucrats who were his retinue while he was prince in Amasya. His account reads, “...merhūmun 
mizācında nev’-i fütūr, i’tidāl-i tabī’atda kusur olmağın, ahvāl-i memlekete kasd ü şu’ūra iltifay itmeyüb, 
giderek āsştane-i sa’ādetde vezārete istihkāk mülāhazası metrūk olub, Amassıyya’da şehzāde iken içeru 
hizmetlerinde olan ba’zı bendelerini tizcek mertebe-i bālāya irişdirüb, vezīr, tāyife-i tavāşiden ba’zını 
dahī serīr-i sadārete getürüb, müşīr-i sahib-i tedbīr eylediler. Sarayda perverde olmuş hālī zihnler, 
merāsim-i saltanatda ‘āmiller üslūb-ı hilāfetde kem-nāmiler, tedābir-i umūrda kāsıru’l-‘ukūl kalīlu’l-
fühūm, ārā-i intizām-ı mülkde za’ifü’l-kuūb ve nahīfü’l-ulūm kimesneler, serīr-i vezāretde hüküm-pezīr ve 
kezā-te’sīr oldılar...” CLZ, p. 95. On this issue also consider MNB, p. 428.     
1250 “Çün Hazret-i Pādişāh-ı hilāfet-penāh ‘inān-ı ihtiyārdan makām-ı vezāretde olan bir niçe bed-
girdārların eline virub kendüler zühd ü salāhı kem-nişīn idinüb serīr-ı ferāgatde ‘uzlet-güzīn olmuşlardır. 
Vüzerā-i. K.ejranın kemāl-i intikāmlarına hüsn-i i’tikādları ve i’timād-ı küllīleri müte’allık oldığı ecilden 
kendüler re’iyyet ahvāline bī-nefsihī mübāşir değillerdi. ‘Ale’l-husūs mübārel mizaçlarında vāki’ olan 
ihtilāl sebeb-i infi’al olmağın memleket bunlarun sū-i tedbirleriyle halel-pezīr olduğına nāzır olmazdı. 
Zikrolan vüzerā Sāmānilerun sebeb-i zevāl-i saltanat-ı kahiresinden, ki ünvān-ı musībet-nāme-i rüzgārdır, 
bi’l-kğlliye gāfillerdi.” ANMB, pp. 173-174. HSE repeats same claim. See HSE4, pp. 43-4. 
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towards high bureaucrats, especially towards viziers.1251 He argues, they were neither 
respecting nor protecting the rights of the subjects. So the distance between the ‘right’ 
(hak) and those who deserved it became as much as the distance between horizons. 
Those who had neither virtue nor merit lived a prosperous and comfortable life while the 
men of virtue and merit fell into poverty. To him, this was because of the fact that the 
viziers were devoid of virtue by nature. They were so greedy and overly fond of money 
that they even appropriated waqf properties, which was completely contrary to the 
religious law.1252 
Celalzāde, in his analysis on the reasons why so many Ottoman subjects adhered 
to the cause of Ismail, and to the Şahkulu rebellion, calls attention to the corruption 
within bureaucrats and in the allocation of timars.1253 He underscores that those who 
merited timar could not attain the post (dirlik), but they were allocated according to the 
bribe offered.1254 Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman repeats the same: “It was out of 
possibility to receive a timar without offering enough bribes. Sipāhis got sick with this 
                                                 
1251 Another contemporary source runs as follows: “Hüdāvendigār hazretlerinin mizāc-ı latīfü’l-
imtizāçlarında nev’an tegayyür bulunub muhtāc-ı ilaç olmağın birkaç eyyām taşra çıkmayub zabt-ı 
memāliki erkān-ı devlet uhdesine tevfīz buyurmuşlardı. Anlar dahī umūr-ı saltanatı kendü arzu vü nefisleri 
içün vaz’ olunmuş sanub cem’-i māle düşüb tekayyüd-i ahvāli mülkiyyede ihmalleri olmağla reāya pāy-
māl ve memleket ehl-i perişan-hāl olmuşlardı...” Vekāyi-i Sultan Bāyezit ve Selim Han, p. 40, cited in 
TNSB, p. 247, footnote 110.  
1252 “Hukūk-ı nās ri’āyeti şanlarında yoğidi. Hakla müstehāk arasında tūl-i mesafe-i bu’du’l-meşrakayn 
vāki’ olmuşdı. Cemi’ erbāb-ı fazl ü kemāl dest-i vekāyile pāy-māl ve kamū ıskāt ve erzāl huzūr-ı kalble 
müreffetü’l-hāl idi. Cibilliyetlerinde rezālet-i nefs ve denāet-i tab’ merkūz idi. Hutām-ı dünya-yı denīyyeye 
cān u dilden rağiblerdi. Đsticlāb-ı mālī bir vechile hāl idinmişlerdi ki māl ü mülk mevrūs-ı eytāmün elinde 
kendüler cānibinden emānet idi. Şer’ile vakfiyyeti sābit olduğına ehl-i vukūfun nihāyeti olmayan yerleri 
temellük itmekde tevakkuf çekmezlerdi.” ANMB, p. 174. For similar arguements see HSE4, p. 44. 
1253 “...Adalet ü nısfet umūrı matrūh, irtişā vü nisbet ve ta’assup kapuları meftūh, tīğ ü tīr-i cevr ü ‘udvān 
ile re’fet ve şefkat escāmını merīz ve mecrūh eylediler...” CLZ, p. 96.   
1254 “...Kadīmden āli mansıplar şeca’at-medār, şehāmet-şi’ār olan yarar ve şīr-merd merd-i dilīr olanlara 
tevcīh olunagelmiş iken, ol etvār ve kā’ide metrūk olub, her Türk sipāhi ve emīr, kanda bir bedbaht ve şakī 
ve gümrāh var ise, ehl-i kadr ve sāhib-i tedbīr oldı. Denīler her mahalleye kedhudā küştenīler her vilāyete 
mutasarrıf ve rāfi’ü’l-livā oldılar..” CLZ, pp. 96-97. Consider also MNB, p. 428.  
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disease and fell devoid of timar.”1255 Celalzāde also puts a special emphasis on unjust 
favoritism toward kuls (slaves). He argues that the Porte allocated timars to kuls without 
regarding whether they merited it while ‘sons of people’ (merdūm-zāde) were deprived 
of timars. 1256  
Celalzāde puts special emphasis on the fact that the rules of timar distribution in 
the provinces of Anatolia, Karaman, and Rum had been well-determined. According to 
these rules a vacant timar must have been allocated to other merited ones. And the merit 
to timar had been according to the merit to sword; bribery had never interfered in timar 
allocation system. In order to get a timar one had to show outstanding performance 
during battles. But during the last years of Bayezid, these good practices were all 
abandoned and corruption infected every state affair. In a similar vein, those who 
deserved timars with their achievements in battles were removed from posts while those 
who offered enough bribe attained good positions.1257       
According to Celalzāde, Ismail used the situation for his purpose and gained 
discontent, dismissed timariots to his cause. Upon his advent those dismissed timariots, 
who totally lost their hope to obtain posts within the Ottoman system, turned their 
attention towards Persia. Meanwhile, Ismail’s khalifas were constantly propagating how 
much of a just ruler he was and how he granted posts (dirlik) to those who deserved. 
                                                 
1255 “Rüşvet virüb bezl-i māl itmeyince bir mansıb ehline düşmek muhal idi. Sipāhi tāifesi bu derdile bīmār 
olub timardan kalmışlardı.” ANMB, p. 174. 
1256 CLZ, pp. 101-102. 
1257 “...Ol devirde bu üslūb ve tarīk külliyen ferāmūş olınub, timarlar bāzār-ı irtişāda mezāda çıkub bī’men 
yezīd olunur oldu. Tavīla tavīla esb ü esterler, katār katār māyeler ve üstür-nerler virilmeyince timardan 
behre-ver olmazlardı. Timara müstehak ve yarar olan bahādır ve dilāverlerin yanlarında ismi havāric ve 
ecnebī olub timar virmezlerdi. Ol ecilden zikr olunan vilāyetlerde sipāh ahvāli mükedder olub, 
muhannesler hüsn-i iltifat ile derecāt-ı ‘ulyāya su’ūd itdiler.” CLZ, pp. 97-8. As indicated several times 
one should be careful while reading Celalzāde and other Selimnāme authors on Bayezid’s period, for they 
were certainly inclined to exaggerate the corruption in the administrative system in order to prepare a 
legitimate base for Selim’s dismissal of his father. Even so, these accounts potentially reflect some truth as 
well.       
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Thus many members of the Ottoman military, who did not have the opportunity to get a 
post, tended to become attached somehow to the qizilbash movement, even if they were 
not qizilbash by heart.1258  
A parallel account of Kemalpaşazāde is already demarcated above. Hoca 
Saadeddin also calls attention to how unjust administration of the Porte shifted sipāhis to 
vagrancy.1259 Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman’s account follows a similar line of argument. 
The discontent sipāhis, who were valuable for the military power of the empire, joined 
qizilbashes since they enitrely lost their hope of achieving posts according to merit 
within the Ottoman system. They gathered under the leadership of Şahkulu. Anonim 
Tevârih-i Al-i Osman demarcates that with the support of discontent sipāhis, the turmoil 
overflowed.1260   
The testimony of the sufi sent by Korkud evidently reveals that some sipāhis 
were among the foremost supporters of the rebellion. When he was asked, “From 
sipāhis, who were attended by him at the beginning?”, the sufi answered, “They were 
                                                 
1258 Celalzāde writes, “... Vilāyet-i ‘Acemde Kızılbaş ta’ifesi zuhūr idüb, Akkoyunlunun re’āyaya sitem ve 
zulm idenleri cümle kırılub, Anatolı cāniblerin ba’zı yerlerinden tā’ife-i Kızılbaşa varmış ādemler olub, bu 
memlekette vāki’ olan mezālim ve mehāyifi işidüb, akvām u akrabasına haber gönderüb ‘ol tā’ife ra’iyyete 
adl idüb ve dirliği yarar ve şīr-merde virürler’ deyu bildirmeğin Rum halkının ekseri ol cānibe meyl idüb 
yer yer ‘Aceme mektublar ve kāğıtlar gönderüb fesāda mübāşeret etdüklerini...” CLZ, p. 101. The 
corruption in administration and debility of the Porte against qizilbash peril became foremost tools of 
Selimnāme authors in order to legitimize Selim’s usurpation. It would not be adequate, however, totally 
discredit their point in this issue. Selim seems to have successfully used the administrative deficiency to 
gain discontent military classes to his ranks. The issue is further evaluated in related chapter of this thesis.  
1259 “Ülkeyi derleyip toplama odaklarına el koymuş bulunanların soyguncu ellerini halkın mallarına 
uzatmaları, rüşvet kapılarını açmaları sonunda timar sahiplerinin çoğu timarsızlıkla dermansız kalmış ve 
boş umutlarla kapı aşındırmadan canlarından bezmiş, yaşamlarından bıkmışlardı. Bunlar karınlarını 
doyurabilmek için türlü türlü düzenler kurmaya zorlanmışlardı. Bu nedenlerle nicesi yol kesen yaramaz 
çetelere yoldaş olup onları güçlendirmişler, vardıkça baş gösteren fesādın genişlemesine destek 
olmuşlardı.” HSE4, p. 44. Also regard MNB, p. 428. 
1260 “Tevātür-i ālām-ı rüzgārla bir niçesi (of sipāhis) cihādan bīzār olub varub ol müfsidlere mülhāk 
olmala madde-i fesād hadden ziyāde olmuşdı. Đçlerinden Şahkulu dimekle müsemmā bir mec’ūlī Kızılbaş-
evbāş kendülere baş idinmişlerdi. Cādde-i itāatden çıkub tarīk-i dalālete sābit-kadem olmağla mu’āhede 
eyleyüb cem’isi fitne vü fesāda el-bir itmişlerdi.” ANMB, p. 174. 
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Kızıloğlu, Köleoğlu, Mehmed Bey, and three individuals from Çakıroğlanları.”1261 The 
testimony of Pir Ahmed also underpins this argument. As mentioned above, one of the 
khalifes whom Pir Ahmed delivered the papers of Şahkulu was alaybeyi, the other being 
timar-eri. There is further archival evidence, which indicates some sipāhis’ participation 
in the rebellion, as well. An undated report written to the Porte by an inspector, who was 
commissioned to investigate the reasons and the progress of the rebellion, does not only 
ratify the argument but also uncovers the incentives of these sipāhis to participate in the 
rebellion.1262   
At the beginning of his report, the inspector explains why and how the rebellion 
achieved such a success.1263 To him, Şahkulu managed to gather so many rebels not due 
to the fact that the necessary preventive measures had not been taken; in contrast, the 
measures had indeed been taken. But the reason behind the wide social support to the 
rebellion was further deep-rooted and complicated. The inspector reports, ‘The realm is 
devastated. The situation of the people (re’āya) is soiled. It is urgently required that the 
conditions here be remedied. The enemy’s numbers are growing day by day.’1264 The 
inspector reports that there were many men from the sipāhi class in the adherents of 
Şahkulu. He further argues, the men who engaged in most troubles were these sipāhis. 
During the fight outside the Antalya fortress they caused many difficulties. It is also 
underlined that the sipāhis in the Ottoman side did not fight efficiently. The rest of the 
report clearly indicates why sipāhis revolted against the Ottoman authorities. Our 
inspector reports the conversation between the Ottoman authorities and rebellious 
                                                 
1261 “Sipahiden ibtida tanışıkda kimler vardı diyecek, Çakıroğlanlarından üç nefer kimesne vardı. Biri 
dahi Kızıloğlu biri dahi Köleoğlu, biri dahi Mehmed Bey derler.” TSA, document E. 5035.  
1262 Compare Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, pp. 35-6. 
1263 TSA, document, E. 6187.  
1264 TSA, document, E. 6187. 
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sipāhis during the fight outside the fortress of Antalya. According to the report, 
rebellious sipāhis said, 
... bir dahi timar satarlarmı? Timarlarımızı satın alı alı cemi’ rızkımız tükendi. 
Timar almağa deve gerek mal gerekdir. Yoldaşa timar yokdur. Nerede maldar 
etrak taifesi varsa bezirganoğulları varsa kadıoğulları, mütevellioğulları varsa 
cümlesi ehl-i timar oldular. Padişahın ne kadar āşinası, seyisi mehteri ve sāir 
hüddāmı  varsa cümlesi ehl-i timar oldular, yoldaşa dirlik kalmadı. Görsünler 
imdi timarı nā-mahall verüb sipahi taifesini zulmetmekten ne fitneler zahir olsa 
gerektir deyu dürlü dürlü mühmelatlar söylemişlerdir. ... Ekseri fesadlara ikdam 
itdüren sipahilerdür ve müslümanlar askerinde olan sipahilerden yoldaşlık 
gelmedi. Dahi artuk dahi olsa fiillerinden yoldaşlık ümid olmazdı...1265 
 
A short account in Haniwaldanus Anonym is complementary to this report. The 
anonymous author states that there were sipāhis among people who joined the 
movement of Şahkulu. Among those sipāhis there was a man whose name was 
Uctaclıoğlu and was a subaşı dismissed from his timar by Karagöz Pasha. His aim in 
joining the rebellion was to take  revenge from the pasha.1266  
On the other hand, another report written by the defterdār of Antalya to Korkud 
gives further details of this fight outside the city walls. The defterdār says following the 
first advent of sufis that some Ottoman forces confronted them, but was defeated. Then 
the defterdār and subaşı of the city recruited an army of three thousand men from 
dwellers of Antalya and villages nearby. But when they confronted with rebels some 
sipāhis and villagers in the Ottoman army changed sides. It was especially by the crucial 
support of these betrayed sipāhis that the rebels defeated the Ottomans, who were forced 
to retreat into the fortress. These betrayed soldiers even surrounded the subaşı, who 
could barely flee to the fortress with a serious injury. The defterdār underscores in his 
                                                 
1265 TSA, document, E. 6187. 
1266 ANMH, p. 49. ANMH describes this man as the second leader of the rebellion, who received a 
province from Ismail when they arrived in Tabriz. Other sources do not specify names of any other leaders 
than Şahkulu. It is highly possible that ANMH confuses the second leader of the rebellion with famous 
qizilbash leader Ustaclıoğlu Muhammed Han, the governor of Amid.   
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report that Şahkulu’s force was reinforced by the participation of deceived sipāhis; they 
spoiled tents, clothes, slaves and other properties of the Ottomans. The power balance 
was so changed in favor of the rebels that if aid would not arrive soon the fortress would 
inevitably fall.1267  
 
6.3.  THE REBELLION 
As already mentioned, Prince Korkud left the Province of Antalya in 915 / 1509. After 
an adventurous journey to Egypt, Korkud felt remorse for having left his government 
without permission and wrote letters to the Porte expressing his penitence. Eventually he 
was allowed to return to his province in 916 / 1510.1268 Ottoman sources do not clarify 
whether or not a provisional governor was appointed to Antalya during his absence. 
Later events suggest, however, that Antalya was devoid of a firm government during this 
era.  
After his return, Korkud did not stay long in Antalya. Without having the 
permission of the Porte, he left Antalya for Saruhan (Manisa) in the early months of 
1511.1269 According to Ottoman chronicles, he moved to Saruhan upon hearing that 
                                                 
1267 TSA, document E. 6321. This document was first published by Uluçay and later reused by Tekindağ. 
See ULCY1, p. 65; Tekindağ, pp. 38-39. 
1268 ULCY1, p. 59. 
1269 According to Kemalpashazāde, Korkud felt uncomfortable with the ‘dirty Turks’ (Etrāk-i nā-pāk) of 
this province. Accordingly he decided to go to the province of Saruhan, where had been his former 
province. “Sultan Korkud mahrūse-i Mısır’dan gelüb Antalya şehrinde bir mildar ikāmet itdükden sonra, 
ol vilāyetün Etrāk-i nā-pākinden, ki sūretā ādem ve ma’nāda bir nice hayvan-ı lā-yefhem idiler, tab’-ı 
şerifi ziyāde bī-huzūr u mükedder olduğu ecilden ol yörede ikāmet etmekden ferāgat idüb Saruhan 
vilāyetine, ki kadīmī taht-gāhıydı, gitmeğe niyet itdi.” KPZ8b, p. 42. HSE follows same line of arguement: 
“Gerçi ol ilin halkı onun (Korkud) adāleti gölgesinde güven ve huzur içinde oldular. Ama ol dıyārda 
yaşayan Türklerin varlıkları doğuştan yaramaz olup, yaradılışlarından dik başlı olduklarıından başka, 
huysuzluk da onların aşağılık yapılarında bir huy gibiydi. Ol insanlıktan eksik kişilerin nifākla dolu 
yüreklerinde bin bir türlü fesād gömülü olub her biri insan biçiminde laf anlamaz hayvana benzer 
kişilerdi. Şehzādenin ince gönlü ol çirkin suratlılardan işrenmeğin eskiden sancağı olan Saruhan Đli’ni 
arzulayıp kapusu halkından birkaç yiğidi hazinesini koyup taşımak için geride bırakarak bir gece ansızın 
Saruhan’a doğru yola çıktı.” HSE4, pp. 42-3.  For similar claims regard also 
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Selim crossed over to Rumelia.1270 Kemalpaşazāde records that Korkud so hastened to 
move to Saruhan that he left Antalya at night, leaving his treasury and possessions to be 
brought later by his men. His hurry, on the other hand, made the people think that 
Bayezid II had died.1271 The qizilbash population of the region, who had been prepared 
for a rebellion for a while, decided to rise up under the leadership of Şahkulu.1272 
Kemalpaşazāde says the sufis of the region communicated with each other and the revolt 
broke out. His account reads,   
[Korkud] Saruhan vilāyetine ... gitmeğe niyet itdi; ahmāl-i eşkāl ve hazā’in ü 
emvāl üzerine kapusı halından bir mikdar ādem koyub, kendüsi ziyāde 
isti’calinden gice ile çıkdı gitdi. Ol havālide olan evbāş-ı kallāş böyle acele ile 
gitmeden Hazreti Hüdāvendigār vefat itdi sanub, ‘isyān izhār itdiler; Şehzādenün 
hazā’in ü emvāline taarruz kasd itdüklerinde ol hizmete mübāşir olanlar 
muharebeye ikdām idüb muhkem kārzār itdiler.1273...Sultan Korkud gice ile 
Antalya’dan çıkub gitdüğin görüb fırsatdur diyu hurūç itdiler. Kendülere 
muvafakat itmeyen müslümanlarun malların ve esbābların gāret kılub zirve-i 
‘isyāna ‘urūc itdiler.1274   
 
                                                                                                                                                
427. Among modern writers, Tansel deems the same factor among the reasons that forced Korkud to leave 
Antalya. Tansel also callas attention to the fact that Korkud’s primary concern was to get closer to the 
capital city in order to augment his change in a possible struggle between princes. See TNSB, p. 249.  
1270 ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, pp. 444-45. CLZ does not mention Selim in this context. To him, Korkud left 
Antalya because he heard that Ahmed left Amasya and arrived in Karaman. At the end, the Porte had to 
approve Korkud’s usurpation. In one of his letters to the Porte, for example, he expresses dissatisfaction 
with the appointment of certain Isa Fakih to the defterdārship of his province Saruhan. See ULCY1, p. 60, 
footnote 9. On the other hand, Prince Ahmed got angry with the rebellious movements of his brothers. As 
mentioned before, he decided to punish both Korkud and Selim; but the Porte prevented him from doing 
that. His later demands in this province leave no doubt about the main incentive of Korkud in moving 
from Antalya. He further requested some coastal cities on Aegean Sea in order to arrive easily at the 
capital city when opportunity appears. For his letters demanding Bergama see ULCY1, p. 61, footnote 10.  
1271 KPZ8b, p. 42. CLZ recites events in a similar fashion: “...Etrāf u cevānibde olan şehzādeler harekāt ve 
inkılāb itmekle, ehāli-yi memleket ve vilāyet ayak üzere gelüb...” CLZ, p. 120. Also regard ANMB, p. 173. 
Later historians repeat this claim as well. HSE says, for example, “Şehzādenin olağandışı yola çıkıp 
gidişini görücek ay gibi tün yolculuğu etmesinden saltanat göğü güneşinin battığı kanısına vardılar ve 
başkaldırıp fesād doruğuna doğru çıktılar. Dokuy yüz on altı Muharreminin onuncu gününde (19 Nisan 
1510). [This date is obviously mistaken. It must be 917 instead of 916. Alevī töresine göre toplanarak 
Şahkulu sanıyla tanınan bir aşağılık herifi kendilerine baş ve buğ ettiler.” HSE4, p. 43. MNB replicates 
HSE but gives the year correctly as 917. Also regard ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, p. 445; MNB, p. 428. Among 
historians of the seventeenth-century, MNB follows HSE and SLZ follows ALI in regard to Şahkulu 
affairs.   
1272 CLZ, p. 120. 
1273 KPZ8b, p. 42. KPZ records this event occurred in early months of 917 / 1511 (evāil-i 917) 
1274 KPZ8b, p. 43.  
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At the beginning, Şahkulu gathered 400-500 men and came to Yenice Derbendi. 
He attacked the caravan which was carrying the property and treasury of Korkud and his 
courtiers.1275 Some of them were killed and some others were captured. Hoca Saadeddin 
claims that the revolt broke out on Muharrem 10, 9161276, which is one of the foremost 
important days according to Shi’ite tradition for it is the memorandum of the martyrdom 
of Husayn, the son of Ali and grandson of Mohammad the Prophet. Hoca Saadeddin 
particularly indicates that they gathered according to the Alevī tradition.1277  
Upon gathering enough men, Şahkulu marched on Antalya. As we learn from a 
letter of the defterdār of Antalya to Korkud, the subaşı and defterdār put together 3.000 
                                                 
1275 According to a detained sufi’s testimony Şahkulu and Ottoman forces fought in Kapulukaya and 
Döşeme Dervendi. See TSA, document E. 5035. Also see SLZ1, p. 445.  
1276 The year in this date is apparently mistaken. It must be Muharrem 10, 917 (April 9, 1511). ANMB and 
MNB give the same date for the beginning of the revolt. See ANMB, p. 173; MNB, p. 428. 
1277 HSE4, p. 43. Nonetheless, archival evidence suggests an earlier date for the beginning of the revolt. A 
letter written by the qādi of Antalya to Korkud dated March 29, 1511 reports the very early phase of the 
revolt. (See TSA, document E. 632.) According to this letter, Şahkulu first attacked Prince Korkud’s 
caravan and servants. (Also see HSE4, p. 43; MNB, p. 428.) His main goal was to capture the treasury of 
the prince, which was trusted to some of his close men by Korkud to be brought to Manisa. Following the 
attack of Şahkulu forces, the subashi of Antalya, Hasan Beg, marched on sufis with some fighters and 
slew a number of them. The qādi stresses that the fighters that Hasan Beg gathered were sunnī. He also 
lays stress on that the number of the sufis gathered in Yenice was increasing day by day and their ultimate 
goal was nothing but to grasp the country wholly: “...Ammā mezkūr Şahkulu gaybet ettükden sonra Yenice 
Derbendi’ne varub gendunun etbā’ından dört-beş yüz nefer kimesne cem’ edüb yola durub Çakırbaşı 
Nasuh bendenizin hātunu ve oğlancıkları ve halkımuzdan ve şehirludan nice cem’-i kesīr göçüb gider iken 
zikr olunan Erdebil halkı mezkūrları basub Mezkur Çakırbaşının kızcağızını ve Yazıcı Kemal kulunuzun 
iki oğlancığın ve yirmi neferden ziyade müslümanları envā’-ı ezālarla katl edüb malların alub 
Çakırbaşının hātunun ve Katip Kemalin kızı ve bazı hatunları ve kızları alub dağa çıkarub esir 
etmişlerdür. El’an kendulardadır. ....Ve sultanım hazretlerinin otağı göçüb Evdekiye’ye varıcak basub 
almak kasd edicek şehirden subaşı bendeniz nice müslümanlarla varub alub şehre getürüldü. Mezkur 
subaşı sünnī tayifesinden cem’-i kesir ile mezkūr Erdebil tayifesinden ve bunlardan nice kimesne maktul 
olub Erdebil halkından kesilmiş baş getürüb ve bir diri kimesne getürdüler, salbolundu. Mezkūr tayife 
Yenice’de durub yevmen fe yevmen mütezayiddir. Kasıtları memleketi bi’l külliye almakdır. Bunda nefīr-i 
ām olmuşdur....” (TSA, document E. 632.) Thus, if we take the starting point of the rebellion as leaving of 
Şahkulu from his cave in Yalınlu, the letter of qādi obviously contradicts HSE’s claim. But HSE’s claim is 
still credible if one takes the starting point as moving from Yenice.  
After attacking Korkud’s caravan and then being attacked by the forces of Hasan Beg, Şahkulu gathered 
his adherents in Yenice and prepared for upcoming attacks, which would be much stronger and victorious. 
Fisher recounts the very early phase of the rebellion in a similar fashion: “When Prince Korkud moved his 
seat from Antalya to Manisa, Shahkuli robbed him of many of his effects which may have given the 
heretics the means to commence their revolt. Once the movement was under the way, it grew in size and 
weight like a giant snowball.” See FSH, p. 97. Therefore, it is reasonable to take 10 Muharrem as the 
beginning of the revolt when Şahkulu set into action in Yenice, after robbing Korkud’s caravan. 
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men and confronted the rebels outside the city. But some sipāhis and fighters gathered 
from nearby villages betrayed and turned against Ottoman forces. In the end, the 
Ottoman forces had to draw back to the fortress.1278 This letter is not dated. But if we 
accept the date offered by Hoca Saadeddin as the sufis day of moving from Yenice, this 
battle must have occurred soon after Muharrem 10, 917 / April 9, 1511. Another letter 
written by Karagöz Pasha pertaining to Şahkulu affairs suggests that another clash 
between Ottoman forces and Şahkulu took place in Yenice; the defterdār lost his head 
during this fight. Hasan Beg could barely flee to the fortress. Rebels also blocked the 
communication of Antalya with the outside world.1279   
Şahkulu surrounded the city for a short while and moved northward, towards 
Burdur, passing through Istanos, Elmalı, and Gölhisar. All the sufis of the region joined 
them while the sunni population fled to mountains.1280 Before entering the city, Şahkulu 
crushed another Ottoman force of 2.500 soldiers commanded by Nokta, one of Karagöz 
Pasha’s men.1281 The qizilbashes entered Burdur on Muharrem 17, 917 (April 16, 1511) 
or just before this day. Prince Osman reported the events to the Porte in his letter dated 
Muharrem 17.1282 Şahkulu did not aim simply to destroy the area; rather he believed in 
capturing the country and establishing his own rule. His practices in the early phases of 
                                                 
1278 TSA, document E. 6321.  
1279 TSA, document E. 77. Published in ULCY1, pp.65-66, footnote 16. Tansel recites that qizilbashes 
attacked the market place of Antalya and spoiled properties of the city dwellers. During this attack 10.000 
people were killed, among whom the qādi of Antalya was as well. See TNSB, p. 249, footnote 125.  
1280 TSA, document E. 5035.  
1281 CLZ, p. 123. KPZ refers to this battle without mentioning Nokta. See KPZ8b, p. 44. ANMB follows 
the same manner. But ANMB’s description of rebellious troops is quite interesting: “…Ol gün hasmın 
kuvve-i tāli’i ziyāde idi. Gāzilere bu hālet mūris-i za’f olub, mühnezim oldılar. Ol esrār-ı nākısu’l-efkārun 
ki kalb-i pür-‘illetleri nūr-ı imandan hālī ve mücevvef idi. Esbāb-ı gururları muza’af oldı. Her biri şāhid-i 
maksūdların kenāre çekmek ümīdiyle baş ortaya koyub ölüm eri olmuşlardı. Aralarında kesret-i vifāk ve 
mezīd-i ittifak bir mertebede idi ki her birinin önünde ölmeği hayat-ı ebedī ve sa’ādet-i sermedī 
bilmişlerdi...” See ANMB, p. 176. See also MNB, p. 428.   
1282 At the beginning of his letter Prince Osman refers his former letters reporting the outbreak of the 
rebellion. Then he reports current events which took place after the first letter. TSA, document E. 2829. 
This document is partly published in ULCY1, pp. 66-67. 
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the rebellion clearly reveal his ultimate goal. Prince Osman reported to the Porte that 
Şahkulu was behaving like a ruler; he appointed beylerbeys and subaşıs to ‘conquered’ 
towns. Prince Osman puts special emphasis on that most of the sipāhis of Teke adhered 
to the rebellion and they proliferated day by day.1283 Ebu’l-Fadl Mehmed Efendi records 
that 20.000 müfsids with their families, properties and animals were present when they 
entered Burdur.1284   
On the other hand, Korkud also informed the Porte on the situation. Karagöz 
Pasha, the beylerbey of Anatolia, Prince Ahmed, the governor of Amasya, and Prince 
Mehmed, the governor of Niğde were assigned to suppress the rebellion.1285 As 
mentioned above, Karagöz Pasha had already sent a small army on Şahkulu under the 
command of Nokta, which was destined to be routed. After defeating Nokta, Şahkulu 
captured Burdur but did not stay there. Hasan Rumlu notes that upon hearing the 
victories of Şahkulu the disciples of the Safavid House (Hānedan) armed themselves 
and joined Baba Şahkulu.1286 He then proceeded toward Kütahya, where Karagöz Pasha 
had settled. Qizilbashes arrived in front of Kütahya on Muharrem 23 (April 22, 1511) 
and the two armies clashed.1287 At the beginning of the fight Karagöz Pasha’s troops 
dispersed the rebels; Şahkulu had to retreat to the mountain. Thinking they had totally 
devastated the foe, Ottoman soldiers left the fight and started to loot properties of 
                                                 
1283 “…ol tāife-i melāyinden sādır olan hadisāt bunlar ki beyan olunur. Mesela mezkūr tāife ol tarihden 
beru yevmen fe- yevmen mütezāyid olub vilayet-i Teke’nin ekseri sipahileri bile anlara mütābaat edüb 
zaman-ı kalīlde bir iki bin melā’in cem’ olub mezkūr bedbaht ki reisleri Şahkuludur, amirāne hareket edüb 
kimin beylerbeyi edinüb kimine yer yer subaşılık verüb bu üzere dimağları fesāda varub sancak 
kaldurub…” TSA, document E. 2829. 
1284 Ebu’l-Fadl Medmed Efendi, Selimşāh-nāme, Lālā Đsmail Efendi Kütüphanesi, 348, f. 48a. Cited in 
Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, p. 54.  
1285 ULCY1, p. 65. 
1286 HR, p. 154.  
1287 ULCY1, p. 68. CLZ points bitters criticism toward Karagöz Pasha accusing him for underestimating 
the power of rebels and not for making enough provision. See CLZ, p. 122.  
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retreated rebels, to whom the soldiers around the pasha joined as well. Taking advantage 
of the situation Şahkulu led an assault on Karagöz Pasha, who was totally defensless, 
and incarcerated him. Upon losing their leader, the Ottoman troops scattered. After 
consulting the sipāhis of Teke1288, Şahkulu executed Karagöz Pasha outside the city.1289   
Some words in the letter of the Ottoman spy Yusuf, who reported the defeat of 
Karagöz Pasha to the Porte, best explain the psychology of the folk in the region. He 
underscores, just like other reporters and spies, that the Porte should not underestimate 
the danger; each day numerous men of plunderer were gathering around him. The folk 
psychology was governed by the idea of revolution; thus the people of the region did not 
trust anyone. Yusuf warns the Porte that one should not compare them with other foes: 
“...mezkūr tāyifeyi zaīf etmek olmaz ve durmayub her gün yanlarına eşirradan adem 
cem’ oluyor. Vilayetin halkı inkılab üzre olub kimesneye itimad değildir. Elhasıl bu 
mel’unları sair a’dāya kıyas etmelü değildir. …”1290  
It seems from this expression that Şahkulu managed to convince not only his 
adherents but also a considerable portion of the non-qizilbash population of the region 
on his claims. As indicated above his intention was not simply to plunder the area but he 
believed in repelling the Ottoman rule from the country and in establishing his own rule 
in the name of Shah Ismail. So the revolt of Şahkulu was intended as a revolutionary 
movement aiming to change the regime.1291 As observed in Yusuf’s report, Şahkulu 
                                                 
1288 See below footnote.  
1289 TSA, document E. 5035. Partly published in ULCY1, p. 62, footnote 11. Also consider TSA, 
document E. 5881; TNSB, p. 251. KPZ and ANMB narrates the events in the same manner. See KPZ8b, 
pp. 45-46; ANMB, p. 176-7. Also consider CLZ, p. 123; MNB, pp. 428-9.    
1290 TSA, document, E. 5881.  
1291 After narrating the death of Karagöz Pasha in Kütahya ANMB states, “...Çün memleket-gīrlik secdası 
dimağları cevfen-i makarr idinmişdi. Müşāhade itdikleri sūret bi-hasbi’z-zāhir ol ma’nāyı kendü za’m-ı 
fāsidlerince mukarrer idüb Anatolı Vilāyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük deyu eşerinde bilürlerdi...” 
ANMB, p. 178.  
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successfully created a revolutionary atmosphere at least in the southern and western 
Anatolia; many people of the region fell into indecision on which side would win the 
struggle. He was appointing governors to captured towns and castles. Furthermore, as 
Uluçay points out, Şahkulu managed to gain some Ottoman administrators for his 
cause.1292   
Another report, that of Prince Osman, also depicts Şahkulu as behaving like a 
ruler, assigning governors, and confusing the minds of people. (…amirane hareket idüb, 
kimin beylerbeyi idinüb, kimine yer yer subaşılık virüb…dimağları fesada varub sancak 
kaldurub…)1293 As also reported in the letter of the qādi of Antalya to Prince Korkud in 
Zilhicce, 916 (March, 1511), he secured the submission of Ardabil sufis living in the 
area and acted like a ruler, setting up dīvan-hāne and attempting to rule the country. The 
qādi warned Prince Korkud on that their ultimate goal was to seize the country 
wholly.1294  
The defeat of the Ottoman beylerbey of Anatolia was indeed a great success for 
the rebellious movement. But Şahkulu was determined to go further. He then turned 
towards Prince Korkud who was the governor of Saruhan. Korkud appointed Hasan Aga 
to the command of his troops, which was reinforced by auxiliary forces from nearby 
provinces. The two armies met on the plain of Alaşehir, where the Ottoman army tasted 
a bitter defeat. Hasan Aga’s and some other sancakbeys’ heads were left on the 
battlefield. Korkud could barely take refuge in the fortress of Manisa. These events took 
                                                 
1292 ULCY1, p. 69.  
1293 TSA, document E 2829.  
1294 See TSA, document E 632.  
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place just before May 3, 1511.1295 Đshak Çelebi records that after this victory Şahkulu 
said to his comrades, “We now took the suzerainty over the Province of Anatolia!”1296 
For some reasons Şahkulu did not attack Korkud in Manisa, but turned toward 
Bursa.1297 On hearing the developments and the intention of the rebels, the qādi of Bursa 
sent an urgent message to the head of the Janissary corps on Safer 4, 917 (April 1511); 
he reported the recent developments and the intention of Şahkulu. In his letter the qādi 
was crying for help,  
Sultan Korkud dahī kaçub Manisa kalesine varub, bi’l-fiil memleketi yıka yaka 
Bursa’ya geliyor. Đki günedeğin yeniçeriden ve gayriden ve gayriden mu’īn ve 
zāhīr ve mededci erişmezse memleket bi’t-tamam elden gitmişdir. Azīm 
adüvdür. Beylerbeyinin vesāyir sancak beylerinin hazīnelerine ve cebecūşlarına 
ve silāhlarına mālik olmuşdur...1298  
 
This report of the qādi explains clearly the degree of the success that the Şahkulu 
movement achieved. Up to this point Şahkulu had defeated five Ottoman armies (he 
himself had never been defeated yet), one of them was commanded by the beylerbey of 
Anatolia, the highest military rank of Anatolia in the administrative system, and the 
other by a deputy of Prince Korkud. Actually in the Anatolian peninsula, there was no 
further Ottoman army, which was prepared and strong enough to stop Şahkulu, when he 
marched toward Bursa.1299 Ahmed, the qādi of Bursa, underscores this fact in an effort 
                                                 
1295 The battle was reported by Ahmed the qadi of Bursa to the Aga of Janissaries in his letter dated Safer 
4, 917 (May 3, 1511). TSA, document, E. 5451. For the report and further details of events see ULCY1, 
pp. 69-70. 
1296 “Anadolu Vilāyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük.” See Đshak Çelebi, Selim-nāme, Đstanbul Üniversitesi 
Kütüphanesi, no. 2614, f. 12b. Recited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi 
Dergisi, 4, 1959, p. 55.  
1297 See KPZ8b, p. 46. KPZ does not mention, however, Şahkulu’s march on Korkud and the battle took 
place in Alaşehir.  
1298 TSA, document, E. 5451. 
1299 One might argue, however, that Prince Ahmed had enough military power to avert Şahkulu. Although 
this idea seems to be true, Ahmed was devoid of the motivation to mobilize his army against Şahkulu 
since he was much occupied with the struggle for the throne. Şahkulu affair was only of secondary 
importance for Ahmed. Nonetheless, as will be analyzed below, his negligence in this affair would cause 
him to lose the throne. 
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to convince the head of the Janissary corps to dispatch military help as soon as possible 
– in two days at the latest -. What is important in his letter is that the qādi does not state 
‘if a military assistance would not arrive, Bursa will surrender!’, but he consciously 
underlines, ‘the country will be wholly lost!’ He also calls attention to the fact that the 
rebels retained the weapons and treasury of beylerbey and some sancakbeys; thus his 
power acquired further strength.  
These early successes of the rebellion, however, should not be regarded as solely 
the result of the deed of Şahkulu and his adherents. Although the Safavid propaganda 
created an ideologically oriented social ground for such uprisings, it is not sufficient to 
explain the whole story. The debility of the Ottoman administration must also be 
regarded in this aspect. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the system of the allocation of 
administrative and military posts, especially of timars, degenerated; those who deserved 
posts by their service could not get good positions while those who offered bribery or 
has favor of high bureaucrats received them. The deterioration of merit based allocation 
of state favor caused many discontent or dismissed government officials, especially 
timar holders, to join the rebellion or at least to support it by some means. On the other 
hand the central government was not functioning efficiently either. Selahattin Tansel 
argues, for example, that the sultan was not aware of the Şahkulu rebellion until 
Korkud’s letter, which was written after the defeat of his forces in Alaşehir, arrived. 
Upon learning the situation Bayezid reproved his viziers, especially grand vizier Ali 
Pasha, severely and commissioned the grand vizier to finish the problem.1300   
Perhaps more vital then the degeneration of provincial administration was the 
chaos that emerged at the Porte. The worsening health of Bayezid II inflamed the desire 
                                                 
1300 TNSB, p. 252. 
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of the princes for the throne. The most important issue occupying the attention of all 
high statesmen, especially during the last two years of Bayezid II’s reign, became the 
problem of determining the successor of Bayezid. Already before the outbreak of the 
Şahkulu revolt Selim left Trebizond for Kefe in 1510. As expressed above, Korkud also 
left his province Antalya on the eve of the rebellion. Strange enough is that although 
Şahkulu rose up almost simultaneously with Korkud’s departure from Antalya, the 
prince did not return but continued on his way to Manisa, leaving the job of the 
suppression to his subaşı and defterdār. As clearly observed, the primary concern of his, 
and of the other two princes, was to get closer to the capital city. The revolt seems to 
have been nothing more than a secondary problem to be solved in the aftermath of 
ascendance to the throne. It must be due to this that Korkud did not deal with the 
rebellion.  
Prince Ahmed, who was assigned to punish the rebels, did not strive to suppress 
the rebellion either. Rather he decided to punish his two brothers since they deserted 
their provinces for the sake of the throne.1301 With this incentive he also left Amasya and 
moved toward Ankara.1302 He sent an envoy to the Porte and explained his complaints 
                                                 
1301 CLZ bitterly criticizes Prince Ahmed for esteeming himself as the most fitting nominee for the throne 
and for not suppressing the rebellion: “Sultan Ahmed saltanat ümidi ile bunca lāf u güzāf urub, ‘ale’l-
husūs ayağı rikābda pādişāhlık sevdasıyla şām u seher cüst ü cüdā ıztırābda idi. Henüz kendü memālik-i 
mevrūsesi içinde yanında bunca tevābi’ u hadem, bi’l-cümle ‘asker-i kevākib-şümār u encüm-haşem birle 
hāzır u müheyyā iken, birkaç etrāk-i bī-idrākin ‘isyān u tuğyānları oldı. Đrişüb şimşīr-i zafer-te’sīr ile ol 
ateş-i pür-tāb-ı fitneye itfā veirmeğe kādir olmadı. Cümle ehl-i Đslāmın ma’lūmı oldı ki Sultan Ahmedin 
kāmeti bī-dirāyetine hilkāt-i saltanat elyak ve ahrā değildir...” CLZ, p. 125.    
1302 “[Ahmed summoned his dīvan and reminded them Selim’s and Korkud’s movement. Then he said:] 
‘Babam māriz ü bī-mecāl olub, kendü hāline iştigalinden vilāyet ahvāli kemāl mertebede ihtilāl bulub-
durur. Münāsib oldur ki mukaddemā varub Kurkud’u te’dīb eyleyem, andan Rumili’ne geçüb, karındaşım 
Selim’i çıkarub, babam yirine pādişāh olam!’ Hazır olanlar bu tedbiri beğenüb, tahrīk ü tahsīn itdiler. 
Ertesi hemān sefer tedārikin idüb, Ankara cānibine müteveccih oldı...” KPZ8b, p. 48. For similar accounts 
consider ANMB, pp. 186-7; HSE4, p. 51. MNB states that Prince Ahmed and the grand vizier Ali Pasha 
were moving coordinally and Ahmed’s leaving of his province was planned by the both. He also 
underscores that Ahmed’s main concern was nothing than to capture the throne. See MNB, p. 430. ALI 
recites Ahmed’s words as follows: “Çünki Korkud bilā-izn-i Pādişāhī sancağını koyub, livā-i Saruhan’a 
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against his two brothers. Ahmed demanded permission from his father to punish Selim 
and Korkud.1303 The answer was not affirmative. Rather he was ordered to return to his 
province.1304 In his answer, Bayezid underlined that one of his brother’s (Korkud) 
disobedience caused such a great turmoil (fesād). He reminded Ahmed of how sensitive 
his province was to the matter for it was close to the country of Ismail and most of the 
people living there were qizilbash. Bayezid assured Ahmed to do what was necessary to 
stop his brothers and ordered him to return to Amasya in order to handle qizilbash 
affairs.1305  
Ahmed received his father’s request, which was also indicative of Bayezid’s 
stand in favor of him, in Ankara.1306 When he learned of his father’s fortunate intention 
regarding the throne, Ahmed accepted to abandon his agenda and informed his father 
                                                                                                                                                
ta’arruz itdi ve Selim Hān oğlı bahānesiyle Kefe ser-haddine varub, bilā-izn ü ruhsat Rūm-ili’ne geçdi. 
Evvelā Kurkud’un üstüne varub hakkından geleyin, sāniyen Rūm-ili’ne geçüb Hān Selim’in vücūdını nā-
būd kılayın” ALI, p. 938.  
1303 ANMB reformulates Ahmed’s words to his father as follows: “…Karındaşım Sultan Korkud ki eski 
sancağın koyub bī-icāzet Saruhan Vilāyetine gelmişdir, ānun giru yerine varması lāzımdır. Hüdāvendigār 
Hazretlerinin ol bābda çün kemāl-i rāfeti ve mezīd merhameti te’dīb olunmalarına mānidir. Bizim 
üzerimize vācip olmuşdur ki ol hizmeti edā idüb varub güşmāl idevüz. Đmdi yümn-i himmetleriyla zikrolan 
maslahatun tedārikiçün ol cānibe teveccüh gösterdim. Gerekdir ki hüsn-i rızaların o yolda bize hem-rāh 
eyleyeler....” ANMB, p. 188. Also consider HSE4, p. 51.  
1304 “Kaçan bu haber Cenāb-ı Şehriyāri’ye vardı, Sultān Ahmed’in bu gūne hiffetine āzorde hātır olub, 
‘itāb-āmiz emirler gönderdi. ‘Zinhār makarr-ı devletinden hareket itmeyüb, yerinde turasın. Vezīr Ali 
Paşa’ya surh-serān ahvāli sipāriş olınmuşdır, ānın müşāveresi ile amel idesin’ cevābını inhā kıldı.” ALI, 
p. 938.  
1305 KPZ re-formulates the words of Bayezid as follows: “Bir karındaşun bi-lā-takrīb yerinden kalkub 
hareket itmekle bu kadar fesād oldı. Senün memleketün hod Kızılbaşa karīn olub, ekser-i re’āyā ol 
mülhidün ehibbāsındandur, me-bādā ki, fitne-yi ‘azīme bā’is olub vilāyet harāb ola. Biz senün 
karındaşlarını dām-ı ri’āyetle kayd-ı gaflete düşürmek tedbirindeyüz. Đnşa’a’llah ‘an karīb sühūletle ol 
me’mūle hayyiz-i husūle vusūl bula.” KPZ8b, 48. ANMB follows KPZ in this issue. Slightly differing 
from KPZ, however, Bayezid’s promise to Ahmed for granting him the throne - but after he successfully 
suppressing the rebellion of course – is evidently indicated in ANMB. It reads, “...Biz gice gündüz senin 
devletin mukaddemātı tertibin idüb karındaşlarını dām-ı ri’ayetle kayd-ı gaflete düşürmek tedbirindeyiz. 
Ol maslahat tamamolub ba’dehu Kızılbaş zümresi müfsidlerin ber-tarāf itdüğümüzden sonra sen kendüni 
ber-murād göresin. cemī’-i matlūbuna suhūletle vāsıl olmak mukarrerdür. Şimdi mahall-i tehettük 
değildür. ‘Đzz u temkīnle dāmen-i ferāgati kendüne çeküb sabr idesin...” See ANMB, pp. 188-9. HSE is 
also clear in this issue. To him too, Bayezid did not only ordered Ahmed to return to his province, which 
was desely populated by qizilbashes, but also promised to secure the throne for him. See HSE4, p. 52.  
1306 HSE4, p. 52. 
 395 
that he would march on the rebels.1307 Upon learning of Ahmed’s decision Bayezid felt 
rather comfortable and dispatched a second letter ordering Ahmed to meet Ali Pasha, 
who had been commissioned to repress the rebellion, and to move together with him 
against the qizilbashes.1308 Ahmed did not return to Amasya but proceeded toward the 
province of Kütahya, where he would meet Ali Pasha. The advance of events would 
show, however, that his primary concern had always been securing the throne for 
himself.1309  
To sum up, on April 22, when Şahkulu defeated Karagöz Pasha, the beylerbey of 
Anatolia, none of the princes except for Şehinşah1310 were in their provinces; and they 
were not very interested in the rebellion. The Porte, on the other hand, was so occupied 
with the struggle of the princes for the throne that Şahkulu affairs were neither perceived 
nor dealt with adequately. But the defeat of Karagöz Pasha made the Porte realize the 
power of the peril. Upon the news reaching the Porte, Ali Pasha, the grand vizier, was 
assigned to suppress the rebellion. Orders were dispatched to begs of Anatolia to gather 
under Ali Pasha’s banner in order to finish the rebellion.1311 Ali Pasha moved from 
Edirne with an army composed of 4.000 janissaries and 4.000 bölük (kapu) halkı.1312 But 
his attention was not concentrated on the rebellion a lot. Neither had he appreciated the 
power of Şahkulu. For him, they were no more than some thousands of looters; and the 
consecutive defeats of Ottoman troops were just because of the improvidence of local 
                                                 
1307 KPZ8b, p. 49; ANMB, p. 189; HSE4, pp. 52-3.  
1308 KPZ8b, p. 49; ANMB, p. 189; HSE4, p. 53; ANMB, p. 50. 
1309 KPZ recounts Ahmed’s intention as follows:“Merhūm Sultan Ahmed kendüyi ‘arūs-ı cülūs-ı mülk-i 
Rūma nāmzed i’tikād idüb, özüni dāmād bilmişdi. Kızılbaşa teveccühi maksūd bi’l-‘arz idüb maksūdına 
vāsıl olmak istedi...” KPZ8b, p. 53.  
1310 Among the four sons of Bayezid, who wer alive, only Şehinşah did not participate the struggle for the 
throne. But his position was more problematic for the Porte for he was obviously affiliated to the qizilbash 
ideas. This will be delineated below. 
1311 KPZ8b, p. 47; ANMB, p. 183.   
1312 KPZ8b, p. 47; CLZ, p. 128; ANMB, p. 184; HSE4, p. 49.  
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governors and of Karagöz Pasha, but not because of the rebels’ power.1313 Ali pasha was 
renown with his pro-Ahmed stand. In this campaign his main intention was to use the 
rebellion as an intermediary-legitimizing step in order to save the throne for Prince 
Ahmed.1314 However, it was not only the intention of the grand vizier, but the intention 
of the sultan as well. If relied on contemporary Ottoman historians, Bayezid planned to 
use the prestige of suppressing Şahkulu rebellion to enthrone Ahmed.1315 Hoca 
Saadeddin records, for example, that when Şahkulu defeated the Ottoman army in 
Kütahya the sultan’s health had already deteriorated seriously. Upon learning the defeat 
of Karagöz Pasha he became so sorrowful that he felt he could no longer carry on the 
saltanat. He summoned leading statesmen and explained his decision, which was to 
leave the throne to Prince Ahmed.1316 But, Hoca Saadeddin says, in order to achieve this 
plan the problem of Şahkulu had to be solved beforehand. He charged Ali Pasha first to 
extirpate qizilbashes and then to bring Ahmed to the capital city.1317 As Hoca Saadeddin 
clearly states, the real point of the Pasha was to meet Ahmed and to make necessary 
preparation for ascending him to the throne.1318  
                                                 
1313 KPZ records, for example, “[Upon learning the situation that the rebellion reached Bayezid II became 
so uncomfortable and angry. Ali Pasha, the grand vizier, said to the sultan] ‘Anatolıda ādem olmayub, 
beğler kötülüğündendür. Birkaç etrāk-i nā-pākün ne kadar iktidārı ola ki bu kadar fesād eyleye, dahī 
haklarından gelinmiye!’ Bilmedi ki düşmene hakāret nazarıyla nazar etmek ‘ayn-ı sefahatdür.” KPZ8b, p. 
47. For similar a account also see ANMB, pp. 179-183; CLZ, pp. 127-8; HSE4, p. 47; MNB, p. 429.  
1314 CLZ writes Ali Pasha’s intention, which was shared by other ‘corrupted’ statesmen as well, as 
follows: “(Ali Paşa) Sāyirleri ile ittifāk eylediler ki, ‘Asıl maksūdumuz Sultan Ahmed ahvālidür, ‘isyān ve 
tuğyān iden melāhide husūsı dahī murādımıza muvāfık vāki’ oldı. ‘Atabe-i ‘ulyāda olan ‘asker-i zafer-
peykerin yararlarını ve yeniçeri dilāverlerinden birkaç bin güzīde ve şīr-merdlerini alub, Anatolıya 
geçelüm, vāki’ olan mühimmāt-ı saltanatı görüb Sultan Ahmedi getürelim’ deyü mu’āhede eylediler...” 
CLZ, pp. 127-8.   
1315 According to ANMB, Bayezid secretly commissioned Ali Pasha to enthrone Prince Ahmed by using 
this revolt as excuse. According to the sultan’s plan Ali Pasha would join Ahmed’s army and provide the 
support of janissaries to Ahmed’s succession. See ANMB, p. 50.    
1316 HSE4, p. 48. 
1317 HSE4, pp. 48-50. For a similar account regard MNB, p. 429.  
1318 “Aslında Paşa’nın gerçek amacı Sultan Ahmed’le buluşarak onun saltanat tahtına oturmasıyla ilgili 
ilk hazırlıkları yapmak ve de yeni padişahı iş başına getirmekti.” HSE4, p. 49. 
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Both Ali Pasha and Ahmed were ordered to move together in suppressing the 
rebellion.1319 An expression recorded by Kemalpaşazāde apparently shows how the 
Şahkulu affair was perceived and dealt with in the high echelons of the Ottoman 
administration. Kemalpaşazāde states that the sancakbeys of Rumelia were also called to 
the Porte. But since they realized the actual intention of the sultan and the grand vizier, 
these begs did not hasten to go to Istanbul but waited for the result of Ali Pasha’s fight 
with qizilbashes.1320 Taking into account Selim’s chance to ascend the throne, the 
sancakbeys did not want to risk their fortune.1321 Hoca Saadeddin chronicles the same 
event but with more details. To him, Bayezid II called beylerbeys of Rumelia to Edirne 
for the sole purpose of protecting the city from a possible attack from Selim. 
Furthermore the sultan planned that when Ahmed would come with the grand vizier 
after suppressing the rebellion he would easily secure the obedience of these begs for the 
rule of Ahmed.1322   
It is, therefore, possible to argue that Ahmed was in the most advantageous 
position with regard to his brothers. He was just and could ascend the throne. The only 
step to be the next sultan was suppressing the rebellion.1323 Ali Pasha, on the other hand, 
                                                 
1319 KPZ recites that when Ahmed’s messenger informed him on Ahmed’s intention to march on 
qizilbashes Bayezid felt so happy and wrote his son, “ ’Đnāyet-i Bāri yāri kılub, ol etrāk-i nā-pāki ortadan 
götüresin, bī-māni’ ü dāfi’ gelüb serīr-i saltanata oturasın. Emmā gerekdür ki Ali Paşa ile dā’im 
müşāvere idüb birbirinüze mu’āvin ü zāhir olasız!’ Ali Paşa’ya dahī hük mü şerif gönderilüb, vech-i 
meşrūh üzre sipāriş olındı.” KPZ8b, p. 49. Regard also TNSB, p. 253; IDRs, p. 88; ANMB, p. 190;   
1320 “...Ba’dehu Rumilinde olan sancakbeylerine ulaklar gönderilüb, kapuya da’vet olıındılar. Onlar dahī 
maslahat tefvīz-i saltanat idüğin bilüb, bir mikdar eğlendier, Ali Paşa ile Kızılbaş-ı evbāşun savaşı ne 
vechle suret bulur, bu serencāmı-ı kār ve ahvāl-ı rüzgār nice olur görelüm diye katlandılar.” KPZ8b, p. 
49. Also consider ANMB, p. 191;  
1321 I would like to remind here that during this time Selim was in Kefe and would sooner cross to 
Rumelia. He was carrying on intense propaganda among Rumelia begs to win them for his cause.   
1322 HSE4, pp. 54-55. 
1323 One should keep in mind that Şahkulu affair was before all a matter of internal politics in the struggle 
of princes for the throne. At that time, Seim also achieved a quite advantageous position. His press gave 
result and he managed to grasp a province in Rumelia. Furthermore he got permission to summon 
Rumelian troops for a ‘gazā!’ campaign on Hungary, which provided him the chance to control Rumelian 
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strongly believed in suppressing the rebellion without any serious resistance. But the 
main question, for him, was to enthrone Ahmed. Nevertheless, his underestimation of 
the power of the rebels would terminate not only his life but Ahmed’s saltanat as well.  
Ali Pasha met with Prince Ahmed in Altıntaş near Kütahya.1324   
On the other hand, when learned that a strong army was dispatched under the 
command of the grand vizier, Şahkulu decided to retreat.1325 According to 
Kemalpaşazāde Şahkulu retreated because he learned that Bayezid II was alive.1326 But 
Şahkulu did not explain this fact (the fact that Bayezid II was alive) to his adherents; 
rather he said, ‘Our immediate need is a fortress to take shelter in case of a possible 
attack. Then assault on Bursa is easy.’1327 Qizilbashes then proceeded toward 
Alaşehir.1328 The begs of Aydın, Saruhan, and Menteşe came together in order to repel 
Şahkulu. Nevertheless, they could not agree on the command of one of them, thus, could 
not move coherently. Consequently they could not put an effective resistance against 
                                                                                                                                                
begs and to gain them for his cause. ANMB asserts that upon Selim appointed to the governorship of 
Semendire, some leading statesmen, who realized that the balance was sliding in favor of Selim, wrote a 
letter to Ahmed and reported him the situation. The way that these statesmen offer Ahmed in order to gain 
the saltanat clearly puts forward how Şahkulu affairs became an issue of internal politics. More clearly, it 
reflects how the rebellion was regarded by high bureaucrats and princes as a tool that would provide 
legitimate base for grasping the throne, rather than a problem of public security to be solved. ANMB runs, 
“Đttifakla Sultan Ahmede mektup gönderdiler. Hazret-i Şehr-yār’un (Selim) tevcīh olunan sancağa 
teveccühün i’lām itdikden sonra didiler ki: Hazret-i Hüdāvendigār ve kapu halkı sığār u kibār emr-i 
ma’hūd üzere cümle müttefiklerdir ve Rum-ili beğlerbeğisine tekrar istimāletler olunub cem’īsi yek-cihet 
olmuşlardır. Hemān maslahāt-ı şehzādenin kızılbaş savaşında mansūr u muzaffer olmasına mevkūfdur. 
Anatolıda olan madde-i fesād munkatı’ olmağla zikr olan ma’ni sūret-pezīr oldığında şāyebe-i şübhe 
yokdur. Hemān mütevākı’ ol tāyifenin zevālidir. Şehzāde hazretlerinden me'mūr olunan oldur ki ol 
müfsīdlerin şerrini ehl-i Đslām üzerinden götür, tā ki müslimanların nefāyis-i enfās-ı müteberrikesi 
sebebiyle gunçe-i maksūdları şükūfte va handān ola....” ANMB, p. 214. HSE repeats more or less the 
same account. See HSE4, pp. 30-31.       
1324 TNSB, p. 253.  
1325 ULCY1, p. 70. 
1326 Ottoman chronicles follows KPZ on this issue. See the following footnote.  
1327 KPZ8b, p. 46. ANMB, HSE, and MNB follow the same line of narration. See ANMB, p. 178, 219; 
HSE4, pp. 46-47; MNB, p. 429.  
1328 HSE4, p. 47. 
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Şahkulu. He moved as he wished in south-western Anatolia and looted the region,1329 
eventually ending up in Antalya. The dwellers of Antalya armed and levied resistance 
against qizilbashes once more. But they had to retreat into the fortress, which was 
besieged by qizilbashes.1330 To Kemalpaşazāde, it was during this siege that Şahkulu 
learned that Ali Pasha was coming with a strong army. Consequently he stopped the 
siege and retired to the mountainous region of Kızılkaya, which was very difficult to 
access, thus, was appropriate to take shelter.1331  
Ali Pasha met with Prince Ahmed in Altuntas near Kütahya and marched on 
Şahkulu toward Antalya.1332 They surrounded Şahkulu in Kızılkaya. The siege lasted 
around one month.1333 Ottoman historians argue that during this time Ali Pasha 
discussed with Prince Ahmed the sultan’s - and his - intention to enthrone him after the 
suppression. This excited Ahmed so much that he thought himself as the sultan of the 
empire1334 and demanded the obedience of janissaries and other soldiers during the 
siege.1335 Nonetheless, janissaries refuted this demand stating that ‘we do not offer our 
obedience to anyone while our padişah is alive!’1336 He was further disappointed by the 
                                                 
1329 KPZ8b, p. 46; ANMB, p. 220.  
1330 ANMB, p. 220. 
1331 KPZ8b, p. 46. ANMB repeats the same account. See ANMB, p. 221.  
1332 ALI, p. 929.  
1333 ALI states that Ali Pasha besieged the rebels here for 38 days.  See ALI, p. 929. (One should keep in 
mind, however, that ALI usually makes mistakes in dates.) If we rely on his account than it appears that 
the grand vizier and Prince Ahmed arrived Kızılkaya in early May of 1511, for Şahkulu fled from 
Kızılkaya on June 15.  
1334 “Şehzāde hazretleri ol gün ol kadar inşirāh u irtiyāh hāsıl olub sevindi ki kendüyi ol gün hemān 
memālik-i Rūm’a pādişāh oldı sandı...” KPZ8b, pp. 53-54. Also consider HSE4, p. 58.  
1335 ALI re-phrases Ahmed’s utterance to janissaries and sipāhis: “Saltanat bana mukarrer olmuşdur. Bir 
el öndin bey’at ü teba’iyyet idenleri ‘uluvv-i himmetim hāmi vü rā’īdir” ALI, p. 929. SLZ follows ALI’s 
account. See SLZ1, p. 453. Also consider MNB, p. 430.  
1336 See, for example, Vekāyi-i Sultan Bāyezit ve Selim Han, p. 53, recited in TNSB, p. 254. Also consider 
ANMB, p. 223; ALI, p. 929; SLZ1, p. 453. ANMB’s account slightly differs. According to ANMB, Ali 
Pasha attempted to bring Prince Ahmed to the commandership of the whole army. His aim was that, when 
Ahmed would gain the victory at the head of the army his way to the throne would totally open.  Ali Pasha 
uttered janissaries that “From now on your commander is Prince Ahmed.” But they opposed to this 
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arrival of a messenger from the Porte. The messenger reported that Prince Selim had 
arrived near Edirne and taken the Province of Semendire.1337   
On the other hand, while Ali Pasha and Prince Ahmed were discussing how to 
secure the throne, Şahkulu was in search of breaking the siege.1338 As Kemalpaşazāde 
explains there were two passages from the mountainous region that the rebels took 
shelter in. One was secured by Ali Pasha while the other branch of the Ottoman army 
under Haydar Pasha’s1339 command was commissioned to blockade the other passage to 
the Province of Karaman.1340 Şahkulu must have understood that he had little chance 
against the grand vizier so he assaulted Haydar Pasha’s forces. After a pitch battle 
Haydar Pasha was defeated, he himself falling in the battlefield,1341  and the qizilbashes 
moved toward Konya on Rebī I 18, 917 (June 15, 1511).1342  
                                                                                                                                                
decision arguing that “Our sultan appointed Ali Pasha to our command. We would not accept any other 
sultan while Sultan Bayezid is alive!” See ANMB, pp. 50-1.    
1337 KPZ8b, p. 54; ANMB, p. 225; HSE4, pp. 59-60.  
1338 HSE bitterly criticizes Ali Pasha for leaving aside the fight with the rebels and so much occupied in 
preparations to ascend Ahmed to the throne.  He says, “Ayaklananlarla uğraşmayı bir yana koymuş toy 
gereklerini tedārike kendini vermişti.” HSE4, pp. 56-7.   
1339 Haydar Pasha was the lala of Prince Sheinshah, who was the beylerbey of Karaman. See KPZ8b, p. 
54; TNSB, p. 254.  
1340 KPZ8b, p. 54. Also regard TNSB, p. 254; ANMB, p. 226; MNB, pp. 430-1. SLZ states, Ali Pasha 
divided Ottoman army into three: one was commanded by Haydar Pasha, the other by Prince Ahmed, and 
the third branch by Ali Pasha himself. Each branch blockaded different sides of the mountain. See SLZ1, 
p. 453.  
1341 ANMB, p. 227; HSE4, pp. 60-61; SLZ1, p. 453.  
1342 Another reason for setting up towards Konya might well be Şahkulu’s friendship with Prince 
Şehinşah, the governor of Karaman. Although we do not have clear evidence on the correspondence 
between the two, it is evident from archival documents that Şehinşah somehow sympathetic towards the 
qizilbash movement. Perhaps it was because of this fact that among the four living princes only he did not 
join the struggle for the throne. Nonetheless his position was less appreciated because of his qizilbash 
tendency. Haydar Pasha, when was the lala of the prince, first tried to persuade Şehinşah to abandon his 
sympathetic attitudes toward qizilbashes. When he realized that the prince was convinced with qizilbash 
ideas, he reported the situation to the Porte. According to his report, two qizilbash khalifas, called Fenāi 
and Dellak, influenced the prince and caused him to appropriate qizilbahs ideals. Haydar Pasha states 
further that the prince and qizilbashes, most possibly Şahkulu and his adherents, agreed on that sooner 
either the prince or the qizilbashes would join the other. Haydar Pasha stressed the urgency of the issue 
and warned the sultan not to regard this affair in parallel with others problems, but as the first priority; in 
order to solve the problem the sultan should come in person and do whatever needed without any delay. 
Otherwise the province of Karaman would be lost. The whole text of original letter runs,  
“Sultanım Hazretlerinin hāk-i pāye-i ... arz-ı bende budur ki, 
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According to ‘Āli, the qizilbashes moved toward the province of Rūm because 
they wanted to go to the realm of the Shah.1343 Şahkulu arrived in Beyşehir on June 
17.1344 Then he proceeded to Kayseri.1345 Ali Pasha could learn only after two days that 
Şahkulu had fled from Kızılkaya.1346 He was so enthusiastic to finish the rebellion as 
soon as possible and underestimated the power of Şahkulu that he left most of his 
                                                                                                                                                
Fenāyi ve Dellāk Đbrahim demekle ma’rūf mezhepsiz mülhidler ve müfsidler ve kafirūn-ı eşeddler şehzāde 
hazretlerini bilkülliye idlāl edüb tarīkden ve tabiatden çıkardılar. Hatta bir derecedir ki ankaribüz-zaman 
mahzulin ve mel’uneyn kızılbaş cemaatının hazelehumullahı taalā ve şehzadenin ittifakları bunun üzerine 
olmuşdur ki şehzāde anlara yahud anlar şehzadeye mülākat olalar. Zamīr-i münīr-i cihān-āranuza mestūr 
olmayub bir dürlü dahi mülāhaza buyurulmıya öyle olsa sultanım hazretlerine vācib ve lāzımdır ki bu 
maslahatı sāyir mühim mesāliha kıyas etmeyüb cemi’ mesālihden akdem ve ehemm bilüm ta’cil ale’t-ta’cil 
devlet-ü saadetle bu canibe gelüb her ne tarīk def-ü ref mümkün ise def etmeğe ikdām oluna. Billahil azīm 
memleket-i Karaman heman elden çıkmışdır. Bir an ve bir lahza tevakkuf cā’iz değildir. Şöylece mülāhaza 
buyurula: bāki garāyibin ve fesadın nihāyeti yokdur. Đnşaallah anlar dahī hāk-i pāy-ı şerefinize mahfī 
olmıya. Bāki sultanım hazretlerin hāk-i pāy-ı şeriflerine il’ām hācet değildir. Ömrü devlet bāki ba’d.  
                    Abdüküm el-muhlīs Haydar el-fakīr.” (TSA, document E. 5590. The back side of this 
document reads ‘Haydar Paşa’dan gelen mektup’, the letter came from Haydar Pasha. Most part of the 
document is published in ULCY1, p. 69.)     
On the other hand, the grand vizier Ali Pasha also wrote a letter reporting the situation of the prince when 
he was on the way to suppress the Şahkulu rebellion. Ali Pasha writes, the prince is yet in our side. But it 
seems that he feels discomfort because of Ahmed’s arrival in Eskisehir. It must be because of that, he 
called all of his kapı kulu soldiers, who was then with Haydar Pasha, and all of the Karaman troops to his 
retinue. Ali Pasha refers to the letter of Haydar Pasha quoted above and repeats the ‘evil-intentions’ of the 
prince. He also points out that the prince freed two captives, who were captured from the qizilbash army 
and sent o him. At the end of his letter, Ali Pasha informs the sultan that he sent Haydar Pasha to Konya in 
order to inspect the situation of the prince more closely and he asks to the sultan how to behave regarding 
Şehinşah. (TSA, document, 6352. The facsimile copy of this document is published in TNSB, p. 228.)   
Indeed, Şehinşah’s link with the qizilbash movement was already established before the Şahkulu rebellion. 
Three letters from the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, Hayır Bey, clearly reveals his cooperation with Shah 
Ismail. In his letters Hayır Bey informs the Porte on the correspondence of the prince with Ismail and 
Ustaçlıoğlu Muhammed, one of the leading generals of Ismail and the governor of Diyarbakır. Learning 
from his letters, in 1510, Mamay Bey, the governor of Divriği, detained three messengers, one carrying a 
letter of Sahah Ismail, second carrying a letter of Ustaçlıoğlu Muhammed, and third carrying a letter of 
Prince Şehinşah. These three messengers were sent to Hayır Bey with their letters. Hayır Bey dispatched 
the messenger of the prince and three letters to the Porte through Prince Ahmed. (TSA, document E 5594. 
The facsimile copies of these letters are published in TNSB, p 240. See also TNSB, p. 239.) But Şehinşah 
left the political arena soon after. He died on July 2, 1511, in the same day that Ali Pasha was killed. See 
ULCY2, p. 123; KPZ8b, p. 55; ANMB, pp. 230-31; HSE4, p. 69; SLZ, p. 457. 
1343 “...Karaman cānibine doğrı inmişler ve çekilüb ‘Âsitān-ı Şāh-ı kerem’ diyū diyār-ı Rūm’a vusūl 
bulmuşlar.” ALI, p. 929. 
1344 TSA, document E. 2667, partly published in ULCY1, pp. 71-2, footnote 24. According to Uluçay’s 
interpretation of this document, which is a letter of Ahmed, Ali Pasha arrived Kızılkaya on Rebī 18, 917. 
This interpretation seems, however, not reasonable for two days later Şahkulu was in Alaşehir.   
1345 MNB, p. 431. 
1346 HSE4, p. 61; TNSB, p. 255; MNB, p. 431.   
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soldiers behind;1347 he chose 500 janissaries1348 and mounted them on horses. In 
addition, some cavalrymen from Karaman and Rum soldiers also joined him. Ali Pasha 
left Ahmed behind1349 and followed Şahkulu with these few soldiers.1350  
Şahkulu moved westward. But Ali Pasha managed to catch the rebels in Çubuk 
near Sivas.1351 Kemalpaşazāde states that the rebels were exhausted and were not 
inclined to fight with Ali Pasha. But realizing that the soldiers of Ali Pasha were fewer 
than the half of them they decided to fight. 1352 Furthermore, Ali Pasha did not wait to 
summon whole of his soldiers, but immediately assaulted Şahkulu on Rebī II 5, 917 
(July 2, 1511).1353 This improvidence, however, would cost him his life.1354 The battle 
                                                 
1347 His words as reformulated in Celalzāde’s Selimnāme shows how he underestimated and despised 
qizilbashes: “...Kendü emsāli mukārin ve musāhipleri ile ittifāk itdiler ki ardına düşdüğümüz düşmene ne 
i’tibār, bir bölük murdār cimrīler, Türkler, Kızılbaşlardur, kaçdılar. Hemān piyāde olan yeniçerilerden 
bir mikdārını atlandurup müfsīdleri kaçurmıyalum, deyü tedbir itdiler...” CLZ, p. 132. KPZ’s account 
sheds light to the psychology of Ali Pasha: “Haber geldi ki ol gümrāhlar Karaman cānibine hücūm idüb 
Haydar Paşa ile olan askerle mukābil olub, ol iki bin kişi tārumār olub, Haydar Paşa şehādet mertebesin 
bulur. Ali Paşa bu haberi işidicek şikārın aldırmış şāhin gibi serm-sār düşer, fi’l-hāl kapu halkından ve 
Yeniçeri tāifesinden ve sāir erbāb-ı timardan ılgara iktidarı olanı cem’ ider, mezkūrların ‘akablarınca 
kovub...” See KPZ8b, p. 54. 
1348 According to ALI 1.000 janissaries.  
1349 TSA, document E. 2667. Partly published in ULCY1, pp. 71-2, footnote, 24. According to a letter of 
Ahmed, he killed the rest of qizilbashes who took shelter on the mountains: “…badehu bu muhibleri 
Hisardağı demekle puhte ki suubetle meşhurdur ol bi-dinin bazı feceresi ana sığınmışlar imiş ve andan 
gayrı bir nice puhtelerin fethine birkaç gün tevakkuf edüb bi-inayetillahi teala hüdavendigar devletinde 
feth olunub cümle puhteler ve perakende dağlarda tutulan üç bin mikdarı kızılbaş melayin kılıçdan 
geçdikden sonra…” TSA, document E. 3062. ALI says, Ahmed returned to his province since he was 
disappointed with the disobedience of kuls (kapu halkı). See ALI, p. 929.   
1350 Prince Ahmed killed some qizilbashes left on Hisardağı and moved to Afyon with the rest of army. 
ULCY1, p. 72; TNSB, p. 255.   
1351 ULCY1, p. 72. KPZ mentions this place as Sarmısaklı while Idris-i Bitlisī, HSE, and MNB recount as 
Gökçay, and ALI as Sarmaşlık. See KPZ8b, p. 54; IDR, p. 88; HSE4, p. 61; ALI, p. 929; MNB, p.431. 
SLZ recites as Gökhan. See SLZ1, p. 453.  
1352 KPZ8b, p. 54. 
1353 ULCY1, p. 72. Consider also CLZ, pp. 133-4. 
1354 “...Milk-i Rūma düstūr-ı vakūr iken nā-dānlıkla birkaç meşhūr cimrinin elinde helāk, eyvān-ı felek-
āşiyān-ı Osmānīde Asaf-mekān iken, bilmezlikle birkaç bī-din ü bī-insāfların destinde pāymāl-ı kabza-i 
hāk oldı...” CLZ, p. 136. HSE depics the death of Ali Pasha in hands of qizilbashes in quite an ironic 
manner: 
“Yer yer Paşamız düşman ile idüb cengi, 
   Gör şehid oldı en sonunda Ali gibi. 
   Ali’nin dostlarıyız dirken ol lānetlikler, 
   Ali’yi öldürmeye bunca çaba itdiler. 
   Sevgiden dostluktan ururken bunca lafı, 
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ended with no victor. But the rebels managed to kill the highest bureaucrat of the 
Ottoman state.1355 The fate of Şahkulu is not clear. His death in the battlefield was 
rumored.1356 According to some hearsay, however, he was heavily wounded but not 
killed.1357 Kemalpaşazāde summarizes the situation: “Mezkūr paşa düşicek Şeytan Kulı 
didikleri müfsīd-pelīd cenk içinde nā-bedīd oldı, yer delindi yere mi girdi, göğe mü çıktı, 
kimse bilmedi.”1358      
 Most probably to shadow his passive participation in the suppression of the 
rebellion1359, Ahmed accuses, in his report to the Porte, Anatolian and Karaman sipāhis 
for the defeat.1360 Even so, his report includes a certain degree of truth regarding the 
Anatolian and Karaman soldiers. In his letter, Ahmed says that the end of Şahkulu was 
not clear: whether he was killed or had fled to the east. Then he asks the Porte: ‘Even if 
                                                                                                                                                
   Ali’ye çektiler kanlı kızıl nacağı. 
   Ali de küskün ol kötülük eyleyenden, 
   Soylu olan kaçar hilekārın övgüsünden” HSE4, pp. 62-3. Also see HR, p. 154.  
1355 TSA, document E. 3062. Also see ULCY1, p. 72; KPZ8b, p. 54;  
1356 According to HR, ALI and SLZ, he was killed in the battlefield. See HR, p. 155; ALI, p. 930; SLZ1, p. 
454. Also regard, Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, 4, 1959, p. 
58.  
1357 Certain Hacı Mustafa wrote after the battle, “…Amma aralarında reisleri olan Şahkulu halife dedikleri 
mülhide cenkde tüfenk dokundu öldü deyu mesāvi dahī varmış. Şimdiki hīnde Erzincan’a can attı gitti 
derler…” TSA, document E. 6664.  
1358 KPZ8b, p. 55. CLZ, HSE, and MNB repeat the same account. See CLZ, p. 137; HSE4, p. 63; MNB, p. 
431. Prince Ahmed’s letter is not clear on Şahkulu as well: “…imdi eğer ol Şeytankulu dedikleri lain 
düştüğü vaki ise hüvel matlub-ı ila cehennem ve bi’s’ el-mesir ve eğer düşmeyüb zir-u inhizam üzre şark 
tarafına çıkub gitdi, dahi gitmedüğü takdirce beher hal onun def’i ne ile olur…” TSA, document E. 3062.  
1359 For example, one of the contemporary sources depicts Ahmed’s position in a pejorative manner as 
follows: In this side, while Ali Pasha was fighting with qizilbashes, Prince Ahmed was waiting with the 
rest of army. His dream was that Ali Pasha would return victorious and they would prepare for taking over 
the throne. But his dreams bitterly collapsed when he heard that Ali Pasha deceased. See ANMB, pp. 229-
30.  
1360 Fisher, relying on the Italian sources, argues that many of Karamanian leaders participated in the 
rebellion from the beginning. Their incentives were more political, however, than religious beliefs. See 
FSH, p. 97. Nevertheless one should take this assertion with caution for none of Ottoman sources mention 
Karamanian leaders participation in the rebellion in any stages of it.   
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he was not killed and did not go to the East (Persia), with which soldiers would he be 
punished?’ Ahmed stresses that the soldiers of Anatolia were seriously deficient.1361 
Idris also states that some Karaman soldiers fought reluctantly.1362 Uzunçarşılı 
argues that Karaman soldiers had secretly reached agreement on leaving Ali Pasha 
already before the battle. During the fight they retreated.1363 ‘Āli’s account goes further. 
He argues that the rebels and Karaman soldiers in the Ottoman army had secretly 
communicated before the fight and agreed on not to fight each other. During the battle 
qizilbashes shouted: “Oh Karaman soldiers! What happened to our agreement with 
you?” Then they gave up the fight and left Ali Pasha face to face with qizilbash 
rebels.1364    
The rebels, choosing Halife Baba as their leader,1365 retreated to the fortress of 
Hafik, but followed by some Ottoman forces composed of janissaries and other armed 
                                                 
1361 “…Şeytankulu dedikleri lā’in düştüğü vāki ise hüvel matlūb-ı ilā cehennem ve bi’s’ el-mesīr ve eğer 
düşmeyüb zir u inhizām üzre şark tarafına çıkub gitdi, dahi gitmedüğü takdirce beher hal onun def’i ne ile 
olur? Anadolu askerinin hod hāli ne derece muhtel olduğu malumları olmuşdur. Zira ki Anadolunun 
kadīmleri vesāyir yararları gitdi yerlerine müsellem ve yaya reaya ve gayrı bī-hamiyyet kimesneler 
nasbolunub Anadolu askeri askerlikden gitmiştir deyu istima’ olunurdu, içlerine girmekle hakikat-ı hālleri 
müşāhade edildi…” TSA, document E. 3062. In his another letter to the Porte, Ahmed further accuses the 
Anatolian troops: “Đnhā olunur ki bu hāyinler zulümleri ile ibādullahı pāyimal ettikden sonra izzet-i 
saltanatı bi’l-külliye ref’ eylediler. Hemān hasma mukābil oldukları gibi yirmi otuz ādem düşmeden 
bunlar firar olmuş. Kangırı’dan ve Engürü’den bir ahada yara yetişmemişdir. Tamam malum oldu. Ve 
Rumdan bir kimseye ok düşmemiş. Heman Ali Paşa merhum ol kadar cenk etmiş ki bi had müddet-i 
medide cenkde üzerine dönüp varmamış. Eğer Ali Paşa üzerine beş yüz adem dönmüş olaydı hasmı aldıydı 
derler. Ve Sultan Alaeddinin cengin acep söylerler melāhide sancağı yıkmış ve bunun atına seğirtmişler ve 
yine at çekmişler. Ahar görmüşler ki alurlar kaçurmuşlar. Melāhide şehzade idüğünü sonra bilmişler. 
Ardınca haylı kovmuşlar. Elhamdülillah halas olmuş. Şunları koyub kaçmak Hüdavendigār’ı koyub 
kaçmak değil midir? Bu ne rüsvaylıkdır, nedir? Gayret-i din ve gayret-i saltanat yere depildi gitdi. Yerler 
ve gökler inlediler. Đbadullahın dādları arşdan geçdi. Bu melunlar neleri varsa vardılar ol melunlara 
verdiler, geldiler. Halkın her nesin bulurlarsa alıyorlar. Đş elden gitdi, dahi ne vakta değin uyurlar. 
Uyanası olmadı. Şu işleri eden türkdür ve birkaç beylerbeyi elinden ciğerleri hun olmuş kimselerdir.” See 
TSA, document E. 6352, recited in ULCY1, pp. 72-73, footnote, 26. Tansel published another document 
from TSA with the same number, but of totally different content. See TNSB, p. 228. I could not see the 
original document in TSA. But it is not unusual in this archive to classify two or more documents under 
same number.   
1362 IDRS, p. 88. 
1363 UZC2, p. 231.  
1364 ALI, p. 930.   
1365 HR, p. 155.  
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men recruited from among the local population.1366 Although arrow skirmish occurred 
occasionally, neither side dared to attack the other. The qizilbashes then moved to 
Erzincan.1367 A letter of Prince Ahmed’s to the Porte shows that Şahkulu forces had been 
moving in coordination with the qizilbashes of the eyālet-i Rum. Perhaps it was because 
of this co-operation that they moved toward Sivas from Kızılkaya. As Ahmed reported 
to the Porte, already before his confrontation with Ali Pasha, Şahkulu met with some 
qizilbashes led by Kürd Halid, Zeynel, and Şah Ali, who were among the leading 
Safavid khalifas active in eyālet-i Rum, and came to Suşehri. They attacked the 
surrounding villages. In the meantime some other qizilbashes gathered in Geldigelen of 
Amasya, who immediately moved to join Şahkulu. But when they arrived in Suşehri, 
Şahkulu had already set off to Erzincan. Kürd Halid then returned to his hometown, 
while Zeynel stayed in Erzincan and Şah Ali went to Kelkit.1368   
The ultimate destination of qizilbash rebels was the realm of the shah. On their 
way they attacked a caravan coming from Persia and killed many people.1369 Among 
them was a famous religious scholar Ibrahim Shebisterī, who was the author of Enbiyā-
nāme, and his son.1370 At the end they arrived in Tabriz. Ismail was in Iraq when he 
heard that the rebels were coming to his country.1371 He immediately set out for Tabriz 
                                                 
1366 TSA, document E. 6664.  
1367 HR, p. 155; ULCY1, p. 73. 
1368 TSA, document E. 3062. 
1369 HR, p. 155. 
1370 IDRS, p. 88. HSE recites this event in most dramatic manner. He says, on realizing that the looters 
would kill his son, Shaykh Ibrahim Şebisteri requested from robbers to kill him before his son. But the 
‘heartless’ robbers killed his son in front of the shaykh, and then ‘martyred’ the shaykh. See HSE4, p. 65. 
Also consider SLZ1, p. 455; MNB, p. 431.         
1371 IDRS, p. 88. HR says, however, that during that time Shah Ismail had returned from Khorasan, from 
the campaign on Shaybānī Khan, and stationed in Şehriyar, a town close to Ray.  
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and arrived there before the Anatolian qizilbashes.1372 He dispersed new comers to 
several troops, and then summoned the leaders of the rebellion.1373 
After a cruel interrogation surprisingly the shah executed some leaders of the 
rebellion.1374 Hoca Saadeddin gives details of the interrogation of the Shah and his 
execution of the leaders of the rebellion. He states that the Shah first dispersed the 
Anatolian qizilbashes to different troops of his army, and then ordered to prepare for a 
feast. Two great caldrons were filled with water and placed on a fire. The guests thought 
they were boiling water to cook a meal, but did not know that these caldrons would 
become the hell of the leader of the rebels and his assistant.1375   
Ismail’s attitude towards the rebels, as reported by Hoca Saadeddin, was quite 
unexpected and is not easy to interpret. Especially the punishment superimposed on 
these Safavid disciples was not something anticipated by the rebels. If we rely on Hoca 
Saadeddin, Ismail called the leader of the rebellious group and his assistants (vezirs) to 
his presence; his first question was that “Under the protection of my father Sultan 
Bayezid, you were living with your families and children in peace. So what was the 
reason why you became disobedient and revolted?”1376 They replied, “Since he got 
older, the disease of his body has caused the disorder of the country. He relinquished 
from measures that would restore the order, and left state issues to his viziers. 
Consequently oppression spread. We could no more stand their unjust practices and rose 
                                                 
1372 SLZ states that when Ismail learned in Iraq that such a crowded group was coming to his country his 
troops were dispersed. Because of that he feared for they could cause turmoil in his country. He hurried to 
gather soldiers and arrive in Tabriz before new-coming qizilbashes. See SLZ1, p. 454.  
1373 IDRS, p. 88.  
1374 HR, p. 155.  
1375 HSE4, p. 66. Also regard SLZ1, p. 455. 
1376 “Babam Sultan Bayezid Han hazretlerinin koruyucu gölgesinde bunca zamandan berü çoluk ve 
çocuğunuzla ferahlık içinde yaşarken neden gerekdi ki boynunu bağlılık lālesinden çıkarub ayaklanma 
doruğuna tırmandın?” HSE4, pp. 66-7.  
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up. On the other hand, it was our sincere desire to put our faces on the Porte of the Shah 
and see his beautiful presence. We thought that it would be an appreciated service to be 
a slave at the Porte of the Shah. Thus we left our country and came.” Then the Shah said, 
“Why was it necessary to put the country in the fire?” The leader of the rebels answered 
this question as follows: “We dared to loot and plunder because we wanted to get 
revenge of the oppressions to which we had been exposed and to add more men to the 
rebellion.” The Shah said, “This answer is not acceptable. You say you love us! While 
you know that the relationship between Sultan Bayezid and I is just like the relationship 
of a father and a son, did you not realize that your movement would damage our 
relationship with the Ottoman Sultan?  How did you especially dare to plunder our 
caravan? Plundering caravans is the job of robbers. What you did is not compatible with 
what you say, and falsifies your words.” Then he could not find anything to say. Ismail 
continued, “And with which sultan’s permission did you put this hat on your head?” He 
replied, “It is the sign of gazā!” The Shah said, “It is up to the permission of sultans to 
put on such hats. Moreover, when did you become gāzi? Is it gazā to spill the blood of 
Muslims?” On concluding the conversation with this severe reproof, by a sign of the 
Shah the leader of the rebels and his vizier were put into the boiling caldrons. Other begs 
of rebellious group were also put to death.1377  
Hoca Saadeddin mentions an interesting event in this context. On disapproving 
of the leader of rebel’s vestry, gāzi hat (otaga) Ismail turned toward one of his leading 
commanders Dev Sultan and said, ‘You can take this otaga if you like!’ Dev Sultan put 
                                                 
1377 HSE, pp. 66-8. The conversation between the Shah and leaders of the rebels is cited also by SLZ. But 
his account is nothing but a replication of HSE’s account. See pp. 455-7.   
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the otaga on and prostrated ‘according to their falsified rite.’1378 Then the Shah checked 
over the rest of the group. He selected those whom he found useful and let the rest free, 
confiscating their properties and horses. Hoca Saadeddin points out with pleasure that 
they ended up in the streets with their women and children and became beggars. In this 
way they found the sentence of their evil action.1379                       
Hoca Saadeddin’s account1380 on the end of rebels is not easy to interpret. 
Especially Shah Ismail’s attitude towards the rebellious qizilbashes of the Teke region 
seems to be odd for many devoted qizilbash fighters in his army were from the same 
region.1381 Hasan Rumlu explains this ‘unexpected’ action of the shah as a punishment 
for killing the tradesmen.1382 According to Hammer, two concerns led Ismail to punish 
the leaders of rebellion. First of all, he wanted to consolidate his absolute suzerainty 
over his subjects by showing cruelty against disobedience. Secondly, he wanted to show 
Bayezid II that he desired to maintain warm relations with him.1383 However, Hammer’s 
reasoning seems neither satisfactory nor consistent. Before all, he contradicts himself. 
He writes that Ismail dispatched an envoy just after punishing the rebels and presented 
his good wishes; however, the same envoy presented itself to Bayezid, the head of 
Shaybānī Khan. Indeed, Hammer, as he often does, makes mistake in dating the events. 
As Fisher determines, Ismail’s envoy arrived at the Porte on May 30, 1511,1384 more 
                                                 
1378 HSE4, p. 67. The same scene is cited by SLZ. See SLZ1, 457.  
1379 For the whole of the conversation in Turkish see HSE4, pp. 66-8. I omitted to quote the original 
version of the conversation since it would occupy much space.   
1380 Thought not giving details Hasan Rumlu verifies the tragic end of the leaders of this rebellion. See 
HR, p. 155.  
1381 They are referred in contemporary sources as Tekelü, literally means the man comes from the region 
of Teke. Tekelü was a tribal entity within the qizilbash army of Shah Ismail and played effective role in 
power-play during the early years of Tahmasb, who was a child then.  
1382 HR, p. 155.  
1383 HAM2, pp. 383-4.  
1384 FSH, p. 99.  
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than one month earlier than the rebels arrived in Tābriz. Thus it is not possible as 
Hammer argues, that this envoy, which carried Shaybānī Khan’s head, could possibly 
inform Bayezid on Ismail’s punishment of the rebels for it had not taken place yet. 
Furthermore, putting aside this chronological mistake, his argumentation lacks internal 
consistency. Because, as Hammer points out, what Ismail did was nothing more than 
challenge the Ottoman Sultan for Shaybānī Khan was a sunni ruler.1385 ‘Āli clearly 
explains this point. He records that Ismail sent the head of Shaybānī Khan with the 
message that ‘the present from the mature son to the blissful father’.1386 ‘Āli interprets 
Ismail’s message as the intention of the enmity of opposition by invoking the chain of 
love.1387      
Fisher also comes out with similar reasoning. He puts forward two possible 
reasons: Ismail condemned and executed the rebels because 1) they robbed his 
caravan1388, 2) he (Ismail) wanted to show that he had not directly sponsored the 
rebellion and to avoid any complicity or doubt in the matter.1389 Fisher’s account, 
however, is no less ambiguous. Although he presents the second reason as more 
probable than the first, just in the following sentence he says, “Evidence for the latter 
assumption is not wanting.”1390 Then he recounts the envoy of the Shah, which brought 
the head of Shaybānī Khan to the Porte.   
                                                 
1385 HAM2, p. 384. 
1386 ALI, p. 935. 
1387 “...Şeybek Hānla savaşub başın kesdi. ‘Veled-i reşidin vālid-i sa’īde armağanıdır’ diyū Sultan Bayezid 
cenābına (cānibine?) gönderdi. Ya’ni silsile-i muhabbeti tahrīk sūretinde simā’-ı ‘udvān-ı muhālefeti 
ziyāde kasdin eyledi...” ALI, p. 935.   
1388 This argument was recently re-echoed by Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, who underlined that the 
prosperity of Safavid empire was intimately depended on the international trade; thus Shah Ismail was 
eager to guarantee the safety of trade roads. See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les ottomans les 
safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, p. 27.  
1389 FSH, p. 99. 
1390 FSH, p. 99. 
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As for the first one, one may attribute certain credibility to such an explanation. 
But it needs to be further clarified. The most reasonable explanation of Ismail’s reaction 
turns out to be the punishment of disobedience. But the question is still to be clarified: 
whose and what sort of disobedience did Ismail punish? And why did he need to turn 
this punishment into a show?  
It is certain from archival evidence and contemporary sources, as evaluated 
above, that Şahkulu started his movement as a khalifa of Ismail and in communication 
with him.1391 To give an example, an official inspector, while reporting his observations 
on early movement of rebels, wrote to the Porte that the rebels were propagating among 
people that the Shah himself would come in early summer (zerdalu vaktinde), the 
country is ours.1392 As is already determined the rebellion started in early April. So it 
seems likely that during the early days of the rebellion, Şahkulu preached among his 
adherents the idea that the Shah would also come to the country of Rum and meet them.  
Đshak Çeşebi records that after defeating Korkud’s army in Alaşehir on May 3, 
1511 Şahkulu said to his comrades, “We now grasped the suzerainty over the Province 
of Anatolia!”1393 As already delineated he assigned governors to captured cities. 
Ottoman historians congruently underline that Şahkulu behaved like a ruler. According 
to Tekindağ, the ultimate aim of Şahkulu was to establish a state in the name of the Shah 
in Anatolia.1394   
                                                 
1391 As careful reader would immediately grasp, in terms of archival evidence the certitude of second 
assertion is far less than the first. In the meantime, it is natural consequence of the first argument.  
1392 TSA, document E. 6187. 
1393 “Anadolu Vilāyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük.” See Đshak Çelebi, Selim-nāme, Đstanbul Üniversitesi 
Kütüphanesi, no. 2614, f. 12b. Recited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli Đsyanı”, Belgelerle Türk Tarihi 
Dergisi, 4, 1959, p. 55.  
1394 Tekindağ, p. 54.  
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Even so, it is of no less a probability that in later stages of rebellion he might 
have seized the dream of independent suzerainty, or at least he moved independently 
from the shah. One feels legitimate in asking the following questions: what was the 
ultimate aim of Şahkulu? Was it well-determined from the beginning, or changed 
according to the course of events? A close study of contemporary sources leads us to 
pursue a second way of perception. Before all, the itinerary of Şahkulu and Ismail’s 
treatment of the rebels include clues about changing goals and incentives of Şahkulu. It 
seems likely that he initiated the rebellion in the name of the Shah with purely religious 
incentives. But parallel to the accumulation of sipāhis and gaining successive victories, 
he began to think his own suzerainty. As already delineated the military campaigns of 
Şahkulu were mainly led by dismissed sipāhis, who were less affiliated to, if not totally 
uninterested in, the qizilbash cause, but among the foremost advisers – especially in 
military and political affairs - of him.   
If his aim would be to support the Shah, Şahkulu must have proceeded eastward 
or toward the qizilbash regions, at least after the battle of Kütahya. But he moved toward 
the center of the empire. He turned toward the qizilbash zones and Persia only when he 
totally lost his hope to capture the country. According to ‘Āli, when Ali Pasha besieged 
them in Kızılkaya, qizilbashes fled from the Karaman side and moved toward the 
province of Rūm because they wanted to pass the realm of the Shah.1395 It seems that 
Şahkulu fell under the influence of the sipāhis in his ranks soon after the outbreak of the 
rebellion. Under their influence, he tended to pursue the idea of suzerainty on his own 
turn and behaved independently from the Shah. The victory over Karagöz Pasha outside 
                                                 
1395 “...Karaman cānibine doğrı inmişler ve çekilüb ‘Âsitān-ı Şāh-ı kerem’ diyū diyār-ı Rūm’a vusūl 
bulmuşlar.” ALI, p. 929. 
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Kütahya seems to be the turning point in the political aspirations of Şahkulu. As referred 
to in this study already, Ottoman reporters and historians need to indicate that after 
capturing Karagöz Pasha, Şahkulu decided to execute him according to the suggestions 
of the sipāhis of Teke.1396 Defeating the Anatolian beylerbey of the Ottoman Empire, 
Şahkulu strongly believed in gaining the control of the whole of western Anatolia for 
himself. Indeed, immediately after this victory his attack on Prince Korkud’s province 
and then his march on Bursa reflect Şahkulu’s big aspiration. Thus, it must have been 
exactly this independent movement (from the Shah) that Ismail severely punished.1397    
 
6.4.  CONCLUSION 
Idris-i Bitlisī records that from the emergence of the rebellion to Ali Pasha’s death 
50.000 people were killed from both sides, thousands of houses were plundered and 
many people were enslaved.1398 The rebellious qizilbashes successively defeated a 
number of Ottoman armies, one of which was commanded by the beylerbey of Anatolia 
and the other by the grand vizier. The Şahkulu rebellion deeply weakened the authority 
of the Ottoman government in Anatolia. It also caused serious mass deportation. Apart 
from the killed people, those who managed to flee from the sword of rebels took shelter 
in the mountainous regions; they abandoned their fields, vineyards, gardens, and even 
their homes. Accordingly agricultural production lessened seriously. As a result, the 
rebellion severely damaged the economy of the Ottoman Empire.1399  
                                                 
1396 See, for example, TSA, document E 5035. 
1397 In the meantime, one should not disregard that the reliability of HSE’s account is at stake. It would not 
be wrong to suppose that he exaggerated the treatment of Ismail against the rebels, because of well-known 
reasons. Even so, Ismail’s discontent attitude toward the adherents of Şahkulu rebellion can not be denied.  
1398 IDRS, p. 89.  
1399 Compare ULCY1, pp. 73-74. 
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Arguably more significant than its damage on economy, the Şahkulu rebellion 
created deep cracks in the social structure of the empire. I have already evaluated that, 
starting with the activities of Shaykh Junayd in the mid-fifteenth century, a large group 
of Safavid followers, principally from nomadic tribes, emerged in Anatolia. In the 
course of time, we can observe a two-fold process regarding this social segment of 
Ottoman Anatolia: on one hand their number increased through gaining new recruits, 
and on the other hand, the religious doctrine and practices that they followed was 
developed further. By the first decade of the sixteenth century, the new synthesis of the 
Safavid Order, which can be called ‘qizilbash way of Islamic mysticism’, for its most 
essential parts, had already appeared. Thus the adherents of this ‘path’, or the original 
word in Turkish ‘yol’, already formed an identifiable relio-social entity. The socio-
cultural background of this group was constituted mostly by Turkoman nomadic tribal 
element, who had already been alienated from the Ottoman regime. By the Şahkulu 
revolt, however, the qizilbash society of Anatolia, which was still congealing its 
religious-political identity, was not only alienated from the Ottoman state agents but also 
from the sunni population of Anatolia as well.  
The outcomes of this rebellion in both domestic and international politics were 
decisive. In the domestic affairs, before all, Ahmed lost his most valuable and influential 
supporter: the grand vizier Ali Pasha. This rebellion’s consequence in the domestic 
politics was quite paradoxical. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that the Şahkulu 
rebellion facilitated greatly Selim’s capture of the throne. A passage in Künhü’l-Ahbār, 
even if it was later fabrication, reveals how Selim used Ahmed’s passive stand against 
Shahkulu to legitimize his dynastic claims. ‘Āli states that Selim defeated his brother 
Ahmed and captured him. Ahmed beseeched Selim, “Oh my sultan! Do not kill me! 
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Show me a small corner of hospice so that I will live there.” Selim’s answer clearly 
reflects how Şahkulu’s defeat diminished the prestige of Ahmed and ended his chance 
for the throne: “You were a respected prince with uncountable soldiers in your retinue. 
Some unbelievers rose up nearby your province. They executed the beylerbey of your 
father. If your eye of fortune was open you would have handled this problem; you would 
have punished them without needing the troops from the side of your father.1400 
Otherwise, I would not feel any reluctance because of your useless body!”1401    
Consequently, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the great upheaval of 
qizilbashes paradoxically presented the throne to Selim, who established his policy on 
qizilbash enmity1402, on a silver tray. His passive attitude during the rebellion made 
Prince Ahmed completely lose the military elite, especially Janissaries.1403 As will be 
delineated, Selim owes his saltanat mainly to Janissaries. It is known that janissaries had 
always been inclined to Selim’s favor for he was more dynamic and warlike. But in the 
absence of such an excuse – the defeat against the qizilbashes – one might think that 
they would hardly dare to repel Ahmed, who was invited by the legitimate sultan, 
                                                 
1400 This sort of narration was evidently part of the legitimization efforts of Ottoman scholars. I would like 
to remind that Selim was in quarrel with his father, even fought with his army, while Ali Pasha was 
handling with the rebellion. Therefore, Selim’s accusation of Ahmed, even if it occurred, was not 
convincing.    
1401 ALI, p. 931. Elsewhere ALI reports Selim’s reply to the request of Ahmed as follows: “... [Your 
punishment’s] bā’isi budur ki, sen taht-ı Yunan’da [Rum] sākin şehzāde ve asākir-i bī-girānla her ān alāt-
ı har u rezme hāzır ve amāde iken Şeytan Kulı nām Hāricī gelüb karībinden geçe ve memālik-i 
mahrūseden Kütahiyye’ye girüb padişah-ı ‘asrın bir beğlerbeğisini katl ide ve niçe müslümanları nehb ü 
gāret ve katlile hasāret idüb sālimin ü gānimin Kızılbaş’a toğrı çekile gide, sen āna karşu varmayasın ve 
havza-i hükūmeti ol makūle Hārici zararından kurtarmayasın, mücerred ‘iş u nūşinde olub, alem haraba 
varduğundan ığmaz-ı ‘ayn idesin. Pes ne vechile şehzāde-i sezā ve husūsā serīr-i saltanata revā olabilür 
misin? Pençe-i siyāsetden rehā buldığın takdirce bunca nüfus-ı bī-günāh zāyi’ olmağla begne’n-nās bizi 
dahī hicāba düşürürsin. Đmdi evlā olan budur ki, hakkından geline ve safha-i rūzgārdan vücūdın pençesi 
hakk oluna!” Âli says he heard this story from Celal-zāde Mustafa. But Celal-zāde does not include this 
passage in his own history. See ALI, pp. 1069-70. 
1402 As the next chapter will delineate, Selim not only represented the absolute qizilbash enmity, but, 
perhaps more importantly, also gained support of the institutions of the Ottoman imperial regime against 
Ahmed’s tribal allies.  
1403 Compare ULCY1, p. 74. 
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Bayezid II to openly to work in favor of Selim, even at the cost of opposing their 
legitimate padişah. The next chapter will further expand this issue.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
THE QIZILBASH FACTOR IN THE OTTOMAN DOMESTIC 
POLITICS: STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE AND THE TOOLS OF 
LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
7.1. QIZILBASH ENMITY AND GAZĀ: THE CAREER OF PRINCE SELIM 
UNTIL ASCENDING THE THRONE 
 
During the last years of Bayezid II only four of his eight sons1404, namely Şehinşah, 
Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim were alive.1405 Selim, who was the youngest of all, was born 
in 875 / 1470-1 in Amasya from Prince Bayezid and Ayshe, the daughter of the Dulkadir 
ruler Alauddevle.1406 He was appointed to the governorship of Trabzon in either 1482 or 
1487.1407 By 1509, when Bayezid II got so ill and old that he could neither lead the army 
                                                 
1404 These were Abdullah, Şehinşāh, Alemşāh, Ahmed, Korkud, Selim, Mehmed, and Mahmud. See 
UZC2, p. 234. 
1405 ULCY1, p. 57. Stanford Shaw, however, argues that Alemshah was also alive and died in 1512. See 
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gāzis: The Rise and 
Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808, Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 79.  
1406 Halil Đnalcık, “Selim I”, EI2; Şinasi Altundağ, “Selim I”, IA, p. 423.  
1407 ULCY1, p. 74. 
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nor govern the empire efficiently, fierce struggles among the princes for the throne 
broke out. As Đnalcık points out, although respected as an intellectual, versed in Islamic 
law and the fine arts, Korkud, the governor of Saruhan, was thought to be less apt for the 
throne.1408 The strongest candidate was evidently Prince Ahmed, who was governing the 
Province of Amasya at that time and is described in Ottoman sources as generous and 
just but also easy-going, fond of having fun, and lacking any sense of monarchical 
responsibility. Ahmed’s succession was supported by many major statesmen, including 
the grand vizier Ali Pasha, and ulemā.1409 For some reasons, Prince Şehinşah, who was 
the governor of Karaman and would die without witnessing the end of this struggle, did 
not take part in this conflict. As the youngest of four princes, Selim, at the beginning he 
was not only the least favored by men of state but also geographically in the most 
unfavorable situation for he was the governor of Trabzon, the most distant province to 
the capital city among those governed by princes. Nevertheless, his well-designed, 
coherent, and determined policy led him to the throne. Ottoman court historians agree 
that he embodied all the qualities of an ideal ruler: justice, generosity, self-
determination, war-like valor, broad wisdom, and zealous devotion to Islam.1410  At the 
end, he not only disqualified his opponent brothers but also forced his father to abdicate 
for the first and only time in Ottoman history.  
                                                 
1408 Đnalcık, “Selim I”; ULCY1, pp. 57-58.  
1409 See Đnalcık, “Selim I”; Altundağ, “Selim I”, p. 423; ULCY1, p. 57.  
1410 For an analysis of CLZ’s description of Selim, for example, see Celia J. Kerslake, “The Selim-name of 
Celal-zāde Mustafa Çelebi as a Historical Source”, Turcica, IX/2-X, Paris, 1970, pp. 45-6. As Kerslake 
indicates, CLZ regard Selim as the only prince embodied all qualities of the ideal ruler and as predestined 
by God to restore the rule of the true religion in the Empire. The itinerary which Selim followed from 
Trabzon to Istanbul was, according to CLZ, a Divinely-ordained path which would lead him to the 
saltanat. ALI also deems him as supported by God (müeyyed min ‘indallāh). See ALI, p. 1052. Ottoman 
historians describe Selim as a courageous, awe-inspiring, and wrathful man who liked ‘ilm and ‘ālim.  He 
had a special interest and talent in poetry (in both Persian and Turkish) and history. For the character and 
appearance of Selim, see ALI, p. 1057; SLZ2, p. 1; MNB, p. 451. 
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Although one might partially attribute this success to the disposition and personal 
skills of Selim, real basis of this astonishing success must be sought in the strategy 
constructed and - without any deviation - successfully applied by Selim and his close 
men. His policy was constructed on two principal pillars, which would not only leave its 
mark on the whole of his reign, but also adjust the ideological stand of the Empire 
forever. First of all, Selim declared himself as the champion of the fight against religious 
‘heresy’ led by Shah Ismail. Secondly, he pursued quite an aggressive policy and 
presented himself as the patron of gāzis and fighters. As will be delineated in the rest of 
this section, this twofold but closely related policy provided Selim the support of 
fighting elements in the Empire, which was most decisive on the advance of events.   
 
7.1.1. Early Years in Trabzon  
Ottoman chronicles congruently underscore a distinctive feature of Prince Selim 
differing from his brothers in a way that he played a part in gazā against infidels and 
heretics in the Province of Trabzon.1411 Kemalpaşazāde, for example, records that upon 
the emergence (mi’rāc-i ‘urūca hurūc) of Ismail in 905/1499 in Iranian lands the 
strongest and the most effective reaction came from Prince Selim. His court became the 
shelter of former Akkoyunlu begs who hardly escaped from the qizilbash army of 
Ismail.  
Mezkūr şehriyār-ı kāmkār (Selim) ki, ... serhadd-ı Gürcistan’da sedd-i 
Đslam olub dururdı, asār-ı mehābetiyle o diyar tolupdururdı. Dergāh-ı 
āsümān iştibāhı kızılbaş elinden kaçub halās bulan Türkmān serdarlarına 
penāh oldı. ... ol diyārun serdarları asitān-ı āsumān-mekānında baş 
urdılar. Ol kişverün serverleri hizmet kemerin bağlanub kapusında 
turdılar. Bayındır beylerinden Ferahşād Beg ve Mansūr Beg, dahi onlarun 
nazīri bir nice emirler rikāb-ı kām-yābında mülāzim olub yürürlerdi. Ol 
                                                 
1411 ANMB, p. 160. 
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māh gibi felek-i rif’atda iken nāgāh cāh-ı feleke düşen a’yān dergāh-ı 
āsümān-iştibāhında gene ‘izzet-ü cāh bulup tururlardı. Bāb-ı sa’ādet-
me’ābı merci’-i erbāb-ı tabl u ‘alem oldı. Dīvān-ı keyvān-mekānı 
mecma’-ı eshāb-ı tīğ u kalem oldı. Ordu-yı hümāyūnına, ki serçeşme-i 
cūy-ı zaferdi, her boydan şehirden ve köyden hayl ü haşem seyl gibi akdı. 
Kahr-ı ateşiyle dehr serkeşlerini yakdı ve kulub-ı a’dā-yı bed-rāye bīm ü 
be’s ve havf  ü hirās bırakdı. Seylāb-ı tūfān-bārān-ı hadengi kūhistān-ı 
Gürcistan’ı garka virdi. Havā-yı gazāyı pür-tāb iden bārika-i bark-ı tīğ-ı 
mīğ-rengi şarka irdi.1412   
 
Kemalpaşazāde states that all these events occurred in the same year that 
Mihaloğlı Ali Beg died, which is recorded by him as 905/1499. Thus, if we rely on 
Kemalpaşazāde, Selim closely observed the developments in Iran and responded 
effectively just after or concurrently to Ismail’s coming to the power.1413  Some archival 
evidence confirms this fact. In evāhir-i Zilkāde 906 (8-17 June 1501) an imperial decree 
was sent to Selim. In this decree, after appreciating his endeavor for informing the 
central government on the developments pertaining to sufis of Ardabil and Shirvan, 
Selim was ordered to assign skilful spies in order to collect further true and trusty 
information regarding to the activities of sufis; and he was ordered to report all the news 
to the central government.1414 
What Selim did was not only protecting former Akkoyunlu begs but also 
pursuing an offensive policy as well. With the help of newly joined begs he attacked 
former Akkoyunlu lands which was then under Ismail’s rule. Kemalpaşazāde states that 
he seized some of these fortresses adjacent to Ottoman Province of Trabzon through 
                                                 
1412 KPZ8a, pp. 232-3.  
1413 KPZ8a, p. 233. We know that KPZ was, like other contemporary Ottoman historians, took pro-Selim 
stand and designed his Selimnāme mostly to legitimize Selim’s unusual practices. Thus he does not 
hesitate to disguise and distort historical facts. Even so, it is safer to use his above-mentioned account for 
he wrote eight defter of his Tevārih during the reign of Bayezid II. See KPZ8a, p. XXIX; KPZ10, p. 
XXIII. 
1414 See document 4 in Appendix I.  
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diplomacy and some other with coercion. Selim annexed Đspiri, Kükezi, Bayburd, and 
Kemâh.  
Şāh Đsma’īl hurūc idüb taht-gāh-ı Azerbaycan’ı alıcak hānümān-ı evlād-ı Hasan 
Hān nār-ı kahr ü bī-dādı salıcak, leşker-i cerrārla Trabuzan’dan çıkub civarında 
olan kişver-i Türkmān’ı zabt itdi. Hisarlarınun ba’zın sulhla ve ba’zın harble alub 
ol diyārı kendü mülkine rabt itdi. Đspiri ve Kükezi (ki) ol kenarlarda ma’ruf ve 
hasānet ü menā’atle mevsūf kal’alardur aldı. Đçlerine hisar erleri koydı. Sonra 
Bayburdı ve Kemāhı dahī teshīr itdi. Ol diyarda kadīmü’z-zamandan yurd ıssı 
olan ‘azīmü’ş-şān emirler bir bir geldi uydı. Nūr-ı ‘adl ü dādla mezkūr bilād-ı 
ma’mūreden zulmet-i deycūr-ı şerr ü şūrrı ref’ itdi.1415 
 
7.1.2. First Confrontation with Ismail: Assault on Erzincan, 1503 
After capturing Tabriz, Ismail dispatched an army to Erzincan and seized the city.1416 
Although Erzincan was not within the borders of Ottoman Empire, such an attempt of 
the young shah attracted the anger of Prince Selim. According to Kemalpaşazāde, Selim 
waged several campaigns on Erzincan in order to repel Ismail’s forces from the 
region.1417 The available sources determine at least two of his campaigns. How Selim 
first decided to attack Erzincan is vividly described in Yusuf’s Selimnāme.1418 Yusuf 
recounts, once upon a time when Selim was eating and drinking with his viziers and 
generals1419 he called their attention and said:  
Ey hayr-u hāh lalalarım ve hevādār kullarım! Đş bu şehr-i Erzincan musībeti 
yādıma gelüb ve az müddette kaç kaç kimesne tasarrufuna girdi, ona taaccüb 
iderim. Evvelā ol şehri mazlum ceddim Yıldırım Hān merhum zamanında dāhil-i 
Rūm olup ba’dehū Zu’l-kadr diyārına mersum oldı. Ve şimdi diyār-ı Acem’in 
vāli-i şumu’l-hāli olan Đsmail-i pür-tadlilin meredd-i mülāhadesi tasarrufunda 
mahkūm olduğuna taaccüp edip, ceddim şehri elden ele gezdiğine tahassür 
                                                 
1415 KPZ8a, p. 232. 
1416 KPZ8a, p. 259. 
1417 KPZ8b, p. 29.  
1418 This is the prose version of the Selimnāme of Şükrī-i Bitlisī, who was contemporary of the events. As 
indicated at the beginning of the manuscript, Şükrī’s work was re-written in prose form by Çerkesler 
Kātibi Yusuf in 1030/1620-1. See YSF, pp. 22-23. 
1419 “Bir karde-i şehinşāhı esbāb-ı meclis araya gelüb şerap, kebāb, saz-söz ve ni’māt-ı dilfurūz hengāmı 
arayı dutdı.” YSF, p. 25. 
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çekerim. Đmdi ma’lūmunuz ola ki ol diyārı mağsūb ve şehr-i mazlūmu düşman 
elinden istihlās etmeğe azimet ettim.1420  
 
From that day on, Selim started the preparation of an army to rescue Erzincan. In 
five to ten days an army was composed and moved immediately. They suddenly 
attacked Erzincan. Since this attack was not expected by qizilbash troops guarding the 
city, Selim’s forces easily captured the city.1421 Kemalpaşazāde reports that Selim 
defeated qizilbash forces in front of the city and freed Erzincan from qizilbash trouble 
for the time being.1422 He assigned one of his men as the governor of the city and 
returned to Trabzon.1423 Our sources do not give the date of this assault, but the flow of 
events suggests that it must have occurred between 1502 and 1505.1424 We know that 
Ismail’s ambassador, who arrived at the Porte in the summer of 1505, protested against 
warlike actions of Selim on the frontier of Trabzon.1425 What the ambassador 
complained about during this visit must have been Selim’s first assault on Erzincan and 
his raids around.   
 
 
                                                 
1420 YSF, p. 25. 
1421 YSF, p. 25. 
1422 “Mezkūr hasm-ı meksūr (Ismail) diyār-ı Azerbāycana irdükden sonra, başın gözin dirdükden ve 
dāru’l-mulk-i Tebrīze girdükden sonra zimām-ı ihtimāmı Erzincan tarafına döndürdi. Ümerā-yı bed-
rāyinün birini ol cānibe gönderdi. Hademi ve haşemi ile geldi ol arada oturdı, emn ü emānı şehirden ve 
yüresindeki karadan götürdi. Ol diyārın tağı ve taşı Kızılbaşla lālezār oldı. Şehzāde-i kişver-penāh Sultan 
Selim Şāh haber-dār oldı. Peleng-i āteş-aheng-i hışm-kīn gibi dürüldi ve büküldi, haşem-i pür hışm ü kīni 
derya gibi cūş idüb taşdı döküldi... Seylāb-ı pür-şitāb ve sehāb-ı āteş-tāb gibi hayl-i cerrārla darü’l-mülk-i 
Trabuzundan çıkub, şemşīr-i cihān-gīrle bark-vār geldi ol diyāra girdi....[after a fierce fight] (qizilbashes) 
tahammül eylemeyüb nücūm gibi tārumār olub gittiler. Ol tünd-huyların yolları üzerinde köpri vardı, anı 
geçe tururken hayl-i seyl-pūyla ‘ādū-yı kine-cūy ardlarından irdi, boğazların dirdi, ördek ve kaz sürüsüne 
şehbāz-ı tīz-pervāz girür gibi girdi, mevc-i tīğ-i mīğ-gūnle zavrak-ı vücūdların garka virdi. Đrden sebük-
bār olub kaçabilen kaçdı kurtuldı. Bāki bed-kirdārlarun kimi ele girib tutuldı, kimi öldü. Şehzāde-i kāmkār 
ol diyārı hār u hāsākdan tekrār pāk idüb, gamām-ı intikāmdan yağan kan bārāni-yle  sahn-i hāki nem-nāk 
idüb, sālim ü gānim döndi gitdi, gelüp makamına ārām itdi. KPZ8a, pp. 259-60. See also HSE4, p. 6.  
1423 YSF, p. 25. Also consider TNSB, p. 265.  
1424 Following Selim’s invasion of Erzincan, KPZ narrates the death of Prince Mahmud. 
KPZ, pp. 260-61. 
1425 FSH, p. 94.  
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7.1.3. Second Confrontation: Assault on Erzincan, 1507-8 
Upon hearing the capture of Erzincan by Selim, Ismail’s anger was stirred up. He 
immediately summoned an army of 12.000 men whose command was assigned to one of 
his chief disciples. Yusuf’s assessment regarding the assignment of a disciple to the 
command of this army is worthy to underscore. He says, ‘Ismail assigned one of his 
disciples to the command of his army, for it was a tradition of the Qizilbash.’1426 Fisher, 
relying on Italian sources, also briefly mentions Ismail’s campaign. He says that after 
Selim had taken the region of Erzincan, Ismail gathered an army. But Bayezid II 
intervened in affairs to settle the disagreement. He sent an envoy to Persia with valuable 
presents and the difficulty was settled.1427 According to Fisher, all these happened in 
1510. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, however, this date does not 
seem right. On the other hand, as Ottoman sources indicate, the disagreement between 
Ismail and Selim was not settled, and indeed would never be settled.     
Tansel argues on the authority of Gelibolulu ‘Ali that Ismail aimed to pillage 
around Trabzon with this army.1428 According to ‘Ali, Ismail sent 3.000 men to pillage 
the province of Trabzon, which was being governed by Selim. Upon hearing Ismail’s 
approaching forces, Selim alarmed his army. At the end of the battle, Selim’s soldiers 
                                                 
1426 “Đş bu dehşetlü haber Ardabiloğlu Şah Đsmail’e vardıkda gazaba gelüb ve fevren şark arkerin derüb 
içinden oniki bin er seçüb, surh-i ser resmi üzere ol askere bir müridin başbuğ idüb Erzincan’a gönderdi.” 
YSF, p. 25.  
1427 FSH, p. 97. 
1428 TNSB, p. 246. Though not being clear enough, Celalzāde also mentions such intentions of Ismail. See 
CLZ, p. 86. Solakzāde repeats the same idea by reciting from ‘Ali. But some details in his account are 
noteworthy. He states that Ismail composed an army of 3.000 men in order to pillage the Province of 
Trabzon. His brother Ibrahim was also in this army. According to SLZ, Selim was ready to meet 
qizilbashes; he defeated them near Erzincan and captured the city. Ibrahim was snatched in the battle. He 
states that it is said that Ibrahim was imprisoned in Trabzon but this hearsay is not verified. SLZ1, pp. 
438-9.  
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killed all of the qizilbash fighters, but arrested the brother of the shah1429, who was 
imprisoned in Trabzon. ‘Ali also adds that they informed the Porte on developments.1430 
In this specific case, however, the accounts of two contemporary sources, 
Kemalpaşazāde and Yusuf, seem to be more reliable. Although Ismail’s response to 
Selim’s assaults in form of attacking the Province of Trabzon was not out of possibility, 
the conditions must have discouraged Ismail from such offensive policies, for he was 
recently forced to retreat from Dulkadir by the Ottomans. In addition, ‘Ali mistakenly 
gives the date of this occurrence as 916/1511.1431 As will be delineated in the following 
paragraphs, this confrontation must have occurred before 1508.  
Though not explained explicitly in the text of Selimnāme, it can be deduced from 
the narration that Ismail’s army easily re-captured Erzincan.  Selim, on the other hand, 
immediately started preparation of an army to re-march on Erzincan. Selim’s only son, 
Süleyman also attended this army.1432 When Selim’s troops appeared in front of the city, 
qizilbashes had already taken the position of war;1433 two armies soon clashed each 
other. If relied on Yusuf’s account, the second round too turned out in favor of Selim.1434 
He quite vividly describes how Selim’s soldiers and Selim personally chased qizilbash 
fighters on rocky slopes of mountains near Erzincan.  
Kızılbaş askeri akbehu’l-ahvāl üzere sınub kaçtılar. Ve kimi at yerağın terk idüb 
baş kurtarmağa dağa çıkdı. Sipāh-i Rūm ardların alub ve Şehzāde bizzat piyāde 
                                                 
1429 Hammer states that this brother was Ibrahim. See HAM2, p. 370. As indicated above, first SLZ 
mentions Ibrahim in this context.   
1430 ALI, pp. 925-6. CLZ also vaguely indicates that Ismail’s intention to attack some fortress of the 
province of Trabzon. See CLZ, pp. 85-6. 
1431 ALI, p. 925. 
1432 YSF, p. 26. 
1433 YSF, p. 26.  
1434 KPZ confirms this argument. “Erzincan nāhiyetinden dahī bir nice def’a ceyş-i bed-kīş-i Kızılbaşı 
savaşla def’ itdi. Ol havālide olan vilāyetlerün ahalisi hümā-yı himāyetinde refāhīyet üzerine rahat olub 
āsūde-bāl u hoş-hāl oldı. Ol hümā-himmetün sāye-i ri’āyetinde Erzenü’r-Rūma varınca merzbūm husūm-ı 
şūm-kademün hücūm-ı kudūmundan me’mun ve mahsūn oldı.” KPZ8a, pp. 232-3. 
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olub ol senkīn kayalardan çıkub, vahşi canavarlar gibi haylı kızılbaş kırdılar. 
Andan dönüp sahrālarda kalan tazı, atlar, katır ve develerin nüker hıyām, garāyib 
esbāb ve yarakların cem’ idüb şehr-i Erzincan’a döndü. Anda birkaç gün ārām 
idüb seyr u şikār ide(rek) cevānibin gezdi. Pes zabt-ı memleket içün bir yarar 
kulun tāyin idüb cānib-i Trabzon’a ric’at eyledi.1435    
    
Kemalpaşazāde records an interesting event worth mentioning here. During his 
march on Alauddevle, Ismail learnt that Alauddevle would not confront but had retreated 
to Elbistan.1436 In order to catch Dulkadir troops, he had to leave heavy provisions in 
Erzincan, as well as the artillery. Kemalpaşazāde states that there was also valuable 
Chinese faience in Ismail’s camp. They situated faiences into artillery and hid under the 
ground.1437 But because of the approaching Ottoman army, Ismail had to leave Dulkadir 
country without finishing his plan. Furthermore, Ottomans forced Ismail to retreat 
immediately so that he could not return through Erzincan, but marched directly to 
Tabriz.1438 Thus his artillery and faience were left in Erzincan. After a while Selim 
somehow learned the situation and immediately moved to Erzincan. Kemalpaşazāde 
says nobody could prevent Selim; but he did as he wished. He found the treasure and the 
artillery and took them to Trabzon. Before returning, he assigned one of his commanders 
as governor of Erzincan.1439  
As understood from Kemalpashazāde’s account, when Selim came to Erzincan, 
the city was under the control of qizilbash forces.1440 What's more, after finishing his 
business, Selim assigned one of his men to govern the city. One may safely deduce from 
this phrase that before Selim’s arrival, the city had not been ruled by Selim’s 
                                                 
1435 YSF, p. 27. Also consider CLZ, p. 87. 
1436 See “Dulkadir Campaign, 1507” in this study.  
1437 KPZ8b, p. 30. 
1438 KPZ8b, p. 30. 
1439 KPZ8b, p. 30. 
1440 He states that “nobody could prevent Prince Selim capturing the city.” One may infer from this 
expression that the city was under the control of some other forces, which attempted to defend the city but 
failed.   
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dependents. When all these details are compared to Yusuf’s account of Selim’s second 
incursion to Erzincan, it evidently appears that what Kemalpaşazāde narrates by 
emphasizing a specific incident is identical with the second attack of Selim explained in 
Yusuf’s Selimnāme. Yusuf, as usual, does not specify the date. Meanwhile, 
Kemalpaşazāde’s explanation obviously puts that Selim assaulted Erzincan for the 
second time during or shortly after Ismail’s campaign on Dulkadir in 1507.1441  
Kemalpaşazāde states that when Ismail learned that his artillery and valuable 
faiences were grasped by Selim, he sent ambassadors to demand them. But his demand 
was refused.1442 Kemalpaşazāde does not specify to whom Ismail sent an ambassador; 
whether it was to Selim or to Bayezid. But we can clarify this point from other sources. 
It is recorded in Italian sources that Ismail dispatched an envoy to Istanbul in 1508. One 
of Ismail’s requests delivered to Bayezid by this envoy was the restitution of the 
armaments stolen by Selim. Ismail’s ambassador underscored friendly sentiments and 
peaceful intentions of the shah regarding to the Ottoman Empire; and he complained 
about hostile attitude of Prince Selim. He expressed that they had been fighting with 
Alauddevle not with Ottomans; but as this had been the case, Selim had stolen their 
artillery.1443 Though the ambassador was treated with respect, his requests were tactfully 
ignored. But it seems that Ismail’s diplomacy was not totally fruitless. Selim soon 
received warning from the Porte. He was ordered not to engage attacks on qizilbash 
territories and on Georgia. This case will be further examined below.      
                                                 
1441 Compare Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, p. 
24.  
1442 KPZ8b, p. 30. 
1443 FSH, p; 96. TNSB, p. 246; HAM2, p. 370 
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Another aspect of Selim-Ismail struggle was that Selim not only pillaged and 
occasionally captured territories of Ismail but also seriously damaged the connection 
between the shah and his Anatolian disciples. Since he either controlled or threatened 
the principal region through which the communication and transportation between the 
shah and his disciples performed, his activities created great annoyance in the court of 
Ismail. An anonymous Ottoman historian points out this dimension of Selim’s activities 
in Persian frontiers:  
Zikr olan tāife-i tāğiye Şehriyār-ı kāmkārun vufūr-ı şecā’atinden şol derece 
mergūb olub leşker-i zafer-peykerinden öyle mağlūb düşmüşdi ki; diyār-ı 
Rūm’un ekser Etrāki bā-vücūd ol fırka-i ehl-i ilhād ve işrākile mesūb iken baş 
kaldurub ol cānibe nigāh itmek kat’a mümkin değül idi. Zīrā defa’atle dest-i tīğ-
hūn āsāminden şerbet-i intikām içmişlerdi. Ve nice kerre ol erbāb-ı dalāliyle har 
ü kıtal olub meydān-ı ma’reke seyl-i hūnile Ceyhūn misal bir vechile seylān 
eylemişdi ki hubāb-ı hūn o fırkanun ferekinde külāh-ı mezellet cāy-gāhlarından 
fark olmazdı. Hazret-i Şehriyār-ı nām-dārun ol eşrār-ı bed-girdārile vesāyir melel 
ü küffāriyle bunca eyyām harb ü kıtāl üzere oldığından şimşīr-i mihr-i tenvīri 
eş’ası mecmū’ āfāka ziyā-bahş olub āyine-i tiğ-i cihāngīrde sūret-i feth ü zafer 
dāyimā cilveger idi.1444   
 
7.1.4. Gazā on Georgia         
Selim’s campaigns, however, were not limited to qizilbash territories; he launched raids 
on Georgia for several times as well.1445 The exact number and the date of these raids are 
not clear in the sources. Şükrī records in his Selimnāme that Prince Selim invaded 
Georgia three times and each time returned with countless booty.1446 He does not 
specify, however, the dates of these raids. Kemalpaşazāde, on the other hand, mentions 
Selim’s two raids on Georgia. In the first place he refers to these raids only in one 
sentence while explaining how Selim turned Trabzon into the shelter of warrior-gāzis 
                                                 
1444 ANMB, pp. 161-2.  
1445 HSE4, p. 5. 
1446 SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24.  
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and old Akkoyunlu begs. The events recorded in this chapter of Kemalpaşazāde’s 
history all took place, as Kemalpaşazāde indicates in the same paragraph, in 905 / 1499-
1500.1447 It becomes clear, then, that Selim embarked gazās on Georgia at least by 1499. 
On the other hand, Kemalpaşazāde mentions elsewhere another invasion of Selim on 
Gerogia. He states that in the early months of 914 / middle of 1508, Prince Selim moved 
from Trabzon with a big army by the intention of gazā.1448 Any other incursion of Selim 
on Georgia after 1508 seems not to be possible since from then on, the struggle between 
princes for the throne was intensified. Just like his brothers, Selim was occupied with 
this struggle too much. Indeed, as will be discussed, the polemic between Prince Selim 
and the Porte started soon after his return from Georgia with abundant captives and 
spoils.  
Consequently, based on Şükrī’s explanation, Prince Selim conducted three incursions in 
Georgia, the first being in 905 / 1499-1500 and the last in 914 / 1508-9. Regarding the 
other chronicles, however, this number might be increased. Kemalpaşazāde and Şükrī 
congruently underlines that Selim returned from the last raid with plenty of booty and 
slaves. According to Kemalpaşazāde, gāzis returned with more than 10.000 slaves and 
the booty flowed into Trabzon like a river.1449 Selim dispatched many valuable presents 
from this booty to Bayezid with a letter explaining his victory (fetih-nāme).1450 
Kemalpaşazāde states that after Selim’s envoy arrived at the Porte, his son Süleyman 
                                                 
1447 KPZ8a, p. 233. 
1448 KPZ8b, pp. 30-31. This information reinforces my argument on the date of Selim’s second attack on 
Erzincan. If Selim marched on Georgia in the summer of 1508, then he must have attacked Erzincan in 
previous summer.  
1449 KPZ8b, pp. 32-33. For similar accaounts, also see SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24. 
1450 KPZ8b, p. 33; SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24. 
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was appointed as governor of Kefe.1451 Şükrī, on the other hand, argues that Selim’s 
request for a province for his son was presented to the Sultan by his former envoy. Upon 
returning from second Erzincan campaign to his province, Selim dispatched an envoy 
with valuable presents to the Porte. His objective was to request a province for his son 
Süleyman. His request was accepted and a citadel separated from the province of Ahmed 
was allocated to Süleyman.1452 When the two contemporary accounts are combined, one 
can conclude that the first time Selim requested a province for his son was in 1507, 
following his victory over qizilbash forces.1453 Although his request was accepted by the 
Porte and Şebinkarahisar was allocated to Süleyman, as will be delineated, Ahmed 
forced the Porte to change this decision.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1451 KPZ obviously skips some details here. Süleyman was not directly appointed to Kefe. But this issue 
will be discussed later.   
1452 SKB, pp. 70-71; See YSF, p. 27.  
1453 KPZ records that when Selim demanded a province (sancak) for his son, Sehinshah’s son Sultan 
Muhammed was the governor of Niğde, Ahmed’s sons Alauddin, Süleyman, and Osman were governors 
of Bolu, Çorum, and Osmancık; Mahmud’s son was the governor of Kastamonu; and Alemşah’s son was 
the governor of Kangırı. See KPZ8b, p. 33. 
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7.1.5. Appointment of Süleyman to Kefe and Selim’s Revolt against his Father 
After a long debate among Prince Selim, the Porte, and Prince Ahmed,1454 Prince 
Süleyman was appointed to the province of Kefe on August 6, 1509.1455  In order to 
assess the importance of Süleyman’s appointment to Kefe in the future developments, it 
is necessary to take a look at the rivalry between princes for the throne.  During the last 
years of Bayezid II, when internal struggle between princes augmented, Ahmed was the 
governor of Amasya, the nearest province to Istanbul while Korkud was the governor of 
Antalya and Selim that of Trabzon, the farthest of all.  
According to the Turco-Mongolian tradition, the sovereignty was exclusively 
granted by God; thus, no arrangement for succession to the throne was established in the 
Ottoman Empire. The ruler among princes would emerge only through struggle, which 
                                                 
1454 A letter of Selim reveals that at first Giresun, Körtun, and Şiryan were to be given to Süleyman. But 
Selim vehemently opposed this appointment, for the climate of mentioned cities was bad and their income 
was low. (This letter presents one of the earliest criticisms of Selim towards the Porte. He says, in his 
letter, that such an allocation to a prince is, indeed, oppressing (zulm). If the Sultan took this decision, then 
it shows that ekān-ı devlet did not truly inform him about these cities. Thus they obviously did not perform 
their job properly. If it was the result of erkān-ı devlet’s decision, then they clearly engaged in oppression. 
See TSA, document E. 5970. The facsimile copy of the entire document is published in TNSB, p. 260.) 
Selim’s severe resistance changed the decision of the Porte. Instead of these cities, Sebinkarahisar, which 
had been within the province of Ahmed at that time, was allocated to Süleyman. Prince Ahmed, however, 
opposed this appointment since Sebinkarahisar was too close to his province. Ahmed wrote to the Porte, 
“…Zira ki Karahisar’ın ana verilmesi caiz görüldüğünde şöyle fehmolunur ki varduğundan iğmaz-ı ayn 
ettikleri muradları Karahisar eyaleti bu suretle ana verilmek imiş. Bu hod mümteniatdandır. Vallahil azim 
billahil kadim mademki kayd-ı hayatdayım eyalet-i mezkure değil andan bir taş verilmek mümkün değildir. 
Bundan evvel hod merraren bu ma’na arz olunmuşdur…” (See TSA, document E 2667. Also consider 
HSE4, p. 7.) Then Süleyman was appointed to Bolu. Ahmed again opposed and forced the central 
government to change Süleyman’s province. His objective was that, since Bolu is between Amasya and 
Istanbul, in case of an emergency Süleyman could prevent him from reaching the capital city. (See HSE4, 
pp. 7-8.) The appointment processes of Süleyman congealed the enmity between Selim and Ahmed. ‘Ali 
states that once Selim even decided to march on Ahmed. He says, “...Fursat buldukça birbirlerinin 
ādemlerine dest urub öldürdiler. Babaları hayatında bu gūne nā-sezā evzā’a başladılar. Hattā bir defa 
Selim Hān ādemlerini fermān-berān eyledi. Leşker çeküb Sultan Ahmed üstüne varmağı mukarrer idi. 
Bi’l-āhere ikisine dahī emirler gönderilüb, nasihat olındı.” ALI, p. 933. 
1455 ULCY1, p. 77;Đnalcık, “Selim I”. Indeed, Selim had already demanded Karahisar or Kefe in his former 
letter: “Mezbur Süleyman Şāh’a dahi civarımızda olub aklen ve insāfen bize münāsib olan Karahisar 
sancağı himmet olunub ol olmaz ise Kefe sancağı ināyet olunmak mümkün ise...” TSA, document E. 5970, 
published in TNSB, p. 260. By this appointment Ahmed possibly thought he won the first round against 
Selim. But the advance of events would show in a couple of years that this so-called victory of Ahmed 
opened the way for Selim to the throne.  
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was at the same time regarded as the selection mechanism of the God for the best 
candidate.1456 For princes, it was, indeed, the matter of death or life, since the winner 
would inevitably put all other princes and their offspring to death, which was exactly 
done by Selim immediately after capturing the power.   
As Đnalcık points out, when the throne became vacant, the most decisive factor 
was to be the first to reach to the capital city and take control of the treasury. 
Consequently, staying in the nearest province to Istanbul was the primary objective of 
all princes.1457 Looking from this perspective, Selim had obviously the least chance to 
capture the treasury in case of an emergency while Ahmed was in the most favorable 
situation. In 1509, when the rivalry stirred up, Selim realized his desperate position in 
Trabzon and developed alternative strategies. His first success was to secure the 
governorship of Kefe for his son Süleyman. His ultimate demand from the Porte was, 
however, a province in Rumelia, which was immediately denied since it was 
contradictory to the tradition (kanun-ı kadīm) to allocate governorship to princes in 
Rumelia. In addition to the governorship of Kefe, Fisher points out another valuable 
appointment that Selim managed to obtain; his relative, Iskender Bey, who had been 
bostancı-başı (chief gardener), became sancakbey of Gallipoli and kapudan 
(commander-in-chief) of the fleet.1458 Fisher also argues that Selim, against his father’s 
wishes, married Prince Mahmud’s widow who was the daughter of a Tatar Khan of 
Crimea.1459 His concern was obviously to gain the alliance of Tatars against his father 
                                                 
1456 Đnalcık, “Selim I”. For further analysis of the Ottoman succession system see Halil Đnalcık, “The 
Ottoman Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty”, in his The Middle East and 
the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Essays on Economy and Society, Bloomington, 1993, pp. 37-69.  
1457 Halil Đnalcık, “Selīm I”, EI2 
1458 FSH, p. 106. 
1459 FSH, 107. Also consider Altundağ, “Selim I”, p. 424. According to ANMB, Prince Süleyman married 
the daughter of Tatar Khan. See ANMB, p. 47. 
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and brothers. As a matter of fact, as will be indicated, there was a considerable number 
of Tatar soldiers in his army when Selim landed on Kili shores.1460 Nevertheless, 
Ottoman historians do not provide clear indication to this marriage.        
Ottoman sources unanimously record that despite the very successful 
achievements of Prince Selim in the Province of Trabzon, Bayezid II did not appreciate 
his efforts. The reason stemmed from domestic politics. Towards the end of the first 
decade of the sixteenth-century, Bayezid’s health deteriorated so much that he totally 
left the state affairs to his viziers.1461 The most important issue discussed in the Porte 
was the determination of the successor of Bayezid. As all sources agreed, Bayezid and 
leading statesmen were openly in favor of Ahmed, the governor of Amasya.1462 Idrīs-i 
Bitlisī records, for example, that in the last years of his reign, Bayezid’s health seriously 
deteriorated. Consequently, complete disarray in the state affairs became inevitable. At 
the end, leading statesmen were summoned and they decided to enthrone Ahmed during 
the lifetime of Bayezid. According to Idrīs, they preferred Ahmed because they had 
good relations with him. In this way they could save their posts in the post-Bayezid 
period.1463     
It must have been because of this fact that Selim’s success was disregarded in 
Istanbul. Contemporary sources record that the central administration was favoring 
                                                 
1460 See, for example, FSH, p. 107. The archival evidence regarding Selim’s movement will be delineated 
in the following pages.  
1461 See, for example, IDRS, p. 87; KPZ8b, p. 39; ANMB, pp. 181-2.  
1462 KPZ’s account on the issue, for example, runs, “...Ol zamanda Tavāsī Ali Paşa vezir-i a’zam olub, 
rü’ūs-i hadem arasında sadr idi, ve Mustafa Paşa vezir-i sāni olub sāhib-i sā’ib-tedbīr, müşīr-i celīlü’l-
kadr idi. Ve sā’ir erkān u a’yānun ekseri kendü hevalarına teka’üd ve inzivalarına mülā’im oldığı ecilden 
merhūm Sultan Ahmede intisāb idüb, atası yirine pādişāh oldığın isterlerdi...” KPZ8b, p. 39. HSE writes 
in the same manner, “[Bayezid II] gönlünü Sultan Ahmed’den yana kaydırmış bulunması, padişahlık 
otağından lütuf yellerini onun emel bahçelerine doğru estirdikten başka, Ahmed’i veliahd edinmesi niyeti 
de kesinleşmiş gibi bulunuyordu.” HSE4, p. 11. ‘Ali, on the other hand, records an important detail: ‘the 
viziers were favoring Ahmed but begs of Rumelia and the Janissaries were favoring Selim.’ ALI, p. 934.  
1463 IDRS, p. 87.  
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Ahmed in such a degree that Ahmed’s men were never absent at the Porte and they 
continuously reported the developments at the Porte to Amasya.1464 The Porte’s open 
favoritism toward Prince Ahmed naturally annoyed other two princes. The first reaction 
to pro-Ahmed attitude of the central administration came from Korkud. He had already 
been forced to leave the Province of Saruhan by the influence of Ahmed on the 
viziers.1465 In 1509, when Bayezid openly indicated Ahmed as heir-apparent, Korkud 
responded quite emotionally. He decided to leave the country and went to Cairo in May 
1509 claiming he would perform a pilgrimage.1466 However, for some reason, he 
returned the next year.1467 But he continued to violate the orders of the Porte. He no 
longer stayed in Antalya, but moved to Saruhan in 1511 despite the disapproval of the 
Porte.1468 
Accordingly, as a result of Ahmed’s influence on the central administration, 
Selim’s raids against Qizilbash and Georgia not only became unappreciated but also 
they were banned by the Porte. His aggressive policy in the eastern frontier of the 
Empire was also considered as a violation of the Porte’s policy regarding the East, and 
                                                 
1464 “Hüdāvendigār Hazretleri’nin tābe-serāh der-i devletinde olan o bī-basiret ve kütāh-nazarlar 
kendülere Sultān Ahmed cānibinden vāki’ olan hüsn-i iltifātla mağrūr olub zikr olan şehzādeye intisāb-ı 
küllī itmişlerdi. Ol münāsebetle cemi’ umūr-ı divāniyye zamīr-i münīrine ma’lūm olmakda bu’de-i mekān-
hācet olmazdı. Her zamanda ‘atabe-i ‘ulyāda kapūsı bendelerinden ādem eksük değül idi. Her biri bir 
nice gün turdukdan sonra sonra cemī’ murādātın görüb, tedbir-i memlekete müte’allık haber-i meserret 
eseri kendüye bedreka-i rāh idinüb kemāl-i ri’ayetle merdiyyi’l-hāl ‘avdet eylerdi. Andan gelen 
kimesnelere bu vechile mezīd-i ri’āyeti sair şehzādelere mūcib-i ihānet olub bu kusur-rāyi ve sūy-i tedbirle 
memleket halel-pezīr olmuşdı. Sultan Korkud’un Mısır’a gitmesine dahī sebeb-i küllī oldı.” ANMB, p. 
162. For parallel accounts also regard KPZ8b, p. 40; HSE4, p. 11. HSE adds that since many begs, eben 
sipāhis were benefitting his grants, they wished to see Ahmed as their sultan by heart.  
1465 ULCY1, p. 58. 
1466 Contemporary Ottoman historians congruently give the reason of Korkud’s movement as the pro-
Ahmed orientation of the Porte. See, for example, KPZ8b, pp. 34-5; HSE4, p. 1; ANMB, p. 162. 
1467 KPZ8b, p. 36; HSE4, pp. 2-3;ULCY1, p. 59.  
1468 ULCY1, p. 60.  
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thus considered as insubordination.1469 Celalzāde records that Selim’s assault on 
Erzincan and his continuous fight with Ismail annoyed Bayezid II. He repeatedly sent 
orders to Selim to stop the bickering with the shah. Consequently Selim stopped his 
attacks on qizilbash regions.1470  
The response of the Porte to his victories against the enemies of the empire, 
naturally, broke Selim’s heart.1471 His sentiment can be see in one of his letters to his 
father: 
[Bayezid’in] rızasına ri’āyet içün bir harābe köşenin riyāsetinden değül tamam 
dünyanın saltanatından kemāl-i ihlās ve ubūdiyetim .... ve Allah te’ālanın tevfīk-i 
diyāneti ile ferāgat idem. Ve eğer vilāyet-i şarkdan kal’a ve il almağa devletlü 
Hüdāvendigār’ın emri ve rızası yoğiken bir nice kal’a ve yirler alub zabtedüb ve 
Sufī’ye virmede tereddüd eylemek bu davaya muhālifdür deyū buyrulursa anı 
dahī memleketim ve hāsılım çoğ olsun deyu nefsim hevāsına tābi’ olub itmedüm, 
belki sedd-i Đslām’ın siyāneti içün itdüm. Ve bu hizmete adl ü insāf üzere nazar 
olunsa makābelede mücerred devletlū Hüdāvendigār’dan .... ve in’am değil 
ālīşān emrelerimüzden ve erkān-ı devletden ve her mü’min-i muvahhidden envā-
i imdād iānet lāzım iken hizmetimiz küstahlığa bel ekābir ü a’yān i’tikādınca 
Sufī’nin evvel hurucunda Sufī’ye nisbet ve mütābeat mülāhaza itdükleri gibi 
neuzübillah şimdi isyana hamlolunursa ol gayreti biz terk itdük. Şimdiden giru ol 
hizmeti oturdukları yirden hüsn-i tedbir ile erkān-ı devlet def’ ideler.1472  
 
As clearly stated in this paragraph, and in all other Ottoman sources as well, the 
main problem of Selim was with the statesmen at the Porte, who were said to be 
preventing the communication between Selim and his father. Selim was said to believe 
                                                 
1469 Đnalcık, “Selim I”. ‘Ali records, “Vaktā ki Hodāvendigār’a bu ahvāl ma’rūz oldı, ‘yerine varasın’ diyū 
bi’l-ittifāk emirler gönderüb, mukayyed olmıyacak ‘Bizimle saltanata yoksa müşterek misin?’ diyū ‘itāb-
āmiz nāmeler yazıldı.” See ALI, p. 926. Solakzāde repeats similar accounts. See SLZ1, p. 440. Also regard 
MNB, p. 422.  
1470 CLZ, p. 87. KPZ narrates in the same manner. His account runs, “Sultan Selim defa’ātle ahkām-ı 
şerife irsāl olınub, ‘etrāf-ı vilāyetde olan a’dā ile, eğer Kızılbaş ve eğer Gürcīdür, musālaha vü müdārā 
üzerine ol, teksīr-i a’dāya rızāmuz yokdur’ dinilecek merhūm Sultan Selim bī-huzūr olub, endişe bahrine 
talmışdı.” KPZ8b, p. 40. For similar accounts, see ANMB, p. 162; HSE4, p. 13. 
1471 ANMB, p. 162. An undated letter written by Prince Selim to his father best expresses his distress. The 
letter reads: “...ekābir ve erkān-ı devlet, devletlu Hüdāvendigār’ın eyyām-ı devletinde emremi (Ahmed) 
devletlu Hüdāvendigār’ın serīr-ı saltanatına geçirmek kasd idüb bāki oğulların sergerdān ve derbeder ve 
belki helāk etmek niyyeti mukarrer olub bilāhire bu iş bu mertebeye yetişti. Çünki helāk mukarrerdir, bāri 
devletlu Hüdāvendigār ben bendesin gendu eliyle helāk etsün, ayağı toprağına onun için gelinmiştir.” 
This letter is published in ULCY1, p.78. 
1472 TSA, document E. 5970. 
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that his valuable activities were not mediated to his father as they were, but presented as 
insubordination.1473 One year later after Korkud’s open violation of the subordination, 
Selim moved from Trabzon, once more disregarding insistent orders of the Porte. 
Ottoman court historians usually tend to conceal Selim’s real intentions. They depict as 
if Selim moved from Trabzon in order to kiss his father’s hands.1474 Some more realist 
historians mention his demands for another province in Rumelia, but presenting as if the 
reason was the low income of Trabzon.1475 A close examination of his movement from 
Trabzon to his ascendance to the throne, however, leaves no doubt that Selim’s only 
goal since the very beginning of his movement was to capture the throne. But, of course, 
he always declared different reasons or pretexts. His strategy was cunningly planned and 
gradual.1476  
                                                 
1473 Ottoman court historians congruently argue that the statesmen in Istanbul created an obstacle between 
Selim and this father. They constantly depicted Selim’s victories against heretics and Christians as 
insubordination to the Sultan’s authority for they favored Ahmed for the throne. Thus Selim lost his hope 
to express his true intentions and sentiments through mediation of these statesmen and decided to visit his 
father personally. TNSB, p. 270. Müneccimbaşı writes, for example: “Vüzerā ve vükelānın ve devlet ileri 
gelenlerinin çoğu güzel huylu ve mülāyim mizaçlı olduğundan Sultan Ahmed’in tarafını tutuyorlar, kötü 
huylu, öfkeli ve sert bir mizāca sahip olan Sultan Selim’den çekiniyorlardı. Bir fırsat ve münāsebet 
düştükçe huūr-ı hümāyunda Sultan Ahmed’in iyi taraflarını, Sultan Selim’in de kötü taraflarını söyleyib, 
Bayezid Han’ın Sultan Ahmed’e karşı muhabbetini artırıp Sultan Selim’den soğutmaya çalışıyorlardı. 
Hatta, Sultan Selim’in Sultan’a itāat üzere olmayıp dāvā-yı istiklāl ettiğini iddia ediyorlardı. Đddialarını 
isbat için de, Sultan Selim’in devlet-i aliyye ile sulh hālinde bulunan kızılbaşlarla savaşmasını ve izinsiz 
olarak Gürcülerin memleketlerini yağmalamasını delil olarak gösteriyorlardı. Sultan Selim’in ağzından 
vüzerāyı tehdid eden bir de mektup uydurmuşlardı.” See MNB, p. 422.  
1474 HSE4, p. 13. HSE says Selim sent to his father three successive letters demanding permission to visit 
him. But his demands were rejected.  
1475 This was, indeed, one of the first pretexts of Selim for departing from Trabzon. When decided to cross 
Rumelia, he first attempted to prepare ground to leave Trabzon. For this purpose he wrote letters to his 
father explaining his discontent with the province of Trabzon. (For one of these letters see ULCY1, pp. 
75-76.) According to KPZ, Selim decided to visit his son in Kefe in order to relax himself. He wrote a 
letter to Bayezid for permission. His request however was denied. Upon his second demand was also 
denied Selim moved from Trabzon without permission. (See KPZ8b, p. 40.) Another contemporary source 
narrates otherwise: he wished to visit his father and sent letters to the Porte. His three successive demands 
were all rejected. (ANMB, p. 162.) Instead, the Porte ordered him to stay in his province and protect it. 
This answer, however, did not satisfy Selim and he decided to depart from Trabzon in 1510. See ULCY1, 
p. 78; ANMB, p. 162.  
1476 The real incentive of Selim to rebel his father is best indicated in Şükrī’s Selim-nāme. It is written in 
this versified history that one day Selim summoned his entourage and discussed the deteriorated situation 
of the empire. He reminded his men of the defeat of the Ottoman army against Mamluks, inability of the 
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Presenting his pretext either to kiss his father’s hand or to visit his son, Selim 
arrived in Kefe in 1510. The correspondence between the prince and the Porte was 
intensified; while the Porte was insistently writing him to return to Trabzon, Selim 
offered several excuses to the Porte. Selim was strictly determined not to return to 
Trabzon. His letters obviously indicate this ultimate determination. In his letter which he 
wrote upon hearing that Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz was dispatched as a intermediary, 
he definitely expressed that there was no possibility for him to return.1477 His response to 
Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz shows his utmost determined attitude. After explaining that 
his violation of the Sultan’s wish was because of his interests in the well-being of the 
state, Selim declared,  
...Ve rızadan garaz Trabzon’a varmak gökten Cebrāil inüb ve Peygamber dilek 
ederse kabul eylemezin.Ve sen anda varub ādemün gelüb cevap getürünceye 
değin bunda ancak tahammül ederin. Ve beni şöyle sanmasunlar ki, Korkud 
Emrem gibi bir yere varub yine rucū’ eyemek ihtimāli ola. Ben bu hususta baş 
vermeye rāzı olub fikrimden dönmek ihtimāli yokdur.1478   
 
Selim was now demanding a province in the Rumelia, which was obviously 
against the Ottoman law.1479 Nevertheless, the Porte ardently refused this demand. It 
                                                                                                                                                
Porte against conspiracies of Alauddevle, and the passive policy of the empire against Shah Ismail. Then 
he declared he could not stay without doing anything while the country was falling in havoc. 
Consequently Selim moved to Kefe. See SKB, pp. 73-75; YSF, pp. 28-29.  ANMH also clearly states the 
real reason of why Selim left Trabzon: ‘Selim learned that his father would leave the throne to Ahmed. He 
got angry for he was not accounted in this affair. Then he built ships to cross to Kefe.’ ANMH, p. 47.  
1477 KPZ8b, p. 41; ULCY1, p. 80, footnote, 35. Also consider TNSB, pp. 271-2; MNB, p. 423. 
1478 TSA, document E. 6322. This document is published in ULCY1, p. 81. 
1479 But the Porte repeatedly declared him that it was unfeasible since it contradicted the traditional law 
(kānun-u kadīm). According to KPZ, Selim first demanded a province in Rumelia while he was in Kefe; 
he had left Trabzon in order to rest in Kefe. KPZ states that upon Selim’s demand, the leading statesmen 
were summoned and they discussed the issue. The conclusion was as follows: “It is contrary to the kanūn-
u kadīm to give a province in Rumelia; and it will cause quarrel among princes. When other princes hear 
such a decision they would also wish to pass to Rumelia. Then how can we prevent such turmoil? The best 
choice is to force the prince to return to his province. If he would refuse, then taking the advantage of this 
pretext we would bring Ahmed to the throne.” (See KPZ8b, p. 41. For parallel accounts see HSE4, p. 15; 
SLZ1, p. 441.) Selim, on the other hand, insisted on his demand arguing that this would not be the first 
time that they would violate kānun-u kadīm. Learning from Sarugurz’s report on this meeting with Selim, 
however, he left the door open for another choice. Sarıgürüz reported to the Porte that Selim would accept 
another province in Anatolia, but not a piaster less than that of Ahmed. (See TSA, document E. 5490. Also 
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should be remembered that Ahmed was also closely following Selim’s movements and 
continuously writing letters to the Porte demanding them to reject Selim’s rebellious 
requests.1480 Selim, on the other hand, was not to return without taking what he wanted. 
He left Kefe and landed on Kili shores in April-May, 1511.1481 In Kili, second offer of 
the Porte reached Selim. He was offered the province of Kefe and some additional 
income from Kili and Akkirman. Selim again rejected this offer and declared his ‘new 
red line’. He swore not to cross back the Danube.1482 On the other hand, he constantly 
assured his father on that his intention was neither to rebel nor to grasp the throne.1483  
                                                                                                                                                
consider HSE4, p. 17.) Later developments would show, however, that this was not what Selim sincerely 
wanted, it was just an intermediary step of more comprehensive bargain. Likewise, Selim did not accept 
the Province of Menteşe, which was offered later. He declared in one of his letters sent from Kefe that it 
was impossible for him to return to Anatolia. Rather, he demanded the Province of Silistre in Rumelia. 
(ULCY1, p. 82; TNSB, p. 274.) Another objective often repeated in his letters was to meet the Sultan 
personally and to express his ideas directly to him. As indicated before, Ottoman historians tend to conceal 
Selim’s real intention simply to legitimize his openly unlawful acts. If relied on KPZ, for example, Selim 
never wished a province in Anatolia, whether it would be greater than that of Ahmed. KPZ states, on the 
subject of so-called offer of a province in Anatolia, that Selim responded that his desire was to kiss his 
father’s hands and to talk directly to him. His account runs, “Babam hazretlerinün mübārek cemālin görüb 
ellerin öpmek be-gāyet muradımdur, bi-nefsih huzūr-u şeriflerine ‘arz idecek kazāyā vardur. Ol maslahat 
nihāyet buldukdan sonra, emr-i şerifleri teveccühle sudūr u zuhūr bulur ise imtisāl olına.” KPZ8b, p. 42. 
Hoca Saadeddin admits Selim’s insistence on a province in Rumelia, but offers a much more legitimate 
reason: he argues that Selim’s intention was to raise the banner of gazā against infidels in Rumelia. But 
the statesmen around Bayezid did their best to damage the relationship between the prince and his father. 
HSE4, p. 15. 
1480 For one of these letters see ULCY1, p. 82. KPZ states that Ahmed got so angry with Selim’s 
movement that he decided to pass Rumelia and punish his brother. But after his intention was prevented 
by the Porte, he could not realize this plan. KPZ8b, p. 48.  
1481 Selim stitched his tent near Kamçısuyu on Rebī I 4, 917 (June 1, 1511). See ULCY1, p. 83. KPZ 
records the date as first months of the year 917. SeeKPZ8b, p. 49. Şükrī records an interesting dialogue 
between Selim and the ruler of Crimea, who was said to be father-in-law of Selim in some sources. When 
he decided to leave from Kefe for Rumelia, the Khan of Tatar offered some soldiers to reinforce Selim’s 
forces. Selim’s response was that ‘do not think that I am going with bad ideas and I have the desire of the 
throne in my heart. Why should I need abundant soldiers; I just wish to see the face of my father!’ SKB, 
pp. 77-78; YSF, p. 29.   
1482 ULCY1, 84. Selim expressed his definite decision in a letter to the Porte. See TSA, document E. 5443.  
1483 Şükrī-i Bitlisī puts special emphasis on Selim’s concern to improve the deteriorated situation of the 
empire. He says, for example, that Selim wrote to the Porte when he was in Kili and explained his 
concerns. Selim says, “Ey erkān-ı din-i devlet! Hātıra bu hutūr etmeye kim benim bu cānibe kudūmum 
kasd-ı tāc u taht rūsūmu ola. Pādişah rub’u meskūne kulları şark ve garp düşmenları zebūn idegelmişken 
şimdi bu mertebe sükūn tutmağa bā’is ne oldı? Kim memālik-i Osmāniyede nice eşkıyā peydā ve sipāh u 
rābeti kahr u zillete hüveydā oldı....” Sukrī’s account continues with mentioning of the weakness in the 
administration against Alauddevle and Shah Ismail. See YSF, p. 31. For original versified version see 
SKB, p. 85.    
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Upon realizing Selim’s resolution, Bayezid ordered the beylerbey of Rumelia to 
come to Edirne. By the suggestions of viziers, Bayezid began to regard Selim’s 
movement as complete rebellion and decided to punish him. Upon receiving the news, 
Selim persistently wrote to his father that his aim was not to rebel but to kiss the Sultan’s 
hands and explain his concerns personally.1484  
‘Ali records that absolute orders were dispatched to Selim not to come to Edirne. 
Even religious scholars issued religious ordinance declaring that “from the point of 
religious law, his blood was permitted.” A copy of this ordinance was sent to Selim. But 
it also could not stop the rally of this grim prince.1485 Nonetheless, Selim advanced until 
Tunca River, near Edirne. Bayezid, on the other hand, moved from Edirne and stationed 
his army in Cukur-çayır. The tension reached its peak.1486 A war between father and son 
was about to ignite. As a last hope, Bayezid again sent Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz to 
settle an agreement. At the end of the negotiations, Selim got almost everything that he 
had demanded. In addition to the governorship of Semendire, a practice never seen 
before in the Ottoman history, he obtained permission to wage gazā campaigns on 
Hungary. Furthermore, Bayezid promised not to determine any heir-apparent during his 
lifetime.1487 Selim was ordered to go to his new province as soon as possible.  
While Selim was struggling with the Porte in Rumelia, Anatolia was in complete 
turmoil. Şahkulu rebellion was expanding in western Anatolia. At the end, the Grand 
                                                 
1484 IDRS, p. 90; TNSB, p. 276. One of his letters, for example, after complaining about Ahmed’s favorite 
position in the eyes of the Sultan, says, “....bu zaif dahī iş baştan aşub gayret ve hamiyet ile helāk olmak 
mukarrer olduğu(nu) müşāhade edüb bizzat devlet eşiğine yüz sürüp ayağı toprağına hālim arzedüb 
devletlu Hüdāvendigārın çun ben bendesine gazābı olub helāk ve zayi’ eylemek murādıdır, bāri varayın 
hāk-i pāyine yüz süreyin her ne fermānı var ise yerine kosun deyu bu cānibe gelindi.” See TSA, document 
E. 6815.  
1485 ALI, pp. 931-2.  
1486 KPZ8b, p. 50; SKB, p. 81. 
1487 For detailed explanation of negotiations see ULCY1, 86; KPZ8b, pp. 51-52; TNSB, pp. 276-9; IDRS, 
pp. 91-92; HSE4, pp. 19-29; ANMB, pp. 212-3. 
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Vizier Ali Pasha was assigned to suppress the rebellion with the aid of some Janissaries. 
Ali Pasha was obviously declaring his pro-Ahmed orientation. His plan was, as 
explained in contemporary sources, to suppress the rebellion with Ahmed and then grant 
him the throne.1488 Selim must have been aware of Ali Pasha’s plan because when he 
heard the Sultan’s decision to go to Istanbul, he rigorously opposed. He did not go to 
Semendire but stayed in Eski Zağra,1489 where he summoned Rumelian troops as if they 
would march on Hungary.1490 Fisher, quoting from the letter of Andrea Foscolo, a 
contemporary Italian observer, dated June 24, 1511, writes: “Selim was afraid that 
should Ali Pasha and Prince Ahmed be victorious, they might then be united and cross 
to Europe against him. With this in mind, Selim camped near Edirne, continually 
increasing the strength of his army at the expense of his father, by offering double 
pay.”1491 Foscolo calls attention to an important point, “Bayezid could find no pasha to 
attack and drive Selim to his new province, because no officer, feeling that Selim would 
be the next sultan, could dare to incur his wrath.”1492  
                                                 
1488 KPZ8b, p. 53.  ANMB states that after the Province of Semendire was allocated to Selim, some 
leading statesmen wrote a letter to Ahmed. They reported him the the latest events. According to these 
statesmen, if he (Ahmed) would solve the qizilbash problem, then his way to the throne would be opened. 
But Selim somehow knew about this letter and decided not to go to Semendire. See ANMB, p. 214.  
1489 Selim was unwilling to go to Semendire, because he thought that Bayezid decided to enthrone Ahmed 
in Istanbul. One of his undated letters to Bayezid reads, “...Devletlu Hüdāvendigār hazretleri Rumeli 
livālarından Semendire livāsını bu bendesine sadaka edüb akın etmek içun icāzet buyruldukda ba’zı 
akıncılardan kimesneler cem’ etmek sadedinde iken ba’zı subaşılar ve sipahiler cem’ olunub Zara 
Eskisi’nde sākin olub tedārikde iken nāgāh Anadolu tarafından kızılbaş üzerine Ali Paşa ile gönderilen 
asker münhezim olub ve Ali Paşa’nın dahī alındığı haberi muhakkak alındukda devletlu Hüdāvendigār 
yümn-i ikbālle Đstanbul’a müteveccih oldı, şol kasde ki Emrem Sultan Ahmed’i getürdüb memleketi ana 
ısmarlayub kendüler ferāgat ideler deyu istima’ olındı....” KPZ states that the succession of Ahmed was 
planned in Edirne, where Bayezid had granted the obedience of Rumelia begs to Ahmed. See KPZ8b, p. 
56. Also regard SKB, p. 87; ALI, p. 942. 
1490 According to Idrīs, one of the most pro-Selim contemporary historians, Selim would sincerely wage 
gazā on Hungary if Bayezid had not decided to enthrone Ahmed. See IDRS, p. 91. In reality, Selim’s aim 
was nothing than to secure the obedience of Rumelian troops.  
1491 FSH, p. 107. Regard also ANMH, pp. 54-55. ANMH states that Selim behaved like an independent 
ruler in Rumelia. He gathered an army of 20.000 men. In order to pay the expense of this huge army, he 
confiscated all gold and silver mines; he also collected all the taxes and tariffs of Rumelia for himself.  
1492 FSH, p. 108. 
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Kemalpaşazāde records that following Ali Pasha’s and Prince Şehinşah’s death 
on July 2, 1511, most of the leading statesmen inclined to invite Prince Ahmed to the 
throne. Kemalpaşazāde also underscores that after the death of Ali Pasha, Ahmed 
pretended to be an independent ruler; he wanted to rule the country as he wished and 
was not willing to accept any other solution.1493 Consequently Bayezid II decided to 
leave the throne to Ahmed. He ordered high officials to do what was necessary to 
enthrone him.1494 And he moved from Edirne to Istanbul in July 1511.1495 Bayezid II 
also demanded the obedience of Rumelian begs for Ahmed’s saltanat. Though some of 
them offered their submission and joined the imperial army on the way towards Istanbul, 
some others preferred to take position on Selim’s side.1496   
Learning that Bayezid had moved from Edirne1497, Selim immediately set off 
with 40.000 soldiers and caught his father near Çorlu.1498 This time, a clash was 
inevitable.1499 Selim was defeated and fled to Ahyolu, where his ships were waiting, on 
                                                 
1493 KPZ8b, pp. 55-6.  
1494 KPZ cites his words, “Oğlum Sultan Ahmed’i getürmeğe tarīk-i sevāb u vech-i ma’kul neyse ana 
meşgul olun, min ba’d padişahınuz oldur.” KPZ8b, p. 56.  
1495 KPZ8b, p. 56. 
1496 KPZ8b, p. 56. 
1497 According to KPZ, Bayezid moved from Edirne to Istanbul in order to enthrone Ahmed. The plan was 
to send Selim to Semendire and to enthrone Ahmed in Istanbul. See KPZ8b, p. 56. Idrīs repeats the same 
account. He records that Bayezid moved in the last days of Rebī II 917 (the last days of July 1511). IDRS, 
p. 92. For similar accounts see HSE4, p. 34 (Hoca also gives the date as the last days of Rebī II); ALI, pp. 
942-3; MNB, pp. 425-6. Italian sources, however, suggest another reason for Bayezid’s departure from 
Edirne to Istanbul. As Fisher summarizes, according to reports of Italian observers, Bayezid heard a rumor 
that Selim was planning to go around Edirne and go to Istanbul to seize the imperial treasury. It was 
because of this rumor that Bayezid moved from Edirne to Istanbul. See FSH, p. 108. ANMB recounts a 
similar account; Bayezid departed from Edirne because he heard that Selim was coming to Edirne with a 
strong army. Since the Sultan had not enough military force to resist Selim for the time being, as he sent 
most of the Janissaries with Ali Pasha, Bayezid fled from Edirne to Istanbul. See ANMH, p. 56.   
1498 ULCY1, p. 87. KPZ and TNS give the number of soldiers as 30.000. See KPZ8b, p. 52; TNSB, p. 281. 
ALI says that he moved with forty or fifty thousand soldiers. See ALI, p. 943.   
1499 Idrīs’ account regarding this battle is quite outlandish. To him, Selim did not want to make war on  his 
father; when he decided to return, the soldiers of the Sultan attacked his forces. See IDRS, p. 93. This 
must be regarded, however, as Idrīs’ attempt to recover the bad-fame of Selim. It should be remembered 
that Idrīs wrote his Selimnāme during the reign of Selim. KPZ and CLZ pursue similar attitude putting the 
blame on the shoulders of Bayezid’s high officials. See KPZ8b, pp. 57-8. For an analysis of CLZ’s 
account see Celia J. Kerslake, “The Selim-name of Celal-zāde Mustafa Çelebi as a Historical Source”, 
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August 3, 1511 (Cemāzī I 8, 911).1500 He moved to Kefe and began to observe the events 
there.1501 Bayezid entered Istanbul on Cemāzī II 17, 917 (September 11, 1511).1502     
 
7.1.6. An Evaluation of Prince Selim’s Policy for the Throne 
The system of the Ottoman state apparatus and economy were established on the basis of 
territorial expansion. Any stagnation in territorial expansion, thus, created serious 
internal crisis.1503 The later episodes of Bayezid II’s reign bitterly experienced one such 
crisis. Especially military classes were eager to maintain continuous warfare. This was 
the result of not only military heroism but also economic interests. Most of promotions 
and assignments of new timars, as well as extra payments to kuls, could be realized after 
military victories and territorial expansions. Thus, especially military wing of the 
Ottoman state apparatus was constantly demanding warfare.1504 Selim, with his militant 
and warlike character, was promising to re-stimulate Ottoman war machine, which was 
in numbness for a while. Thus his war-like fame won him the favor of the members of 
military classes. More specifically, as Đnalcık states, the Janissaries, timar holders, and 
akıncıs wanted Selim’s succession for “it was the military campaigns that gave 
                                                                                                                                                
Turcica, IX/2-X, Paris, 1970, pp. 44-47. ALI follows IDR’s account on this issue. See ALI, pp. 944-5. On 
the other hand, ANMH recounts Selim’s behavior in a different manner which seems to be closer to the 
truth. To ANMH, Selim pursued quite an offensive policy; he followed his father and assaulted him when 
he reached him. Bayezid always tried to avoid a confrontation with his son. But Selim carried the situation 
into a point at which a clash became inevitable. See ANMH, pp. 56-7.        
1500 ULCY1, p. 88; TNSB, pp. 281-2; ALI, p. 947. ALI gives this date as the day on which the battle 
occurred. KPZ notes that the Janissaries and kapı kulu soldiers became so sorrow when Selim was 
defeated in this battle. See KPZ8b, p.58.  
1501 For detailed narration of the battle and Selim’s flight see KPZ8b, pp. 56-58. Also see SKB, pp. 89-90; 
YSF, p.33; HSE4, pp. 37-41; ALI, pp. 943-7.  
1502 ALI, p. 947.  
1503 Compare Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, 
pp. 27-27. 
1504 ULCY1, p. 77. 
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opportunity to these military classes to get promotion, more valuable timars or 
booty.”1505     
In their attempt to legitimize Selim’s usurpation of the saltanat from his father, 
Ottoman historians of the sixteenth century always emphasize Selim’s promise to 
(re)mobilize the ‘central institutions’ of the Ottoman empire.1506 Celalzāde Mustafa, for 
example, while bitterly criticizing corrupt practices of the viziers and begs during the 
last years of Bayezid II, underlines that the timars and state posts were not allocated on 
the basis of merit. Those who offered enough bribe got the posts instead of those who 
deserved timars according to their service. Celalzāde emphasizes that Selim took stand 
in favor of warrior-gāzis. He did not take even one fifth of the booty, which had been the 
tradition, but delivered all the booty to the gāzis.1507 Selim’s aim was to attract the 
warriors (yarar ādem) who were disappointed by wrongdoings of the Porte.1508 
According to the Celalzāde’s reconstruction of Selim’s early days in Trabzon, Prince 
Selim summoned the leaders of these discontent classes in Trabzon and told them that he 
did not appreciate this policy of the Porte. As re-formulated by Celalzāde, Selim 
launched a campaign on Georgia in order to provide booty for these discontent and 
neglected groups and to show that his favor was on these groups. According to 
Celalzāde, Selim evidently uttered to the leaders of these discontent groups that if he 
could be the sultan, his favor would be over them rather than the class of slaves.   
Not difficult to recognize, Selim’s ghazas against Gerogian Christians, which 
were resulted in satisfactory spoils, attracted idle young population of Anatolia who was 
                                                 
1505 Đnalcık, “Selim I”.  
1506 KPZ8a, pp. 232-3; ANMB, pp. 160-61; HSE4, pp.5-6.  
1507 CLZ, p. 103. 
1508 CLZ, pp. 103-4. 
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not yet attached to Qizilbash movement to Trabzon. Selim declared himself as the leader 
of gāzis. Celalzāde vividly describes how Selim made Trabzon the gathering center of 
gāzi-warriors. He says that Selim dispatched messengers to the provinces of Anatolia, 
Rūm, and Karaman in order to preach his intention of gazā on Christian Georgia. These 
messengers explained to the unembroidered young fighters that Prince Selim would 
launch a gazā campaign on Georgia and those who desire some spoil and booty shall 
come and join his army. By this way, Selim gathered yarar ādems of the cities, towns, 
villages, and of the nomadic tribes, who were in search of adventure, from above-
mentioned provinces.1509 He spoiled the Georgian territories with these recruited forces 
several times. At the end of each campaign the warriors received booty, which inflamed 
their desire for further gazās.1510 These fighters not only reinforced the army of Selim, 
but also expanded his fame as the patron of gāzis and warriors throughout the empire. 
When they returned to their home, these men narrated what they saw and heard during 
the raid on Georgia. Especially the booty and Selim’s promises to the non-slave origin 
warriors (merdūm-zāde) must have echoed among discontent population. Celalzāde says 
that Selim’s policy created such an excitement among the folk that they sang songs 
whose lines reads: “Yürü Sultan Selim meydān senindür!”1511 They also trusted, 
Celalzāde argues, in the promise of Selim and disregarded qizilbash side.1512  
                                                 
1509 “...Memālik-i mahmiyede vāki’ olan şehirlerden ve kasabātdan ve kurādan ve konar göçer erbāb-ı 
ahbiyeden cihād ve gazādan safalu olan merdān-ı kār ve hizebrān-ı kār-zār Trabzon’a sefer idüb, bu 
bahāne ile hayli hayli dilāverler, gazā-perverler, cihād-ziverler anda varub cem’ olmışlar...” CLZ, p. 102. 
1510 CLZ, p. 102.  
1511 CLZ, p. 105. 
1512 CLZ, p. 105. 
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Selim obviously appeared as the symbol of aggressive policy.1513 In 1507, during 
his invasion of the Dulkadir principality, Ismail passed over the Ottoman lands and 
enrolled Turkomans who were Ottoman subjects in his army. Although it was an open 
violation of Ottoman sovereignty, Bayezid avoided any open conflict with the shah. 
Meanwhile, Selim, in his own turn, pursued a rather aggressive policy. As explained 
above, he raided Erzincan in 1507. He did not hesitate to criticize Bayezid’s passive 
policy especially against Shah Ismail.1514 As Đnalcık puts it succinctly, 
While, by his submissive attitude, Prince Ahmed was favored by the Sultan and 
the Grand Vizier, Selim became the symbol of an aggressive policy. Selim, 
however, declared that his concern was not to secure the throne but to save the 
empire from the havoc in which it had fallen. Openly criticizing his father’s 
inactivity, he showed himself as a champion of the warfare against heretics as 
well as Christians. Already from Trabzon he had organized raids into the 
neighboring Georgia. His ghazā activities, used as political propaganda, won him 
the favor of the Janissaries, the timariot Sipāhīs and Akindjis in Rumelia. It was 
the military campaigns that gave opportunity to these military classes to get 
promotion, more valuable tīmārs or booty.1515      
 
One would easily realize that this offensive policy made military classes whose 
income and wealth was depended on warship become inclined to Selim. On the other 
hand, as reported by Celalzāde, viziers and high bureaucrats were favoring Ahmed’s 
candidacy. Selimnāme authors unanimously argue that these statesmen were in favor of 
Ahmed since Ahmed was relaxed and soft in disposition. They thought that if Ahmed 
                                                 
1513 ULCY says that Selim first realized the vitality of the qizilbash threat and wrote several letters to the 
Porte in order to call attention to this rising danger. But he never received a satisfactory answer. Then he 
waged campaigns on the Qizilbash with warriors gathered from the provinces of Rum and Karaman. He 
became the leader of sunnism against shi’ism. ULCY1, p. 76. ULCY follows, however, the footprints of 
Ottoman court historians, not only in this specific case but also throughout his article, and takes a pro-
Selim stand. As explained in the former sections, the Porte was actually quite aware of the qizilbash threat 
and took severe preventive measures.   
1514 When their pro-Ahmed orientation became apparent Selim pointed his bitter criticism especially 
against viziers and high officials at the Porte. His undated letter, possibly written in Kefe during his 
rebellious movement, clearly shows how he accused erkān-ı devlet: “Memleket ahvālinin tedārik olunması 
hususunda daima iğmaz-ı ayn vāki’ olub memleketin ahvāli bābında sū-i tedbirinizden gayri nesne zāhir 
olmaz. Mā-hāsal-ı kelām bu kadar fitne ve fesāda sizing adem-i ikdamınız vāki olmuştur…” See ULCY1, 
p. 79. 
1515 Đnalcık, “Selim I” 
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would be the next sultan, their established order would continue. On the other hand 
Selim was dynamic, rigorous, enterprising, and warlike. They knew that during the reign 
of Selim they would either loose their position or have to work harder.1516      
A passage in the Selimnāme of Idrīs-i Bitlisī succinctly explains the two pillars of 
Selim’s strategy in his struggle with his father and brothers. Idrīs says that when Selim 
approached to Edirne demanding to meet with his father, Bayezid declined his request 
and ordered him to return. But Selim insisted on his demand. According to Idrīs’ re-
formulation, Selim based his claim for the throne on two pillars: first, the Porte had 
given up rigorous gazā policy, which had always been the core of the traditional policy 
from their ancestors.1517 The Sultan had to stimulate gāzis and launch cihād campaigns 
in order to enlarge the realm of Islam. This the tradition of the Prophet (sünnet), was the 
strict order of the God on certain portion of Muslims (farz-ı kifāye)1518. On the other 
hand, the warrior-gāzis began to loose their enthusiasm and skill since they never 
engaged war; especially the young soldiers who never participated in a gazā were 
neither tasting the heroism and the religious enthusiasm of a holy war nor progressing 
their skills and abilities to fight. Selim accused the Porte, as reported by Idrīs, for they 
renounced traditional policy of the dynasty.1519 
Selim’s second criticism pointed toward the viziers, if not toward the Sultan, was 
regarding their passive attitude in qizilbash affairs. Selim carefully constructed his line 
of argument in such a manner that, on one hand, he called the attention of the statesmen 
(erkān-ı devlet) to the rising power of Ismail and his deadly enmity regarding the 
                                                 
1516 See, for example, CLZ, pp. 105-106.  
1517 Consider also HSE4, p. 11.  
1518 That is the strict order of God on Muslims, but not on every individual. If some portion of Muslims 
fulfils this order, then the others will not be responsible. If no one would fulfill, then the whole Muslim 
society would be punished for it.  
1519 IDRS, pp. 90-91. Also regard HSE4, pp. 11-12.  
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Ottoman Empire; and on the other hand, he openly accused them of not taking necessary 
measures against this serious and rising peril.1520 He argued that if this problem was not 
to handle adequately, its hazards on the Ottoman state and society could not be 
recovered; thus, the problem had to be urgently treated. In the meantime, his father was 
not able to handle such a great trouble because of his old age and deteriorating 
health.1521 Therefore, one of the princes had to take over the rule of the country. As a 
matter of fact, the Sultan was also aware of his lack of sufficient qualities in order to rule 
the empire adequately during this critical period; it was known that he wished to leave 
the throne to Prince Ahmed.1522 Idrīs does not directly say on behalf of Selim that the 
true candidate was Selim himself.1523 Nevertheless, his expression means exactly the 
same thing. Idrīs reports Selim’s last words to the Porte as follows: “It is certain that the 
viziers agree on Ahmed’s saltanat; but their primary concern in choosing Ahmed is not 
for the good of the state but for their own profit.1524 Nevertheless, in spite of viziers and 
statesmen, holy warriors (mücāhit) and strong-fighters (yiğit) are just in opposite 
opinion.”1525    
‘Ali reports that during 1510’s, Ismail’s majesty was in its climax while the 
Ottoman realm was experiencing its most disastrous period. On one hand, the number of 
soldiers in his army increased day by day; but on the other hand, the security and peace 
in the ‘country of welfare’ (memālik-i ma’mūre), i.e. the Ottoman realm, diminished 
hour by hour accordingly. The Sultan could do nothing because of his tiresome health 
                                                 
1520 For a similar account see HSE4, p. 12.  
1521 For a similar reasoning for succession of Selim regard HSE4, p. 12.  
1522 IDRS, p. 91. 
1523 Ottoman historians who composed their histories during the reign of Selim or his son Süleyman 
always describe Selim as the best candidate to handle the great troubles to which the empire was exposed 
during the last years of Bayezid II. See, for example, HSE4, p. 17.    
1524 For a similar account, see ANMB, pp. 193-4.   
1525 IDRS, p. 91. 
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and old age while his subjects fell into miserable life conditions and poverty. He states 
that “the power and splendor of Shah Ismail reached such a degree that the populations 
of Anatolia were in expectation with great fear that the Shah shall come to Rūm either 
today or tomorrow!”1526  
Selim successfully used this pessimistic atmosphere for his purpose. The 
following verse of Celalzāde evidently shows ideological construction of pro-Selim 
camp: “Vücūdı olmasa Sultan Selim’in / Sa’ādet menba’ı şāh-ı kerīmin / Alurdı milketi 
(memleketi) düşman ser-ā-ser / Fütūh u nasr olmazdı müyesser.”1527 ‘Ali follows the 
traditional line of Selimnāme authors which profoundly appropriates pro-Selim stand, in 
depicting princes and their attitudes regarding to the appalling situation of the country. 
He portrays Prince Ahmed, who was then the foremost candidate to the throne, as a man 
of laxity of pleasure. To him, Ahmed was not interested in the deteriorating conditions 
of the country, and those of the subjects, but his only concern was to secure the throne 
for himself and have a more enjoyable life in the palace.1528 In a similar vein, Prince 
Ahmed was indifferent to the rising qizilbash threat as well. ‘Ali follows the traditional 
line in arguing that the most suitable candidate to the throne was Selim, even if he was 
the youngest prince. Because he had the qualifications needed for a good ruler of which 
the other princes were lacking. In that aspect Selim was the greatest among all 
                                                 
1526 ALI’s account runs, “Bu tarīkle rūz be rūz askerini ziyāde itmekde ve saat be-saat memālik-i ma’mūre 
halkının huzūr u āsāyişi zāil olub gitmekde idi. Hodāvendigār ise, za’f-ı kuvāsına bināen ızhār-ı sekīne vü 
vakār ile ser-gerdān ve vüzerā vü ümerā ol cānibde tagallübe hayrān, re’āyā ise bu ortalıkda perişān-hāl 
ü ser-gerdān olub, Şah Đsmail’in sīt u savleti bir dereceye vardı ki, ‘Acabā vilāyet-i Rūm’a bu gün mü 
gelür ki veyāhud teveccühi yarına veya obir güne mi kalur ki?’ diyū havfile tereddüd iderdi. ‘Ve bu ru’b u 
hirās sonı niye varsa gerekdür?’ diyū birbirlerine söylerlerdi. Hattā vilāyet-i Rūm’a mahsūs emti’adan 
ba’zı nesne ister oldı. Sūret-i ‘arz-ı muhabbetde ādemleri gelüb, ahvāl-i vilāyeti ve kendüden olan havf u 
huşū’ı tamāmen fehm eyledüği muhakkak buldı.” See ALI, pp. 935-6. 
1527 CLZ, p. 131.  
1528 ALI, p. 936.  
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princes.1529 Since Selim had a nature of a good ruler, he deeply recognized the danger of 
qizilbashes for the empire before his brothers and even before his father did. Ha was 
uncomfortable with the advance of Shah Ismail in Persia and frontier regions, even 
before the outbreak of struggles for the throne. Already during his governorship in 
Trabzon, Selim truly realized the poisonous menace of Ismail for the Ottoman Empire; 
and he thought on how to eliminate this rising enemy. He felt so sad and regretful 
because of not being the sultan of the empire during this vital period in which his father 
and the viziers could not truly comprehend the qizilbah jeopardy. In these sentences, 
‘Ali does not hesitate to explain Selim’s real incentive and goal in departing from 
Trabzon: Selim tried to find ways to overcome the qizilbash problem. Eventually he 
decided to grasp the throne for himself and then to solve the problem.1530 It was for this 
purpose that he first procured Prince Süleyman’s appointment to the governorship of 
Kefe and then moved from Trabzon pretending to visit his son. However, his genuine 
objective was to cross to Rumelia and to grasp the throne when opportunity 
appeared.1531  
To sum up, we can determine at least three very important elements in the 
movement of Prince Selim up to his ascendance: Firstly, he departed from Trabzon with 
the absolute goal of acquiring the throne and never hesitated or thought to return to 
                                                 
1529 “...amma Sultan Selim-i vakūr gāyetde ‘ālī-himmet ü gayūr olmağla sāir şehzādelerden kihter ve 
sinnen asgar iken himmeten ve gayreten her birinden ekber u mihter olmağın...” ALI, p. 936. 
1530 Indeed, ALI does not directly state the ultimate goal of Selim. A careful reading of the whole 
paragraph, however, leaves no suspicion on this assumption.  
1531 “...Şah Đsmail’in hareketine ve surh-serān ve Đbn-i Ardabil’in cür’et ü cesāretine rencide vü bī-huzūr 
olurdı. Dem be-dem teessüf ü nedāmet ve mālik-i taht u saltanat olmaduğına ‘arz-ı peşimāni vü mihnet 
kılurdı. Belki gāh gāh hāriçden kimse agāh olmaduğı demlerde göz yaşları katarātını dökerdi. Gūya ki, 
nihāni cünūd-ı gaybī ile akınlar salub, dūd-ı āh-ı alev-nākden zerrīn ‘alemler ve bayraklar çekerdi. Âhir-i 
kār, ‘Kızılbaş tāifesinin dest-i te’addīleri itālesini Âl-i Osman’ın milk-i mevrūsının izālesine müstevcibdir’ 
diyū hüsn-i tedbīr idüb, kurret-i ‘aynı olan noyīn-i nev-āyīni, ya’ni ki şehzāde-i selimü’t-tab’-ı Süleyman-
temkīni Kefe sancağına vāli basb itdi. Anları taht-ı eyāletine ulaşdırmak bahanesiyle Rum-ili’ne geçmeğe 
himmetini ‘ālī kıldı...” ALI, p. 936.  
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Istanbul throughout his journey. As delineated above, a careful scrutiny of his movement 
clearly unveils this fact. All other demands of Selim which were constantly furthered 
throughout his journey were simply a pretext to secure the peace with the Porte and to 
gain time. Two distinguished features of his personality and disposition marked not only 
his early movement  which led him to ascend to the throne but also his whole reign as 
well. These features are that he was harsh and grim in temperament; and that he used to 
discuss things in depth before making a decision, and once decided he applied it with 
ultimate determination.  
Secondly, one of the principal constituents of Selim’s political propaganda was 
the stress on the warship and gazā. In this, he gained the favor of military classes, which 
would be decisive in his struggle with his father and brother Ahmed. As will be 
evaluated in the next sections, it was the Janissaries who opposed the Sultan Bayezid’s 
legitimate decision to enthrone Prince Ahmed, who prevented him from materializing 
this intention, and who repelled Prince Ahmed while he was arriving in Üsküdar in order 
to ascend to the throne.     
Last but not the least, alongside with the gazā, Prince Selim consciously 
constructed his policy on the qizilbash enmity since the early days of his governorship in 
Trabzon.1532 As will be further discussed elsewhere, his strictly anti-qizilbash stand was 
chiefly effective in gaining the favor of the influential groups, among which the 
Janissaries came first, in Istanbul. Selim’s antagonistic attitude against qizilbashes must 
have also won him the favor of the sunni population who suffered especially during the 
rebellion of Şahkulu. Although this popular support was not effective in his capturing 
                                                 
1532 Sohrweide calls attention to the role of Selim’s tutor and favorite entourage Halimī, who was a 
member of Zeynīyye Order. See Sohrweide, pp. 143-4. As already delineated another prominent sheikhs 
of this order had caused Sheikh Junayd to be driven away from Konya after a theological discussion.  
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the sovereignty, it prepared a public ground and legitimacy for his later harsh measures 
against qizilbash population. The following chapters evaluate how this happened.  
 
7.2. QIZILBASHES IN THE OTTOMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE CIVIL 
WAR AND THE TRIUMPH OF FANATICISM 
 
7.2.1. Selim’s Ascendance to the Throne, 1512 
In the Mid-August of 1511, there was a complete chaos in the Ottoman realm. After Ali 
Pasha suppressed Şahkulu rebellion with difficulty at a cost of his life, Prince Selim 
attacked his father but was defeated. He had to flee to Kefe on August 8. In the 
meantime, Prince Ahmed was following the developments with great anxiety. He 
insistently demanded permission from the Porte to cross Rumelia and punish Selim. But 
his demand was again refused. Nevertheless, Selim’s daring attack on his father 
convinced the Porte and the Sultan that it was time to leave the throne to Ahmed. 1533 
Although his performance in suppressing Şahkulu rebellion seriously eroded the image 
of Ahmed as a candidate to be the next Ottoman sultan, Selim’s situation was no more 
advantageous than Ahmed’s because he was seen as the defeated rebellious prince.  
Haniwaldanus Anonym records that after this battle with his son, Bayezid did not 
permit begs, sancakbeys, and beylerbeys of Rumelia to go to their provinces but ordered 
them to spend the winter in Istanbul.1534 His aim was to secure the ascendance of Ahmed 
to the throne. Haniwaldanus Anonym argues further that Bayezid took the obedience of 
Rumelian governors for Ahmed’s suzerainty; he made them to swear for that. They took 
                                                 
1533 For details of events and archival evidence see ULCY2, pp. 117-8.  
1534 For a parallel account see also KPZ8b, p. 59. 
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an oath that they would accept the rule of Ahmed and would do what is necessary to 
protect him.1535 Fisher gives a similar account. To him, Bayezid decided to abdicate in 
favor of Ahmed and demanded the obedience of generals to Ahmed’s rule. In Fisher’s 
account, however, the response of the soldiers differs from what was stated in 
Haniwaldanus Anonym. Although Bayezid offered many gifts and increases in pay on 
the account that they would accept Ahmed as their sultan, he could not win them over to 
the idea. The military commanders and the governors of Rumelia preferred Selim 
because they believed that it was he who could lead them in victorious wars.1536 ‘Āli 
also follows the same line of argument. To him, Bayezid was inclined to leave the throne 
to Prince Ahmed but the begs of Rumelia and the Janissaries were in favor of Prince 
Selim.1537  
Kemalpaşazāde provides a similar account. According to him, on arriving 
Istanbul the imperial council gathered and discussed the necessary measures. They 
agreed upon a solution that an open clash with Prince Selim was to be avoided since in 
such a case the inclination of soldiers and population to Selim’s side was highly 
possible.1538 They would offer Selim and Ahmed to return to their provinces. When this 
                                                 
1535 ANMH, p. 57. ANMB confirms this idea. The Sultan initially guaranteed the obedience of Rumelian 
begs to Ahmed:  “... Öyle tedbir itdiler ki: zikrolan beğleri Hüdāvendigārun ‘izz-i huzuruna getürüb, her 
birine ‘alā haddihi yemin itdüreler, kendü rızalarını padişahın dest-i ihtiyārına virüb, kat’a emr-i 
vācibü’l-inkıyāda muhalefet eylemeyeler. Lā-cerem ümeraya emr oldı. Meclis-i himāyuna hāzır oldılar. 
Mā-hüve’l-maksūd ma’lum olıcak cümlesi kendü sadakat ü ihlāsını eymān-ı gülāzü şeddād ile müşeyyed 
kılub canımız başımız Hazret-i Hüdāvendigarun yolına fedā didiler. ...” See ANMB, pp. 232-3. Upon his 
arrival in Istanbul, after the battle with Selim, Bayezid did not permit Rumellian to quit Istanbul: “… Tāc 
u hilāfeti Sultan Ahmed’e tefviz eylemek tedārikinde olub Rum-ili askerine icāzet virmedi. …” See ANMB, 
p. 251; also see pp. 252-3.  
1536 FSH, pp. 108-109.  
1537 “Vüzerāsının meyl-i tāmmı ve Hodāvendigār’ın ihtimāmı tāc u taht Sultan Ahmed’e olmak üzere idi. 
Ancak Rum-ili beğleri, zümre-i yeniçeri Sultan Selim Hān cānibine meyl itmişler idi...” ALI, p. 934. ALI 
repeats similar ideas in p. 937. ALI states in elsewhere that on entering Istanbul after the battle of Corlu, 
Bayezid declared his decision to abdicate in favor of Ahmed; but nobody agreed upon this idea. See ALI, 
p. 947.  
1538 KPZ8b, pp. 58-9. 
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was over and the tranquility was procured, then bringing Ahmed to the throne was 
easy.1539 Nevertheless, Ahmed did not agree on this plan.1540 On realizing that nothing 
but the throne would calm his son, Bayezid II decided to abdicate in favor of Prince 
Ahmed,1541 who was then called to Istanbul.1542 
Ahmed moved with his army possibly from Eskişehir to Istanbul. Taking 
advantage of the Şahkulu rebellion, Ahmed had already gathered Anatolian soldiers 
under his command. But his most trusted troops consisted of post-Karamanid tribal 
forces of Taş-ili region such as Turgut and Varsak tribes.1543 Upon invitation to Istanbul, 
Ahmed dispatched edicts to leaders of these tribes to join him with their forces. In one of 
these edicts, for example, he informs Musa Beg and Ahmed Beg, who were the leaders 
of Turgut-oğlu tribe, that he would rally to Istanbul and orders them to join his forces 
with their warrior-men.1544    
                                                 
1539 KPZ8b, p. 59. CLZ recites a similar account. See CLZ, pp. 140-1. For parallel accounts also see 
HSE4, p. 70; ANMB, p. 231; MNB, pp. 432-3.  
1540 HSE describes Ahmed’s refusal of this plan because of his insufficiency in politics. See HSE4, pp. 74-
75. Also see ANMB, p. 232.  
1541 See IDRS, pp. 93-4. Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han records, “... be’delyevm seccāde-i ibadet 
üzre tesbih ve zikre meşgul olmak tedārikinde oldum. Bi-hamdillah evlād-ı emcādımın üçü bile sezāvār-ı 
serīr-i serverī ve lāyık-ı mesned-i kayzeridir. Lākin Ahmed Han’ımın kesret-i evlādı olub ve sinn ü sāl 
ciheti ile cümleden mukaddem olmağın imdi iktiza hasebiyle anı izhar tedārikinde olasız ki şimdiden girū 
padişahınız oldur. Bu hususta ihmal itmeyesiz. ...” Cited and quoted in TNSB, p. 287, footnote 168.  Also 
consider ANMB, pp. 232-3; HSE4, pp. 72-73.  
1542 According to CLZ, Bayezid II said that “Rıza ve muradım maksūd ise benim padişahlık itmeğe 
mecālim kalmadı. Đhtiyarımla saltanatı oğlum Ahmed’e virdim. Min ba’d padişahınuz oldur tedārikün 
eylen!”. See CLZ, p. 141. In one of his letters dated early Cemāzi I, 917 (early August, 1511) Ahmed 
orders the leader of Turgutlu tribe to join him since he will go to Istanbul. ULCY2, p. 119. Also consider 
ANMB, pp. 251-2; MNB, p. 433.  
1543 See, for example, TSA, document E 2667. 
1544 “....El-hāletü hāzihī emr-i āli ile Âsitāne-i saadete teveccüh edüb sizin gelmeniz lābüd ve lāzım 
olmağın....karındaşınız oğullarıyla ve akvām ve etba’ ve size müte’allik yarar ādemleriniz ile te’hir ve 
tevakkuf etmeyüb isti’cal gelüb ordı-yı hümāyunuma mülāki olasız....” Quoted in ULCY2, p. 119. Uluçay 
says that he quoted this passage from the document E 2667 of TSA. In addition, throughout his work, 
Uluçay refers to and recites passages from this document in some other contexts as well. Nonetheless, the 
content of the aforementioned passage is clearly different from Uluçay’s quotations. It seems that during 
his study in TSA, a number of documents were catalogued under the same number, which is not an 
unusual practice in this archive, but later they were given different numbers. For the time being, however, 
the document catalogued as E 2667 is a report of Mir-ālem Mustafa, obviously a spy of Prince Selim, on 
the situation and military strength of Prince Ahmed. The situation depicted in the document strongly 
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But the most effective branch of Ottoman army, namely Janissary corps1545, was 
not favoring Ahmed; indeed, as the forthcoming events would show, they were 
enthusiastically disfavoring him. According to Kemalpaşazāde, the principal reason for 
the Janissaries’ disfavor was Ahmed’s insufficient courage and enthusiasm in war. Some 
Janissaries had been already participated in wars with Şahkulu forces and witnessed 
insufficiency of Ahmed as a commander. Kemalpaşazāde writes,  
Yeniçeri taifesi bu ittifakı işidüb, Hüdāvendigār Sultan Selim’le itdüği ahd ü 
misākı nakz itdüğine bī-huzīr oldılar. Bir yere gelüb tedbir itdiler. Bunlarun nısfı 
Ali Paşa ile Anadolu’da bile olub, Sultan Ahmed’i görmüşlerdi. Cür’et ü şecā’at 
ü sahāvetine ve sā’ir ahvāline tamām vākıf olmışlardı. Eyirdiler ki, ‘Kendü 
re’āyāmuz olan bir niçe Etrāk-i nā-pāk hurūc u zuhūr idüb, bunca fesād eyledi. 
Ali Paşa bu mikdar asākir ile varub mülāki oldı, yine sū’-i tedbir ile ihmāl ü 
müsāhale[den] gayrı nesnesi zāhir olmadı. Âl-i Osman’un gayretin yirde hasır 
koyub anların haklarından gelemeyen riyāset-i ‘āmme, ki Hak te’ālādan kullarına 
nübüvvete mu’ādil bir sa’ādetdür, ānun hakkından gelinmek munteni’ 
hāletdür.’... Kapu halkı ve Yeniçeri taifesi kendüden teneffür ü i’rāz 
eylemelerine sebeb-i küllī umūr-ı saltanatda līnet ü mülāyemet üzerine olub 
şiddet ü salābet üzerine olmaduğın... 1546   
 
Şükri follows the same line of argument. He states that the Janissaries and 
Rumelian troops strictly objected to the possible rule of Ahmed. Their special hatred 
was pointed towards Ahmed’s vizier and lala, Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha, whom they 
accused of retreating without fighting bravely in the battle with Mamluks in Adana, and 
of fleeing from Şahkulu forces by leaving Ali Pasha defenseless. Thus, as Şükri cited 
                                                                                                                                                
suggests that it was written towards the end of the summer of 1512. This document which includes quite 
valuable information will be further referred.  
1545 IDRS deems Janissary corps as the most sincere (ihlaslı) branch of the Ottoman army. His reasoning 
does not need explanation. See IDRS, p. 94. 
1546 KPZ8b, pp. 59-60. Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han  gives a similar reasoning for the Janissaries’ 
attitude toward Ahmed: “... Şeytan-kulu uğraşında Sultan Ahmed Ali Paşa’ya imdada cüret itmeyüb 
havfından eyāletine çekilüb gide ve ırz-ı saltanatı kayırmak kaydında olmayub terk-i nāmus ide, bā-husus 
ol tāife-i ehl-i fesād kendü sancağına karib bulunmuş iken min ba’d andan bir merdāne hareket sādır ve 
dilīrāne cümbüş zāhir olmaya. Bu makule tenperver olan makam-ı hilafete neden istihkak bulur ve 
padişahlığa ne hüner isbatı ile lāyık olur. Serīr-i saltanata sezāvār Sultan Selim-i nāmdārdır, biz andan 
gayrisini kabul itmezüz...” Cited and quoted in TNSB, p. 290, footnote 188. For a similar account see also 
ANMB, p. 255.  
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directly from the Janissaries’ words, a prince who makes such a man his vizier and 
advisor could not be suitable for the ruler-ship.1547  
Hoca Saadeddin also emphasizes Ahmed’s weak and unsuccessful governance 
during the qizilbash revolt of Şahkulu in explaining the Janissaries’ discontent. 
According to him, they said that “although there was a strong imperial army under his 
command, Ahmed could not handle some barefooted Anatolian Turks. He did not 
protect the honor of the saltanat but fled from a number of poor sackers. Being so, how 
could he regard himself merited to the post of saltanat, which is a gift of God and 
requires strong and vigorous personality? Those who are fond of relaxed and joyful life 
cannot bear this heavy burden. Thus, leaving the Ottoman throne to Ahmed would lead 
to the downfall of the empire. We do not agree upon the saltanat of any other prince but 
Selim, who has already proved that he has the noble potency of the sultan-ship!”1548     
So, the Janissaries were fairly displeased when they learned about Ahmed’s 
approach to Istanbul in order to take over the throne. The discontent of the Janissaries 
was in such a degree that they wrote threatening letters to the members of the imperial 
council (divan) to make them change from their decision.1549   
Ahmed sent a letter to the grand vizier Hersek-zāde Ahmed Pasha on his way 
ordering to make necessary preparations for his enthronement. He must have been aware 
of the disfavor of the Janissaries and other kuls because in his letter Ahmed specially 
asks about their attitudes.1550 Upon learning that Ahmed arrived in Maltepe and the 
members of the divan were making necessary preparations to welcome the next 
                                                 
1547 SKB, pp. 91-92; YSF, pp. 32-3. Also see MNB, p. 434.  
1548 HSE4, pp. 77-78. For similar ideas also see ANMH, p. 58.  
1549 ULCY2, p. 119. 
1550 ULCY2, p. 119.  
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sultan1551, the Janissaries’ discontent turned into revolt on Cemazī II 27, 917 (September 
21, 1511). They filled the streets cheering “for the sake of Selim’s fortune and for his 
enemies’ misfortune!”1552 They plundered houses of the second vizier Mustafa Pasha, 
Kadıasker Müeyyed-zāde Abdurrahim, Hasan Pasha the beylerbey of Rumelia, and 
Nişancı Cafer Çelebi.1553 Fortunately these statesmen were not in their houses. 
Otherwise they would lose their heads as well.1554 Celalzāde describes the Janissary 
coup d’etat vividly, 
Sultan Ahmed ki yarın Đstanbul’a gelür geçer didiler. Ol gice, ibtidā-i şebden 
vakt-i ‘işāya varınca Yeniçeri odalarında olan dilirler velāyet-tesīrler, a’dā-
teshīrler, şīr-nazīrler, aristo-tedbirler ictima’ idüb, a’yān-ı devletin ve ümerānın 
Sultan Ahmed cāniblerine tevessül ve intisābları mahzā hatā savābdandur. Anı 
serīr felek-nazīr-i Osmana geçürüb padişah eylemek ulu günah ve zehb-i medīd 
oldığını fikr idüb, Selim Han gibi ādil padişah āsitāneden merdud u dūr, Sultan 
Ahmed gibi muhannes serīr-i mülke geçüb şād-ı mesrūr olmak dūdmānımızda 
olan gayret ü hamiyyete sezāvār olmaz. Ocağımuz Hak penāhı, yatak ve 
turağımuz şeri’at dest-gāhıdur deyū mülāhaza ile ittifak ve ittihad eylediler ki 
kalkub Sultan Ahmed’i getürmek isteyen paşaların evlerünü basub yağma ve 
talan eylediler. ... yarak ve yasakları ile müretteb ve mükemmel oldılar. Gürūh-ı 
enbūh ve cünūd-ı saadet-şükūh, Allah Allah āvāzesiyle Đstanbul’ın derūnını pür-
sādā-yı sa’ādet-penāh eylediler. Bölük bölük olub, berk-i hātif gibi irişüb, 
içerüsin ve taşrasın nehb ü hasāret itdiler.1555 
                                                 
1551 For the preparations and happiness of leading statesmen for Ahmed’s arrival see, for example, HSE, 
pp. 75-76.  
1552 TSA, document E 3197. This document was first partly published in ULCY2, p. 121; the facsimile 
copy of the full text is published in TNSB, p. 292.  
1553 IDRS mentions that the grand vizier Hersek-zāde Ahmed Pasha was also among the statesmen who 
were attacked. See IDRS, p. 94. For further details see TNSB, pp. 289-291; HSE4, p. 78-9; ANMH, pp. 
58-9; ALI, p. 948; SLZ1, p. 459; MNB, p. 434.  
1554 ULCY published a contemporary account explaining details of the event, namely the letter of Nihālī 
Çelebi, which was written to Hālimī Çelebi, the tutor of Prince Selim. Nihālī Çelebi states the sources of 
the Janissaries’ anger and their psychologies as follows: “...Yeniçeriye dahī aziz yaran bu haberi nakl 
idicek yine kağıdlar yazub der-i bī-saadetlerine asdılar. Kim, şöyle istima’ olundu ki, bize mültefit 
olmayub Sultan Ahmed’i getüresiz, bizimçün it ağzından üstühan tutar diyesiz; bilin kim biz kelp değil şīr-
i neriz; bize gıda kelle geredür. Vallahi’l-azīm cümlenizün başın kesrüz bilmiş olasız deyu her birine āhar 
ekābir bu mekātibe itimad itmeyüb ehibbāsı mekātibidür deyu getürmeğe mukarrer idüb gemiler tezyin 
edicek Cemāziyelāhırın yirmi yedinci gecesi cemi’ Yeniçeri ‘Allah Allah Sultan Selim’in devletine 
düşmanlarının körlüğüne deyu gülbank vāzıyla müsellāh olub......Hāliyan Yeniçeri Hünkar’a ağalarıyla 
mektub verdiler, elbet Müeyyedoğlu ve Mustafa Paşa ve Hasan Paşa ve Nişancı ve Mirim ve Ahi Çelebi 
şehirden gitmek gerekdir ve Sultan Ahmed dahī kandan geldiyse andan gitmek gerekdir. Ve illā fesadı min 
ba’d görürsüz dediler. Hünkār rāzı olub iltizam eyledi....” TSA, document E 3197, in ULCY2, p. 121. 
Also see KPZ8b, p. 60. 
1555 CLZ, p. 149. For a similar account see HSE4, pp. 77-78; SLZ1, p. 459. 
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The Janissaries soon secured their control on the capital city. Neither the Porte 
nor the Sultan could do anything. Idrīs states that Bayezid II tried to calm the Janissaries. 
But his intention was to secure Ahmed’s entrance to the city. On the other hand, the 
Janissaries were not to accept Ahmed’s entrance to Istanbul in any condition.1556 Yular-
kısdı Sinan Pasha, the lala of Ahmed, hardly saved his own life. The Janissaries 
followed him until the port but could not catch him. The Janissaries shouted to Sinan 
Pasha, “Tell him [Prince Ahmed] to go back to where he came from. Otherwise we cross 
to the other side and, for the sake of Sultan Selim, tear him into pieces.”1557 Learning the 
situation from Sinan Pasha, Ahmed had no other choice than to depart from Üsküdar and 
head to Anatolia.1558 His plan was first to control the Anatolian provinces and then 
return to Istanbul.1559   
                                                 
1556 IDRS, p. 94.  
1557 TSA, document E 3197. The facsimile copy of entire document is published in TNSB, p. 288. 
According to CLZ, the Janissaries, indeed, detained Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha. But they freed him to carry 
their message to Prince Ahmed, who was ultimately arrogant. CLZ re-phrases their words, “... Ol efendin 
diyen bī-gayret ü nāmusa iriş. Rum tahtına padişahlık güzāf, serīr-i Osman’a uruc mahza laf değildir. 
Bunca zamandan beru Amasıyya taht-gāhında şah olub atası devletinde padişah idi. Biz anı ādem sanub 
dāyima devleti āsitānesine yüz sürüb, arz-ı niyāz iderdik. Memleket-i Đslamiyede bir tāyife-i bī-din – 
mezheb gürūh-ı zālimīn ve hāsīrīn ve bī-edeb hurūc itdiler. Bunca kanlar dökülüb hānumanlar harab 
itdiler. Rikāb-ı saltanata hakaretler düşürdüler. Anatolı beğlerbeğisi ve atabe-i ālem-penāhda vezir-i 
āzām olan Ali Paşa’yı katl u kahr eylediler. Kendünün üzerinde bī-nihaya asker-i zafer-rehber var iken 
Đslam ve din düşmenlarını kahr u kama kādir olmadı. Lekelek ihtiyar idüb gayret ve hamiyyetsiz iken şimdi 
saltanat mı ister? Bī-ar u gayret ne yüziyle geldi. Devlet āsitānesini hāli mi zan eyledi? Bu ocak erenler 
meydānı, pehlevānlar hanedānıdır. Bunda olan gāziler din-i mübīn-i Ahmedīnin kulları çākerleridür. Biz 
anı saltanata kabul itmek ihtimali yokdur. Var haber eyle başını alub kande giderse gitsin!” See CLZ, p. 
150.  
1558 IDRS, pp. 94-5; TNSB, p. 292. SLZ states, “... Daha sonra yeniçeriler Đstanbul iskelelerini bir yolunu 
bularak zabt eylediler. Üsküdar yakasınan gemi değil kuş bile uçurmadılar. ...” See SLZ1, p. 460. For a 
similar account also see MNB, p. 435.  
1559 “... gerü Karaman vilāyetine azimet itdi. Hatırında bu mānayı mukarrer eyledi ki vilāyet-i Karaman’a 
varub mukaddema Karaman vilāyeti hakimi olub vefat iden karındaşı Sultan Cihanşah’ın oğlu Sultan 
Muhammed’i kendüye yār idinüb, mukaddema Anadolı ve Karaman ve Rum diyārlarını zabt u feth idüb 
müstakil padişah ola. ..” CLZ, p. 151. Also see KPZ8b, p. 60; ANMB, pp. 258-9; SLZ1, p. 460.  
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Ahmed began to behave as if he had been the ruler of Anatolia during the 
lifetime of Bayezid II.1560 The Sultan warned him several times but Ahmet didn’t heed 
his words .1561 As indicated above, Ahmed mainly rested on tribal forces which had long 
been, indeed, the chief opponents to the Ottoman rule in Anatolia under the banner of 
Karamanid dynasty until Mehmed II annexed Karaman. After the Karaman rule, 
nomadic Turkoman tribes of the Taurus region such as Turgut and Varsak continued 
their opposition whenever an opportunity emerged.1562 Ahmed was playing a dangerous 
game; his allies were principal opponents of the Ottoman regime by nature. As Uluçay 
already presented a number of examples, Ahmed deemed these tribal forces the most 
trusted troops of his army1563 and allocated provinces to these tribal leaders in his own 
name.1564  
On the other hand, the Janissaries’ coup d’etat succeeded in Istanbul. Pro-Ahmed 
statesmen were either disqualified or pacified. On Şevval 16, 917 (January 6, 1512), the 
second vizier Mustafa Pasha became the grand vizier in place of Hersek-zāde Ahmed 
Pasha, Sinan Pasha became vizier, Yunus Pasha the beylerbey of Rumelia, and 
Dukakinoğlu Ahmed Pasha the beylerbey of Anatolia. Hasan Pasha, the former 
beylerbey of Rumelia, was assigned to the governorship of Semendire but he refused this 
                                                 
1560 For example, as ULCY indicated, Ahmed assigned a certain Ali Beg to the governorship of Niğde in 
late December 1511. See ULCY2, p. 121, footnote 8. Also consider IDRS, p. 95.  
1561 KPZ8b, p. 60. 
1562 For example, when a certain Mustafa, pretending to be the member of Karaman dynasty, rose up in 
1500, these tribal forces did not hesitate to join him. For further analysis of the issue, see Chapter III and 
Chapter V in the present study.  
1563 In a Şaban 11, 917 (November 3, 1511) dated edict of Ahmed, which was written in Yenişehir 
addressing Tugutoğlu Musa Beg, Turgudoğlu Musa Beg is ordered to come to join the army of Ahmed 
since he is needed. Ahmed assures Musa Beg on granting him a satisfactory reward: “...Đnşaallahü’l-aziz 
her birinizü ulûfeden ve dirlikden gereği gibi mahzuz ve behremend kılub hoşnud ve razı eyleyem. 
Vallahu’l-azîm bu ahd ü peymana muhalefet etmeyem...” TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, 
pp. 121-2.  
1564 See ULCY2, pp. 121-2. Also see HSE4, 80. 
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position.1565 Nevertheless, the new administration was still under the suspicion of the 
principal supporters of Prince Selim in Istanbul, namely the Janissaries and kapu halkı. 
A report of one of Selim’s spies in Istanbul reflects the balance of power in the capital 
city. His spy Hacı reported the pro-Selim and anti-Selim parties in Istanbul to his master 
as follows: 
...Ve āyine-i gayb-ı gaaye mahfi olmıya ki, a’da-yı devletinden herkes ağalardan 
vesair ehl-i divandan kapu halkına pişe edinüb her gün vahşet-engiz ve nefter-
āmiz kelimāt idüb, işte geldi, bunca bin tatar getirdi, bizden intikama gelmiştir 
deyu nice bunun gibi emsāli öz lā-dine lāyık hezeyān iderler. Amma yeniçeri 
vesair kapu halkı cemi’ muhiblerün devletlü vücudundan ricaları bu ki, devletle 
gelüb Silistre nahiyesinde temekkün idüb Hüdāvendigār’a tenezzül tazarru’ tariki 
üzere elçi gönderüb sancak taleb olunub....Erkānda adem-i icabet olamaz. Dahī 
muannidinun kelle-i devletlerini ol sahip devletün dü ayağına galtan ederüz 
derler. Tatar gelmesün denildikde, bilinüz gelmiye, itimadımız yokdur. Ta’zir 
edüb ale’l-gafle üzerine asker çekesüz deyu sual edicek her birisi yemin edüb 
varmazuz da, varayın deyene de mani’ de olub hakkından gelürüz derler. Đ’timad, 
adem-i i’timad re’y-i cihan-ārāya menuttur.1566 
 
At the same time Prince Ahmed, who was in Aksehir, demanded the province of 
Karaman, which was then governed by Sultan Mehmed, the son of Prince Şehinşah1567,. 
But his demand was refused.1568 Ahmed’s obvious aim was to make this previous 
Karamanid capital the center of his government in Anatolia. His preference of Konya 
                                                 
1565 ULCY2, p. 122. Also see TNSB, p. 291. According to ALI, Molla Halil became the kazasker of 
Anatolia and Ibrahim Paşa-oğlu was assigned to the post of nişancı. ALI gives, however, the date of this 
event as September 23, 1512. See p. 948.  
1566 TSA, document E. 6186, published in ULCY2, pp. 122-3. After a couple of months, however, Selim’s 
another spy in Istanbul, named Yusuf, reported the grand vizier Mustafa Pasha, vizier Sinan Pasha, and 
Yunus Pasha along with the head of the Janissary corps among the leading figures of the pro-Selim party 
in Istanbul. The report reads, “…ve Mustafa Paşa hod bī-riya sultanıma kul olmuşdur. Ve Sinan Paşa on 
evvel gelür ve hatta Sultanum ile bile olmasına haylı iştiyakları vardır. Ve Yunus Paşa ve Yeniçeri Ağası 
hālis mūnis bendenizdür…” TSA, document E 7072, published in ULCY2, p. 125. At the end of his report, 
Yusuf says that he had registered the names of those who stood against Selim and sent this register as 
well.  
1567 Prince Shehinshah died as the governor of Konya on Rebī II, 917 (July 2, 1511). See ULCY2, p. 123. 
1568 ULCY2, p. 122. Regard especially the footnote 11. A spy of Selim reports the events in the capital city 
to the prince: “ [after reciting new appointments to the high official posts] Sultan Ahmed çaşnigir-başısı 
gelüb giru tālib-i Karaman suretin tutub ‘elbet ya verin; ya hücum ederim, müslimanların huni dökülür, 
günahı uhdenizdedür; bir sefih oğlana bī-vech Karaman gibi memleketi vermek nedir?’...Ve kendüsü 
Akşehir’de amma hakikat-ı hal bu ki, devletle beruya teveccühünüz istima’ idüb tecessüse gelmişdir...” 
TSA, document E 6187. See also TNSB, p. 292; HSE4, p. 83. 
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instead of Amasya can be accounted for the principal force, namely ex-Karamanid tribal 
forces, on that he relied against the Kapı kulu and Janissaries.1569 Upon receiving the 
repudiation of the Porte, Ahmed besieged the city. Sultan Mehmed could not resist long 
and Konya fell to Ahmed’s control.1570 What Ahmed did was an open violation of the 
subordination to his father.1571  
The Janissaries and Kapı kulu took advantage of this situation and rose up again 
in Istanbul.1572 According to the letter of one of Ahmed’s sympathizers, upon learning 
the fall of Konya, the Janissaries sent a letter to Prince Selim informing him that Ahmed 
captured the province of Karaman and most of Anatolia. Selim gathered a great number 
of soldiers among which were some akıncı begs such as Mihallu, Evrenuslu, and Yahya 
Paşalu.1573 Janissaries feared that Ahmed would capture the whole country and then 
execute them.1574 
The archival evidence clearly reveals that the Janissary corps and the other 
branches of slave troops were ultimately determined to enthrone Selim. They even dared 
the insubordination to the royal authority of the legitimate sultan for this purpose.1575 
They forced Bayezid II to leave the throne to Selim through most disrespectful and 
brutal means. Bayezid could no longer resist cruel pressure of his rebellious soldiers and 
                                                 
1569 ALI states that he gathered soldiers among the vagrants of Karaman region and prepared to oppose the 
sultan of the time. See ALI, p. 1059.  
1570 KPZ8b, p. 61; ANMB, p. 263; ALI, p. 948. TNSB, p. 293. 
1571 See .” KPZ8b, p. 61; HSE4, pp. 83-84; ALI, p. 949; SLZ1, p. 461.   
1572 “Konya şehrini ... muhasara itdüğüne kapu halkı ve Yeniçeri cemaati ziyāde bī-huzur oldılar. 
‘Fermān-ı āli-şanla tasarruf olunan sancağun tasarrufuna māni’ olmak isyan u tuğyandur’ diyu 
müctemi’an divana geldiler.” KPZ8b, p. 61. ALI gives a similar account: “... bu husūs içün leşker Sultan 
Ahmed’den yüz döndürmeğe sebep oldı. ‘Padişah-ı cihān vali nasb eyledüği Şehzādeyi bilā-emr u cürm 
muhāsara itmek mahzā isyandır’ diyū her kişi kendüden el çekti. ...” ALI, p. 946.  
1573 TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 24.  
1574 See ULCY2, p. 24.  
1575 CLZ states that Bayezid II was still searching ways to bring Ahmed to Istanbul. But the head of the 
Janissary corps (Yeniçeri ağası) warned the Sultan on that it was impossible to persuade Janissaries for the 
saltanat of Ahmed. If he [Bayezid II] would not accept their demand, then they would conduct further 
banditry. See CLZ, p. 154. 
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had to call Prince Selim to Istanbul in order to command the imperial army in a 
campaign on Prince Ahmed.1576 On Muharrem 9, 918 (March 27, 1512) Selim was 
invited to the capital city.1577 Indeed, Selim was following all the events in Istanbul 
through incessant reports of his spies. One of them, a certain Yusuf, wrote concurrently 
the situation in the capital city. Yusuf assures Prince Selim in his report that after 
Ahmed’s assault on Konya, the balance had quickly shifted in his favor. He states that 
the leading members of the new government such as the grand vizier, the viziers, and the 
beylerbey of Rumelia, were waiting for Selim enthusiastically. Furthermore, he reports 
that the Sultan invited himself [Yusuf] and told him that “I have assigned my son to the 
command of my army; all the soldiers and weapon are in his service.”1578   
Convincing himself on that the situation was fairly suitable, Selim departed from 
Kefe.1579 He entered Istanbul with the cheering of the Janissaries.1580 Bayezid II invited 
Selim in order to command his imperial army against Ahmed.1581 Selim’s intention was, 
                                                 
1576 KPZ argues that Bayezid was quite disappointed with the activities of Ahmed. He says, “ ... Hazret-i 
Hüdāvendigār dahi anlarun [Janissaries] inkisarından ziyāde inkisarı vardı, be-gāyet incinüb hatırı 
Sultan Ahmed’den i’raz itdi. Vüzeraya ‘Maslahat neyse tedārik idün!’ didi. Ahir-i kār şöyle tedbir olundı 
ki, Sultan Selim’i getürüb ser-asker ideler. Sultan Ahmed ebsem olmaz ise üzerine varub def’-i zarar 
ideler...” KPZ8b, p. 62. For further details see TNSB, pp. 293-6; HSE4, pp. 84-85; ANMB, pp. 265-6.  
1577 ULCY2, p. 125. ULCY published a part of the imperial edict that orders Selim to come and take the 
command of the army against Ahmed. It reads, “...Karındaşın, oğlum Ahmed’in men’i hususunda kapum 
halkı ve yeniçeri kullarımı sana koşam. Sen dahi teveccüh idüb gelesin deyu emr eyleyüb mefāhirü’l-
emācid yeniçerilerim kethüdası Đlyas ile hükm-i şerif irsal etmiş idim...Đmdi evvel emrim ki, sādır olub 
mezkūr yeniçerilerim kethüdāsı ile sana hükm-i şerif irsāl olunmuşdur. Ol emrim mukarrerdir....Şimdiki 
hālde Rumeli’de vāki’ olan sancak beglerine ahkām-ı şerife irsāl idüb emreyledim ki senün cānibindnen 
mektub ve ādem varub niyet ettiğün gibi her ne mahalle davet eder isen sancaklarına müteallik subaşılar 
ile ve çeribaşıları ile ve cem’i sipāhiler ile cebelisü ile müretteb ve mükemmel yarakları ile varub vasıl 
olalar...” TSA, document E 6187, published in ULCY2, p. 126.  Also see ANMB, p. 266. ALI mistakenly 
states that Bayezid invited Selim in order to command the imperial army during the campaign on Shah 
Ismail, not on Prince Ahmed. See ALI, p. 950.  
1578 TSA, document E 7072, published in ULCY2, p. 125.  
1579 For his journey from Kefe to Istanbul see KPZ8b, pp. 62-3. 
1580 KPZ vividly describes the happiness of the Janissaries while Selim was entering the city. See KPZ8b, 
pp. 63-4.  Also see HSE4, p. 94.  
1581 “... vüzerā ve a’yān kemā kān ittifak-ı sābıkları üzere esnā-yı musāhabetde gerü Sultan Bayezid ile 
meşveret ve ittihad itmişler ki Hazret-i Padişah behişt-āşiyāna [Selim] ser-askerlik ihsan olınub def’ 
eyleyeler. ...”CLZ, p. 159.  Fisher states that Bayezid designated three conditions to Selim before 
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however, different. After Selim provided the full support of the Janissary corps and Kapı 
kulu soldiers, he refused to command the army without the title of sultan.1582 Bayezid 
tried to persuade his son but was not successful. After fierce quarrels,1583 he had to 
abdicate the throne in favor of his son Prince Selim on Safer 7, 918 (April 24, 1512).1584 
Bayezid II wished to spend his last days in Dimetoka, but died on his way.1585  
The disrespectful threats of the Janissaries were chiefly to persuade Bayezid to 
leave his throne. Idrīs narrates how Janissaries persuaded Bayezid to leave the throne in 
favor of Selim. Their argumentation was quite compatible with the policy of Prince 
Selim. Janissaries told the Sultan, as Idrīs rephrases, that the realm was in complete 
turmoil and chaos because of the ongoing civil war between the princes. The enemies of 
the empire, especially the oppressor qizilbashes, used the weakness in the administration 
of the state to interfere in the Ottoman internal affairs, even to attack the Ottoman lands. 
Prince Ahmed proved his inefficacy to overcome this problem. On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                
bestowing the army upon him: “Bayezid was to die as sultan and Selim was to succeed him; and Selim 
was lenient with Ahmed.” See FSH, p. 110.  
1582 Even CLZ, one of the most pro-Selim Ottoman historians of the sixteenth century, admits that Selim 
forced his father to retire resting on the unquestionable support of the Janissaries. He says that when some 
statesmen came to Selim and conveyed him the sultan’s decision, Selim turned towards the soldiers and 
asked the situation. The soldiers, however, proclaimed that they would not accept him solely as their 
commander (ser-asker) but as their sultan. They shouted, “Hayır padişahım [Selim], kulların ser-asker 
olduğunuza rıza virmezler. Serir-i saltanat himmet olunursa fermān-berüz, ne hizmet olursa bende-i 
kemterlerüz!” Then Selim turned to the statesmen and told them to inform the Sultan about the answer of 
the Janissaries. When they reported the attitude of Selim and the army, however, Bayezid II got angry and 
proclaimed that he would not leave the throne to anyone else while he was alive. Nevertheless his viziers 
persuaded the sultan explaining the ultimate determination of the army on the saltanat of Selim. See CLZ, 
p. 160. Also see FSH, p. 111; ALI, p. 951. 
1583 ANMH vividly describes Bayezid’s hopeless resistance against Janissaries to save his own position. 
See ANMH, pp. 64-7.  
1584 ULCY2, p. 127; ALI, p. 1049; MNB, p. 439. KPZ narrates the events in a slightly different manner. 
To him, when the Sultan learned the desire of the Janissary and Kapu Halkı to enthrone Selim, he accepted 
it willingly. See KPZ8b, p. 64. According to KPZ, Selim ascended to the throne on Safer 8, Thursday.  
See KPZ9, p. 66. Also consider IDRS, p. 99; HSE4, pp. 97-98. For further reading on Selim’s ascendance 
to the throne by force see SKB, pp. 93-108; TNSB, pp. 296-304.  
1585 CLZ, p. 163; HSE4, pp. 98-106; ALI, pp. 952-3; KPZ9, pp. 67-8. KPZ depicts Selim as if he felt sad 
when he heard his father’s death. But some other sources imply that Selim might have ordered to execute 
his father. See, for example, FSH, p. 111; MNB, p. 440. On the death of Bāyezid II see M. Şahabettin 
Tekindağ, “II. Bayezid’in Ölümü Meselesi”, Tarih Dergisi, 24, 1970, 1-14; TNSB, pp. 307-310.  
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Bayezid was so old and ill that he could not lead the army against the great perils of the 
empire. So he had to leave the throne in order to save the future of the empire. There 
were three candidates for this heavy mission. His failures against qizilbash movements 
clearly showed that Ahmed was insufficient in strength of sword and capacity to govern 
the empire.1586 Korkud’s candidacy could not be considered seriously since he had no 
son. Thus, as rephrased by Idrīs from the words of the Janissaries, the only merited 
candidate was Selim and the Jannisarries would not accept any other princes as their 
sultan.1587  
 
7.2.2. Prince Ahmed, the Ruler of Anatolia 
Kemalpaşazāde records that all begs of Anatolia and Rumelia subdued to the new sultan 
except his brother Ahmed. As indicated above, Ahmed had already begun to move as an 
independent ruler in Anatolia during the last days of his father.1588 Thus, he did not 
recognize the suzerainty of Selim and continued to rule Anatolia. As Kemalpaşazāde 
notes, the main portion of his military power came from Turkoman tribes of the post-
Karaman region, such as Karaman-oğlu, Ramazan-oğlu, Turgut-oğlu and Varsak, which 
                                                 
1586 See ANMH, p. 63.  
1587 IDRS, pp. 97-98. Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han also vividly describe how the Janissaries 
surrounded the palace and forced Bāyezid to abdicate in favor of his son Selim. Some of their words 
during the conversation with the legitimate sultan were, “… ittiler ki padişahımuz alilü’l-mīzaç olub 
Devlet-i Aliyye bir şehriyār-ı cedīde muhtaç idüğü azhar mine’ş-şemsdir. Lā-cerem şehzādelerden birine 
teslim-i saltanat tahmin ve mukaddema tāyin olunmuş idi. Đmdi biz Sultan Selim’den gayrisini kabul 
itmezüz bu gūne bu maslahat görülmeyince buradan dönüp gitmezüz. …” Quoted in TNSB, p. 304, 
footnote 268. For similar lines of argumentation of the Janissaries also see ANMH, pp. 60-61; SLZ1, pp. 
466-7.  
1588 ULCY partly published some degrees of Ahmed in which he was described as the sultan of the time. 
One of them, issued in Bursa in early June 1512 to the alaybey of Biga, reads, “… Sultan-ı selātin-i zaman 
Ahmed Han ezallahu teāla hazretleri avātıf-ı hüsrevānelerinden bu kullarına Anadolu beglerbegliğini 
sadaka ve ihsan buyurdular ...” TSA, document E 5876, published in ULCY2, p. 132. ULCY mentions 
some other similar degrees of Ahmed as well.  
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were the champions of the opposition to the Ottoman regime from the very beginning. 
Kemalpaşazāde reads, 
Kurūm-ı Rumdan bir kimse kalmadı ki itā’at kılmadı, illā birader-i mihteri Sultan 
Ahmed, ki ol zamanda daru’l-mülk-i Amasya’da vāli-yi ‘āli-şandı, inkıyād 
itmedi. Karaman’a gelüb Varsak-ı pür-nifakun ve Turgud-ı ‘ānudun1589 cünūd ü 
rünūdın cem’ eylemeğe meşgul olub, zimām-ı ihtimāmını ol taraflarun teshīrine 
dönderdi.1590   
 
The contemporary reports and the advance of events clearly demonstrate that 
Ahmed was not skilful in politics. At the beginning of the struggle, most of the powerful 
institutions in the state machinery of the Ottoman Empire were in favor of Ahmed and 
against Selim and Korkud. But he could not keep the alliance of these forces. Especially 
his passiveness during the revolt of Şahkulu marked the turn of the rally between him 
and his younger brother Selim. During this campaign, he totally lost the most effective 
branch of the Ottoman army, namely the Janissary corps and Kapıkulu soldiers. Since 
then, Ahmed began to deviate from the center of gravity of the state machinery and to 
shift towards periphery while Selim started to approach to the center. Ahmed’s 
utilization of tribal forces against the central army of the empire might be regarded as a 
pragmatic policy. Whatever it was, his relying on such tribal forces which were the 
enemy of the ‘Ottoman regime’ by nature1591, must have provoked statesmen, 
bureaucrats, and religious scholars who were closely adhered to the traditional line of 
the regime to incline towards Selim’s side. Indeed, Ahmed was in a complete paradox: 
on one hand, the only effective military force that he can employ against Selim was 
post-Karamanian tribal forces of the Taş-ili region, as mentioned in Ottoman sources. 
                                                 
1589 It is very interesting to note that KPZ always uses the adjective “‘anūd” which literally means 
stubborn, for Turgud tribes. Against whom or what were they stubborn? KPZ obviously refers to their 
resistance against establishment of Ottoman rule in southern Anatolia where these tribal forces resisted 
stubbornly.  
1590 KPZ9, p. 69-70. 
1591 See Chapter III in this study. 
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On the other hand, these tribes appeared as the intrinsic enemies of the Ottoman imperial 
regime throughout the history, and were still chief opponents of this regime, for it was 
directly threatening the traditional way of life of all these tribal groups. Therefore, 
although their allegiance provided Prince Ahmed a military power against powerful 
Janissary corps1592, it caused Ahmed to lose the support of the central actors in the 
traditional state machinery. In other words, his allegiance with the periphery eroded the 
legitimate ground of his claim for the saltanat.  
The land forces of the Ottoman army during this period were composed of three 
main branches: the slave-origin standing army or kapı-kulu, provincial army of timarlı 
sipāhi, and akıncı troops.1593 Among these three branches, only the Janissaries clearly 
took position at the beginning of the civil war. The other two branches of the army 
remained reluctant to offer open support to either princes, but preferred to wait for the 
result. As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the struggle, there were sipāhis on 
both sides. When the balance of power changed in favor of Prince Selim, however, 
Ahmed’s sipāhis sooner left him and sought ways of Selim’s forgiveness.1594 Like the 
                                                 
1592 As well-known, the Ottoman army during this period was composed of three main branches: the slave-
origin standing army or kapı-kulu, provincial army of timarlı sipāhi, and akıncı troops. Among these three 
branches, only the Janissaries clearly took position at the beginning of the civil war. The other two 
branches of the army remained reluctant to offer open support either princes, but preferred to wait the 
result. As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the struggle, there were sipāhis on both sides. When 
the balance of power changed in favor of Prince Selim, however, Ahmed’s sipāhis sooner left him and 
sought ways of Selim’s forgiveness. Like the Janissaries, there was another military power clearly defined 
their position during the very early phases of the struggle and remained loyal until they totally lose the 
hope. This power was, however, not a part of the Ottoman militia, but rather was the traditional enemy of 
the Ottoman centralization process, thus of its institutional tools. It was the tribal fighters of Karaman, 
Turgut, Varsak, etc.   
1593 For a general reading on the Ottoman military system, see Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti 
Teşkilâtından Kapıkulu Ocakları, I, II, Ankara: TTK, 1988 (first published in 1943); Halil Đnalcık, The 
Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600, London, 1973, especially pp. 89-118; Abdülkadir Özcan, 
“Osmanlı Askerî Teşkilâtı”, in Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi, cilt I, ed. Ekmeleddin Đhsanoğlu, Đstanbul, 1999, 
pp. 337-370. 
1594 There are a number of letters of Ottoman officials to the court of Selim explaining how the conditions 
compelled them to move with Ahmed and requesting the forgiveness of the former. See, for example, 
document E 5877, which is the letter of a certain Yusuf written to explain the reasons of some of his 
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Janissaries, there was another military power clearly defined their position during the 
very early phases of the struggle and remained loyal until they totally lose the hope. This 
power was, however, not a part of the Ottoman militia, but rather was the traditional 
enemy of the Ottoman centralization process, thus of its institutional tools. It was the 
tribal fighters of Karaman, Turgut, Varsak, etc.   
More important for the purpose of the present study was the relationship between 
these tribes and Shah Ismail. As will be delineated, the allegiance of Ahmed and 
Turkoman tribes lacked the ideological basis. Nomadic tribal milieu of Anatolia became 
the principal ground for leafing out the qizilbash way of religious perception, and for the 
flourishing Safavid Order. There are archival evidence showing the correspondence and 
the cooperation of these tribes with Shah Ismail. Thus the ideology of the military group 
on which Ahmed rested his strategy was somehow interrelated with the qizilbash 
movement. In this perspective, Ahmed was digging his own pit. He had no chance 
against the central powers of the state with these forces.  
Ahmed sent his son Alaeddin to Bursa. Alaeddin’s army was consisting of some 
Anatolian sipāhis under the command of Mustafa Pasha, the beylerbey of Anatolia, and 
                                                                                                                                                
seemingly disobedient (to Selim) actions and to prove his loyalty to Prince Selim. Another document 
vividly depicts how the troops of Ahmed coming from the Ottoman military system began to switch sides 
when the fortune turned towards Selim. One of Selim’s spies among Ahmed’s soldiers, namely Mir-ālem 
Mustafa, reported towards the end of the summer of 1512 that at the beginning some Janissary oğlans had 
willingly joined to Ahmed’s ranks. But then they were regretful and seeking ways of running away from 
Ahmed’s army. Even a higher officer of Ahmed (çavuşbaşı) was regretful because of supporting Ahmed; 
he revealed his penitence to Selim’s spy and wrote a letter to the prince begging his pardon. The related 
part of Mir-ālem Mustafa’s letter reads, “…Sultan Ahmed çavuşbaşısı Bālī bendenizü bu cānibde olan 
acemi yeniçeri cem’ itmek gözedüb ve avārız düşürmeğe gönderilecek biz bendenizi bile mu’āvin olub bile 
yürüye deyu bir hüküm gelüb biz bendenüz dahī çavuşbaşı ile bile Burusa’ya ve Đnegöl’e ve Sultanönü’ne 
varub iki yüz mikdārı oğlan cem’ olunub gönderildi. Zikr olan oğlanlar evvel rızaları ile alınmış idi. Şimdi 
yine pişman olub kaçayu derler. Amma çavuşbaşı Bālī bendenüz biz fakir bendenüz ile müşavere idüb ben 
Sultan Muhammed kullarından idim bir tarik ile gelmiş idim yine benim halımı sen (?) i’lām idiver diyicek 
çavuşbaşı bendenizün hali kendinin bir mektubu var anda malumdur. Kavlinde ve fi’linde sadık 
kulunuzdur. ...”  
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the tribal forces from Dulkadir-oğlu, Ramazan-oğlu, Turgut-oğlu1595, and Yumlu 
tribe.1596 It is interesting to note that in a contemporary report, all these tribal forces in 
Alaeddin’s army are called ‘Karamanī’.1597 At first Alaeddin took the control of the city. 
But heavy taxes levied by him and the plunder of his tribal soldiers soon turned the 
public opinion against Alaeddin.1598  
Another contemporary report of a spy called Mir-ālem Mustafa clearly puts 
forward the fact that Ahmed’s most trusted forces were from ex-Karaman tribes. The 
same report also proves the assertion that in case of difficulty, these forces would easily 
abandon Ahmed since they were alien to the Ottoman regime. The report, after stating 
that Ahmed was wandering in the Marmara region, runs,  
Sultan Ahmed ahvālinden istifsār olunursa cümle bin beşyüz mikdārı ādemi 
vardur. Ve oğlu ile beğlerbeğisi yanında dahī beş yüz mikdārı ādem kalub ulūfeci 
tāifesinden ekseri ulūfe verilmedüğü sebebden dağılmışdur. Ve beğlerden 
Karaoğlu Ahmed Beg ve Ramazanoğlu ve Şehsüvaroğlu ve Turgutoğlu vardur. 
Şimdiki halde beş bin ādemle Kütahya’ya gelmek kābildür, beş bin ādeme cevap 
virmek kudreti yokdur. Şöyle ma’lum olına. Taş Đli beğlerine ve Karaman 
beğlerine defaatle ulaklar varub ta’cil gelesiz deyu ikdam olundukda 
Osmanlunun bir ādeti vardur, sefer adın ile on gün bir yerde ve on beş gün bir 
yerde oturur, ādem eskidür, bizim ana kudretimiz yetişmez. Đnşaallah düşman 
üzerine gelicek varalum deyu def’-i vakt iderler, bi’l-külliye gelmezler deyu 
Çavuşbaşı kulunuz cevab virüb inandurdu.1599    
 
Upon learning that Selim moved from Istanbul towards Anatolia, Ahmed 
attempted to gather further soldiers. Again, his principal source of manpower was tribes 
of Taş-ili. In mid-July 1512, he sent a decree to Turgutoğlu Musa Beg, who was 
assigned to the governorship of Turgud-ili by Ahmed, ordering to join the forces of 
                                                 
1595 ULCY2, p. 132.  
1596 “... Ve Sultan Ali ahvālinden sorarsanız Bursa’ya avārız akçesine varub bazı Yumlu tāyifesi şenā’at 
idüb şehir halkı dahī el bir idüb iki yüz mikdārı ādemilerini helāk kovdular. ...” See TSA, document E 
2667. Also consider TNSS, p. 4.  
1597 TSA, document E 6333.  
1598 See TSA, document E 5452. Also see KPZ9, pp. 71-2; TNSS, pp. 4-5; ALI, p. 1059. 
1599 TSA, document E 2667. 
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Taceddin Beg, who was the Karaman Beylerbey of Ahmed and commissioned to gather 
soldiers around Eskişehir. This document was designed according to the imperial style, 
depicting Ahmed as the Ottoman sultan and Musa Beg Turgutoğlu as one of his 
commander-governors. 1600   
To conclude, archival evidence clearly shows that Turgutoğlu Musa Beg was one 
of the most trusted allies of Prince Ahmed. As already mentioned, Ahmed wrote at least 
three letters to Musa Beg ordering him as one of his governor-general to join his army. 
Turgutoğlu tribe was one of the principal sources of soldiers to which Ahmed resorted 
during critical moments of his movement, such as rallying to Istanbul in order to ascend 
to the throne, mobilizing his forces against Selim’s army. His first letter dates back to 
early August 1511, when he was invited to Istanbul to ascend to the throne. Since the 
prince did not trust the Janissaries and kapıkulu soldiers, he took his most trusted allies 
with him in this journey.1601 Likewise, the Janissaries repelled him from the capital city. 
Ahmed’s second letter to Musa Beg is dated November 3, 1511, which was just after he 
returned from Istanbul. Losing all his hopes in the capital city, Ahmed decided to 
                                                 
1600 The entire text of the document E 3057 in TSA runs,  
“(Tuğra of Ahmed) 
Fahrü’l-ümerā ve’l-ekābir müstahmim el-me’āli ve’l-mefāhir ‘aziz el-vücūd-ı şerif... el-mahsūs  
be-ināyetü’l- .... Turgut ili sancağı beği Musa dāme izzuhu tevki-i ref’-i hümāyun  
vāsıl olıcak ma’lum ola ki şimdiki hālde emirü’l-ümerā ve’l-ekābir hāviyyü’l-meāli  
ve’l-mefāhirü’l- mahsūs be-’ināyetullahi’l- mu’īn Karaman beğlerbeğisi Taceddin Beğ  
dāme ikbaluhuyu ādem koşub ılgar tarikiyle gönderdüm. Eyle olsa  
sen dahi yarar ādemler ile gelüb Eskişehir önünde ılgayub  
mūmaileyhe yetişesin. Fi’l-cümle bu bābda kat’a te’hir ve terāhir  
cāyiz değildir. Gayret demidir yetişmek ardınca olasın.  
olasın şöyle bilesin ‘alāmet-i şerife i’timād kılasın. 
Tahriren fī evāhir-i āhir-i Rebī lī-sene semān aşer ve tis’a mie (Mid-July 1512) 
Be-mahall-i 
Çayır-ı Karahisar-ı Sahib.”  
1601 “... El-hālet-i hāzihī emr-i ‘āli ile āsitāne-i sa’ādete teveccüh idüb sizin gelmenüz lābüd ve lāzım 
olmağın ... karındaşınız oğullarıyla ve akvām ve etbā’ ve size müte’allik yarar ādemleriniz ile te’hir ve 
tevakkuf etmeyüb isti’cal gelüb ordu-yı hümāyunuma mülāki olasız! ...” See ULCY2, p. 119, footnote 5. 
ULCY refers to the document E 2667 of TSA as the source of this phrase. Nevertheless, E 2667 has a 
completely different content. As already discussed before, this must be because of the change of the 
catalogue numbers of some documents after ULCY’s study.   
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establish his own government in Anatolia and gathered his most trusted begs and 
commanders in Yenişehir, where he allocated governorships to each of them. In his 
second letter, sent from Yenişehir, Ahmed calls Musa Beg to his presence and explains 
that he would grant official post and source of income (dirlik) to the beg of Turgut-oğlu 
tribe.1602 And his last letter was just mentioned in the former paragraph.  
What is of primary interest for the purpose of this study is that the same Musa 
Beg was also among the prominent allies of Shah Ismail in Anatolia. It has already been 
delineated that in the advent (hurūc) of Gilan in the summer of 1500, Ismail’s principal 
source of warrior was Anatolian qizilbashes most of whom pursued a nomadic-tribal 
way of life. Since the social roots of his disciples were chiefly in Anatolia, Ismail could 
not be uninterested in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman state; and he did not. Archival 
evidence shows that he aimed to organize discontent tribal population of Anatolia, 
primarily but not necessarily the qizilbash society, especially against Selim’s ascendance 
to the throne. In the establishment of the allegiance between Prince Ahmed and the tribal 
forces of central and southern Anatolia, Ismail’s interference must have played a 
considerable role. His letter to Turgutoğlu Musa Beg, dated May 23, 1512, just one 
month later than Selim’s ascendance to the Ottoman throne, clearly shows how he 
oriented these tribal forces of Anatolia. The complete text of the letter runs,  
Bismillahirrrahmanirrrahim 
Ya Ali 
El hükmü lillah Ebu’l-muzaffer Đsmail Bahadır sözümüz 
(on iki imamın ismi bulunan mühür) 
Emir-i a’zām-ı ekrem Musa Durgutoğlu’na ināyet ve şefkatimize ümidvar 
olandan sonra şöyle bilesün kim iftiharü’l-e’azim ve’l-āyān Ahmad Ağa 
Karamanlu ol tarafa gönderdük ve ol her ne ki ihtiyar gelesi gendüye şefkat 
etmek gerekkim müşarü’n-ileyh sözünden maslahatından çıkmasun ve mutābaat 
                                                 
1602 ULCY2, pp. 121-2. Most probably because of the confusion referred in the former footnote, ULCY 
again refers to the document E 2667 as the source of this letter.  
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ve yardım ona kılsun kim inşaallahu teala her ne kim anın muradı isteği olsa 
hasıldur. Günden güne her iş vaki bula (bulsa) Ahmed Ağa in’āmı (ittifakı) ile 
dergah-ı mu’allamıza bildürsünler kim her nev’ buyruğumuz olsa amel itsün 
gönlünü hoş dutub merhametimize imrār (ısdār) olasun. 
Tahriren fî 7 Rebiü’l-evvel 
sene 918  (23 Mayıs 1512)1603 
 
In this letter, the first point that immediately draws attention is that Ismail 
addresses Turgutoğlu Musa Beg as if he was his subject and gives him orders as if he 
was the ruler of Musa Beg. The order itself is also of importance. Ismail states that he 
appointed a certain Ahmed Aga Karamanlu as responsible to organize – and govern – 
these sides (ol taraflar), thus he [Musa Beg] should act in accordance with the directives 
of Ahmed Aga Karamanlu. Ismail also indicates that Ahmed Aga was among his 
respected men whose requests were to be accepted in the royal court. Thus if he [Musa 
Beg] had any request from the Shah then he would conduct it through the mediation of 
Ahmed Aga. Ismail’s letter openly orders Musa Beg to act in accordance with the royal 
decree of the Shah. It is obviously seen in this edict of Ismail that he was in an attempt 
to create an administrative system to govern the tribal population in Ottoman Anatolia.  
Perhaps the most appealing message in this decree is in the words placed just at 
the beginning of the text. Ismail starts his message by stating that ‘after being hopeful’ 
(ümitvār olandan sonra). This hope is noticeably refers to the hope for the shah’s arrival 
in a short while, more clearly the shah’s conquest of Ottoman country.  As demarcated 
in the context of the Şahkulu rebellion as well, there was a strong expectation among 
Anatolian population for Ismail’s march on Anatolia until the battle of Çaldıran in 1514. 
                                                 
1603 TSA, document E 5460. The facsimile copy of this document is published by Selahattin Tansel. See 
TNSS, Appendix: Vesikalar. The transliterated text of the document is republished by Faruk Sümer in his 
Safevî Devleti’nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 51, 
footnote 100.  
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This expression in Ismail’s letter was seemingly written in order to reinforce this 
hope.1604      
Indeed we do not have enough evidence about the religious stand of Turgutoğlu 
tribe. To what extend they adhered to the religious and mystical ideas of the Safavid 
Order is not clear. What is clear within the available evidence, however, is that they had 
always been against the expansion of the Ottoman rule in Anatolia. Though the primary 
reasons of their fierce opposition were political, one should not also underestimate the 
role of socio-cultural discrepancy between the settled and controlled society provisioned 
by the Ottoman state and the nomadic-tribal societies of the Turkoman heritage.1605 
Consequently, it would not be wrong to assume that there was a certain affinity between 
qizilbash way of religion and socio-cultural structure of Turgutoğlu tribe. In a similar 
vein, one could suggest a similar affinity between the religio-mystic interpretation of 
Safavid sheikhs and other Turkoman tribal populations such as Karaman, Varsak, 
Ramazanoğlu, Afşar etc. Indeed we have enough historical sources to assume that these 
tribal groups were the main milieu in which the qizilbash message was rooted deeply 
and was growing.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1604Indeed, Ismail’s attack on Ottoman land was not impossible before 1514. But we do not have clear 
evidence pointing out his preparation for such a campaign on Anatolia. Nevertheless, Ismail skillfully kept 
the hope of Anatolian disciples alive for such a campaign. Accordingly the Safavid administration 
successfully kept public excitement among Anatolian Turkomans which weakened the suzerainty of the 
Ottomans.   
1605 For further reading on Turgutoğlu tribe see Zeki Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 
1948, Ankara, 1952, 140-158; “Turgut oğulları, eserleri-vakfiyeleri”, Vakıflar Dergisi, 3, 1956, 31-64; 
Faruk Sümer, “Turgutlular”, IA. 
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7.2.3. Prince Murad, Nur Ali Khalifa, and Qizilbash Insurgences in the Province of 
Rum 
The available evidence does not permit us to accurately determine Ahmed’s attitude 
towards the qizilbash movement and his relation with qizilbashes. What the 
contemporary sources clearly show is that he attempted to use the discontent qizilbash 
mass for his cause. But the ideological dimension and the degree of this relationship, as 
reflected in the sources, are highly ambiguous. On one hand, his principal military 
confidants, both sedentary people of the Province of Rum and the tribes of especially 
Taş-ili region, as well as some in the Province of Rum, were at the same time the 
principal audience of the qizilbash message. On the other hand, some of his acts clearly 
reflect that Ahmed was a sympathizer of neither qizilbashes nor their ideals. On one 
occasion, he dispatched considerable portion of his army to repress the uprising of Nur 
Ali Khalifa, while in the other, when he was in search of a suitable asylum, he refused to 
take refuge in the realm of the shah. It seems that he certainly established a kind of 
problematic relationship with qizilbashes of Anatolia. One can surmise that his interest 
in the qizilbash-affiliated groups was mainly derived from pragmatic reasons, namely to 
get the support of discontent qizilbashes whose military capability was known, against 
the powerful army of Selim. In terms of ideology and socio-cultural perception, on the 
other hand, one can hardly observe, within available documentation, any affinity 
between Ahmed and the qizilbash movement.  
Perhaps the most concrete result of Ahmed’s vague attitude against qizilbashes 
was that Ahmed’s ‘soft’ policy against the Qizilbash Movement created a somewhat 
‘legitimate’ ground for qizilbashims in towns and high cultural echelons. Hüseyin 
Hüsameddin provides several examples of the fact that the number of statesmen and 
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ulemā at the court of Ahmed felt uncomfortable with this situation. Upon realizing that 
their warnings would have no result in Ahmed’s palace, most of them joined the suit of 
Selim, who had already declared himself as the champion of anti-qizilbash fight.1606  
His son’s, Murad’s1607 position was, however, completely different. Archival 
evidence and contemporary sources leave no doubt on his adherence to the qizilbash 
movement. Two contemporaries of the events present some explanation of both 
Ahmed’s and Murad’s connection with the qizilbash movement.  
To begin with, Kemalpaşazāde explains this relationship in a quite conspiratorial 
way. To him, Murad’s joining the qizilbash community was a political tactic designated 
at the court of Ahmed. Disturbed by his brother’s accession, Ahmed sought to attain the 
support of Anatolian forces, both within and without the Ottoman military. His plan was 
first to establish a government in Anatolia and then march on Selim. On the other hand, 
the Şahkulu revolt, alongside with some other developments, had clearly shown that 
                                                 
1606 See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Amasya Tarihi, vol. 3, Istanbul, 1927, pp. 247-8, 254, 257-8. According to 
Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Ahmed’s interest in the Qizilbash Movement was far beyond pragmatic causes. He 
argues that Ahmed obviously supported Persian (Acem) scholars and literati against their Turkish 
colleagues; thus he favored Persian culture at the cost of Turkish culture. To Hüseyin Hüsameddin, these 
Persian-cultured men propagated the ‘love of the house of Muhammed’ (Hubb-i Āl-i Aba), which was a 
sign of Shi’ism and supporting Shah Ismail in Amasya and the region around. Therefore, Ahmed directly 
supported the spread of Shi’ism in the Province of Rum. See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, pp. 242-9. 
Nonetheless, Hüseyin Hüsameddin’s arguments include serious errors. In many aspects, he simply reflects 
the mentality of Selim-nāme authors, adding new mistakes to the Selim-nāme literature in some other 
aspects. First of all, his nationalist approach clearly distorts the historical framework. He attempts to 
depict the struggle between Selim and Ahmed as a struggle of the Turkish culture and tradition against 
Persian culture and tradition. In this picture, Selim was the champion of Turkish tradition against Ahmed’s 
patronage of Persian culture. This sort of classification obviously contradicts the historical realities. 
Furthermore, Hüseyin Hüsameddin identifies sunnism with Turkish culture - and with Selim’s party – and 
shi’ism with Persian culture, which was, to him, supported by Ahmed. This is a clear mistake stemming 
from the retrospective approach of Hüseyin Hüsameddin. It has been already shown in Chapter V of the 
present study that the Shi’i domination in Persia was an enterprise of Shah Ismail and his qizilbash 
disciple-comrades. Thus the Persian literati in Ahmed’s palace in Amasya, if existed as Hüseyin 
Hüsameddin argues, could barely have been shi’ite.  
1607 Prince Murad was the oldest son of Prince Ahmed. He was the governor of Çorum while Ahmed was 
governing the province of Amasya. When Ahmed deported from Amasya, he governed Amasya as well. 
See ULCY, p. 127. 
 472 
qizilbashes of Anatolia had considerable military power. Ahmed aimed to gain this 
military force for his cause against his brother. Kemalpaşazāde states, 
Again his confidants suggested to him that it would be a clever move if he 
allowed the impression to be spread abroad that one of his sons revolted against 
him. He could then gather about himself the discontent and unruly elements, and 
thus two groups could be acting against Sultan Selim at the same time. Ahmed 
agreed to this and informed his son Murad, who was his deputy in Amasya, to 
pretend that he was in revolt; and when Murad did so, within a few days several 
thousand Kızılbaş rallied to his side.1608 
 
Celalzāde follows a similar line of narration. To him, upon realizing that the 
soldiers and sipāhis of this region (ol cānib) were compulsorily inclined to obey their 
sultan (pādişāh) (Selim must be referred to here by the word pādişāh), Ahmed’s 
confidants suggested him to gain the support of qizilbashes, who were outnumbered in 
this region. According to the plan advised to Ahmed, one of his sons was to convert to 
qizilbashism and to wear the tāc of the Shah so that he would gather an army from them 
against Selim. For this purpose Ahmed had his son Murad profess adherence to the 
qizilbashes, wear red head-dress, and abandon the ritual of Islam.1609 Celalzāde 
emphasizes that they [qizilbashes] had already prepared their weapons and other 
necessary tools of war before this incident. On learning Murad’s conversion to 
                                                 
1608 Selim-nāme, Topkapı Sarayı, Hazine, 1424. Quoted in Ahmet Uğur, The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the 
Light of the Selim-nâme Literature, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p, 209. Indeed it is not certain 
that this work was written by Kemal Paşa-zāde. Ahmet Uğur notices that although the name of the author 
is not mentioned, the work is identical with the Selim-nāme of Sa’dī, preserved in Topkapı Sarayı, Revan, 
1277. Uğur says that certain minor differences between the two works make it unlikely that Kemal Paşa-
zāde could be the author of this work. (Sa’dī b. Abdülmüte’āl wrote his Selim-nāme during the reign of 
Süleyman the Magnificent. His work was translated as a doctoral dissertation in the University of Basel by 
Marie Therese Speiser (Zürich, 1946)). Kerslake argues that Selim-nāme of  Hazine 1424 does not belong 
to Kemal Paşa-zāde. Nevertheless, as Ahmet Uğur calls attention, the content of Sa’dī’s work is derived 
from Defters viii and ix of Kemal Paşa-zāde. (See Uğur, p. 15)  Thus it seems to be safe to deem that this 
information is originally derived from KPZ.   
1609 Fisher deduces from Italian sources that Ahmed had not only his son Murad profess adherence to 
qizilbashes but also marry one of his daughters to Shah Ismail. See FSH, p. 110. Nonetheless, Ottoman 
sources do not confirm this assertion.   
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qizilbashism, the Safavid disciples of the region felt so pleased that in a couple of days 
more than twenty thousand qizilbash fighters gathered about him. 
 Anatolı cānibinde Sultan Ahmedin muktezā-yı idrāk-i dūni ve müsted’āyı ‘akl-ı 
zebūnı üzre gördü ki, serīr-i sa’ādet-pezīr-i hākānī vücūd-ı mevdūd-ı sultānī birle 
ārāste oldı. Lā-büdd yanında olan dūnler tedbir ve tedārik eylediler  ki, ol 
cevānibde olan asker ve sipāhi zarūrī der-i padişahlarına mūti’ ve münkād 
olurlar. Bu vilāyetlerde kızılbaş tāyifesine nihayet yok, oğullarından birisini 
kızılbaş idelüm, tāc-ı Şāhī giysün, az zamanda üzerine vāfir kızılbaş cem’ olur. 
Hazır sipāh u cünūddur. Anlar ile Sultan Selim’e mukabil oluruz deyū tedārik 
idüb ana binā’en evlād-ı kirāmından büyük oğlı Sultan Murad’ı bu husus içun 
kasdile kızılbaş tāyifesine mütāba’at ve inkıyād itdürüb, başına tāc-ı surh giyüb 
āyin-i Đslamı terk itdürdüler. Ol tāyife hürrem-i şād olub evvelden ‘ale’l-hufye 
ālāt ü esbāb ve kārzārları hāzır idi, hemān hurūc idüb Sultan Murad üzerine 
ictimā’ eylediler. Birkaç gün içinde üzerine yiğirmi binden ziyāde müsellah 
āhen-pūş ve div-huruş evbaşlar cem’ oldı.1610 
 
However, not everything went according to the will and the plan of Ahmed. The 
qizilbashes gathered around Murad committed so many injustices and outrages against 
the people that there appeared to be the danger of Ahmed losing the popular support 
against Selim. Then, he ordered Murad to rid himself of these qizilbashes. But Murad 
was no longer a sincere follower of his father.1611 Rather he consulted with a certain 
Kara Iskender, one of the leading qizilbash khalifas in the region, who was in his suit. 
Kara Iskender expressed the view that the people would follow those leaders who held 
power of which Sultan Ahmed no longer had any hope. Therefore, it was only Ismail 
that the people could turn for refuge.1612  
Within this unexpected situation, Ahmed was not sure about what to do. But 
qizilbashes continued to tyrannize and plunder the local people in the Province of Rum, 
especially Sunni population, who demanded help from Ahmed.  
                                                 
1610 CLZ, p. 166.  
1611 Selim-nāme, p. 210. 
1612 Selim-nāme, p. 210. 
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Sultan Ahmed sent troops against this now unwelcome body of supporters, and 
in a battle between the two sides Kara Iskender was slain. On hearing this Murad 
Çelebi did not go to join his father, but moved instead towards Tokat. Shortly 
before this, Şāh Ismā’īl had sent troops into Anatolia under the command of “Nār 
Ali” and Tokat was placed under siege; the people of the region were terrorized 
and made to recognize Şāh Ismā’īl as their ruler. When Murād arrived he joined 
up with these Kızılbaş troops at Kazova, and together they went to the Şāh. 
Ismā’īl, however, fearing that the troops were rendering obedience to Murād 
rather than himself, had him killed.1613   
 
Celalzāde’s account seems alike but contains some differences. He does not 
mention the qizilbash outrages. To him, when Murad asked them to offer his father help, 
the leaders of qizilbash army said that they offered their allegiance since he [Murad] put 
on tāc-ı Şāhī and chose the qizilbash path; thus, they could move only by the permission 
of the shah. The qizilbash leaders offered Murad first to go to the shah and take his 
authorization; if the shah would approve, then they were to provide every kind of 
support to him and his father. Accordingly, they set off for Iran. When they arrived, 
however, Murad was murdered and another person was substituted for him. In the 
meantime, Ahmed was to wait for the possible help from the qizilbash side.1614 
Celalzāde does not mention Nur Ali Khalifa and his military actions.  
Another contemporary of the events, namely Idrīs-i Bitlisī, describes Nur Ali 
Khalifa as an agent of Shah Ismail1615, who was commissioned to organize the 
qizilbashes of the Province of Rum and set up an insurrection. Müneccimbaşı broadens 
this argument. He states that Shah Ismail sent Nureddin [obviously referring to Nur Ali 
                                                 
1613 Selim-nāme, p. 210. It is explained in the following paragraph that at this time Selim was waiting for 
the arrival of his son from Kefe. When Süleyman arrived, he left him in Istanbul as his deputy, and 
immediately set out for Ankara.  
1614 CLZ, p. 167.  
1615 Contemporary Ottoman and Safavid sources leave no doubt that Nur Ali Khalifa was a direct agent of 
Shah Ismail. Realizing this point, Sohrweide truly argues that the military operation of Nur Ali Khalifa in 
the Ottoman Province of Rum was the first direct intervention of Shah Ismail in the Ottoman domestic 
affairs that we definitely know. See Sohrweide, p. 159.  
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Khalifa]1616, one of his khalifas, to the realm of Rum in order to gather soldiers among 
the Turkomans of Varsak, Avşarlu, Karamanlu, Turgudlu, Bozoklu, Tekelü, Hamidlü 
tribes, who were inclined to the qizilbash way of religion and blasphemy.1617 Taking 
advantage of the civil war within the Ottoman realm, Nur Ali Khalifa proceeded towards 
Anatolia with twenty thousand men.1618 These qizilbashes plundered all the cities on the 
way from Karahisar and Niksar to Amasya.1619 Their aim was to capture Amasya.1620 
Ahmed sent his vizier Sinan Pasha on the rebellious qizilbashes with an army. But the 
pasha was destined to be defeated. He could hardly save his life1621 while qizilbashes 
arrived in Tokat.1622 Idrīs underscores that the majority of the population in this region 
was the adherents of Safavid order;1623 therefore, a great number of indigenous people 
accompanied with the rebels, which worsened the fitne.1624 But Idrīs neither indicates 
any direct connection between Ahmed and the qizilbash movements in his province nor 
mentions Murad in this context.   
                                                 
1616 Hüseyin Hüsameddin traces the origin of Nur Ali Khalifa – or Nureddin Ali Khalifa as he writes  to 
Mardin. He argues, without providing sources, that in 1495-6 Nureddin Ali Khalifa came from Egypt to 
Amasya and propagated Shi’ism in the name of Shah Ismail until he left the city in April-May 1497. See 
Huseyin Husameddin, p. 240. Elsewhere, he says that Nureddin Ali Khalifa arrived at Amasya in 1507-8 
as the ambassador of Shah Ismail. See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, p. 255.  
1617 MNB, p. 435. 
1618 MNB says that Nureddin gathered thirty thousand men among these Turkoman tribes. See MNB, p. 
435.  
1619 MNB says that they plundered the towns and villages around Amasya, Tokat, and Sivas. See MNB, p. 
435. 
1620 IDRS, p. 95. Also see HSE4, p. 84. 
1621 MNB, p. 436. 
1622 IDRS, p. 95; HSE4, p. 84. Uzunçarşılı, without citing his sources, states that Nur Ali Khalifa gathered 
some thousands of Alevī (qizilbash) cavalries in Koyulhisar and defeated a small-scale Ottoman army 
commanded by Faik Beg. Then Nur Ali Khalifa captured Tokat, where he red hutbe in the name of Shah 
Ismail. It was after the capture of Tokat that Sinan Pasha marched on qizilbashes and was defeated. See 
UZC2, p. 229.  
1623 IDRS uses the word ‘sufi’, which then commonly referred to the disciples of Safavid Order. HSE, 
whose account is almost entirely derived from IDRS, says for example, “Çün ol tarafın türkü Kızılbaş’a 
tutkun idi.” HSE4, p. 84. MNB repeats the same idiom but uses a religiously more technical and elaborate 
word, ‘rāfizī’, to describe this group. See MNB, pp. 435-6. 
1624 IDRS, p. 95. See also HSE4, p. 84; SLZ, pp. 461-462. The latter two obviously repeat IDRS in this 
matter. For the revolt of Nur Ali Khalifa see also TNSB, pp. 256-257.  
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 According to Idrīs, and some other Ottoman historians following him, it was 
after the defeat of Ahmed’s forces against Nur Ali Khalifa that the prominent 
commanders of the Janissary corps and sipāhi troops, alongside with the wise statesmen 
in Istanbul, decided to call Prince Selim from Kefe to Istanbul.1625 Hoca Saadeddin 
follows similar line of argument. To him, the defeat of Sinan Pasha strengthened the 
opposition of the Janissaries and Kapıkulu soldiers against the saltanat of Ahmed on one 
hand and their support to the saltanat of Selim on the other. Putting forward the 
worsening circumstances in every part of the empire, because of the civil war, they 
raised their voices to bring Selim from Kefe to Istanbul in order to govern the 
country.1626 So, if we rely on the account of Idrīs, the battle between Nur Ali Khalifa and 
Sinan Pasha took place before the accession of Selim on April 24, 1512.  
Here, we observe two distinctive lines of narration regarding the qizilbash 
movements in the Province of Rum and Ahmed’s relation with these movements. One is 
originating from Kemalpaşazāde and expanded by Celalzāde by omitting certain details, 
while the other traces back to Idrīs, which was followed by Hoca Saadeddin, Solakzāde, 
and Müneccimbaşı.  
The first line regards Ahmed’s relationship with qizilbashes and Murad’s 
conversion to qizilbashism purely as a political maneuver to gain the military support of 
qizilbash fighters who were already proved to be efficient during the Şahkulu rebellion 
and in some other events. According to Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde, Sultan Murad 
never converted to qizilbashism sincerely, but pretended to be a qizilbash just for the 
sake of his father’s political strategy. Nevertheless, archival evidence which will be 
                                                 
1625 IDRS, pp. 95-6.  
1626 HSE4, pp. 84-5. For a similar account also consider MNB, p. 436.  
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evaluated below makes us to think otherwise. A close examination of the contemporary 
reports of Selim’s spies in Anatolia give the impression that Murad’s connection with 
the qizilbash movement was far beyond solely pragmatic-political purpose; rather, he 
seems to have sincerely attached himself to the qizilbash cause to a certain extent as 
well. Likewise, when his father called Murad to his suite when preparing an army 
against Selim, he didn’t accept Ahmed’s invitation arguing that he had his own works in 
the Province of Rum.  
Although Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde seem reasonable in explaining the 
beginning of Ahmed and Murad’s correspondence with the qizilbashes, they are 
obviously inclined to overlook the fact that after a while Murad became absorbed in 
qizilbash ideals to such an extent that he even broke off his father’s struggle. The reason 
for this sort of attitude of two prominent bureaucrats and ulemās of Ottoman realm is not 
difficult to realize. Their concern was obviously to conceal the adherence of an Ottoman 
prince to the qizilbashism, a religio-mystical path which was officially delineated and 
proclaimed as ‘heresy’. Rather, they present his liaison just as a political tactic produced 
by the incompetent retinues of Ahmed. In doing so, they were in search of exonerating 
the members of royal line from religiously and ideological ‘heresy’. It is not surprising 
from this point of view that Prince Şehinşah’s adherence to qizilbashism, which is 
clearly presented in archival reports, is also never mentioned in Ottoman chronicles. 
Indeed, they could not free them from intrinsically admitting Murad’s ideological 
adherence to qizilbash movement. According to Kemalpaşazāde, for example, when 
Ahmed wanted Murad to rid himself of the qizilbashes since they caused to erode the 
popular support for Ahmed with their outrages, Murad did not obey his father but 
consulted a certain Kara Iskender, one of qizilbash
 478 
Shah. Celalzāde says, on the other hand, when Murad, in accordance with the plan 
designated in Ahmed’s court, offered qizilbashes to help his father, they rejected to do 
so without taking the permission of the Shah. Then Murad went to Iran with qizilbashes 
but did not return to his father. As for the end of Murad, two accounts again come 
together. Murad was killed by Shah Ismail upon arriving Persia. Celalzāde interestingly 
ignores the Nur Ali Khalifa rebellion completely.  
The other line of narration, however, focuses on Nur Ali Khalifa rebellion but 
completely ignores Ahmed and Murad’s relationship with the qizilbash movements in 
the region. Similarly with Kemalpaşazāde, Idrīs and his followers also describe Nur Ali 
Khalifa, who managed to capture Tokat in the name of the Shah, as an agent of Shah 
Ismail commissioned to organize a rebellion in Anatolia. But they diverge from the first 
group with regard to Ahmed’s respond to Nur Ali’s activities and its consequence. Idrīs 
states that Ahmed sent his troops after Nur Ali under the command of Sinan Pasha, who 
was defeated. It was this defeat that finished the support for Ahmed’s candidacy in 
Istanbul.  
Indeed, the qizilbash movements in the Province of Rum in the year 918 (1512-
3) and Murad’s adherence to this movement are documented to a certain degree in 
archival reports housed in TSA. A careful study of these documents suggests that the 
qizilbash movement advanced as at least two correlated arms: One was led by Nur Ali 
Khalifa Rumlu,1627 a Safavid khalifa directly charged by the Shah with organizing the 
qizilbash population especially living in the Province of Rum for an uprising, and the 
other being led by indigenous khalifas and Sultan Murad.  
                                                 
1627 HR claims that Nur Ali Khalifa was coming from Rum. See HR, p. 164.  
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Archival evidence clearly reveals that, whether sincerely or as a political 
maneuver, Prince Murad put the qizilbash tāc on. Furthermore he was among the leading 
figures who organized the qizilbash movement in Çorum, Amasya, and Tokat region.1628 
A contemporary report points out his central role in organizing qizilbashes of the region 
for an uprising against Selim. In this report, it is written to the Porte that Murad wore 
qizilbash tāc and became qizilbash. A certain Kara Iskender, one of the leading qizilbash 
khalifas in the region, was responsible for converting the prince into a qizilbash. After 
becoming qizilbash, Murad gathered more than 10.000 qizilbashes as his soldiers and 
rebelled.1629  
An undated report of Yusuf, one of Selim’s prominent spies in Anatolia, gives 
details on the co-operation of Sultan Murad with the qizilbash khalifas. According to 
Yusuf’s report, in late mid-April, 1512, he was informed that Murad sent messengers to 
the cities around and gathered the qizilbash fighters around him. In 5 or 6 days, more 
than ten thousand men were summoned in Geldigelen, south of Amasya. Yusuf 
mentions a certain Đsa Halife-oğlı who seems to have been among the prominent 
qizilbash khalifas. He was imprisoned by Murad in Çorum when Ahmed left Amasya 
but then he was freed, as one of the two leaders of the qizilbash group.1630 The same 
information is recorded in another contemporary report. It is recorded here that Murad 
was suggested during a banquet of drink (hamr-i sohbet) to free Đsa Halife-oğlı, who 
could gather thousands of sufis per day; by this Murad could collect a great number of 
soldiers without any expense. Murad accepted the offer, freed Đsa Halife-oğlı, and 
                                                 
1628 Yusuf, one of the leading spies of Selim in Anatolia, says in one of his letters that although he had not 
accepted to inspect the situation of Sultan Murad and his relations with qizilbashes at that time, he would 
accept this mission. See TSA, document 5877.  
1629 “…Haliyen bu diyarda sofular başkaldırub huruç etdiler. Kara Đskender nam şahsın idlaliyle Sultan 
Murad taç geyüb sürhseri  gendüye asker etdi. On binden ziyade oldular…” TSA, document E 6522.  
1630 TSA, document E 7292. 
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included him in his suit. Then they dispatched sufi messengers to the khalifas explaining 
the situation, which excited qizilbashes of the region.1631  
According to Yusuf’s report, the other leader of the insurgent was Davud Halife-
oğlı. Yusuf states that all the Sufis around Iskilip either joined them or were on their 
way. All the male members of families joined. He also mentions a certain Aslıhan Ağa, 
who seems to have been among respected āyāns. One of his sons had already joined 
qizilbash rebels. He too received a tāc (tāc of the Shah indicating adherence to the 
Safavid religious path) and was to go with his other son. Their number was said to be 
around thirty thousands. They looted the villages on their way, robbed the qadi of 
Çorum who was returning from Amasya and cut one of his arms.1632 These qizilbash 
vagabonds also attacked and looted Zünnun Beg, one of Turkoman begs, and Barak Beg 
on their way.1633  
The other contemporary report confirms Yusuf’s account.  
Haliyen bu diyarda sofular başkaldırub huruç etdiler. Kara Đskender nām şahsın 
idlāliyle Sultan Murad tāç geyüb sürhseri (kızılbaş) gendüye asker etdi. On 
binden ziyade oldular. Yevmen fe yevmen Sofu Đsa halife oğlu nam mülhidin 
üzerine cem olurlar. Ve Seydi Ali Halife dahi kendüye nûger olub Geldigelen’e 
yığıldılar ki fesād-ı azim edeler. Nice köyler talan etdiler ve nice ademleri katl 
edüb atların ve esbabların yağmaladılar. Bu diyarda emn kalmadı Alaüddevle’ye 
varuruz derler. Sultan Murad her tarafa ademler gönderüb her halifeyi 
tenbihleyüb asker cem’ eder.1634 
 
Yusuf points out in his report that Sultan Murad does not join them yet; but he is 
said to arrive soon, to wear the tāc and prostrate to the Shah. According to another 
                                                 
1631 “... Bir havadis dahi budur ki Çorum’da Đsa Halife oğlunu Sultan Murad habsden çıkarır her gün ana 
bin sofu cem’ eder. Ulufesiz haraçsız her ne muradın var ise idesiz. Ol dahi hamr-i sohbette dedikleri gibi 
edüb mezkūru habisten çıkarub kenduya nöker edüb etraf u cevānibe sofular gönderüb her halifeye 
macerayı ilam edüb anlar dahi eski mezheplerin izhar edüb dâl ve mudill olub sebb-i sahabe ve katl-i nefs 
ve nehb-i emval ettiler...” TSA, document E 6522.  
1632 In document E 6522, the qadi of Corum is reported to be killed by sufis.  
1633 TSA, document E 7292. 
1634 TSA, document E 6522. This document is partly published in ULCY2, pp. 128-9.  
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contemporary report, twenty sufis gathered around Murad in Amasya. They entered the 
city by repelling religious scholars (hocalar) and commanders (paşalar); and they 
conducted outrages there as well. After killing lots of people (most probably from 
among sunni population), they moved with Sultan Murad to Geldigelen.1635  
Yusuf also reports that after recognizing the real goals and nature of qizilbashes, 
Murad regretted because of his adherence to the qizilbash movement. He arrived at such 
a decision in consultation with Kara Iskender and Mihmanoğlu, one of his captains. His 
commanders were in fear and looking for a suitable opportunity to flee. Yusuf also 
records a hearsay that the secret intention of the Sufi was to execute Murad’s 
commander and tutor. Yusuf says that “they are still gathering. Their intention after 
gathering in full numbers is said to go to Dulkadir country. … The son of Ahmed Çelebi 
[Murad] arrived in Amasya and sent a tāc to the qādi of Amasya ordering him to put on. 
On receiving, the qādi wore it by saying ‘it is the sultanic order!’” The Turkish text of 
Yusuf’s report runs,  
Eğer bu diyarın ahvālinden istifsar buyurulursa, şimdiki halde harabe müteveccih 
oldu. Sultan Murad etrāf-ı aleme ulak salup kande kızılbaş var ise yanına 
cem eyledi. (Muharrem ayının aharında) haber olundu, beş altı güne değin 
Geldigelen ovasına on bin vardır derler cem oldu. Meğer ki Đsa Halife oğlu 
derlerdi Çorumda bir oğlan var idi. Sultan Ahmed bu diyardan gitdüği vakit 
Sultan Murad habs etmişdi. Anı koyuverdi. Başlarının biri ol ve biri dahi Davud 
Halife oğlu derler Đskilip diyarında ne mikdar sofu varsa kimi gitdi, dahi gidiyor. 
Bir evde ne mikdar erkek adem var ise hepsi gitdi. Aslıhan Ağa’nın da bir oğlu 
gitdi. Ve kenduya dahi taç geldi. Bir oğluyla dahi kendu gitmek sadedindedir. 
Askeri yirmi otuz binden fark etmez derler. Cem oldukları yerde olan köyleri 
soydular. Çorum kadısı Amasya’dan gelürmüş, bir bölük sofuya uğramış. Dutup 
soymuşlar nesi var ise aldukdan sonra bir elin kesmişler. Türkman beglerinden 
Zünnun Beg derler imiş üzerine adem seçmişler. Kendusu duyub kaçmış. 
Taalukatını kırub rızkını ve esbābını almışlar. Barak Beg oğlunun dahi evini 
yağmalamışlar deyu haber geldi. Yağluca dahi etrafında olan köyleri 
                                                 
1635 “… Amasya’da yirmi bin sofu cem’ olub nice müslümanları ehl-i ilimden ve halvetī olan 
kimesnelerden katl etdiler. Sultan Murad’ı alub Geldigelen’e götürdüler. Anda dahi fesād-ı azim etdiler. 
Hocaların ve paşaların kaçırub şehre girdiler…” TSA, document E 6522.  
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yağmaladıkları mukarrer. Sultan Murad dahi içlerine gelub girmedi. Amma bu 
gün yarın gelür, taç örter (urunur), Şah’a secde eder derler. Sürhserin bu asıl 
hareketini görüp cemiyetlerine nazar edicek etdiğü (ne) sonra peşiman olmuşdur 
derler. Meğer ki bu fikri bu tedbiri bir kendu ve bir Kara Đskender derler ve biri 
dahi kendu çavuşlarından Mihmanoğlu derlermiş, bu üçünün fikriyle ve 
tedbiriyle olmuş. Paşaları havf edüb bu gün yarın fırsat bulurlarsa kaçarlar. Ve 
hem sofunun kasdı varımış ki paşalarını ve hocasını katletmeğe. Şimdiki halde 
dahi cem olunmak üzerindedir. Tamam oldukdan sonra Alaüddevle üzerine gider 
derler. Hak teala kemal-i lütfundan bu zalemei def edemezse ehl-i Đslamın hali bu 
diyarda gayet mükedderdir. Amma es-seyf ve amma el-küfr deyub dururlar. 
Ahmed Çelebi oğlu Amasya’da olageldi kendusu Amasya kadısına taç gönderdi, 
örtsün (urunsun) deyu. Ol dahi almış, emr-i padişahidir örtelüm (urundum) 
demiş. Bu babda şol ki beyan vaki dir arz olundu. Baki emr hazretinize 
mufavvazdır. 
Veddua  
kema yelik Yusuf1636 
Murad assigned Kara Iskender to the governorship of Iskilip. Then the dwellers 
of the city were terrorized; some of them fled to mountains and some others took shelter 
in the fortress of the city. They sent message to Ahmed requesting help. On learning the 
situation Ahmed dispatched an army of ten thousand soldiers under the command of 
Davud Pasha and Kızıl Ahmed-oğlı. The report from which this information is derived 
was written when this army was on the way. In the meantime, the army of sufis arrived 
in Sivas by setting the region on their way on fire and sent a messenger to the Shah.1637 
The proceeding of Ahmed’s troops under the command of Davud Pasha and 
Kızıl Ahmed-oğlı is not recorded in this document, and unfortunately not in any other 
documents known to us. But Kemalpaşazāde’s account seems to complete the story. As 
delineated above, Kemalpaşazāde states that when the plunders and outrages of 
qizilbashes heavily burdened the local population, Ahmed sent troops against these 
                                                 
1636 TSA, document E 7292. Almost all text is also published in ULCY2, pp. 129-30.  
1637 “…Ve Đskilib’i Kara Đskender’e verdi. Đl ve şehir ürküb kimi dağa ve kimi kaleye girdiler. Sultan 
Ahmed’e ulaklar gitdi. Feryat etdiler. Ol dahi on bin ademle Davud Paşa oğluyla ve Kızıl Ahmed oğluyla 
asker gönderdi. Yolda gelür derler. Nebi Halife bu vechile haber getürdü. Ve sofu askeri şimdi yıka yıka 
Sivas’a çıkub Şah’a elçi gönderdiler. Bu diyarın ahvali bir dürlü dahi oldu. Ehl-i Đslam muhatarada ve 
tehlikede kaldı…“ TSA, document E 6522. 
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qizilbashes led by Kara Iskender, which were defeated by Ahmed’s troops. 
Kemalpaşazāde further says that on hearing this, Murad did not go to join his father, but 
moved towards Tokat. A contemporary spy report confirms this. It records that although 
Sultan Ahmed dispatched several orders to Prince Murad to come and join his forces, 
Murad did not comply with this order by stating that “I have a number of enemies 
here.”1638 Thus, putting two accounts together, it appears that after assigning Kara 
Iskender to the governorship of Iskilip, Murad set off with other qizilbashes for Sivas. 
Remembering that Tokat was on the way between Iskilip and Sivas, Kemalpaşazāde’s 
account seems to be quite compatible with the archival evidence. On the other hand, the 
people living in and around Iskilip demanded help from Ahmed against Kara Iskender. 
Ahmed sent ten thousand soldiers to free Iskilip from Kara Iskender’s assault. This was 
the first middle-scale army sent by Ahmed against the qizilbash rebels. Although 
Kemalpaşazāde says that Kara Iskender was slain during this battle, it is probably not 
true since we see him in the following events. But it is highly possible that qizilbashes 
were defeated.   
According to Kemalpaşazāde, shortly before this event, Shah Ismail had sent 
troops into Anatolia under the command of Nur Ali, who seized Tokat in the name of the 
Shah. Murad and Nur Ali met in Kazova near Tokat and they together went to the Shah. 
It is also recorded, though vaguely, in a letter written to Selim by a certain Hacı Kemal, 
that Sultan Murad met with Nur Ali Khalifa and inclined towards the East [i.e. the 
country of the Shah]. Hacı Kemal reports this event as he learned from the letter of the 
                                                 
1638 It is recorded in the report of Mir-ālem Mustafa, one of Selim’s spies in Anatolia, that“... Ve Sultan 
Murad ahvālinden sorarsanız defaatle gelesin deyū ulaklar varub, benim bu yana düşmanlarum vardur 
demiş. ...” See TSA, document E 2667. 
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governor of Sivas.1639 So Kemalpaşazāde’s account is fairly compatible with archival 
evidence except for the last assertion. As will be evaluated below, Nur Ali Khalifa 
would not return to Iran with Sultan Murad. As for Sultan Murad, however, it is highly 
possible that he went to Iran through Sivas for he is not mentioned in the context of later 
events. Likewise, as Uluçay indicates, Murad wrote a letter to his father from Sivas 
suggesting he go to the Shah together.1640 We know from contemporary sources that 
Murad went to Iran during his father’s struggle with Selim and died there after a couple 
of years.1641  
Safavid chronicles also mention Murad’s relation with the Shah and Nur Ali 
Khalifa. For instance, Hasan-ı Rumlu states that Murad – with ten thousands qizilbashes 
with him – met Nur Ali Khalifa in Kaz Çayırı after the latter captured Tokat and read 
hutbe in the name of the Shah. Then they together turned back to Tokat. But this time 
the townspeople showed signs of resistance. Then the qizilbashes set the city on fire and 
went to Niksar. Hasan-ı Rumlu says that in Niksar Murad left Nur Ali and went to the 
realm of the Shah.1642 He must have followed the way through Sivas. But before arriving 
Sivas, in Artuğak a serious disagreement rose up within qizilbashes among Murad’s 
company. Yahya Pehlivan and Dev Ali suggested going to the Shah while Kara Đskender 
advocated going to Dulkadiroğlu Alauddevle Beg. The two groups clashed with each 
                                                 
1639 “…Şimdiki hālde Sivas sancağı beginden ādem ve mektub gelüb tastīr olan cevab budur ki, bundan 
evvel Sultan Murad Nur Halife ile Kızılbaş elçisi ile şark tarafına müteveccih olub...” The letter of Hacı 
Kemal, a possible spy of Selim. At the end of the letter Kemal wants Selim to pass Anatolia as soon as 
possible. Therefore, it must have been written before Selim move to Anatolia on July 29, 1512. See TSA, 
document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 130.  
1640 ULCY2, p. 131.  
1641 In addition to KPZ and CLZ see IDRS, p. 115; HSE4, pp. 165-6; ALI, pp. 1068-9; SLZ2, p. 13; MNB, 
p. 456. The latter four sources points out that Murad fled to Shah Ismail and died in Persia after three or 
four years.  
1642 HR, p. 165.  
 485 
other. It was rumored that after this fight, Yahya Pehlivan and Dev Ali died.1643 The rest 
of qizilbashes moved eastward. In his report dated May 17, 1512, Sultan Musa, the son 
of Prince Mahmud, the governor of Kastamonu, reported this event to Selim as follows,  
... Murad Beg ki ol eşirrayı cem’ idüb Artuğak (قا غdرا ) nām mevzie varmışlar 
idi. Đttifak Murad Beg cānibinden Kara Đskender Beg Alāüddevle üzerine 
Pehlivan Yahya ve Dev Ali bunlara muhalefet idüb biz Şah Đsmail’e giderüz 
deyū ayru baş çeküb iki taraf birbirlerine girüb şaha gideriz diyenler tarafından 
haylı sofu kırılub ve Yahya ve Dev Ali’nin başı kesilüb bāki varan eşirra dahī 
gelüb Kara Đskender cānibine tābi olmuşlar ve andan sonra Alāüddevle Beg’in 
güveyisi Murad Han bir bir cānibden buluşub bir mikdar sofu kırmış fi’l-cümle 
bu ahvāl ma’lumumuz olduğu üzere i’lām olundu. ...”1644 
 
As clearly seen in this document, Kara Iskender had not been slain by troops of 
Ahmed. After killing Pehlevan Yahya and Dev Ali, Kara Iskender subdued the other 
qizilbash group as well. But what happened to the qizilbashes under the leadership of 
Kara Iskender and Murad after this disagreement is not clear in the document. 
According to Sutan Musa, although Kara Iskender was in favor of going to Dulkadir 
territories, Murad Han, the son-in-law of Alāüddevle Beg, attacked the qizilbash group 
and killed a number of them just after their internal fight. Thus it would not be wrong to 
assume that they, with Prince Murad, consequently set off for Iran.   
Independent from Kara Iskender and Murad, there were other local qizilbash 
uprisings as well. For example, Kürd Halid Beg1645 rose up in the name of the shah and 
plundered some of the towns of Karahisar, such as Suşehri, Akşehir, and Şaphāne. In the 
                                                 
1643 ULCY2, p. 130. 
1644 TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 132.  
1645 Kürd Halid was one of the Kürd begs who adhered to the qizilbash movement. An archival document 
accounts him among qizilbash begs, along with Lala Beg, Bayram Beg, Hacı Rüstem etc., moving under 
the direction of Shah Ismail. (See TSA, document E 7620. The full tranascribed text and facsimile copy of 
this document are published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Deux rapports sur Şāh Isma’il et les 
Özbeks (Études Turco-Safavides, X)”, Quand le crible était dans la paille :hommage à Pertev Naili 
Boratav, Paris, 1978, pp. 68-73.) He had been active in the Province of Rum during the Shahkulu rebellion 
as well. After Ismail’s defeat in Çaldıran, however, he wanted to change sides demanding refugee from 
Selim. Nevertheless, he was put to death with his one hundred and fifty men. See “The Battle of Çaldıran” 
in this study.  
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meantime, two Safavid khalifs, Şah Ali and Şahkulu attacked Şiran and Alucra, killing 
the subaşı. Apart from them, a certain Memiş and Menteş wore the qizilbash tāc in 
Kürtün and had the population of the region profess adherence to qizilbashism. After a 
while, all these small qizilbash groups came together and intended to capture Trabzon in 
the name of the Shah. Nonetheless, they were dispersed by an Ottoman force and forced 
to retire to Yukarı Kelkid, where they continued banditry.1646  
Turning back to the adventure of Nur Ali Khalifa, all the contemporary sources 
agree on that he was among leading khalifas of Shah Ismail and was commissioned by 
the Shah directly to organize the qizilbashes of Rum against the Ottomans. HR states 
that “when the Khāqān-i Iskandar-sha’n (Isma’īl) heard of the (state of) revolt in the 
land of Rūm, he sent Nur Ali Khalifa Rūmlū to those regions for the purpose of 
gathering the devoted Sūfīs together. When Khalifa reached Qarā Hisār, some three or 
four thousands horsemen among the Sūfīs of Rūm and the murīds of that region joined 
him with their families.”1647 Taking courage from this support, Nur Ali marched toward 
Malatya. On hearing this, Faik Beg, who was the Ottoman governor of Malatya1648, 
prepared a small-scale army of three thousand cavalries against qizilbashes. Two armies 
met in Tokat. After routing Ottoman cavalries, Nur Ali entered Tokat and read hutbe in 
the name of Shah Ismail. Some of the townspeople visited Khalifa and were received 
honor.1649 Then he went to Kazova, where Murad joined him.  
                                                 
1646 TSA, document E 6672. The facsimile copy of this document is published in TNSS, appendix, 
document 16. For a summary of the document also see p. 68 in the same work.  
1647 Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, pp. 82-3, recited from 
A Chronicle of the Early Safawīs, being the Ahsanu’t-Tawārikh of Hasan-i Rūmlū, vol. I (Persian Text), 
ed. C. N. Seddon, Baroda, 1931, p. 134-5. Also see HR, p. 164. 
1648 sic 
1649 HR, pp. 164-5. 
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In Niksar, Nur Ali Khalifa left the other qizilbash group, which was led by 
Sultan Murad, Kara Iskender and some other local khalifas. After pillaging some towns 
he set off for Erzincan. But on the way, in Eyu-yazı (يز`dا ), he heard that an Ottoman 
army of fifteen thousand men under the command of Sinan Pasha was approaching. He 
then organized qizilbash troops for the battle. After a bloody fight which continued from 
the afternoon prayer until sunset, Ottomans were routed and Sinan Pasha fled. HR says 
that Sinan Pasha was killed while he was fleeing.1650 Nevertheless, this is not true as 
evidently seen in archival evidence. 
Ottoman archival documents also indicate some details of this battle. As we learn 
from the letter of Hacı Kemal, Ahmed sent troops with his vizier Sinan Pasha to Amasya 
where the pasha gathered further soldiers among local people. Sinan Pasha first aimed to 
march on Sultan Musa, whose allegiance to Selim was already delineated.1651 
Nonetheless he later changed his mind and turned against Nur Ali Khalifa since he was 
deemed vulnerable by the pasha. Sinan Pasha’s army met the qizilbashes under the 
command of Nur Ali in Koyulhisar, in the north of Sivas. During the battle, the Karaman 
troops in the Ottoman ranks withdrew. At the end Ottomans were defeated. Sinan Pasha 
could hardly save his head by fleeing from the battlefield. Nur Ali sent one hundred 
qizilbashes to catch him. Nonetheless, this small qizilbash group was surrounded in 
Çithanı, near Sivas, by the troops of the governor of Sivas and were slain. On hearing 
this, Nur Ali set of for Sivas in order to capture and plunder the city.  
Şimdiki hālde Sivas sancağı beginden ādem ve mektub gelüb tastīr olan cevab 
budur ki, bundan evvel Sultan Murad Nur Halife ile Kızılbaş elçisi ile şark 
tarafına müteveccih olub Sultan Ahmed Beg tarafından Sinan Paşa’ya bir nice 
ādem koşulub gelüb Amasya’da ol yerün atlusundan ve yeyağından birkaç bin 
                                                 
1650 HR, pp. 165-6. Also consider AA, p. 68.  
1651 See his letter to Selim above.  
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ādem cem’ idüb Sultan Musa üzerine hücum etmek kasdında iken yine avdet 
edüb Nur Ali Halife zebundur deyub ardından ılgar idüb varub Koyulhisar’da 
ardından yetüb ikindi vaktında beraber olunub hayli cenk olub sağ koldan hain 
Karamanlu kaçub bu sebebden Sinan Paşa münhezim olub iki bin mikdarı piyāde 
kılıçdan geçüb ardınca Sinan Paşa’nın yüz mikdar kızılbaş gönderüb Sivas’tan 
yukaru Çithanı’na gelicek Sivas Begi’nin anda bir mikdar askeri hazır bulunub 
yüz kızılbaşı araya alub kırmışlar. Nur Ali’ye bu haber varıcak Sivas’ı talan ve 
gasbetmeğe kasdedüb bi’l-fiil Sivas üzerine gelmek üzeredür. ... ve dahī Sinan 
Paşa’yı münhezim iden Yapoğlu Şah Beg’dir ki evel āhar hiyānetlik ile 
meşhurdur.1652  
 
Whether or not Nur Ali attacked on Sivas is not clear from available sources. If 
we rely on Hasan-ı Rumlu, after his victory over Sinan Pasha, Nur Ali Khalifa went to 
Erzincan, which had been allotted to him, dispatching the heads of the Rūmīs, together 
with large quantities of booty, to Ismail’s court.1653 Two years later, Hasan-ı Rumlu 
mentions him among the influential qizilbash leaders in the battlefield of Çaldıran.1654 
Three years later, however, he was certainly in Erzincan. In the letter written to Selim by 
a certain Mehmed1655, it is reported that after the return of imperial army from Kemah, 
Nur Ali Khalifa came from Harput, crossed Murad River, and was on his way towards 
Ovacık. Mehmed, who was also the commander of Ottoman troops, adds that some 
tribal Turkoman leaders such as Ulaş, Yaraş, Aygutlu, Yusuf Varsak, alongside with a 
certain Saru Şeyh, also attended the army of Nur Ali. Furthermore, in this qizilbash 
army, there was also a number of korucus1656, who came from Iran (Yukaru Cānib).  
… ol menbā-ı fitne vü fesad mecma’-ı ehl-i tuğyan u ilhād ser defter-i 
mütemerridin Nur Ali Halife-i bi-din bazı kendu emsali melāin ile Ulaş ve Yaraş 
                                                 
1652 TSA, document E 2667, partly published in ULCY2, p. 130.  
1653 HR, p. 166.  
1654 HR, p. 178. 
1655 According to ULCY, this man was most probably Mirahur Bıyıklı Mehmed Aga. See ULCY2, p. 130. 
HR affirms this idea. But it mentions him as Bıyıklı Çavuş Mustafa, Selim’s governor of Trabzon. See 
HR, p. 190. 
1656 The name of the special soldiers in the army of Shah Ismail. These troops were directly bound to the 
Shah and their primary duty was to protect the Shah.  
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ve Aygutlu ve Yusuf Varsak ve Saru Şeyh lāinin divan begi ve bazı askeriyle ve 
yukarıdan gelmiş bir nice korucuyla Harput’dan gelüb Murad suyun geçüb…1657 
 
We learn from the rest of Mehmed’s letter that Ottoman troops and qizilbash 
fighters under the command of Nur Ali confronted in Göksu on June 21, 1515.1658 HR 
follows a similar line of narration. To him, on learning Mustafa Pasha’s [Mehmed] 
approach to Erzincan, Nur Ali Khalifa, with Aygutoğlu Muhammed Beg, mobilized his 
troops against the Ottomans. Two armies met near Çemişkezek. After a bloody battle, 
Nur Ali Khalifa was killed with many qizilbashes and the rest dispersed, among which 
was Aygutoğlu as well.1659 According to Mehmed’s report, however, the battle took 
place in Göksu.1660  
                                                 
1657 This document is the letter of certain Mehmed to Selim. In the rest of the letter he also says that 
Aygutoğlu and Yusuf Varsak escaped. See TSA, document E 6316, published in ULCY2, pp. 130-1.  
1658 Mehmed says in his report that they moved from Rum Saray on Rebī I, Thursday. But he does not 
specify the year. According to the report the battle took place eight days later on Friday. ULCY takes the 
year as 918. Rebi I 1, 918 corresponds July 15, 1512, Thursday. Nevertheless, the events mentioned in the 
document obviously took place in the summer of 1515, when Selim captured the fortress of Kemah. 
Furthermore, in July, 1512 Selim was not in a position to send any army to eastern Anatolia for he was to 
cross Anatolia on July 29 and Ahmed was in control of central and eastern Anatolian provinces. Thus, the 
year must be taken as 921. However, Rebī I 1, 921 was not Thursday but Wednesday. Indeed, Mehmed 
says gurre-i Rebī I.  The word ‘gurre’ is normally used for the first day and the night of months in Arabic 
calendar. (Ferit Develioğlu, Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lügat, Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2006, p. 295) 
In this case, Mehmed seems to have used the same term for the second day of the month as well. In 
addition, HR also mentions this battle among the events of the year 921. His account is quite compatible 
with the report of Mehmed. See AT, p. 190. 
1659 See HR, p. 190. 
1660 “… Ordu-yı hümayun yümn-ü ikballe Kemah’dan müracaat etdükde ol menba-ı fitne vü fesad 
mecma’-ı ehl-i tuğyan u ilhad ser defter-i mütemerridin Nur Ali Halife-i bi-din bazı kendu emsali melain 
ile Ulaş ve Yaraş ve Aygutlu ve Yusuf Varsak ve Saru Şeyh lainin divan begi ve bazı askeriyle ve 
yukarıdan gelmiş bir nice korucuyla Harput’dan gelüb Murad suyun geçüb beş yüzden ziyade melahid-i 
melain gümrahla Pir Hasan Beg’in haberin alub anın kasdın ovacuğa azmedüb fitne-i fesada … itdüğü 
istima’ olıcak…hazır bulunan dilīr-i dilāverleri istimāletleyüb himen ve ināyet-i şāhāneyi ümidvār idüb 
mübārek şehr-i Cemaziyelevvelin gurresi Penşembih günü te’hir ve tefakkuf etmeyüb Rum Saray’dan ol 
taife-i evbaş kasdına Kıruçan yolundan ılgar edüb akeblerin girizgahların alub Düşenbih günü begne’s-
salâtin vaktinde Göksu kenarındaki şeşenbih günü ale’s-sabah sudan geçüb yemin ve yesar ve kalb ve 
cenahı tertib edüb sağ kolda Guraba Ağası Hüseyin bendeniz ihtiyarlarıyla yoldaşlığa kalan kapu halkın 
koşub üç yüz mikdarı erle tarh koyub sol kola dahi karındaşım Hızır bendenüzle Nur Ali Beg orçulu(?) 
Karahisar sancağının bazı güzide erleri ve Yapaoğlu Đskender bendenüz ki gelen Karamanluya ve bazı 
ihtiyarlarıyla ve yoldaşlığa gelen subaşı ve erbab-ı timar ve gönüllüyü yüz mikdar dilāverlerle tarh koyub 
Canik sancakbegi Baltaoğlu kalbde sağ tarafda Asitane-i saadetden himmet ve inayetle gelen ümera-i 
ekrad Kaasım Beg ve Pir Hasan Beg sancaklarıyla ve haliyen gelen Atak begi Ahmed Beg ile Sultan 
Ahmed Beg’i kalbde sol canibe ve bu bendeye mahsus yarar adem ve bendelerünüz kalbde sancak önünde 
tayin olunub .... Serdarları olan lāin Nur Ali-i bî-din hayli cenk edüb āhar zahm-ı sehimnâkle mecrūh ve 
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Mehmed’s letter clarifies two crucial points which are important in assessing this 
movement correctly: the first point is that the assertion repeated in chronicles that Nur 
Ali was an agent of Shah Ismail and was sent to Anatolia with the aim of organizing 
qizilbashes against the Ottoman authority. The attendance of Ismail’s special force in the 
army of Nur Ali clearly proves this argument. The second point is perhaps more 
important for the purpose of this study. This document evidently shows that when Ismail 
sent one of his khalifas to Anatolia to initiate an insurgence, his prominent supporters 
were appeared as the tribal Turkoman fighters. As indicated several times before, these 
social classes in central and eastern Anatolia were the natural allies to the qizilbash 
movement in Anatolia.  Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, while questioning the reasons 
behind the widely acceptance of Safavid propaganda in central and eastern Anatolia 
rather than other parts of the Ottoman lands, also comes out with the same conclusion. 
She studies the survey registers of several regions and truly observes that the reason 
must be sought in the socio-political structure of these regions which were densely 
populated by tribal people. She says,  
Les documents conservés aux Archives du Palais de Topkapi ne laissent donc 
subsister aucun doute sur le fait que les Safawides essayèrent de miner l’Êtat 
ottoman par l’intérieur. Mais pourquoi exerçaient-ils une telle emprise sur 
l’Anatolie centrale et orientale ? On comprend mieux la situation lorsqu’on 
feuillette les registres de cadastre que la Porte établissait à des intervalles plus 
ou moins réguliers. Ceux-ci montrent que la structure sociale en Anatolie 
centrale et orientale n’était pas le même que dans les reste de l’Êtat ottoman. 
Tandis que les recensements en Roumélie et en Anatolie occidentale étaient 
dressés par villes et villages, les recensements de l’Anatolie orientale étaient faits 
par tribus. Pour la Qaramanie le recensement était mixte. Nous avons d’une part 
le recensement des centres urbains et des villages qui en dépendaient et d’autre 
part les recensement des tribus et des clans. Ceci montre que le sentiment 
d’appartenir à telle ou telle tribu l’emportait sur toute autre notion et que, pour 
                                                                                                                                                
giriftār gelicek diri durmağa kabil olmaduğu sebepten kelle-i bi-devletleri alınub ve nice dahi korucu ve 
yararları dahi cenkde düşüb bāki binden ziyāde melāin-i gümrah tu’me-i şemşir-i gaaziyan-ı din penāh 
olub…” TSA, document E 6316.  
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entraîner la masse, suffisait de s’assurrer de la sympathie d’un chef de tribu ou 
clan mécontent de la vie.1661  
 
As pointed out before, Sultan Murad had already arrived in Iran before the battle 
between Nur Ali and Ottoman troops. As already indicated, the Ottoman Chronicles 
provides two distinctive line of narration regarding the end of Murad: Kemalpaşazāde 
and Celalzāde argue that he was killed by the Shah on his arrival while Idrīs argues that 
he died in Iran after three of four years. Nevertheless, Idrīs does not mention Murad’s 
activities in the country of Ismail. Two letters written by contemporary officials prove 
Idrīs’s account. Furthermore, they give quite valuable details regarding the actions of 
Murad under the auspice of the Shah.  
The first letter was written by Şadi Beg to Selim when he was in Bursa. 
Although the date of the letter is not specified, the context of the events suggests that it 
was most probably written between December of 1512 and January of 1513.1662 In his 
letter, Şadi Beg reports the developments in ‘the other side’ (yukaru cānib), which was 
derived from the spies dispatched before. Learning from this report, Shah Ismail, after 
dispatching some of his troops to Khorasan,1663 sent Dev Ali and Sultan Murad towards 
Ottoman territories in order to capture the country of Rum while he turned towards 
Isfahan to spend the winter. But, on hearing the defeat of his troops in Khorasan against 
Özbeks, he proceeded toward this territory.1664 
                                                 
1661 Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les 
Safawides”, Revue des Études Islamiques, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, pp. 399-340. I would like to remind 
here, for the purpose of this chapter, that they were also one of the main sources of Ahmed’s troops 
expected to be fought against Selim’s Janissaries, Kapıkulu soldiers, and later on sipāhis.  
1662 See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, p. 31. 
1663 In November 1512, a Safavid army under the command of vākil Yar Ahmed Huzānī, who was killed 
in the battlefield, was defeated by Özbeks in Gac-Davān. Ismail then sent supplementary troops to secure 
his eastern borders. For further reading see Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs 
voisins, p. 30.  
1664 TSA, document E 6478/2. 
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Şadi Beg says that Ismail warned Dev Ali on that if he would hear about the 
advent of Selim then he would not enter Anatolia but wait for him [Ismail]. Otherwise 
Dev Ali and Murad were to go down to Anatolia and to conquer the lands in the name of 
the Shah. Shah Ismail had already allocated the provinces of Anatolia to his confidants, 
all of whom were included in the qizilbash army under the command of Dev Ali. In this 
distribution of the Shah, Sultan Murad was appointed as the beylerbey of Anatolia. 
Ismail also wrote a letter to Prince Ahmed advising him to go to Rum, to wait for his 
help, which would soon arrive. However, for the time being, Ismail said to Ahmed, his 
troops under the command of Dev Ali were ready to provide any support when he 
[Ahmed] needed. When Ahmed went down to Rum [from Darende], he sent a messenger 
to Dev Ali to demand military aid by reminding Ismail’s promise. The answer of Dev 
Ali, however, was not affirmative. He said that it was the strict order of their Shah that 
they were not to enter Rum while Selim was in Anatolia. At the same time, Dev Ali sent 
the messenger of Ahmed with his letter to the Shah and requested the majestic 
instructions.1665  
Safavid chronicles also affirm Ismail’s intention to employ Murad in order to 
strengthen his power in Anatolia. After the execution of Ahmed, Murad continued to 
contest the succession with Selim on the support of the Shah. According to Tārikh-i 
Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh, Ismail’s plan was to use Murad to provoke a rebellion against Selim. 
For this purpose, qizilbash troops under Div Sultan and Muhammed Han Ustaclu 
escorted Murad to Sivas. Nonetheless, since no support for him was materialized, this 
                                                 
1665 TSA, document E 6478/2. 
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plan was abandoned. Before the end of 1512, Murad gave up the struggle against Selim 
and returned to Iran, where he was granted asylum by Ismail.1666   
Another contemporary report, namely the letter of Mamay1667, narrates the events 
in the same way. What Mamay adds, however, is that Ismail’s decision to send troops 
toward Anatolia was mostly due to Sultan Murad’s advice; he said that that side of Rum 
would join their side. Another detail recorded in Mamay’s letter, which is absent in the 
other, is that when Dev Ali and Murad arrived in Said Çuhuru with one thousand men, 
they learnt that Selim crossed to Anatolia with imperial army. Then they decided not to 
go to Rum but wrote a letter describing the situation to the Shah, who ordered them to 
stay where they were.  
... hāliyen bu tarafda mütecella olan haber budur ki bu bende-i kemine Şah 
Đsmaile ademler irsal etmişdi elçi suretinde bir iki atla şimdiki halde avdet edüb 
gelüb böyle haber verdiler ki Şah Đsmaile Gök Kavak mevziinde vasıl olub bir ay 
mikdarı bile geçüb Đsfahan kurbına bile varub andan avdet etdiler ol haletde Dev 
Aliyi Sultan Muradla bu tarafa tayin etdiler Sultan Murad söziyle ki Rumun berü 
geçesi bize dönse gerekdür deyü vakti ki Said Çuhurına vusul buldı bin mikdarı 
Ademle istima etdiler ki rikabı rikab-ı hümāyunları devlet-i kamrani ve saadeti 
cavidani birle berü geçede nuzul-ü iclal buyurdu. Ol rey tehir olundu. Anda Şah 
Đsmail ile arz etdiler. Andan cevab böyle geldi ki yerinde otursun Said 
Çuhurundan hareket etmesin deyu ve Keçebaş1668 leşkeri galib olub Şah Đsmail 
üzerinde iki bin adem mikdarı kalmadı olan askerin Horasan tarafına 
gönderdi...1669 
 
Consequently, the qizilbashes of Erzincan and Bayburd1670 maintained their 
position and watch over Selim’s movement. Meanwhile, they sent letters and 
messengers to the qizilbashes living in the Ottoman side promising them to come in the 
                                                 
1666 Cited in Roger Savory, Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 
1965, p. 82. 
1667 Mamluk governor of Malatya-Divriği region. See ULCY2, p. 123; Bacqué-Grammont, Les Ottomans, 
les Safavides et leurs voisins, p. 39.  
1668 Refers to Ozbeks, which were also called as ‘Yeşilbaş’. For further explanation see Bacqué-
Grammont, Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, p. 42, footnote, 71.  
1669 TSA, document E 8758. The whole text of the document is published by Bacqué-Grammont. See his 
Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, pp. 40-41. 
1670 Then, these cities were included in Safavid territories  
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next spring. The qizilbash propagandists were spreading the news that even the Shah 
was in preparation to march toward Anatolia and warning them to take necessary 
precautions for a great advent. Şadi Beg says that they sent a messenger to Çepni tribe 
living in the Province of Trabzon as well. The qizilbashes of this region even intended to 
capture Trabzon by way of banditry. Şadi Beg also describes the difficult situation of 
Torul fortress, near Trabzon.1671 He says that although they stocked some provision in 
the fortress some time ago, since transportation was cut off by qizilbashes, they could 
not provide additional supply; thus, the food in the fortress was about to finish. Ottoman 
soldiers could not go out of the fortress as well.  
In the last part of his letter, Şadi Beg points out the weakness of the Shah’s 
situation. He reports that although the voice of the Shah was seemingly loud, there was 
no need to fear. Because his troops were divided into several fronts: some were in 
Khorasan, some in Bagdad, some in Diyarbekir, and some in the border on Rum under 
Dev Ali’s command. None of these troops could leave their places and help the other 
since they were exposed to enemies in each front. The Shah himself was wandering 
between fronts with his special forces.1672 Here Şadi Beg puts forward his own idea that 
if the news of the advent of the sultan [Selim] would be heard, then all the enemies 
would disperse. As a last note, Şadi Beg adds that some of Murad’s confidants fled from 
his suit and reached Trabzon through Georgia.1673  
 
                                                 
1671 Document E 6672 in TSA also indicates qizilbash activities in Torul. According to this document, the 
son of the ex-governor of Torul and his father’s tutor Yahya, who also had a timar in Torul, managed to 
convert most of the population into the qizilbash movement.  
1672 For the situation of Persia and Ismail’s policy in the winter of 1512-1523 see Bacqué-Grammont, Les 
Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, pp. 29-31.   
1673 TSA, document E 6478/2. The whole text of the document with its facsimile copy is published by 
Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont in his Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, pp. 32-
35.  
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7.2.4. The End of the Struggle: Selim Executes Males of the Royal Line 
When Selim crossed to Anatolia with a strong army on July 29, 15121674, Ahmed was 
not optimistic about his fortune. Upon learning Selim’s march on him, Ahmed first 
intended to retire toward Çukurova1675, which was controlled by Karaman, Bulgar, and 
Taş-ili begs. But the serious obstacle on this way was Hemdem Pasha, who was newly 
appointed as the beylerbey of Karaman by Selim. Meanwhile, Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha 
was still in Amasya with the properties of Ahmed. In his letter to Selim, Karaca Pasha 
reported that Prince Ahmed had moved toward Ankara and would be there on July 27. 
Among begs of Taş-ili, Umur Beyoğlu and his brother, Yuvaoğlu Mehmed Beg, 
Kebelioğlu, and Şit were moving with Prince Ahmed and pillaging several cities in 
central Anatolia. At the same time, Sinan Pasha sent a messenger (ulak) to Ahmed 
informing him on that he had gathered the soldiers of Rum and had the intention to 
arrive Ankara with 15.000 men; but if he could not arrive, then the prince had to come to 
the Province of Rum and meet him there.1676 Consequently, Ahmed moved toward 
Amasya from Ankara.1677  
Considerable portion of Ahmed’s army was squandered during the battle with 
Nur Ali Khalifa. Ahmed was well-aware of the fact that the rest of his army was not 
enough to confront Selim’s forces. Because of that, he began to search best place to flee. 
Some options were discussed in his court: some of his begs advocated to take shelter in 
the country of Shah Ismail.1678 Some other begs suggested going to the country of 
                                                 
1674 See, for example, HSE4, p. 149. According to some sources, however, Selim passed to Anatolia on 
July 18. See TNSS, p. 7.  
1675 TNSS, p. 8. 
1676 TSA, document E 2667, partly published in ULCY2, p. 137.  
1677 ULCY2, pp. 136-7. HSE says that he went from Karaman region (diyār) to Amasya upon learning 
Selim’s march. See HSE4, p. 150; ALI, p. 1060. 
1678 ULCY2, p. 137; IDRS, 111.  
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Dulkadir.1679 Of course Taş-ili, the region from where Ahmed gathered most of his 
fighters, was also on the table as an alternative. As we learn from the report of Karaca 
Pasha to his patron Selim, he was invited to Taş-ili by Turkoman tribal leaders of the 
region. According to this report, Ramazanoğlu sent a letter and suggested he come to 
Taş-ili, but by leaving his properties (ağırlık) behind. If he (Ahmed) would come, 
according to the plan of Ramazanoğlu, they would ally with Bulgar begs and kill those 
Karaman begs who betrayed, gaining the obedience of the rest (of Karaman begs). 
Karaca Pasha also informs Selim on that they sent a letter to the governors of Damascus 
and Aleppo, demanding their allegiance. Their aim in searching the allegiance of 
Mamluk governors was that if they could not resist in Taş-ili then they would flee 
towards Damascus.1680  
Hoca Saadeddin states that during the flight of Prince Ahmed most of the 
governors and begs deserted the prince and sought ways to find acceptance at the court 
of Selim, while some others still remained with Ahmed.1681 ‘Āli recites a similar 
account, 
Hizmetinde dāmen der-meyān ve da’vā-yı hulūsla can-feşān olan ümerā-i rū-
şināsān dahī iki kısım olub, bir bölüği hātime-i kār ne sūretle bedīdār olacağını 
bildiler. Envā’-ı inābetle rū-gerdān olub, rikāb-ı hümāyūn-ı şehriyārī takallübine 
‘azīmet-kunān oldılar ve me’mūllerinden ziyāde ri’āyetler ile şād-kām oldılar. 
Ammā bir kısmı ‘inādına musırr olub, ‘Ya taht ola, ya baht, ya tığ-ı saht ve ten-i 
baht ber-taht’ diyüb Sultan Ahmed’den ayrılmadılar.1682  
                                                 
1679 TNSS, p. 9. 
1680 “... Ramazanoğlu haber gönderüb eğer Bulgar canibine gelürseniz cemi’ ağırluğunuz bırağub tenha 
gelmek gerekdir ki Bulgar begleriyle muavenet edüb Karaman beglerinin hiyanet edenlerin kılıçdan 
geçirüb mā-bākisin itaat itdürüb arka yardım alalım demişler. Dahi Şam ve Halep melik-i ümerāsına 
ādem gönderilmiş ki, muavenet taleb ideler. Amma ol cānibe ādem göndermekden garaz, Taş’da karar 
idemeyecek olursa Şam cānibini penāh tutuna. ...” TSA, document E 6399. At the court of Ahmed, fleeing 
to Egypt was also discussed; even this idea gained the sympathy of the prince who sent a letter to Kansu 
Gavri, the Mamluk ruler of Egypt. Nevertheless Gavri kindly turned down this request. See TNSS, p. 9; 
Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Memlūk Sultanlarının Yanına Đltica Etmiş Olan Osmanlı Hanedanına Mensup 
Şehzādeler”, Belleten, cilt 17, sayı 68, p. 531.  
1681 HSE4, p. 150.  
1682 ALI, pp. 1060-61.  
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Those governors and begs who abandoned Ahmed when they realized that the 
balance of power turned for the sake of Selim, must arguably have been the timar 
holders and other governors who were closely connected to the traditional state 
machinery of the Ottoman Empire and owed their position to the established order. Their 
concern was just to be at the right side in this struggle. Those begs who provided their 
support until the end, however, were tribal leaders who had difficulty in incorporation to 
the Ottoman system. Their concern was not simply to take position at the right side. 
Rather ideological orientation was more responsible for their support to Prince Ahmed. 
Because, as already evaluated, Selim appeared as promising to re-establish the Ottoman 
traditional regime, which was weakened during last years of Bayezid II. Using this 
image successfully, Selim managed to gain the support of the most influential power of 
Ottoman state machinery and to shift Ahmed from center to periphery in the ideological 
plane. Thus, the real ground of the tribal support for the candidacy of Ahmed should be 
searched in his opposing position to the traditional central powers of the state.    
At the end, Ahmed moved eastward and arrived Divriği, which was at the border 
between Ottoman Empire and Dulkadir Principality.1683 Here again different views arose 
about where to go. Karaman begs insisted on fleeing to the Shah’s country while 
Turgutoğlu, Reyhanoğlu, and Mıdıkoğlu begs advocated to take shelter in Egypt.1684 His 
son Murad was enthusiastically favoring to ally with Shah Ismail. He sent letters to his 
father one after another advising him the alliance of the shah. But he vigorously refused 
                                                 
1683 KPZ9, p. 73. 
1684 CLZ states that Ahmed thought that he had three choices: fleeing to Egypt, becoming qizilbash, or 
trying his chances against Selim. Ahmed chose the last alternative. See CLZ, p. 169.  
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this idea and tore the letter from his son. Şükrullah who was in the retinue of Ahmed 
until Divriği reported the situation as follows,  
Bu fakir bendeniz Sultan Ahmed’le Divriği beraberi Kazık Beli’ne değin 
cemaatımla ve ehl-i begtümle bile vardım. Hāliyen Karaman’dan evvelki 
beglerden gayri Turgud-oğulları, Reyhan-oğulları ve Mıdık-oğulları gelüb 
tamam Mısır cānibine teveccüh etmiş iken zikr olan Karamanlı gelicek elbette 
Kızılbaş canibine gidelim, derman bize ol canibden olur, Mısır’a varıcak heman 
habs olursun deyu idlāl eylediler. Hatta oğlu Sultan Murad’dan Sivas altında iken 
mektub gelüb Şah, Dev Ali ile bize yirmi bin kadar asker koşdu. Erzincan’da 
gelüb katılasın. Emir budur ki Üsküdar’a değin varıla deyu. Sultan Ahmed dahi 
gelen mektubu pareleyüb ve ol canibe idlal eyleyene iltifat etmeyüb ol tarafa 
meyleylemedi. Sultan Selim Rum canibine çıkdığı gibi Alaüddevle Bege varub 
müşavere edüb Kayseri yanından Karaman’a varalum, ne olursak at üzerinde 
olalum deyu idlal eylediler. Alaüddevle Beg’e elçi dahi gönderdiler. Henüz 
elçileri gelmedi. Sonra padişah devletle Engürü’de karar eylediği işidecek giru 
zikr olunan kimselerin fikri böyle oldu ki gel imdi Haleb’e varalum, ordan 
Çukurova’ya çıkalım, Karaman Taşını arka edinelüm, ne kadar adam isterseniz 
biz bulalım deyu mütekellif oldılar. Varub habs olmakdan ise ölürsek at üzerinde 
ölelüm deyu çaşnigir başıyla Karamanlı idlāl eylediler. Bu tedbir üzerinde 
kaldılar...1685   
 
Ahmed proceeded to Darende and from there sent a letter to his brother Selim, 
who was then in Ankara, proposing to divide the country between himself and Selim. 
Selim did not accept this proposal.1686 Taking the approaching winter into account, 
Selim retired to Bursa from Ankara on November 23, 1512.1687 Then Ahmed attacked 
Amasya, which was being governed by Mustafa Beg, the son of Davud Pasha, and took 
the control of the city.1688 As a precaution, Selim spent the winter in Bursa, where he 
executed Musa, Orhan, Emir (sons of Prince Mahmud), Osman, the son of Alemşah and 
the governor of Çankırı, and Mehmet Beg, the son of Şehinşah and the governor of 
                                                 
1685 TSA, document E 7052.  
1686 For the letters of both princes see ULCY2, pp. 140-1. Also consider TNSS, pp. 9-10. 
1687 ULCY2, p. 142; TNSS, p. 11. KPZ records that after 63 days Selim returned from Ankara to Bursa on 
November 19, 1512. See KPZ9, p. 73.  Also see ALI, p. 1061.  
1688 ALI, p. 1061; MNB, p. 452; TNSS, p. 12; HAM2, p. 403. 
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Konya.1689 He also executed his brother Prince Korkud and ordered to burry him in 
Bursa on March 17, 1513.1690  
In the meantime, Ahmed spent the winter in Amasya, from where he moved on 
January 29, 1513, leaving his son, Sultan Osman, as his deputy.1691 He first went 
towards Tosya which was governed by Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha. After some small-scale 
fights with the troops of Mehmed Pasha, he proceeded to Ankara. Selim also marched 
on Ahmed from Bursa. Two armies confronted in Yenişehir on April 15, 1513.1692 After 
a bloody battle Ahmed was defeated and detained on the way while fleeing towards 
Đzmit and executed immediately.1693 On May 14, 1513, Sultan Osman, the son of 
Ahmed, and Sultan Mustafa, the son of Sultan Murad were executed in Amasya.1694 So, 
in the end Selim extirpated all the males of royal line except Prince Murad, who had fled 
to the Shah’s country where he would cease in a couple of years.1695 He returned to 
Istanbul leaving his son Süleyman as the only living male member of the dynasty.1696     
 
                                                 
1689 ULCY2, p. 142. KPZ recites this execution as follows: “… Sene-i mezbūre Şevvalinün yiğirmi yedinci 
gicesi [January 5, 1513] Sultan Şehinşah oğlı Muhammed, ki Niğde diyārınun serdarıydı, ve Sultan 
Alemşah oğlı Sultan Osman, ki Kangırı sancağınun sipeh-salarıydı, ve Sultan Mahmud oğulları Sultan 
Orhan, Sultan Musa ve Sultan Emirhan, ki sancak yerlerdi, ahşam vaktinde saraya davet olunub kapucılar 
odasına getürildi. Eğerçi bunların ikisi dahī nā-reşide tıfl idi, emmā cihan-dīde pirler tedbiriyle amel 
olınub … ol leyl-i pür-veylde beşinün dahī maslahatları görüldi.” KPZ9, p. 74. From Italian sources 
Hammer recites the hopeless resistance of the young princes to the executioners. See HAM2, p. 404. Also 
consider IDRS, p. 112; CLZ, p. 178; SKB, p. 118; YSF, p. 39; HSE4, 154; ALI, p. 1062 and p. 1071; 
MNB, p. 453.    
1690 ULCY3, p. 191. For further reading see KPZ9, pp. 75-77; HSE4, pp. 155-160; ALI, pp. 1062-5; 
ULCY3, pp. 185-91; TNSS, pp. 13-16.  
1691 ULCY3, p. 192; TNSS, p. 17.  
1692 KPZ9, p. 80; HSE4, pp. 162-4; TNSS, p. 18. Hammer, relying on Italian sources, gives the date as 
April 24. See HAM2, p. 406.  
1693 ULCY3, p. 197; KPZ9, p. 81; CLZ, pp. 176-7; TNSS, p. 19; HAM2, p. 407; SKB, pp. 129-132; YSF, 
p. 42; ALI, p. 1067; MNB, p. 456.    
1694 ULCY3, p. 199.  
1695 IDRS, p. 115. Ahmed’s son Alaeddin and his brother were sent to Egypt before Ahmed’s death. But 
they died there because of plague. See IDRS, p. 115. Also see HSE4, pp. 165-6 and ALI, pp. 1068-9; 
SLZ2, p. 13; MNB, p. 456. The latter four also specify that Murad fled to Shah Ismail and died in Persia 
after three or four years.  
1696 KPZ9, p. 81.  
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CHAPTER VIII  
 
 
ÇALDIRAN, 1514: 
THE APEX OF THE QIZILBASH ZEAL 
 
 
 
8.1.  PRELUDE TO THE CAMPAIGN 
Gelibolulu ‘Āli deems Selim as the second greatest among the Ottoman sultans. 
According to him, Selim was a great sultan not only because of his personal skills and 
abilities but also because of the divine support behind him. He interprets the victories of 
Selim against the Safavids and Mamluks as a strong proof of the divine approval of his 
saltanat.1697 He believes that what Selim successfully accomplished during his reign 
could only be fulfilled by any other ruler in many more years with serious difficulties 
                                                 
1697 “Selātin-i Âl-i Osman’daki padişahlar da müşārun ileyhin ecdād-ı ‘izāmından Ebu’l-Feth Sultan 
Muhammed Gāzi cümleden mevsūfdur. Bu delil ile ki Đstanbul fethine müte’allik olan hadis-i şerifinde 
‘izām-ı şān-ı ‘Ni’me’l-emīr’le ma’rūfdur. Ammā anlardan sonra gelen padişahlardan sāhib-kıranlık nāmı 
Sultan Selim Han’a mahsūsdur. Nitekim ‘Müeyyed min ‘indillāh’ olmaları fütühāt u āsārlarıyla 
mansūsdur. ...” ALI, pp. 1051-2.  
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and hazards.1698 ‘Āli argues that two accomplishments of Selim were of special value for 
the Muslim society (ümmet-i Muhammed):  
Evvelā: Vālid-i büzürgvārı Sultan Bāyezid Han’ın hilkat-i şeriflerindeki sebāt ve 
sükūn-ı ‘anāsırın cüz’-i gālibini hāke makrūn itmekle hareketden kalduğı ve gün 
günden Şah Đsmail-i Erdebilī Ehl-i Sünnet ve Cemā’at memālikine müstevli olub 
kılıç çalduğı, dahī tursa rūy-ı zeminin teshīrine cüll-i himmet kılduğı ve Sultan 
Selim Han gibi sāhib-kırān-ı ‘asr elinden tabanca yemesi memālik-i etrāf 
padişahlarının hānumanlarına sular koyduğı hususın def’idir.  
Đkinci: Ol makūle sahib-i hurūc ki, da’vā-yı şeref-i siyādet ide ve ırk ve nesebi 
māderi tarafından Emir Hasan-ı Tavīl ve āna ferzend ü halef-i cemīl Sultan 
Ya’kub-ı Celīl hānedānına nisbet hem şahlık ve hem mürşid-i gümrāhlık 
semtinden hezār hezār evbaşa hüsn virüb idlāl ve baş baş müfsidleri sāye-i 
rāyetinde ‘ibādı pā-māl idinüb serkeşlik üzre iken bī-havf u tereddüd üstüne 
varub zarar ve şurūrına ahāli-i Đslamdan men’-i pür-def’idir ki, ol makūle hasm-ı 
kavīnin def’i kırk yıl kāmil tedārik isterdi ve ol zümre mā-beyninde kibār u sığār 
ve kāffe-i a’yān-ı büzürgvār – ‘iyāzen billāh – ne cefālar çekdi. Kanı 
dökülmeyüb sağ kurtulanlar dahī bīmār u zerāne kanlar yutaydı ve askerine gāh 
sa’ādetle ve gāh kerāmetle ve gāh velāyetle i’tikād viren Hāricī’nin hānedān-ı 
devleti ateşgede-i gebrān gibi gitdikçe kuvvet ve işti’āl bulub söyündürmesi niçe 
rūzgār harb u kıtāl ve iştiğāl icāb iderdi.1699   
 
Celalzāde’s view was not different. In his Selim-nāme Celalzāde says that 
“during the reign of Bayezid II, the viziers were not acquainted with necessary vision 
and knowledge in order to govern the country successfully. Moreover, they were 
defective in terms of religious purity and because of this, the conditions of the country 
worsened day by day. If Sultan Selim did not ascend to the throne, the country of Rūm 
(mülk-i Rūm) would have been (inevitably) lost. (Merhūm Sultan Selim Han padişah 
olmasa mülk-i Rum elden gitmiş idi.)”1700  
In the years until Selim executed Ahmed in 1513 and finished the civil war, 
Anatolian population and the provincial administrators were in a complete turmoil and 
confusion. On one side, for the state officials and local authorities it was hard to openly 
                                                 
1698 ALI, p. 1071.  
1699 ALI, pp. 1053-4.  
1700 CLZ, p. 253.  
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disclaim their tendency since the other prince could punish them. There are a number of 
letters in TSA archives reflecting this situation. Many local governors and qādis sent 
letters to Prince Selim presenting their obedience but at the same time expressing their 
excuse for cooperating with Ahmed. They informed the new sultan about the situation 
they were in. If they had not followed Ahmed’s orders, he would have realized their real 
intention and punished them. Within these conditions, they had no other choice but to 
pretend as if they had been adherents of Ahmed.1701  
The civil war seriously distorted the running of the governmental mechanism. No 
official could take himself from playing a part in the struggle of princes for this would 
be the most vital decision to determine their future within the Ottoman state machinery. 
Thus, the primary concern of the state agents was to take position on the right side. But 
being on the right side was depended on the efforts of the adherents as well. 
Consequently, once they chose a side, that is, a prince, they had to work with utmost 
enthusiasm for the future of their candidate. The natural consequence of this was, of 
course, intensified partisanship among the bureaucrats, soldiers, scholars, and other state 
agents and representatives.  
The most devastating results of such chaos and confusion among the members of 
the askerī class or the ruling class arguably appeared on the wellbeing of the re’āya, the 
tax-paying subjects. The malfunction of the governmental apparatus paved way to 
corruption in the official spheres. Thus, the condition of the subjects worsened further. 
How this corruption contributed to the creation of a fertile ground to produce qizilbash 
rebellions has already been demarcated. Idrīs, for example, calls attention to the point 
                                                 
1701 See, for example, the letter of Sultan Musa, the governor of Kastamonu. TSA, document E 2667. Also 
consider TSA, documents E 6376, E 6205.  
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that there were a great number of Safavid disciples, who liked to amuse their nefs (or to 
fulfill even the immoral desires of their soul) and were inclined to attack defenseless 
(miskin) people in several regions of Anatolia. Idrīs indicates a very interesting point 
here that because of the qizilbash groups in Anatolia, serious discords (fitne) appeared 
within the imperial army.1702 Unfortunately he gives no further detail about this discord. 
However, his account makes the point clear that there were certain qizilbash 
sympathizers in the Ottoman army, most probably among the sipāhis.1703  
Furthermore, the plunder and banditry of the qizilbashes also created a serious 
discontent especially among the Sunni subjects of the empire. Thus, the Sunni 
population in Anatolia was in great expectation from Sultan Selim when he returned to 
Istanbul as the ninth Ottoman sultan. I have already discussed how he won the public 
opinion of the Sunni population by his successfully applied policy since his movement 
from Trabzon. When he returned to Topkapı Palace, there was a public expectation from 
him to resolve two principal problems: the corruption within the askerī classes, which 
increased the burden on the shoulders of re’āya, and the qizilbash trouble. Indeed, the 
second problem was not easy to settle in a short time if one would desire a permanent 
solution. However, Sultan Selim believed in a short-cut ‘solution’, which was indeed by 
no means a solution for the benefit of the society but would leave an inheritance of 
irreversible socio-religious cleavage within Anatolian population. He preferred to use 
the sword to deal with this complicated knot instead of untying it; namely he attempted 
to extirpate the society who caused ‘problem’ with cruel and harsh methods. Indeed, 
what he did to his Muslim subjects was questionable for a Muslim ruler. It must be the 
                                                 
1702 IDRS, p. 122.  
1703 The leading role of the provincial timar-holding sipāhis in Şahkulu Revolt is already delineated.  
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strong public expectations indicated above that provided the psychological ground 
which was fed by general suffering and pain because of disorder and banditry of the 
qizilbashes, and that enabled Selim to practice such a harsh policy against his own 
subjects.  
A report presented to Selim by a middle-ranking religious scholar, namely Ali 
bin Abdülkerim Halife, mirrors the collective sentiment of the Sunni population. The 
report is preserved in TSA and published by Selahattin Tansel.1704 In his long report, Ali 
bin Abdülkerim Halife both explains the lapses within and outside the state machinery 
and offers solutions. More importantly, he repeatedly expresses his strong expectation 
from Sultan Selim to put an end to such oppressions, which, one might assume, to have 
certain degree of social basis.  
Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife begins with the religious scholars who were supposed 
to be exemplary for ordinary people. He argues that most of the qādis, nāibs, muderriss, 
and muftīs were indulged in every sort of immorality. The bribery, sexual perversion, 
alcohol consumption, etc. were wide-spread among them. He underlines that Bayezid II 
and his viziers did not pay attention to such needs of religious scholars and urgent needs 
of the re’āya who were living in provinces outside of Edirne and Istanbul. Another 
subject of complaint was the heavy taxes. Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife describes some 
taxes, such as bennāk resmi and gerdek akçesi, and incumbencies on re’āya, such as 
providing provisions for ulaks, as oppression from religious point of view and requests 
from the sultan to abolish such practices for they turned life for the subjects unbearable.  
                                                 
1704 Tansel summarizes the content of this considerably long report in his book and gives its facsimile copy 
in the appendix. See TNSS, pp. 20-30.   
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Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife’s attitude towards the qizilbashes is, on the other 
hand, quite fanatical. He recites a fabricated statement attributed to the Prophet that ‘At 
the end of time, Persia will be full of fitne and become infidel.’1705 According to Ali bin 
Abdülkerim Halife, the Safavids were those infidels filled Persia with fitne as foresaid 
by the Prophet.  Consequently, he deems the qizilbashes of Anatolia, who adhered to 
Safavid Order, as infidels too. After referring to their insults to Kur’an by stomping on it 
and hanging it on the necks of dogs, he renounces the ‘soft’ policy of the government 
and provokes the sultan to extirpate the qizilbashes. He says,  
... üşde bir zaman geldi ki Rum memleketinin halkının çoğu Erdevil [sic] olub 
kāfir oldu. ... Erdevil gelürse hep uyarız, tābi oluruz didiler, nice fāsid fikirlere 
meşgul oldılar. ... ah kanı gayret-i Đslam? Bu mel’unlar ‘Şah, Şah!’ dirler, niçin 
mü’minler ‘Allah, Allah!’ dimezler? Ve bunlara kılıç çalmazlar? ... Ey güzel 
Sultan Selim! Heman gayret-i Đslam sizde kalmışdır. Bu kāfirleri hep kırmak 
gerekdir. Zira bular [bunlar] münkir-i kelamullahdır, cāhid-i dinullahdır, hādim-i 
şer’ullahdır. ...1706  
 
Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife’s apparent hatred of the qizilbashes reaches such a 
degree that he even declares the color of kızıl (red) as a symbol of infidelity. He 
compares this color with blue and yellow which were attributed to Christians and Jews, 
and argues to ban the clothes and hats bearing red colors for Muslims. He goes further 
asserting that according to some books of religious law and sanction, the testimony of 
those men who wear red and yellow clothes is not acceptable. These colors are, to him, 
the ornament of Satan.  
... Zīrā bir zālim kāfir-i bī-din zāhir olub kızıl şapka giyüb ehl-i ilme ve ehl-i 
tevhide ve ehl-i Đslam ve sünnilere adüvv olub, darb urub azīm cidāl kıtāl idüb 
bed fiīl itdi. Adını kızıl şapkanın tāc kodı, hāşā ki tāc ola! ... bize dā’vā-yı fāsid 
etti, cihan halkını dalālete bırakdı. Hidāyet-i ehl-i imanı inkar-ı küllī eylediler. 
Öyle olsa kızıl renkden gāyet hazer ihtirāz itmek gerekdir. Nitekim gök renkle 
                                                 
1705 TSA, document 3192, cited in TNSS, p. 28. 
1706 Quoted in TNSS, p. 28.  
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saru renkden ihtirāz olundığı gibi, gökle sarunun Nasārā ile Yahūdiye mahsus 
olmuşdur. ...1707  
 
Apart from the qizilbashes, Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife also calls attention to ışıks 
who lived communally in their lodges and wandered. He deems this group inferior to 
infidels from a religous point of view. According to him, these ışıks said that ‘our pray 
(namaz) was already performed (thus there is no need for us to perform pray)’, and they 
prostrated one another, used alcohol and hashish in their food, and were really merciless 
and mischievous. Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife advises Sultan Selim to confiscate their 
lodges in order to turn into mescids and even to kill them.1708    
Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife’s report clearly shows that a segment of Ottoman 
society was in expectation of effective measures both against corruptions within the 
governmental mechanism and against ‘religious divergent’ groups. This expectation 
made it possible for Selim to undertake a truly ruthless policy against his own subjects.  
Giovan Maria Angiolello, who was an eye-witness of events, says that the 
Kurdish local rulers governing the borderline region between two empires provoked 
Sultan Selim to invade the Safavid Empire.1709 Şerefhan Bitlisī confirms the invocation 
of Kurdish leaders. He states that when Emir Şeref lost Bitlis to the qizilbashes, he 
pinned his hopes on the Ottoman sultan who was rumored to have an intention to invade 
Iran. Emir Şeref, in collaboration with Idris-i Bitlisī and Muhammad Aga Kelhokî, who 
were also among the prominent notables of the region, persuaded 20 Kurdish feudal 
lords to support Sultan Selim. Then, they wrote a letter, presenting their loyalty to the 
                                                 
1707 Quoted in TNSS, p. 28.  
1708 Quoted in TNSS, p. 29.  
1709 See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in 
NIT, pp. 118-9. 
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sultan; and Idris-i Bitlisī and Muhammad Aga Kelhokî brought the letter to Istanbul.1710 
Although written after the battle of Çaldıran, some other letters of Şerefhan Bitlisī 
preserved in Tokapı Palace Museum further envisage the co-operation of the local Kurd 
lords with the Ottoman Empire before and after the battle.1711  
After executing Prince Ahmed, Selim returned to Istanbul in May 1513. 
However, he did not stay there for long and soon moved to Edirne, where he 
immediately started the preparations for a wide-ranging campaign on Shah Ismail. He 
first demanded Sultan Murad from the Shah. But his demand was turned down.1712 
Indeed, knowing his attitude towards the qizilbashes since his governorship in Trabzon, 
Ismail always maintained a negative attitude towards Selim. He, for example, did not 
congratulate Selim when he ascended to the Ottoman throne. It has already been 
delineated that Ismail’s plan was to capture the eastern provinces of Ottoman Anatolia 
by using the prestige of Sultan Murad, as well as his mystical authority on the 
qizilbashes of this region.  
Selim’s situation, however, was not an easy one. On one hand, a considerable 
portion of his subjects were openly adhered to Ismail and rising the banner of revolt 
when an opportunity emerged. On the other hand, both these troublesome subjects and 
the shah using them as a sixth column within the Ottoman realm were Muslims, though 
being affiliated to a different sect, namely Shi’ism. According to the Islamic law, it was 
not easy to issue a religious sanction legitimizing war against any other Muslim state or 
                                                 
1710 Şerefhan, Şerefnâme, trs. From Arabic to Turkish M. Emin Bozarslan, Đstanbul: Hasat Yayınları, 1990, 
pp. 479-80. 
1711 These letters are E 10739, E 9647, E 5818, and E 8308, dated 1516, 1518, 1519, and 1520 
respectively. For a discussion of the relationship between Şerefhan Bitlisī and Selim I, primarily based on 
these letters, see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Quatre lettres de Šeref Beg de Bitlis (1516-1520) 
(Études turco-safavides, XI)”, Der Islam, Band 63, Heft 1, 1986, 90-118.   
1712 TNSS, p. 32. 
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group. Indeed, the Ottoman sultans waged wars against their Muslim neighbors during 
the earlier centuries obtaining the approval of the religious scholars for their actions. In 
these fetvās, the permission of waging war against Muslim states, or more correctly 
principalities, were derived from the idea that fighting against those who prevent the 
holy war against the enemy of the religion was itself a holy war. All the Ottoman 
campaigns against Karasi, Germiyan, and Karaman Principalities were religiously 
legitimized by the same idea.1713 
The conditions were, however, completely different in the case of the 
qizilbashes. The problem they caused was not preventing Ottomans from the holy war 
against Christians. None of the religious sanctions issued against the qizilbashes touched 
upon this formulation of the Ottoman ulemā’s traditional legitimizing methods. Rather, 
the problem then was something internal within Islam. Two Islamic states affiliated with 
two different Islamic sects were in confrontation. And politically there was no way of 
reconciliation for the conflicting interests of the states involved. From political point of 
view, the clash was inevitable.  
Nonetheless, in order to wage a campaign, any Muslim state had to secure the 
approval of religious scholars, which signifies the approval of religious Islamic law, that 
is, of God. This was exactly the focal point of confusion for all sides of the conflict. 
Because in order to promulgate such a fetvā, one had to prove that the opposite side was 
out of the ‘true path’ of the religion, i.e. they were heretics. Only after proving this, a 
religious scholar could authorize a campaign against Muslims. On the other hand, such a 
sanction was not easy for a religious man for a well-known saying of the Prophet reads 
                                                 
1713 See, for example, Feridun Emecen, “Ottoman Policy of Conquest of the Turkoman Principalities of 
Western Anatolia with Special Reference to Sarukhan Beyliği”, in Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), The 
Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389), Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993, 35-40.   
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“If one promulgates another as an unbeliever, one of them becomes an unbeliever. If the 
statement of the speaker is true then the other man is really and unbeliever, but if he is 
mistaken, then he himself becomes an unbeliever.”1714 Thus, blaming a Muslim with 
atheism (küfr) is quite a risky action for a religious Muslim.  
However, when the fetvās issued against the qizilbashes and the descriptions by 
Ottoman historians and religious scholars are scrutinized, it can be concluded that they 
were completely free of such a religious concern. Both contemporary chroniclers and the 
authors of fetvās seem to have been quite sure and clear in their thoughts regarding the 
the qizilbash problem. These texts contain sharp discriminations, clear descriptions, 
strict judgments, and offer severe punishments for the qizilbashes. Even so, a careful 
study of these texts in the context of the political atmosphere in the contemporary 
Ottoman palace raises some questions on this clarity in terms of religious thought. First 
of all, one should keep in mind that these fetvās and chronicles, commonly called as 
Selim-nāme, were written either under the rule of Selim or his son Süleyman. Second, 
they were, except for the fetvā of Hamza and perhaps of Kemalpaşazāde, written after 
the events somehow arrived at the final phase, after the Ottomans and Sunni 
interpretation of Islam gained victory against Shiite Ismail. Approaching the whole 
matter retrospectively influenced the Ottoman perception of the qizilbash phenomenon 
directly. One can hardly argue, for example, that in the autumn of 1513 
Kemalpaşazāde’s mind was as clear as it was while he was writing his Defter IX in 
December 1516.  
                                                 
1714 Riyâzü’s-Sâlihin ve Tercemesi, vol. 3, ed. Muhyiddîn-i Nevevî, translated into Turkish by Hasan 
Hüsnü Erdem, Ankara: Diyanet Đşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1991, pp. 145-6.  
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Selim-nāme authors unanimously narrates the early phase of Selim’s preparation 
for Persian campaign as if there was a complete agreement among the statesmen and 
scholars on the legitimacy of this campaign.1715 A closer scrutiny of some accounts, 
however, casts doubt on this supposition. As will be discussed below, when the Selim-
nāme literature is carefully analyzed, taking the enthusiastic endeavor of the authors to 
legitimize Selim’s all actions into account, one gets the impression that the main 
stimulating force behind such religious stand of scholars was Selim’s resolute insistence 
and political aspirations. In other words, although the discussion seems to have been 
carried out on religious grounds, it was under the heavy influence of the political 
polarization. Thus, it is hard to assess these texts from a fully religious perspective. 
Rather, their political content or the governing political orientation behind these 
religious sanctions, should be examined carefully in order to understand the nature of the 
upcoming developments adequately.  
 
8.2.  ASSEMBLY OF EDIRNE: THE DECLARATION OF WAR  
In Edirne, Sultan Selim summoned the members of the divan, statesmen, and the 
religious scholars to discuss the religious, political, military and provisional aspects of 
the coming campaign.1716 Şükrī vividly narrates this assembly. According to him, Selim 
                                                 
1715 IDRS says, for example, that all ulemā agreed that it was necessary, before all, to rid of the qizilbash 
evil, even to neutralize them was compulsory by religion (vācip) on Muslims. IDRS, p. 117.   
1716 Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikalrın Işığı Altında Yavuz Sultan Selim’in Đran Seferi”, 
Tarih Dergisi, sayı: 22, 1968, p. 57; TNSS, p. 33. HSE’s history includes subtle indications to this 
assembly (divan) in Edirne. See HSE4, p. 169. KPZ, who wrote his history only two years later (in 1516) 
and possibly was in Edirne in the winter of 1513-1514, interestingly does not mention this meeting. See 
Ahmet Uğur, Kemalpaşa-zade Đbn-Kemal, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1996, p. 13. For further 
reading on the life and works of Şemseddin Ahmed bin Süleyman bin Kemal Paşa (KPZ) see Mecdī 
Mehmed Efendi, Şakaik-ı Nu’maniye ve Zeylleri, c. I, haz. Abdülkadir Özcan, Đstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 
1989, pp. 381-385; ALI, pp. 1209-1216; Franz Babinger, “Kemālpashazāde”, EI2, p. 912; Đsmet 
Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa Zāde”, IA, p. 561; Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Mustafa Sait 
Yazıcıoğlu, eds., Şeyhülislâm Đbn Kemâl Sempozyumu, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.  
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first described his position as the shadow of God on Earth and the protector of 
Muslims,1717 and then stated that the Christian enemies were not in a position to attack 
the empire; the real enemy of the Ottoman Empire was Shah Ismail, who was 
threatening the Ottoman realm not only with his increasing military power but also with 
his ‘heretical’ ideas and great number of disciples within the Ottoman territories as 
well.1718  
                                                 
1717 “Hem mana Đslam şahıdur lakab                   Şahlığ esbābına Hālık sebeb 
      Pes niçün Đslam içün cehd itmeyem            Hak tarīki üzre her dem gitmeyem 
      Çünki zıllullah okurlar adımı                      Gösterem eşyaya istişhādumı 
      Şimdi Đslamun hevā-dārı menem                 Kande mazlum olsa gām-hārı menem” SKB, pp. 136-7.  
1718 Şükrī cites Selim’s utterance which remarkably reflects how Ottoman intelligentsia formulated the 
position of both sides as follows:  
      Erdebilün şehridin itti hurūc  / Çarh ona yār oldı vü virdi ‘urūc  
      Evliya nesli diyü her hās u ‘ām  / Ona yüz döndürdü vü şark oldı rām 
      Başa tāc aldı vü çıkdı ol ferid / Âlem ehlin ser-be-ser itdi mürid 
      Şimdi Rum içre müridi çokdurur  / Ona meyl itmez vilāyet yokdurur 
      Şark anundur şimdi tā serhadd-i Hind  / Âciz olmuşdur elinden Hind  
Sind 
      Şah Đsmail iderler nām ana    /   Ta’na eyler lik hās u ‘ām ana 
      Mustafa şer’ine mānidür bu gün / Kendü etvārıyla kānidür bu gün 
      Din-i Đslam ile anun kini var  / Kendü zu’m-ı fasidince dini var 
      Yok zamanında mesācidden eser  / Ni medāris var ni Kur’an u haber 
      Mü’minün katlin mübah itmiş durur / Ol tarafdan merhamet gitmiş durur 
      Küfre ol gāyetde virmüşdür revaç  / Kim ‘alāmatını itmiş başa tāc 
      ...................                                             .................. 
      Hancaru ‘azm itse kan itdi müdām  / Kana gark oldı o kişverler tamām 
      Ol diyārı ser-be-ser aldı fesād   / Benden ister Musul u Bağdād dād 
      Leşkeri bī-had velī kāfir kamu   /  Kılıcın gidiser āhır hamu 
      Đşleri zulm ü siyāsetdür hemin   / Fitneden hāli değül maşrık-ı zemin 
      Başlarında tāc vardur lāle-vār  / Yir yüzin tāc-ıla itsem lāle-zār 
      Katline fetvā viribdür ehl-i din   /  Ekser ehl-i dine eyler kahr u kin  
      Bir fesād itmişdür ol müfsid ki dehr / Çekmemiş Nemrūd elinden böyle kahr 
      Ol diyārı yakdı zulm ile tamām  /  Din ‘adūsı oldur imdi ve’s-selām 
      Fitne-i Ye’cüc ile toldı zemin   / Lik men Đskenderem iy dūr-bin 
      Tanrıdan Đslama hāmi gelmişem  /  Halaka anun-çün kirāmi gelmişem 
      Benden iy erkān-ı devlet vehm idün / Neyse maksūdum kemāhi fehm idün 
      Gayrı şaha siz kıyās itmen meni  / Oda düşmen iktibās itmen meni 
      Azm ü cezm idem budur Tabrize men / Sıdk ile kasd idem ol hūn-rīze men 
      Ger bana tevfīk olursa reh-nümān / Sürha-serden gösterem deryā-yı hūn 
      Yā alam halk intikamın bi’t-tamam  /  Yā idem yek-ser cihānı ona rām 
      Hayfın ehl-i Đslamın andan alam  / Almasam ol hayfı koy andan kalam 
      Ref’ itmiş adl u istihkāmı ol  / Pāy-māl itmiş tamām Đslamı ol 
      Def’i farz-ı ‘ayn olubdur Tanrı-çün / Zimmetümde deyn olubdur Tanrı-çün 
      Đtmesem ger def’ makbul olmazam  / Küllikim rā’ınnda mes’ul olmazam 
      Zulm u isyān def’i içün gelmişem   /  Hāssa kāfir def’i içün gelmişem 
      Şimdi men hod bir gazāvāt isterem   / Küfr āsārından āyāt isterem. 
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Selim, as reflected in Şükrī’s account, not only underscores the religious heresy 
of Ismail and his followers but also depicts them as oppressors killing true Muslims, 
pillaging their properties, devastating Islamic monuments, and assaulting the great 
symbols of (Sunni) Islam.1719 He pictures Ismail as a great source of astray who pursued 
the path of evil and abandoned the order of Muhammad on Earth1720; indeed, he was a 
                                                                                                                                                
See SKB, pp. 137-8. Also consider YSF, who rephrases Selim’s utterance in this divan as follows: “… 
Đmdi bu peyāmdan netice-i meram budur ki şark diyārın serāser kabza-i tasarrufa alan Erdebiloğlu 
dedikleri habīs-i lebīs nesl-i vilāyet iddiasın ide. Evbaş kesīre baş olub, yevmen fe-yevm bağī savaşın 
eyleye. Şahlık tahtına lihak ve selātin tahtına otak bağlamış, anın hūz u hurūf ve mürekkebāt-ı tā’tıl-ı şer’ 
u tahlil-i muharremāt üzere mebnī olduğundan gayri mensūbe-i şeytaniyye ile nice şahı mat idüb nısf-ı 
kāinata ahkām yürütmüş. ... Ulemā-i din ve fukahā-i müsliminden anın hāli istihyār ve ef’āli istifsār 
olundukda nakilleri muvāfık, sözleri mutābık ol tāği-i bāğinin zulm ü inād ve küfre irtidādın hükm idüb, 
demi helāl ve kıtāli efdāl-i ā’mal olduğuna fetvā verdiler. Đmdi ol zālimin cevr-i kahırdan def’ etmeye 
azm eyledim. Asker çeküb üzerina varmak isterim. Görek sizin dahi re’yiniz nedir? ...” See YSF, pp. 135-
9. HSE and SLZ follow similar line of narration. See HSE4, p. 170; SLZ2, pp. 14-15. Lütfi Paşa, the 
famous grand vizier of Suleyman I, re-phrases Sultan Selim’s utterance as follows: “Andan Sultan Selim 
devlet erkānlarını cem’ idüb didi kim: “Ey benim can ve gönülden müridlerim! Sizlere bu (sic) nice sözüm 
vardur, gözünüzü ve kulağınızı benden yana tutun. Bir sözüm budur ki cibilletimde konulan şeca’at berk 
urub cenk arzusun ider ve düşmana yeryüzünü tenk () eylemek diler. Ve bir sözüm dahi budur ki bu 
kadar mal ve menāl ve bu kadar esbāb ve bu kadar asker hayfā kim bunlar şöylece hāli tura! 
Böyle leşker, böyle haşmet kimde var       Böyle meleket böyle kut kimde var 
Hayf kim geçmiş Feridun yohsa ben         Gösterürdüm āna bezm u encümen 
Ve bir sözüm dahī budur ki çünki bize zıllu’l-llah ve sultan-ı ehl-i Đslam diyū lakab komuşlardur niçun ehl-
i Đslam’a mu’īn ve hevādār olmayavuz. Ve bir sözüm dahī budur ki Şah Đsmail kanlumuzdur ki Sultan 
Ahmed oğlı Sultan Murad yanına varub sığındığu içün katl eyledi. Ve’l-hāsıl murad budur kim serdar-ı 
Acem Şeyh Haydar oğlı Şah Đsmail rıfz mezhebin ihtiyār idüb sünniler katlini gendüye ve gendü etbā’ī 
şeyātin-rehberlerine helal görüb mescidleri ve medreseleri oda urub küfrün gāyet revācın virüb ve din-i 
Đslamı gāyet zelil idüb...Andan sonra Selim vüzerāsına emr idüb “Ceddümüz Sultan Muhammed 
zamanında (208) Hasan dırāz üzerine ne mikdār yarak ile vardı ise siz bir nice ol kadar eylen!” diyū emr 
itdi.” See Lütfi Paşa, Tevārih-i Âl-i Osman, haz. ‘Âli, Đstanbul, 1341, pp. 207-8.  Also consider HSE4, pp. 
169-170; TNSS, p. 33.  
1719 Such Ottoman accusations of Shah Ismail are repeated by the Venetian sources, but of course in a 
praising manner in this case. A report from 1502 reads, for example, “Aming [Ismail’s] notable acts, to 
show his contempt for the Muslim faith he brought horses into the Turkish mosques in [in Erzincan] and 
tied up dogs inside, and then he destroyed the mosques down to their foundations. He ordered the 
restoration of a Christian church, half ruined previously by the Turks, and adorned it in all solemnity. … 
He ordered all the Muslim books to be burned, persuading the people that they must abandon the vain and 
false Muslim tenets and adore the living God. …” Sanuto, I Diarii, 4: 485-9, quoted in Palmira Brummett, 
“The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, in Medieval Christian 
Perceptions of Islam, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 342. 
Ludovico d’Varthema, another Venetian source writes, “[Ismail] was going through the country putting 
everywhere to fire and flame; and especially killed all those who believed in Bubachar [Abu Bakr] and 
Othman [Uthman] and Aumur [Umar].”  Quoted in Brummett, p.343.   
1720 Similarly in his letter (fetih-nāme), which was written after the battle of Çaldıran, to Süleyman, Selim 
narrates the prelude of the battle as follows: “Before embarking the battle, I have sent my messengers to 
Ismail who declared him his fallacious faith. They also affirmed that the rightly guided religious scholars 
agreed on his blasphemy and issued sanctions for the execution of him and his followers. I have informed 
him on that because of above-mentioned reasons, cleaning his dirty presence from the surface of earth 
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supporter of küfr and made the symbol of küfr the tāc (hat) on his head.1721 To sum up, 
Selim describes Ismail and his movement as a great fire of fitne within the world of 
Islam; and underlines that it was compulsory duty (farz-ı ‘ayn) on the Muslim rulers to 
extinguish this fire.1722 It is rather meaningful that Selim compares Ismail and his 
followers with Ye’cüc while presents himself as Alexander.1723 Selim argues, as Şükrī 
rephrases, that the Muslims living in the territories under Ismail’s rule were suffering 
from oppression and demanding to take them into his realm of justice. Thus, Selim 
presents his campaign on the qizilbashes as a revenge of Muslims who suffered from 
Ismail’s oppression (zulm). In doing so, his aim was obviously to present his battle 
against Ismail as a religious duty for the sake of the whole Islamic world.1724 
                                                                                                                                                
became inevitable for me [for I am the sultan of Muslims.] But before using my sword I offer him the 
religion of Islam once more. If he would repent of his malicious actions, convert to Sunni Islam, and 
recognize all the land that my horse trampled until now as Ottoman land then he will see nothing but help 
and kindness from my state.” See See Feridun Bey, pp. 358-9. (I have not translated whole the text mot à 
mot but summarized it.) As clearly reflected in this official document, Ottoman state did not regard 
Safavids within the borders of Islam. The same attitude is quite apparent in other fetih-nāmes of Çaldıran 
as well. 
1721 For a similar description of Shah Ismail and his followers see Hadîdî, Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman (1299-
1523), haz. Necdet Öztürk, Đstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991, pp. 385-6. 
1722 Indeed, Ottoman historians unanimously depict the qizilbashes as oppressors tyrannizing the Muslim 
population. See, for example, IDRS, p. 120. Interestingly, more or less the same depiction was made by 
the qizilbashes of Anatolia about the Ottomans, who forced them to change their traditional way of life. 
Idris-i Bitlisī states that the brilliant temporal success of Ismail exited his enthusiastic disciples to such an 
extent that they began to deem Ismail as a divine being. See IDRS, p. 122. 
1723 SKB’s account truly reflects the perception of the Ottoman intelligentsia of the matter. Meanwhile, 
one feels legitimate in questioning whether or not this account could reflect true attitude and thought of 
Selim for it might well be the fabrication of SKB to a certain extent. Although Şükri-i Bitlisī was in the 
Ottoman Palace by the last years of Bayezid II (See Đsmail Hami Danişmed, Đzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi 
Kronolojisi, c. 2, Đstanbul, 1971, p. 22.) and participated in many events he narrated in his Selim-nāme, his 
contribution may not be disregarded. But still, considering the actions of Selim from his governorship of 
Trebizond to the Mamluk campaign carefully, it would be recognized that Selim was the real architecture 
who made the Islamic scholars to construct such a perception of Ottomans – and Safavids of course. For 
Şükri’s life and works see Mustafa Argunşah, “Giriş: Şükri-i Bitlisī’nin Hayatı ve Şahsiyeti”, in Şükrī-i 
Bitlisī, Selim-nāme, haz. Mustafa Argunşah, Kayseri, 1997, pp. 3-36.  
1724 For a similar but concise account see ALI, p. 1073.  Another contemporary author, Mahremî reports 
the situation in a similar manner. See Hatice Aynur, “Tavalalı Mahremî’s Shehnâme and the Kızılbash”, in 
Syncrétismes et hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du 
Collège de France, octobre 2001, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 237-48. Beldiceanu-Steinherr argues, 
however, that the persecution of Selim I was not primarily because he declared himself the guardian of 
sunnism but because he had to keep the integrity of the empire, which was under serious threat by 
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Idrīs also emphasizes this point and states that since there was no other Islamic 
power to stop Ismail’s tyranny on Muslim societies, the Ottoman Empire was the only 
sunni state able to stop this torrent of heresy. Thus, Idrīs suggests, that it was the only 
way for Selim to wage campaign on the qizilbashes for the sake of not only the Ottoman 
Empire but also the whole Islamic world.1725 With such a strategy, Selim would kill two 
birds with one stone: one was to secure the legitimacy of his campaign’s religious 
ground. Likewise, he says, in Şükrī’s account, that because of Ismail’s and his followers’ 
wrongdoings and perversity, the ulemā issued sanctions authorizing Muslims to murder 
them.1726 Selim’s other concern pertained to the developments in the aftermath of the 
campaign. He declared himself as the savior of Sunni Islamic world for he would finish 
a heretic power within Islam. As will be delineated, the first letter of Selim to Ismail was 
exactly constructed on this ideological background and was an excellent manifesto of 
Selim’s self-image he desired to establish.  
There is evidence proving Selim’s success in this attempt. A fervent Sunni 
scholar, Fazlullah Ruzbihan b. Khunjī’s two entreaties to Sultan Selim may potentially 
reflect the sultan’s image in the Sunni Muslim world outside the Ottoman realm. 
Fazlullah was the court historian of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu until the latter’s death in 
1490. Being an ardent enemy of shi’ite Safavids, he observed the rise of Ismail with 
great anxiety. Following the intense civil war between Akkoyunlu princes, he left 
Azerbaijan in 1490. After spending ten years in Kâşân, he went to Khorasan finding 
homage at the court of Muhammed Shaybanī Khan. He spent rest of his life in Khorasan 
                                                                                                                                                
numerous fragmented heterodox groups. See Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans 
la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, p. 42.  
1725 IDRS, p. 122.  
1726 This aspect of the issue will be further evaluated below. 
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under Shaybanī patronage and died in Buhara in 1521.1727 His works in a variety of 
fields shows that Khunjī regarded Safavids a great peril against Sunni world and 
fervently provoked Sunni rulers to get rid of this peril. His depiction of Ismail’s 
ancestors, which no doubt steered Yakub Beg, is already examined. Nonetheless, the 
Akkoyunlu dynasty was destined to vanish under the hooves of the qizilbashes horses. 
When emerged as a great military power in Azerbaijan and Iran in the first decade of the 
sixteenth century, Ismail faced two great Sunni enemies: Ottomans in the west and 
Uzbeks in the East. After Azerbaijan and Iran fell under shi’ite rule, Khunjī first went to 
the Uzbek court. Nevertheless, Shah Ismail managed to defeat Uzbeks in 1510. This 
defeat must have seriously eroded Khunjī’s dreams pertaining to Uzbeks Khans.  
On the other hand, Selim’s victory made Khunji so happy that after four years he 
wrote two poems - one in Persian and the other in Turkish - praising Sultan Selim.1728 
Khunji openly addresses Selim as the only protector of the Muslim world and the deputy 
(halife) of Allah and Muhammed.1729 He repeatedly describes Selim as Zülkarneyn of 
Islam and the savior of Muslims (Mehdi-yi Sahib-zaman).1730 In his poems (one may 
regard these works as letters of petition or entreaties), Khunjī not only praises Selim and 
his great victory against the ‘enemy of true religion’, but also incites him to re-march on 
Ismail in order to eliminate the problem and to conquer whole Persia and Khorasan. He 
                                                 
1727 For the life, deeds, and work of Fazlullah Ruzbihan b. Khunjī, see Derya Örs, Fazlullah b. Ruzbihān-i 
Huncī ve Tārih-i ‘Ālem-ārāy-i Emīnīsi, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara 
Üniversitesi, 1999, pp. 23-40; Gülşen Seyhan Alışık, “Fazlullah b. Rūzbihān-i Huncī’nin Yaşamı ve 
Yavuz Sultan Selim Han’a Yazdığı Türkçe Manzum Yakarışı”, Modern Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi, 
cilt 2, sayı 4, Aralık 2005, 70-87.  
1728 These letters are recorded by Feridun Beg and Idris-i Bitlisī. See Feridun Beg, pp. 367-369; IDRS, pp. 
125-30.  
1729 Feridun Beg, p. 368; IDRS, p. 126.  
1730 Feridun Beg, p. 368-9; IDRS, p. 126-29. 
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advises Sultan Selim that the ‘red-cap’ is like a poisonous snake - if you would not crush 
its head you could not get the result.1731  
Clear enough in Khunjī’s entreaties, hence, that he regarded Sultan Selim as the 
only hope against the rising qizilbash threat to the Sunni world. One might feel 
legitimized to extend this exemplary case to many other Muslim scholars outside the 
Ottoman country. Accordingly, after defeating Ismail in 1514, he gained such a great 
prestige in the eyes of the Sunni world that nobody within the ulemā circles could show 
resistance against his campaign on Sunni Mamluks, at the end of which he carried the 
symbolic leadership of the whole Islamic world to Istanbul.1732   
At the end of his speech, Selim clearly put forward his idea that it was urgently 
necessary to wage war on the Shah and to extirpate this mortal evil forever. Then he 
demanded the opinions of the present statesmen and scholars, expecting his ideas to be 
approved. Nevertheless, they were not as sure as Selim was. Although Selim repeated 
his question twice, no response came. It was only the third time that a law-ranking 
Janissary soldier stepped forward and said, 
Hakk Celle ve ‘Alā pādişāhımızın ömrini dırāz ve lütf u ihsānını ‘ibādına hātır-
sāz ve iltifāt-ı bī-girānını çāker-efrāz eylesin, ki pādişāhımız ruh-ı revāndır. 
Anlardan ayrı düşen leşker māned-i cism-i bī-candır. Zāt-ı şerifleri gibi yegāne 
pādişāhı āllahdan isterdük. Bu kadar bir nev-civān ve pir-tedbir ferzāne 
                                                 
1731 Feridun Beg, p. 367; IDRS, p. 125.  
1732 Edward Browne has truly pointed out Selim’s intention of becoming the supreme head of Islamic 
world in his combat against ‘heretic’ Shah Ismail, “For Sultan Selim was what is now called a Pan-
Islamist, and his ambition was to be not merely the Sovereign of the greatest and most powerful 
Muhammadan State, but the supreme head of the whole Muslim world. His conquest of Egypt and the 
Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina in 1517, and his assumption of the title of caliph, which, whether by 
threats or promises, or a combination of the two, he induced the last titular Abbāsid Caliph to surrender to 
him, might well have given him this position but for Shah Isma’īl and the barrier of heterodox which he 
had erected between the Turks, Egyptians and other Sunnis to the West and their fellow-believers to the 
East in Transoxiana, Afghānistān, Balūchistān and India. The Persians not only refused to recognize 
Sultan Selim as Caliph, but also repudiated the whole theory of Caliphate.” BRW, p. 24. For claims of 
Sultan Selim to universal legitimacy also see Karen M. Kern, The Prohibition of Sunni-Shi’i Marriages in 
the Ottoman Empire: A Study of Ideologies, Unpublished PhD. dissertation, Colombia University, 1999, 
pp. 54-58.  
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pādişāhımız ola, nat’-ı zeminde Şāh evine at sürsek dir idik, li’llāhi’l-hamd 
duāmız kabul oldı ve nāvek-i recāmız pūte-i icābete vusūl buldu. Fermān 
Hüdāvendigārındur, şimdi buyursun şimdi gidelim, her ne zamanda teveccüh 
kılursa emrine ita’at idelim.1733  
 
‘Ali records that upon hearing these words from a low-ranking janissary who 
earned only nine akçe ulūfe, the Sultan generously granted him the governorship of the 
Sancak of Selānik.1734 According to ‘Ali, why the statesmen and generals remained 
silent when Selim asked their opinions, was because of fear caused by the disposition of 
Selim. This sort of interpretation should be regarded, however, as an attempt of a later 
Ottoman court historian to clarify and to glorify the fame of Selim. In a similar vein, 
‘Ali mistakenly narrates as if this event occurred in Istanbul when Bayezid II was alive 
in Dimetoka.1735   
A similar account is recorded in Şükrī. On demanding their opinion, the 
statesmen did not present their answer immediately; rather they negotiated the issue 
among themselves. At the end they decided to consult the law of former sultans (kanūn-ı 
selef).1736 Upon hearing their answer, Sultan Selim became rather annoyed and said that 
the former law was neither the word of God nor the deed of the Prophet (sünnet). Then 
he gave the unquestioned obedience of the qizilbashes to the Shah as an example stating 
that whatever the shah initiated, his adherents perceived it as law without doubt. Finally 
                                                 
1733 ALI, p.  . TNSS argues that this conversation takes place just after Selim’s ascendance to the throne in 
the spring of 1512. See TNSS, p. 31. Nevertheless, as Hammer realizes, the context of events suggests that 
it must be during the divan of Edirne. See HAM2, p. 420. 
1734 ALI, p. 1074.  
1735 ALI, p. 1073.  
1736 The best way of interpreting this phrase seems to take it as the traditional law of Ottomans, which is 
called örf. As Halil Đnalcık determines in his various works, Ottoman law was composed of two main 
branches: the religious law (şeriat) and the traditional or sultanic law which principally encompasses state 
affairs. See, for example, Halil Inalcik, “Şerî’at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet”, in his Osmanlı’da Devlet, 
Hukuk , Adâlet, Đstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46; “Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş, Örfî- Sultanî Hukuk ve 
Fatih’in Kanunları, Siyasi Đlimler ve Hukuk”, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 13, 1958, 102-126; 
“Adâletnâmeler”, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 11, 1965, 49-145. 
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he blamed the statesmen and the scholars for being enslaved by the law and ordered 
them to start the necessary preparations for the campaign ahead.  Şükrī’s account reads,  
Çün ekābir şah fermanın tamam  /  Dinledi ‘arz itdi k’iy pür-ihtişām 
Ceddünüz kānunun icrā idelüm  / Anların üslūbu üzre gidelüm 
Đş bu sözden hışm-nāk oldı ferid  /  Kakıdı a’yāna tünd ol ehl-i dīd 
Kim bu kanūn u kavā’id ü sübül / Gökten inmiş Hak kelāmı hod değül 
Ne Resūl’ün sünnetidür bī-hilāf  / Ni bu güft u gūda vardur ihtilāf 
Kendu devrinde ne ihdās itse Şah  / Ol anun kānunudur bī-iştibāh 
Devr anundır, emr anun, kanūn anun / Bahr anundır, berr anun, hāmūn anun 
Her zaman bir sūret ile iktiza  / Nef’ virmez böyle demde mā-mezā 
Uş bu kanūn-ı kavāid bi’t-tamām / Kim verüpdür nazm-ı eşyaya nizām 
Âdemī-zād ihtirā’idür bu hep / Her tarīka bir farīk olmuş sebep 
Siz hemān kanūn dip olmışsız esir / Kendü zātında habīr olsa vezir  
.............................. 
Bunda şart olan ferāsetdür hemin  / Yok suver yā reng yā dība-yı Çin 
Đmdi sizde maslahat bābın açun   / Defter-i tumār elkābın açun 
Đttifāk idün bu yolda bī-nifāk  /  Kim bozar tedbiri gayr-ı ittifak1737 
 
These are only two accounts that leaked out through thick pro-Selim filters of the 
Selim-nāme authors. Nevertheless, even these leakages are enough to observe the 
reluctance of the leading statesmen to wage an all-out campaign on Shah Ismail. One 
can easily discern in these accounts that Selim’s enthusiasm and resolution to handle the 
qizilbash problem with severe measures including violence was not shared by the 
members of the divan and the high ranking religious scholars. On the contrary, when the 
fact that these narrations are seriously manipulated versions of events in favor of Selim 
in which the ‘unpleasant’ elements were gravely tuned down is taken into account, it 
stands to reason to propose that there was a considerable resistance against Selim’s 
radical policy.  
However, after viziers realized Selim’s firmly determinant attitude and became 
exposed to his wrath, the viziers and pashas had to approve of Selim’s plans.1738 Then, 
                                                 
1737 SKB, p. 139.  
1738 SKB re-phrases their answer as follows:  
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orders were dispatched to local qādis and governors to start necessary preparations for a 
large-scale campaign.1739 On March 20, 1514, Selim moved from Edirne to Istanbul.1740 
Hammer says that this divan was summoned three days before Selim’s departure from 
Edirne.1741  
 
8.3.  ASSEMBLY OF ISTANBUL: THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE WAR 
One can trace the change in the Ottoman attitude towards the qizilbash issue in the first 
decade of the fifteenth century through the phrases employed by scribes and historians. 
The word ‘qizilbash’ is used neither in imperial edicts nor in chapters of the Ottoman 
chronicles narrating the events of the year 1500. Rather they employed the word ‘sufi’ in 
order to refer to the disciples of Safavid order.1742 Kemalpaşazāde, for example, uses 
‘qizilbash’ for the first time while narrating events of 911/1505 pertaining to the 
Ottoman-Safavid relations. He describes Ismail’ movement as fire of anarchy (nār-ı 
fitne) that extended to southern Iran (vilāyet-i Fars) and Iraq; and the majesty of the Shah 
augmented day by day. But he still does not employ any religious terminology.1743 He 
also uses the same word while reciting Ismail’s campaign on Dulkadir in 913/1507. Here 
                                                                                                                                                
“Söylediler şaha a’yān k’iy ferīd            Bahtun efzūn ola ömrün ber-mezīd 
  Pās-bān-ı der-gehün bulsun mihir         Sāye-i çetr-i felek-sāyun sipihr 
  Seyr idüb döndükçe çarh-ı āsumān       Ömrün olsun iy şeh-i sāhib-kırān 
  Zāt-ı pākün hās u ‘ām içün müdām       Devlet ü baht ile tursun ber-devām 
  Padişahā emr ü ferman sendedür           Biz kamu cismüz hemān can sendedür.” See SKB, pp. 139-40. 
1739 SKB, pp. 141-43; YSF, p. 44; ALI, p. 1075. 
1740 KPZ9, p. 95. According to IDRS, SKB, YSF, Lütfi Paşa, HSE, and ALI, he moved on March 19. See 
IDRS, p. 145; SKB, p. 143; YSF, p. 44; Lütfi Paşa, Tevārih-i Âl-i Osman, p. 208; HSE4, p. 174; ALI, p. 
1076. HYDR claims, however, that Selim departed from Edirne on Tuesday, March 21, 1513. Regarding 
the starting day of the campaign HYDR recites an interesting anecdote. He says that “it was recited from 
Shah Ismail that according to sayings of Imams to begin a campaign on Tuesday is not appreciated. Sultan 
Selim ordered, on the other hand, to begin the campaign on Tuesday.” See HYDR, p. 59.  
1741 See HAM2, p. 420. Hammer takes March 19 as the date of departure.  
1742 In the imperial edicts delineated in Chapter V, the Safavid disciples are insistently referred as ‘sufi’; 
the word ‘qizilbash’ is not employed.  
1743 KPZ8a, p. 243. 
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also appears another word which would be frequently seen in later descriptions of the 
qizilbashes by Ottoman writers: ‘evbaş’ which literally means vagrant.1744 
Kemalpaşazāde’s description of Ismail and his disciples further develops and gets closer 
to the official formulation of later Ottoman ulemā, which evolved in its final form during 
the reign of Selim I, in his narration of Ismail’s capture of Bagdad in 1508.1745 He uses, 
for the first time, the words ‘kızılbaş’, ‘gümrāh’, and ‘evbaş’ together.1746 This words 
would evolve into formulaic expression of the Ottoman religious scholars in a few years. 
Perhaps what is more significant is that Kemalpaşazāde firstly atributes ‘rafaza’1747 to 
Ismail and his followers. He says that when Bagdad fell in the hands of Ismail only those 
who were supposed to pursue shi’ite faith avoided his wrath. He massacred Sunni 
population of the city.1748 This is the last connotation attributed to the qizilbash identity 
in the eighth defter of Kemalpaşazāde’s Tevārih. 
                                                 
1744 KPZ8a, p. 251.  
1745 The conquest of Baghdād and the occupation of ‘Iraq-i ‘Arab marked the final stage in the conquest by 
the Safavids of the former Aqqoyunlu territories. See Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid 
Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 1965, p. 77.  
1746 KPZ8a, p. 277. 
1747 The connotation of this word is quite comprehesive and variable in Ottoman context. But still some 
consistent elements of meaning can be detected in almost all usages. First of all ‘rafaza’ associates with 
shi’ite connotations such as disregarding first three true chalips – especially first two – and Aisha, the wife 
of the Prophet, and exalting Ali and his offspring. In connection to the shi’ite content in its meaning 
‘rafada’ also refers to religious heresy in Ottoman context.    
1748 “...geldi Bağdad’ı aldı. Ol sevād ābāda dahī nehr-i kahr ü bī-dādı saldı. Rafzla müttehem olanlar ehl-i 
bid’atdan hāli mübhem olanlar kurtuldular. Onlar ki, eshāb-ı sünnet ü cem’atdılar gark-āb-ı ‘azābda 
boğuldılar. Māhi-yi āsār-ı bid’at olanların harmenini yile virüb, hāmī-i şi’ār-ı şeri’at olanları ol 
havāliden ayırub, Medinetü’s-selām Bağdad’ı ālām-ı Đslām’dan hāli kıldı. Nūr-ı hidāyetün menba’ını 
zulmet-i dalāletle mālī kıldı. Ceyş-i bed-kīşi Bağdad’a bir iş itdi ki, şerha kābil değil. Ol bī-dādların 
fesādların fesādların beyāna lisān mütehammil değil. .. 
Dil niçe şerh eylesün düşmenlerün bī-dādını 
Yıkdılar dārü’s-selām u sulhun bünyādını 
Niçe akmasun gözümün kanlu yaşı Dicle-vār 
Leşker-i gam geldi yıkdı gönlün Bağdādını.” See KPZ8a, p. 278.  
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In the very early years of the sixteenth century, the sufis were killed for political 
reasons, not on a religious ground.1749 Differing from the term ‘qizilbash’, which 
connoted political disobedience and religious heresy together, ‘sufi’ was used to refer to 
anarchic adherents of Ismail. Here the reason for the punishment was the anarchy they 
caused but not their religious stand.1750 The formulaic phrase repeated in all decrees is 
‘siyāseten salb itmek’, executing by raison d’Etat. The description of sufis in these 
decrees and the judicial ground of punishment shed light on the stage of the qizilbash 
problem in the Ottoman Empire in summer of 1501. It is obvious from this archival 
evidence that the Ottoman approach to the problem was yet political. No religious 
heresies of these groups are addressed, but they are described as groups causing disorder 
and anarchy (zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkıyā).1751 As Gilles Veinstein put forward, 
On ne saurait donc sous-estimer la conscience que, dès les tout débuts de Sâh 
Ismâ’îl, avant même l’intronisation de ce dernier, le sultan a au du péril qu’il 
faisait courir à l’ordre régional, déjà bien compromis, et au territoire même de 
l’Etat ottoman. Néanmoins, ce péril n’a pas encore acquis toute sa dimension 
politico-idéologique mais relève encore plutôt de l’anarchie tribale. Les choses, il 
est vrai, ne vont plus tarder à changer de sens.1752 
   
                                                 
1749 As mentioned earlier, the Otoman law was divided into two main branches: the religious law (şer’ī 
hukuk) and the sultanic law (örfī hukuk). The status of the Safavid disciples was yet in the sphere of the 
sultanic law. 
1750 For another assessment regard Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 231 and p. 233.  
1751 Aşıkpaşazāde’s account which deviates from the general picture put forward by other sources should 
be mentioned here. Aşıkpaşazāde is the only Ottoman historian who evaluated early Safavid affairs not 
only in religious context but also in political one. As will be explored below, for the first time he mentions 
religious ordinances issued by religious scholars on the sufis of Ardabil. Indeed, Aşıkpaşazāde argues that 
the scholars of religion (ulemā) had already concluded that the adherents of this sufi order fell out of the 
true religious sphere, namely they became infidels. (See APZ, p. 249.) Kemalpaşazāde, for example, does 
not yet mention any religious heresy; he gives the reason of mass deportation as the banditry and 
disobedience of these sufis. (Solakzāde, however, follows APZ’s line. To him the reason was their heretic 
beliefs. “[Ismail’in] Yanına toplanmış bulunan mülhidlerin ekserisi Teke ve Hamid vilāyetinden olmakla, 
o memleketlerde, mutlaka rāfizilik kokusuna bulaşmış olmaları ve mezhepsiz sayılmaları dolayısıyla 
Rumeli yakasına sürüldüler.” SLZ1, p. 429.) Aşıkpaşazāde’s account on the infidelity of Ardabil sufis 
during the early years of the sixteenth century is rather peculiar. No other Ottoman chronicles evaluate this 
problem in terms of religious discourse until Selim launched war on Safavids in 1514. The first fetvā 
disclaiming the qizilbashes as unbelievers is known to be issued by a certain Hamza shortly before the 
Campaign of Çaldıran.  
1752 Gilles Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 236. 
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Solakzāde states that Ismail made his soldiers wear red-caps after his ascendance 
to the throne in Tabriz. And thence his soldiers became famous for the epithet 
‘qizilbash’.1753 Solakzāde does not use this word in the former chapters of his history. 
We see similar explanations in other sources as well. A sixteenth-century anonymous 
history, for example, cites almost the same story. After capturing Tabriz, Ismail soon 
became one of the most majestic rulers of the era. He ordered all his men - his retinues, 
his bureaucrats, warriors, adherents of his father and grandfather – and all his subjects 
whether they were Muslim or Christian to wear red-caps (kırmızı çuhadan taçlar). 
Eventually, his followers and subjects were called ‘kızılbaş’. Ismail’s goal in doing so 
was to differentiate his men from the Ottomans.1754 We know that the word “kızılbaş” 
was not initiated by Ismail, but by his father Shaykh Haydar. Then how should we 
interpret this false account repeated in relatively independent Ottoman sources? The 
answer must somehow be related to the ‘political’ connotation of the word ‘kızılbaş’ in 
the Ottoman context. Before appearing as a temporal power, Safavids and their disciples 
were simply ‘sufis’ in the eyes of the Ottoman officials. When they turned into a 
political rival, the term ‘sufi’ was replaced by ‘kızılbaş’.   
It is understood from Ottoman sources that the epithet of ‘qizilbash’ achieved 
wide acceptance among Ottomans only after Ismail’s achievement of significant 
temporal power. Because of that, this term not only conveyed mystical connotations 
such as being spiritual devotees of the Safavid order for which the term ‘sufi’ had been 
                                                 
1753 See SLZ1, pp. 428-9. 
1754 See ANMH, p. 39. This anonymous historical document was written in the sixteenth century, 
approximately one century before Solakzāde. On the other hand, a careful examination reveals that it 
evidently has a different stand from other ottoman chronicles. Thus, though still bearing discernible 
familial resemblances with Solakzāde and with other Ottoman chronicles, there are reasons to deem its 
account considerably independent than that of the established clichés in the Ottoman historiography of the 
sixteenth-century. 
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used until the temporal power of Ismail became a threat for the Ottoman rule but also 
included, at least as much as its mystical content, political and military connotations in 
the Ottoman context. Furthermore, the Ottoman historians and bureaucrats used to attach 
adjectives to the word: the most frequently used formulas are kızılbaş-ı evbaş, vagrant 
qizibash, kızılbaş-ı bed-ma’aş, qizilbash living a bad way, kızılbaş-ı bī-din, qizilbash 
without a religion, kızılbaş-ı melā’in, damned qizilbash, qizilbash in bid’at u dalāl, 
kızılbaş revāfiz-i bī-iman, qizilbash who went astray and without faith. One would 
immediately realize the two prevailing themes in these adjectives: one is socio-political 
and the other is religious. First of all they are described as disobedient-vagrants, not 
recognizing the ‘legitimate’ authority of the Ottoman state and the damned people living 
in a bad way of life. A close analysis of the works of Ottoman ulemā such as 
Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde Mustafa shows that these descriptions actually reflect the 
attitude of the Ottoman elites towards the nomadic subjects of the empire. Secondly, 
there are still some other adjectives depicting the qizilbashes as heretics deviated from 
the true path of Islam, qizilbashes who went astray, and in some occasions as people 
without faith. Indeed, it was the combination of these two themes that constituted the 
‘Qizilbash Heresy’ in the Ottoman context: the excellent marriage of the politico-
militarism and the ghulat-shi’ite mysticism; in other words, the metamorphosis of the 
Safavid gnosis (irfan) in the Turkish tribal milieu.   
Turning back to Sultan Selim’s campaign, he arrived in Istanbul in ten days and 
pitched his tent on Filçayırı near the famous quarter of Eyüp.1755 Here Selim again 
summoned an assembly of especially the high ranking ulemā this time. He demanded 
                                                 
1755 IDRS, p. 145. Lütfi Paşa says that Sultan Selim stayed in this place for twenty two days. See Lütfi 
Paşa, Tevārih-i Âl-i Osman, p. 208.   
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their opinion about the legitimacy of his campaign from a religious point of view. To put 
it more directly, he demanded religious sanction for this campaign. Again, as reflected in 
almost all Selim-nāmes, Selim describes Ismail and his followers as in astray and 
underscores that he [Ismail] had been damaging the true path of Islam. His 
argumentation in demanding religious authorization for the execution of the qizilbashes 
was completely established on religious ground. If we rely on contemporary Ottoman 
historians, in this assembly he did not even mention the political threat posed by 
Ismail.1756    
As will be discussed later, within purely religious context, the qizilbashes’ deeds 
seem to have not been enough to promulgate them in astray; thus to wage war against 
them – further, to kill a great number of the empire’s own subjects - would not be 
approved easily, at least when compared to the treatment of the Ottoman administration 
to similar ‘religiously divergent’ groups devoid of political menace. The decision was 
obviously taken on a political ground, even though the issue was evaluated fully within 
the religious terminology.  
                                                 
1756 SKB narrates the events in verse: 
“...  Kondı Filçayırı üzre şehriyār              Đtti yiğirmi iki gün anda karar 
Bunda cem’ itdi mevāli fırkasın         Rum ahālisin ü sāhib-kırkasın 
Kādı vü müfti müderris bi’t-tamam   Geldi dirildi efāzıl hep be-nām 
Uş bu āli zümreden itdi sual               Hüsrev-i gāzi şāh-ı ferhunde –fāl 
K’iy mevāli şarka men azm itdüm uş  Hayr dip bir niyyet-i cezm itdüm uş 
Şah Đsmail tā itdi hurūc                        Fıska feshat virdi isyana urūc 
Bid’ati ām itdi vü Đslamı ketm             Zulmü itmām itdi vü bī-dādı hatm 
Her fesāda mazhar oldı ol farīk           Koydular zulm ü dalālet-çün tarīk 
Đlm ü şer’ ü fi’l ü har ü sarf ü nahv      Bunlarun devrinde yek-ser oldı mahv  
Sünnet ü icmā ü Kur’an u kıyās           Sürhā-serden giydi gūn-a-gūn libās 
Hill ü hürmet farkı ma’dūm oldı hep   Küfr ile eşyayı yakdı bu Leheb 
Katl-i nefs ü sebb-i sühān-ı vebāl         Küfr ü kin āsārı ya’ni tāc-ı āl 
Uş buna mānend evsāf-ıla Şah             Muttasıfdur şah u hem Şāmi-sipāh 
Đmdi katl ü mālına fetvā virün              Đzn-i şer’ī birle istiftā virün 
Ger gazādur izn ü ruhsat hükm idün    Mal u esbābın ganimet hükm idün 
V’er hatā ise irādet virünüz                  Bir heves itdüm icāzet virünüz ...” SKB, pp. 143-4. Also see 
YSF, pp. 44-45.  
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It is clear that Selim had already started the preparations for the campaign when 
he summoned religious scholars and demanded the religious sanction. This assembly 
could not have any influence on the intension of Selim for he had already taken his 
decision firmly. This assembly of Istanbul was simply a tool for providing a legitimate 
religious ground and preparing the public opinion for the upcoming campaign and for 
the persecution of the Anatolian qizilbashes. As I have already indicated, Selim had well 
clarified his mind regarding the qizilbash affair even before the assembly in Edirne. 
It should be pointed out that the two assemblies in Edirne and Istanbul seem to 
have been different in content. Although some sources state that Selim summoned all 
prominent statesmen and religious scholars in Edirne assembly, the way the issue was 
discussed and the demand of Selim at the end, suggest that this assembly focused on 
political facet of the issue. Indeed, Selim’s utterances in this meeting were quite alike 
with what he said to ulemā in Istanbul assembly. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that they discussed the religious ground of the affairs. As it is well-known, religion 
and politics were so much intermingled in the Middle Ages that one could hardly deduce 
the dominant incentive only from the utterance; rather in order to penetrate into the true 
nature and content of any utterance, one should regard the broader framework and the 
context as well. In the assembly of Edirne, after declaring the heretic stand of Ismail, 
Selim explained his decision and demanded their opinion on the matter. (Asker çeküp 
üzerine varmak isterim. Görek sizing dahī re’yiniz nedür?).1757 The answer leaves no 
doubt that his primary audience was statesmen and the issue was being evaluated on 
political ground.1758 Indeed, Şükrī does not mention the religious scholars but only refers 
                                                 
1757 YSF, p. 43. 
1758As I have delineated above, they offered to consult to the traditional law (örf). 
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to the statesmen as participants of this assembly.1759 Idrīs also mentions two distinct 
assemblies before the campaign: first he summoned statesmen and generals to discuss 
the political and military aspects, and then the religious scholars.1760   
After ‘persuading’ his viziers and pashas to wage a campaign against Shah 
Ismail, Selim needed to get the approval of the religious law. It must have been because 
of that that he summoned a second assembly in Istanbul only thirteen days after the first 
one to discuss the campaign on Iran. Idrīs states clearly that upon securing the approval 
of begs and soldiers, Selim summoned a second assembly which was attended by the 
prominent religious scholars of the time.1761 Thus, the focus in this second assembly 
was, as contemporary sources unanimously agreed on, to clarify the religious ground of 
such an operation within the realm of Islam. Likewise, after referring to Ismail’s deeds 
as contrary to the Islamic law and Sunni doctrine, Selim directly demanded religious 
sanction from the present ulemā.1762  
Contemporary authors unanimously reports that, dissimilarly with the former 
assembly, Selim’s demand was immediately accepted and performed quite willingly by 
the scholars. Kemalpaşazāde, who was one of the participants in most of the events that 
he recorded in his history journal completed in 1516, narrates the assembly of scholars 
in Filçayırı as follows, 
… Ol makam-ı rahat-encāmda [Filçayırı] birkaç gün ārām olundukdan sonra āli 
divan olub, ol ‘asrda cādde-i şeri’atde sābit-kadem ve ehl-i sünnet ü cemā’at 
                                                 
1759 “Edrene tahtında Şāh-ı ser-firāz                Đtti rūşen-rāy ifşā-yı rāz 
      Paşalar gelsün didi dergāhuma                Bir sözüm var hassā devlet-hāhuma” SKB, p. 135. SKB 
records that when Selim called the viziers and pashas to the assembly, the grand vizier Hersek-oğlu 
Mustafa was ill and lying in bed. But the sultan insisted on his participation since the issue was very 
crucial.        
1760 IDRS, p. 123. IDRS does not specifies, however, that the first assembly was summoned in Edirne 
while the second in Istanbul. 
1761 IDRS, p. 123. Also consider TNSS, p. 39. 
1762 His audience, thus, was evidently the prominent ulemā of the empire rather than the statesmen. 
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arasında kalem-i fetvā ile ve ‘ālem-i takvā ile müsellem ve mukaddem olan 
mevālī divana da’vet olundı. Kızılbaş-ı evbāş ta’ifesinün muhārebesi husūsı 
söyleşilüb, muktazā-yı şeri’at nidüği istiftā kılınub, bu maslahat müşāvere olındı. 
Anlar dahī rāy-ı sevāb icmā’ idüb bu cevābı müstetābı tahrīr itdiler ki: “Her kim, 
ol dāll ü mudille intisāb ide, ve ruhsat virdüği ef’āle irtikāb ide, mübāhı 
mübahu’d-demdür. Cem’in tefrīk ve eşyā’ını temiz itmek gerek, sā’ir harbī 
kāfirlerden anlarunla muhārebe ehemm ü akdemdür. A’vān u ensārı sā’ī-yi 
fesāddur. Her ne diyārda ve bilādda var ise emān virmeyüb helāk itmek gerek. 
Ayet ü hadīs hükmiyle āmil olub vech-i arzı ol habīslerün levs ü revs-i 
ilhādından pāk itmek gerek.” ... Sultān-ı Đslām ol mālik-i ezimme-i ahkām olan 
ulemā-yı a’lāmun fetvāları muktezāsınca ‘amel idüb, ol ‘azīm-i kadīmle ‘azm-i 
rezmi tesmīm eyledi. ...1763    
 
If we rely on Kemalpaşazāde, and other contemporary Selim-nāme authors, 
Selim did not meet any opposition in the second assembly from the ulemā. On the 
contrary, they (the ulemā) not only issued the religious sanction legitimizing war against 
Ismail and his adherents but also encouraged him to extirpate these malicious people 
from the face of the earth.1764 Idrīs deems, for example, the proliferation of the 
qizilbashes as the greatest discord (fitne) in the world. 1765 If we rely on Idrīs, the ulemā 
of the time unanimously claimed that for the ruler of Muslims, scattering the qizilbashes 
was more urgent than fighting with unbelievers.1766 To sum up, according to the 
Ottoman chroniclers, all religious scholars agreed on the necessity of waging a war on 
                                                 
1763 KPZ9, pp. 96-97.  
1764 For example, SKB follows the same line of arguement with KPZ and writes,  
“Yek-ser ehl-i ilm virdiler cevab              K’iy emirü’l-mü’min devlet-me’āb 
Bunda yokdur zann u yā reyb ü güman   Müttefikdür cümle ilm ehli ‘ayān 
Ger cihād-ı a’zam ister tācüdār               Uş ganimet uş gazā olsun süvār 
Çün cevab aldı mevāliden Selim             Ber-murād oldı ahāliden Selim 
Geldi dirildi tamam ālāt-ı ceng                Cübbe cevşen gürz-ile top u tüfeng.” See SKB, p. 144. 
1765 See IDRS, p. 116. 
1766 IDRS, p. 123. IDRS gives an example from Ebu Bekir, a companion of the Prophet, while reasoning 
this argument. He says that it was already decided to conquer Damascus and to wage cihad against 
unbelievers shortly before the death of the Prophet. However, upon the revolt of Museyleme el-Kezzāb 
with prophetic claims, Ebu Bekir, in consultation with Umar and Ali, changed the priority marching on 
Museyleme. Thus, handling the fitne within the realm of Islam is always prior to performing cihād against 
external enemies. For similar arguments see CLZ, p. 209. In one of his fetvās, Ebussuud Efendi also refers 
to the same decision of Ebu Bekir in explaining the priority of handling the qizilbash problem. See 
Maunuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, no. 3542, fols. 46a-47a. Also see Eberhard, pp. 166-
7; Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhülislâm Ebussuud Efendi’nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanunî Devrinde Osmanlı 
Hayatı, Đstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006, pp. 134-6, fetvā 481.  
 528 
the qizilbashes and dispersing them in order to save Muslims from a great 
oppression.1767 
Considering the report of Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife, it is clear that some 
members within the ulemā class who were vigorously advocating the suppression of this 
‘heretic’ movement by all means possible had already emerged. But still one feels 
legitimate in feeling doubtful about the picture of the attitudes of the contemporary 
ulemā by Selim-nāme authors. As indicated earlier, their writing retrospectively should 
be discerned in this picturing as well as their writing under the patronage of Selim, who 
had then already accomplished the victor, or of his son Süleyman. Of course, within 
available sources, it is not possible to determine whether or not any opposition to the 
sanction came out from among the ulemā class, and if so to what extent. What we can be 
sure of is, however, that they felt the heavy pressure of Selim’s despotic, ruthless, and 
determined personality on all the decisions both ulemā and statesmen took. When 
writing the events years later, the influence of this pressure which was rather augmented 
was profoundly reinforced by the psychology of adherence to one party in a fierce and 
sharp religio-political confrontation. Consequently, one should be careful in assessing 
the attitude of the Ottoman religious circles toward the qizilbash problem and read these 
accounts by tuning down the religious sharpness or intolerance to a certain extent, 
realizing the political stimulus behind this seemingly religious approach.  
According to Kemalpaşazāde, Selim first demanded religious sanction from 
ulemā in Istanbul assembly, 13 days later than the start of the campaign. In the 
                                                 
1767 Tekindağ, differently from the author of the present study, refutes KPZ’s record which states that 
Selim obtained the religious approval from the ulemā in Istanbul, and argues that the religious sanctions 
were issued before the assembly of Istanbul. See Tekindağ, “Yavuz Sultan Selim’in Đran Seferi”, p. 57, 
footnote 33. 
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meantime, Şükrī says, some ulemā had already issued religious sanction for the 
execution of the qizilbashes before Selim summoned the first assembly in Edirne.1768 
During the declaration of his decision to his viziers and pashas in Edirne, Selim referred, 
as Şükrī narrates, to certain fetvā(s) which were authorizing the persecution (katl) Ismail 
and his followers. Şükrī’s account runs, “Katline fetvā veribdür ehl-i din.”1769 Regarding 
his long descriptions even in a detail of events throughout his history, Şükrī’s reference 
to the religious sanction only with one short sentence suggests that he was not inclined 
to stress the religious facet of the issue, at least in Edirne assembly. Moreover, he does 
not clarify when and by whom this fetvā was issued. Whether he expressed the shared 
                                                 
1768 Although not specifying a date, HSE seems to have pursued similar view. He mentions the religious 
sanction issued by the doctors of the religious law just before narrating Selim’s first assembly in Edirne. 
Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that HSE wrote his history more than half a century later than 
the events, it is not of little probability that he might have mistakes in chronological order of the events. 
Furthermore, as already pointed out, Selim-nāme authors had been proved to show zealous enthusiasm to 
create a legitimate ground for Selim’s unruly and daring practices.  One of the best examples of such 
efforts is recorded in Tacut’-tevārih. HSE says that ”once at the presence of Sultan Süleyman, Đbrahim 
Paşa, one of Sultan Suleyman’s grand viziers, asked me, ‘Our sultan has objections to some practices of 
his father; could you explain the reasons of his controversial practices?’ Then the sultan himself said, ‘We 
are not in a position to oppose the decisions of the majesty (Sultan Selim); but you should express your 
doubt!’” After mentioning three controversial practices of Sultan Selim in order to answer the question 
asked by Đbrahim Paşa - killing and imprisoning the qizilbash envoys, marrying Ismail’s wife to another 
man, and appropriating goods of merchants - HSE brings explanations for each practice clearly attempting 
to advocate Selim. (See HSE4, pp. 212-25.) From this point of view, one might regard his reference to the 
fetvā just before the assembly of Edirne as a part of legitimizing efforts. By doing so, HSE as well as some 
other Ottoman historians aimed without a doubt to stress that the campaign of Çaldıran and the large-scale 
persecution of Muslim subjects during this campaign were not because of Selim’s political ambition but 
chiefly because of the religious incumbency put on his soldiers by the ulemā. Likewise, HSE does not 
mention the fetvā in other parts of his history. See HSE4, p. 169.  
1769 SKB, p. 138. Also regard YSF, p. 43. It reads, “...Ulemā-i din ve fukahā-i müsliminden anın hāli 
istihyār ve ef’āli istifsār olundukda nakilleri muvāfık, sözleri mutābık ol tāği-i bāğinin zulm ü inād ve 
küfre irtidādın hükm idüb, demi helāl ve kıtāli efdāl-i ā’mal olduğuna fetvā verdiler. ...” Here a pecularity 
of Selim-nāme literature that I insistently underscore appears evidently. YSF’s history was the re-edited 
version of SKB’s text in prose. In the text of SKB’s Selim-nāme only the sentence “Katline fetvā veribdür 
ehl-i din” is recorded pertaining to the religious sanction. SKB’s expression is quite vague and not 
sharpened. However, as clearly seen, YSF expands this one sentence and adds supplamentary expressions, 
which creates an impression that Selim consulted the prominent religious scholars of the time and received 
full authority to kill the qizilbashes. This provides a good example to the argument, which I follow, that as 
time went on, the minds of Ottoman scholars got clearer and parallel to the advent of events and their 
judgments gained sharpness (regarding the qizilbash affairs). What we read for the most part are, 
unfortunately, the products of the clarified and sharpened minds, which were written down after the battle 
of Çaldıran. Consequently, it is very difficult to penetrate into the true attitudes of the Ottoman religious 
scholars during the eve of the great clash.    
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sentiments among the Ottoman elite or referred to a written fetvā is not clear in his 
narration. Nevertheless when the whole chapter is taken into account, one feels that he 
simply explains a general tendency rather than a signed fetvā text. He might even have 
fabricated this information later, when writing his history.   
Celalzāde states that upon Selim’s declaration of his intention to wage war 
against Ismail, the attended statesmen and begs unanimously agreed upon this idea by 
stating that they (the qizilbashes) were worse than unbelievers for the realm of Islam and 
Ottomans. Then they decided to ask the religious dimension of the issue to the religious 
scholars. For this purpose the ‘ālim who was the müfti’l-müslimin at the time was asked 
the legitimacy of such a war from the point of religion. In his answer, the müfti’l-
müslimin sanctioned this war.1770 Unfortunately, Celalzāde does not clearly indicates 
who the müfti’l-müslimin was.1771  
Indeed, since the reign of Selim, a considerable literature of heresiography 
disclaiming the faithlessness of the qizilbashes down to the nineteenth century appeared. 
Almost all the fetvās and treatises dealing with the qizilbash issue, however, trace back 
two fetvās/treatises issued in the first quarters of the sixteenth century: one is the famous 
fatva of a certain Hamza and the other being the treatise (risāle) of Kemalpaşazāde. Both 
texts are dedicated to prove the fallaciousness of the qizilbash path of religion, to  justify 
                                                 
1770 “’... mādām ki ol tāyifenin bu sebīle sülūkleri olub, tārīk-ı dalāletden tevbe ve inābetleri olmıya, her 
vechile küffār-ı hāksārdan eşedd ve eşerr, min cemī’i’l-vücūh füccār-ı nār-kārardan edall ve ebterlerdir’ 
deyü tafsīl-i kelām idicek sāmi’īne mecāl kalmayub cümlesi ol cānibe ‘azīmet ma’kul ve makbuldür 
didiler. Ba’zı erbāb-ı savāb bu rāyı müstahsen görüb işaretleri ana müncer oldı ki, bu husus a’lemü’l- 
‘ulemādan sual, müftī-i din-i mübīnden fetvā olına. Ana binaen bu suret-i ahvāl tesdīd olunub ol tarihte 
müftī’l-müslimin olan ‘ālimden istiftā itdiler. Selātin-i şer’-āyinin teveccüh-i müveccehleri ol tāyife 
üzerine olamak meşru’ idüğün cevāb virdiler. ...” CLZ, pp. 209-210. 
1771 One further point to be noted here is that although CLZ’s arrangement of events, namely first taking 
the political decision and then providing religious sanction, is congenial to the accounts of SKB and KPZ, 
when writing his history half a century later than events, he was,most likely to make a mistake regarding 
the timing and the location of the second event, i.e. providing the religious sanction. As already 
delineated, Selim assembled religious scholars in Istanbul, when the campaign had already started. Yet 
CLZ narrates as if both events had taken place in Edirne, before the beginning of the campaign.  
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waging war against them and to kill them individually. Later treatises and fetvās, among 
which are those of famous Ebussuud Efendi, followed these two fetvās, especially the 
treatise of Kemalpaşazāde, in essence.  
Unfortunately neither the fetvā of Hamza nor the treatise of Kemalpaşazāde is 
dated. Their content and style suggest, however, that Hamza’s fetvā1772 must have been 
the first text of the Ottoman heresiography literature pertaining to the qizilbashes.1773 
According to Şahabeddin Tekindağ, this fetvā was most probably issued in 1511 or 
1512. His conclusion derives from the impression he got from an additional note 
attached to the main text of fetvā. To him, the inscription at the end of E 6401 suggests 
that the fetvā was presented to Yahya Pasha, who was the beylerbey of Anatolia in 1508, 
and includes implication to the Şahkulu rebellion.1774  Nevertheless, his argument needs 
further clarification and correction. Firstly, Yahya Pasha’s name is followed with the 
phrase ‘rahimallahu te’āla’, which is generally, though not exclusively, used for dead 
people. Secondly, according to this note, the fetvā was issued after Yahya Pasha’s 
campaign on the qizilbash (ba’de hıyni’s-sefer ile’l-Erdebiliyyin el-malā’īn)1775; but it 
does not indicate how much later. Lastly, this note is seemingly a later addition to the 
original document for i) the inscription is clearly different from that of the main text, ii) 
                                                 
1772 There are several copies of this fetvā. Three copies are housed in TSA with document numbers E. 
6401, E 5960, and E 12077. The first one was published by Tekindağ in 1968 and all three were 
republished by Tansel one year later. See Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, pp. 54-55 and appendix; 
TNSS, pp. 35-36 and appendix. At the end of all three texts, the name ‘Hamza’ is inscribed. But at the end 
of E. 6401 it reads, ‘el-Müfti ez’afu’l-ibād Hamza el-fakir eş-şehir bi-Sarıgürz (Sarugörez)’.  
1773 Apart from the fetvās of Ebussuud, a number of fetvās and treatises proclaiming the qizilbashes as in 
astray appeared since the middle of the sixteenth century. For example, for four treatises dealing with this 
issue in the second half of the sixteenth century, namely those of al-Nahjuvānī, al-Sirvānī, Mirza 
Mahdūm, and Mutahhar, see Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. 
Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970, pp. 53-61.  
1774 Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, p. 55. 
1775 As already delineated, Yahya Pasha was dispatched with Rumelian troops and 4000 Janissaries to 
protect the eastern borders of the Empire against Shah Ismail during the latter’s campaign on Dulkadir in 
1507.  
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it repeats the name of the author, although it is separately written by the original pen. At 
the end of the original text, it reads, “harrarahu az’āfu’l-‘ibād Hamza el-fakīr”. On the 
other hand, the additional note begins with the phrase, “ve’l-müftī az’āfu’l-‘ibād Hamza 
el-fakīr eş-şehīr bī-Sarıgürz”.   
On the other hand, a close study of the text of the fetvā suggests that it was 
written in order to justify the war against Shah Ismail as cihād. During the Şahkulu 
rebellion there was no need for such a religious sanction since qizilbashes were 
perceived as rebels; therefore, persecuting them was obviously not problematic from the 
religious point of view. Hamza’s fetvā declares that scattering their community is both 
‘farz’ and ‘vācib’ for Muslims; whoever dies on the Muslim side is a martyr and will go 
to paradise while their deaths will be in depths of the hell. Hamza also proclaims that the 
Sultan of Islam should kill their men while dividing their women, children, and property 
among Muslim soldiers as booty.1776 From these expressions, it is clear enough that 
Hamza’s sanction was to prepare a religious ground for the upcoming campaign of 
Selim against Shah Ismail. Consequently, it must be issued after the summer of 1513, 
when Selim secured his throne eliminating and executing Ahmed and the other males of 
the royal line. According to Selāhattin Tansel, Hamza authored this fetvā upon Selim’s 
demand from the ulemā in Edirne.1777 If we accept this assumption Şükrī’s one sentence 
reference to a religious sanction may be interpreted as the fetvā of Hamza. Nonetheless, 
I have already delineated that Selim’s first assembly of war in Edirne was concerned 
                                                 
1776 TSA, document E 6401.  
1777 TNSS, pp. 34-6. As I have already put forward, on the authority of mainly KPZ and SKB, however, 
the assembly of Edirne was summoned in order to discuss the political aspects of the campaign and the 
preparations rather than the religious aspects. Contemporary sources do not indicate Selim’s demand of 
the religious sanction in this assembly. On the other hand, Tansel also claims that this fetvā provided the 
legal ground for the execution of many qizilbash – Ottoman sources roughly say 40.000 - within Ottoman 
Empire before the campaign. See TNSS, p. 38. As will be evaluated in the following pages, Tansel’s 
argument stands to reason.  
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with the political dimension of the issue rather than the religious one. None of our 
sources mention Selim’s any demand for a religious sanction in this assembly. Then 
again, the second assembly in Istanbul was summoned directly with the aim of 
discussing religious aspects of the campaign. Contemporary sources unanimously report 
that with the prominent Ottoman ulemā Selim obtained the religious sanction providing 
religious basis of the campaign in this assembly. Thus, if it had not been issued before, 
we can safely take early April of 1514 as terminus post quem for the date of Hamza’s 
fetvā.  
The identification of the author of the fetvā is another problem and would likely 
to shed light on the issue if clarified. I have already delineated that at the end of E 6401, 
the author writes his name as simply “Hamza el-fakīr”; but a note, which is evidently a 
later addition, adds further epithets to the name of the author. It reads ‘el-Müfti ez’afu’l-
ibād Hamza el Fakir eş-şehīr be-Sarugürz’. Tekindağ claims that his full name was 
Müfti Nureddin Hamza Sarı Görez (d. 927/1521) and was one of the most distinguished 
ulemā of the time. He adds, on the authority of Bursalı Mehmet Tahir1778, that his family 
was from Balıkesir and he was buried near Yayla-Camii in Istanbul.1779 Tansel repeats 
the same idea that one may possibly identify Hamza with the kazasker Nureddin Efendi, 
but he is not as sure as Tekindağ.1780 R. C. Repp, on the other hand, seems to feel certain 
                                                 
1778 Mehmet Tahir’s account runs:  
“Sarıgürz Nureddin Efendi ‘Balıkesirī’ 
Nātık bi’l-Hak fakīh muhaddis bir zat olub Karasī’dendür. Burusalı Hoca-zāde ile Sinan Paşa’dan 
telemmüz eyledi. Sultan Selim ol zamanda kadı-askerlik rütbesine nāil olmuş idi. ... Vefātı 927’de kabri 
Đstanbul’da Fatih civarında Yayla Camii kurbundaki mektep haziresindedir. ... Haleb kadısı iken 990’da 
vefāt iden hafīdi Mehmed Efendi de fuzaladan bir zattır. Sarı tüylü, kısa boylu ve mülhem olduğu-çün 
zamanında ‘Sarı-gürz (زآ ير`)’ şöhretiyle be-nām olmuşdur.” See Bursalı Mehmet Tāhir, Osmanlı 
Müellifleri, vol. I, Ankara: 2000, p. 341. Mehmet Tāhir mentions some works of Nureddin Efendi, among 
which the fetvā of the war against the qizilbash is not mentioned at all.  
1779 See Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, p. 53.  
1780 TNSS, p. 34.  
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about the identity of Hamza. He claims that he was Molla Nūr al-Dīn b. Yūsuf al-
Karasīwī known as ‘Sarı Görez’, an established scholar who had already been one of the 
Sahn müderrises, served as a mufti pending Ali Cemâlî’s return from the pilgrimage, 
held the qādilik of Istanbul during the period July 1511-September 1513 and May 1518-
September 1521 and also held both kazaskerlik.1781 Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr also 
follows the same line of argument in identifying the author of the fetvā, arguing that he 
was no other than Nureddin Efendi, first the qādi of Istanbul and later the kazasker.1782 
The principal source of these scholars, except Repp who additionally consults Şakāyık, 
is again Osmanlı Müellifleri of Mehmed Tahir. However, because of three reasons to be 
discussed below, according to Mehmed Tahir’s account, it is very problematic to 
identify our Hamza with Sarıgürz Nureddin Efendi.    
Although Tekindağ does not mention it, the one whom Mehmed Tahir refers to is 
obviously well-known kazasker of Selim, who was sent by Bayezid to Selim as an 
intermediary while Selim had been in rebellion. Furthermore, in Mehmed Tahir’s 
account, the name ‘Hamza’ is not recorded. And lastly, while counting the works of 
Nureddin Efendi, Mehmet Tahir does not anyhow point to the fetvā pertaining to the 
qizilbashes among them. The only connection left between the two religious scholars is 
the epithet ‘Sarugürz’. Nonetheless, even this epithet was not possibly common for two 
authors, the author of our fetvā and Müfti Nureddin, who was the kazasker of Selim. It is 
highly possible that the writer of this additional note confused the author of the fetvā 
with famous kazasker Müfti Nureddin Hamza Sarı Görez.  
                                                 
1781 R. C. Repp, The Mufti of Istanbul, A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy, 
London, 1986, pp. 217-20.  
1782 Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les 
Safawides”, Revue des Études Islamiques, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 397.  
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Adel Allouche follows Repp and, on the authority of Taşköprizāde, says that he 
was from an indigenous family of Karasu, a town in northern Anatolia, and recorded in 
biography books as Nureddin el-Karasuvī (d. 1512).1783 Although Allouche’s 
consultation to Şakāik-ı Nūmāniye, which is totally ignored by the first three scholars, 
must be appreciated, he still seems to be wrong in identifying our Hamza with Nureddin 
el-Karasuvī for he seemingly dwelled on the wrong entry in the Şakāik-ı Nūmāniye. 
A three and a half pages section in Mecdi’s translation of Taşköprizāde’s 
monumental work, whose summary is also recorded by ‘Ali,1784 leads us towards a 
completely different direction and leaves little doubt on the life and deeds of our Hamza. 
Taşköprizāde and ‘Ali mention a religious scholar, namely Mevlāna Muhammed b. 
Ömer b. Hamza, who became famous in Antakya with his skill in reciting Kur’an (ilm-i 
kıra’at), his sermons, and religious sanctions (fetvā). He visited Cairo and obtained 
compliance in hadis and fıkıh there. He was the author of two books written in these 
fields, namely Tezhībü’ş-Şemāil and Nihāye. Then, he came to Istanbul during the reign 
of Bayezid II and attended in the conquest of Moton. He was also in the court of Selim 
during the campaign of Çaldıran. ‘Ali indicates that he wrote a delicious book for the 
two Ottoman sultans. He was with Süleyman I during the campaign on Hungary. He 
died in 938 / 1531.1785  
Taşköprizāde’s account is rather long and detailed. He says that Mevlāna 
Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza became famous with the nickname ‘Mevlā vā’iz-i Arab’ 
                                                 
1783 Adel Allouche, Osmanlı-Safevi Đlişkileri. Kökenleri ve Gelişimi, translated from English to Turkish by 
Ahmed Emin Dağ, Đstanbul, 2001, pp. 122-3.  
1784 Interestingly, none of the scholars consults ALI’s Künhü’l-Ahbār. 
1785 ALI, p. 1224. ALI also records, “Âlim-i Rabbānī ve kāşif-i esrār-ı Kur’ānī bir aziz idi.”  
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or ‘Mevlāna Arab’.1786 His family was from Māveraü’n-nehir from among the disciples 
of famous Taftazānī but settled (tavattun itdi) in Antakya. After delivering sermons 
(va’az) in some cities of the Middle East, including Tabriz, Amid, and Hasankeyf, he 
went to Cairo, where he received the compliment of the Mamluk ruler of Egypt, 
Kayıtbay until the death of the latter in 903 (1497-8). Leaving Cairo, he first went to 
Bursa and then to Istanbul. After returning from the conquest of Moton, he delivered 
sermons in Istanbul during which he condemned the fallacious (zenādeka ve mülhidīn) 
and sufis who did not avoid dancing.1787  
Taşköprizāde says that after some time he moved to Aleppo where he engaged in 
the patronage of Hayırbey, the Mamluk governor of the city, and continued his sermons 
for three years. Then he returned to Rum. Taşköprizāde does not specify why he went to 
Aleppo leaving the Ottoman capital city. One might speculate that he might have left 
Istanbul because of his strife with some prominent figures of religious circles. Taking 
into account his leaving not only Istanbul but also the Ottoman realm, a more possible 
line of thought is that he must have gone to Mamluk territory in order to refrain from 
any possible harmful outcomes of the civil war among the Ottoman princes. Although he 
                                                 
1786 One should not confuse Muhammed b. Omer b. Hamza with Molla Alāaddin Alī el-Arabī, known as 
Molla Arab, who died in 1496 as the Mufti of Istanbul. For Molla Alāaddin Alī el-Arabī, see Repp, pp. 
174-87.  
1787 “... Meclis-i vaazda zenādeka ve mülhidīn ve raks iden sūfiyye-i menā’lehin hakkında kādh-amiz ve 
dahl-engiz kelimāt ider idi. ...” Mecdī, p. 413. Menākīb-ı Đbrāhīm-i Gülşenī recites an interesting occasion 
regarding to the opposition of Vā’iz-i Arab. On one occasion when he was delivering a sermon in 
Ayasofya Mosque, Vā’iz-i Arab, who was an unbeliever in the sainthood (meşāyih-i ‘izāma ve evliyā-yı 
kirāma hemīşe inkar üzere oldığı mukarrer olmağın), began to denounce sema’ as atheism. Then a certain 
Dīvāne Şüca’, who was among mecāzib-i meşāyih, stood up and started dancing. During his dance in 
ecstasy the shaykh proved certain supernatural deeds which made the present audience to disbelieve in the 
words of Vā’iz-i Arab. When the negative attitude of the author of the menākıb regarding Vā’iz-i Arab is 
considered, one immediately realizes that he did not have a good fame among sufis. See Muhyî-i Gülşenî, 
Manâkib-i Đbrâhîm-i Gülşenî, yay., Tahsin Yazıcı, Ankara: TTK, 1982, pp. 224-5. ‘Raks’ was one of the 
most controversial issues between ulemā and sufis in the early sixteenth-century. Many prominent 
religious scholars, including KPZ, were opposing ‘raks’ during the religious rituals of sufis. For KPZ’s 
attitude towards Sufism and ‘raks’ see, for example, Hayrani Altıntaş, “Đbn Kemal ve Tasavvuf”, in 
Şeyhülislām Đbn Kemāl, hazırlayanlar S. Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, 
Ankara: Türkiye Diyānet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989, 194-203.  
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does not give any proper date, Taşköprizāde’s narration suggests that Muhammed b. 
Ömer b. Hamza left Istanbul during the last two or three years of Bayezid’s reign. After 
delivering sermons which were usually dedicated to condemn the qizilbashes and to 
proclaim them as unbelievers for three years, Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza returned 
from Aleppo to Rum. According to Taşköprizāde, his return to the Ottoman realm was 
directly connected to the qizilbash campaign of Selim. Terceme-i Şakāik continues: 
Mahrūse-i Haleb’de üç yıl mikdārı vaaz ve hadis ve tefsir ile eğlenüb revāfız ve 
melāhideyi, husūsan tāife-i Erdebiliyyeyi kadh ve zem idüb bu iki gürūh-ı 
mekrūh ve tāife-i gayr-ı hāifenin nihād-ı nā-pāk ve cibillet-i bā-cibilletlerinde 
nihāde olan sū’-i ahvāl-i demīme-i zemīmeyi ve kabīh-ef’āl-i nākıse-i şenīā’-i 
nā-hemvārı halk-ı āleme tebliğ itmekde mübālağalar ider idi. ... Tāife-i reddiye-i 
Erdebiliyye fāzıl-ı mezkūre buğz ü adāvet idüb mesācid ve me’ābedede haşa 
ashab-ı kirām zevi’l-ihtirāmdan sonra ana dahī la’net iderlerdi. Ba’dehu diyār-ı 
Rūm’a gelüb merhum Sultan Selim Han Gāzi hazretlerini Kızılbaş-evbaşa cihad 
itmeğe tahrīz ve tahrīs idüb emr-i gazānın fezāiline ve ve ahvāline müte’allik bir 
kitab-ı bedī’u’l-üslūb ibdā’ ve ihtirā’ eyledi. Pādişāh-ı Selimu’t-tab’ yekrān 
‘azm-i sādıkla hem-inān olub asākir-i zafer-rehber ile Kızılbaş seferine giderken 
fāzıl-ı mūma-ileyh rāh-ı gazāda ‘izzāt ve kemāte mesūbāt-ı cihādı beyān ve 
müberrāt-ı gazāyı tibyān eyledi. Zaman-ı mukābele ve evān-ı mukātelede nārgār-
zār ve āteş-i muhārebe-i kerem olub  “ve kad belağatu’l-kulūbu el-hanācire” 
ma’nāları zāhir oldukda ol tāife-i tāğıyye-yi bāğıyye-i div-surat ve kul-sīretin 
zarar u gezendini müslümanlardan def’ içün dua idüb cümle-i mücāhidīn ve 
Pādişāh-ı sa’ādet-āyin ‘amin’ didiler. ... Dua hedef-i icābet ve ve nişān-ı 
isticābete musādif olub evmāc-ı maksūda vāsıl olmağın tāife-i Kızılbaş-ı evbāş 
münhezim u mün’adim oldılar. ... Bu kaziyye-i marziyyenin vuku’undan sonra 
Rum illerine revāne olub mecālis ü mehāfilde va’az ve pend itmeğin halk-ı ālem 
anın enfās-ı müessire-i müsmiresi berekātında o evāmir-i ilāhiyyeye inkıyād ve 
menhiyāt-ı münkirāt-ı memnu’dan imtina’ eyledi. ...1788 
 
As clearly reflected in the above-passage,  Mevlāna Arab was fanatically against 
the the qizilbash movement to such a degree that even a sixteenth-century Ottoman 
religious scholar, Taşköprizāde himself, had to admit that he exaggerated in condemning 
and disdaining disciples of the Safavid Order. If we rely on Taşköprizāde, Mevlāna Arab 
assumed that the proclamation of the qizilbash as ‘heretics’ or ‘infidels’ was a religious 
                                                 
1788 Mecdī, p. 413. 
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mission for himself. Taşköprizāde stresses his exaggeration and fanaticism in a striking 
way. He indicates that the adherents of Ismail hated him so much that they included his 
name to the first three khalifas to be cursed in mosques and shrines during or after the 
pray.1789  
It seems from Taşköprizāde’s account that Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza was 
not content with simply proclaiming the heresy of the qizilbash through religious 
sermons but wished to do more in order to uphold the faith of Muslims keeping them 
away from the destructive effects of qizilbashism. It must be because of this incentive 
that following the ascendance of Selim, he immediately returned to the Ottoman Empire. 
Taşköprizāde states that he encouraged Sultan Selim to wage a war against the 
qizilbashes, arguing that it would be a cihād. Furthermore, he authored a book in a new 
style on the virtue and conditions of gazā, which was completely original and had never 
been seen before, (emr-i gazānın fezāiline ve ahvāline müte’allik bir kitab bedī’u’l-üslūb 
ibdā’ ve ihtirā’ eyledi). This description is worth considering. Taşköprizāde does not use 
the verbs ‘te’lif etmek’ (to author) or ‘yazmak’ (to write) but the verbs ‘ibdā’’ and 
‘ihtirā’’ both of which mean to initiate or create something have never been seen before. 
If we take his fetvā on the qizilbashes as the first one, Taşköprizāde’s description of his 
work becomes quite meaningful. Likewise, the problem – to describe the religious 
position of the qizilbashes and to determine the attitude towards them – was for the most 
part original for Islamic scholars of religious law and needed a new interpretation.1790  
                                                 
1789 I have not come across any record in Safavid or Ottoman sources indicating such a name included 
among the people to be cursed. But, even if this is a fabrication of Taşköprizāde, still it is apt to reflect the 
degree of the fanaticism of Mevlāna Arab, his hatred against the qizilbashes, and the hatred of the 
qizilbashes towards him.  
1790 For the Sunni ulemā of the sixteenth century, the originality of the problem is best reflected in one 
Ebussuud’s fetvās. He says that he has never cme across such a group neither in shi’ism nor in sunnism. 
This group is not even one of the 72 fallacious groups explained in the famous saying of the Prophet. 
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Taşköprizāde states that when Mevlāna Arab personally joined the campaign on 
the qizilbash; he declared and clarified the virtue of gazā and cihād on the way. 
(Kızılbaş seferine giderken fāzıl-ı mūma-ileyh rāh-ı gazāda ... cihādı beyān ve müberrāt-
ı gazāyı tibyān eyledi.) Remembering that the campaign started in Edirne on March 19 
(or 20) and the religious sanction was provided through the assembly with ulemā in 
Filçayırı, which was summoned on the tenth day of the campaign, Taşköprizāde’s 
explanation leaves no doubt that the first fetvā for this campaign was issued by 
Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza during the campaign, i.e. during or shortly after the 
assembly of Istanbul. Possibly because of this fetvā, he seems to have obtained Selim’s 
special benevolence; during or shortly before the battle he prayed for God to bestow 
Ottomans the victory while the sultan and soldiers followed him. Taşköprizāde says that 
his pray was accepted by God.  
After Mevlāna Arab returned from Çaldıran, he settled in Bursa and delivered 
sermons during the rest of his life. He died on Muharrem 4, 938 (August 18, 1531) in 
Bursa.1791 As reflected in Terceme-i Şakāik, his profile resembles a middle-ranking 
religious scholar whose career built up mainly on the religious sermons (va’az) and 
religious sanctions (fetvā). Because of that, the epithet ‘müfti’ is inscribed before his 
name in the document E 6401. During his first visit to the Ottoman Empire, he doesn’t 
seem to have achieved a satisfactory position within the Ottoman society of ulemā. His 
                                                                                                                                                
Rather they took the worst elements of each of these fallacious groups and created a new synthesis of 
heresy. See Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, no. 3542, fol. 46a-47a. Also see 
Eberhard, pp. 166-7; Düzdağ, pp. 134-6, fetvā 481. Eberhard suggests that Ebussud’s fetvā should have 
been issued during his long şeyhülislamlık between 1545-1574, most possibly before Sultan Süleyman’s 
second and third campaigns on Persia in 1548 and 1553. He was already a famous qādi in 1532, first in 
Bursa and then in Istanbul. In 1537, he became the kadiasker of Anatolia and seven years later the 
şeyhülislam. See Eberhard, p. 50. 
1791 Mecdī, p. 414.  
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fanatic anti-qizilbash stand was like a shining star for him during Selim’s campaign on 
Iran, when he managed to include himself into the close circles of the sultan.  
The fetvā of Hamza1792 is already discussed by several scholars and its text is 
published twice.1793 Even a glance reveals that the ultimate aim of the text is to sanction 
the war against Shah Ismail and the persecution of the qizilbashes, either at war or 
peace. According to Hamza, executing the qizilbashes and dispelling their community 
wherever they were seen is not only approved but ordered by the religious law, for 
simply they fell apart the sphere of the faith or became disbelievers (kāfir ve mülhid).  
Hamza lists the following acts and practices of Ismail and his followers as reason 
for denouncing them disbeliever: despising the Qur’an, Shari’a, and Islam, approving 
the acts prohibited by God, killing (sunni) ulemā, prostrating before their chief as if he is 
God, cursing Abu Bakr and Omar and denying their caliphate, defaming and cursing 
Āysha, and (consequently) endeavoring to nullify the Shari’a of Muhammad.1794 
                                                 
1792 As Repp suggests, neither Hamza’s nor Kemalpashazāde’s statement should be taken as a fetvā since 
they are not cast in the traditional impersonal form but directly aimed Shah Ismail and his followers. See 
Repp, p. 220. Rather, they might be regarded as a manifesto of ulemā securing the religious ground of 
Selim’s campaign. Another function of these treatises was, without doubt, as Parmaksızoğlu suggests, to 
prepare public opinion against Safavids and for the upcoming severe persecutions. See Parmaksızoğlu, 
“Kemal Paşa-zâde”, IA, VI, p. 563. Nevertheless, since Hamza’s statement is widely known as fetvā of 
Hamza, I will refer to it as ‘fetvā’. 
1793 The complete text of the fetvā with facsimile copies of the original documents in TSA (E 6401, E 
5960, E 12077) is published in Tekindağ, “Yavuz Sultan Selim’in Đran Seferi”, pp. 54-5; TNSS, pp. 35-36, 
footnote, 61. In the appendixes of their works, Tekindağ provides a fascimile copy of E 6401, while 
Tansel puts all three documents. For discussions of the fetvā, see, in additon to these three works, Repp, 
pp. 218-20; Allouche, pp. 122-4; Đsmail Safa Üstün, Heresy and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire in the 
Sixteenth Century, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Manchester, 1991, pp. 35-49.  
1794 “… Müslimanlar bilün ve agah olun şol taife-i kızılbaş ki reisleri Erdebiloğlu Đsmaildür, 
peygamberimüzün aleyhi’s-salât ve’s-selâm şeriatini ve sünnetini ve din-i Đslam ve ilm-i dini ve Kur’an-ı 
Mübin’i istihfaf etdikleri ve dahi Allah-u Teala haram kıldığı günahlara helaldür dedükleri ve istihfafları 
ve Kur’an-ı Azim’i ve Mushafları ve kütüb-ü şeriati tahkir edüb oda yakdukları ve dahi ulemaya ve 
sülahaya ihanet edüb kırub mescidleri yıkdukları ve dahi reisleri laini mabud yerine koyub secde itdükleri 
ve dahi Hazret-i Ebi Bekr’e radıyallahu anhu ve Hazreti Ömere radıyallahu anhu söğüb hilafetlerine 
inkar itdükleri ve dahi peygamberimizin hatunu Ayişe anamuza (radıyallahu anha iftira etdüb – added in 
the later copy, E 5960) söğdükleri ve dahi peygamberimüzün aleyhi’s-salat ve’s-selam şer’ini ve din-i 
Đslam’ı götürmek kasdın itdükleri ve bu zikr olunan ve dahi bunların emsal-i şer’e muhalif kavilleri ve 
fiilleri bu fakir katında ve baki ulema-i din-i Đslam katlarında (tevatürle) malum ve zahir oldığı sebebden 
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Hamza’s foundation in accusing qizilbashes with disbelief (küfr), however, seems to 
have been heavily manipulated by the political conditions of the period. First of all, 
some of his accusations appears to be at least over-toned. For example, despising 
Qur’an, Shari’a, and Islam must be carefully regarded. Furthermore, as delineated 
elsewhere in this study, permitting the acts banned by God and prostrating before Shah 
Ismail should be appraised within the unorthodox, extremist-shi’ite, and militant Sufism 
of the qizilbashes. That sort of Sufism was not a new phenomenon in the Ottoman 
Empire. Rather, it always co-existed with the Ottoman orthodox version of Islam.1795 In 
the meantime, other accusations pertaining to the first two caliphs and Ā’ysha are 
supported by Safavid sources, not in the form of accusation as expected but as a natural 
result of Shi’ism.  
Another question is the ratio between the ‘guilt’ and the punishment in this fetvā. 
Leaving the theoretical framework of the theological discussions aside, which appears to 
have been quite controversial in the history of Islam,1796 on the level of practice, 
Hamza’s judgment seems quite harsh and unprecedented in the Ottoman context. Hamza 
concludes that killing them and scattering their community is obligatory for all true 
Muslims; their dead are in hell while ‘Muslims’ who would die during fight against 
them are martyrs; whatever they slaughter is impure, their marriage is invalid, and they 
could not benefit from inheritance; in short, they are worse than infidels.1797 I have 
                                                                                                                                                
biz dahi şeriatün hümi ve kitaplarımuzun nakli ile fetvā virdük ki ol zikr olunan taife kafirler ve 
mülhidlerdür. …” See TSA, document E 6401.  
1795 This is already discussed in length in the second chapter of the present study.  
1796 For a summary of discussion among Islamic scholars, see Eberhard, pp. 5-44. Also consider Ahmet 
Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar), 3. baskı, Đstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003, pp. 1-70. 
1797 “…Bunları kırub cemaatlerin dağıtmak cemi’ müslümanlara vacib ve farzdur. Müslümanlardan ölen 
sa’id ve şehid cennet-i aladadur ve anlardan ölen hor ve hakir cehennemün dibindedür. Bunların hali 
kafirler halinden eşedd ve ekbahdur, zira bunların bugazladukları ve dahi saydları gerekse doğanla ve 
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already discussed the despising attitude of the Ottoman ulemā towards the nomadic 
tribes and their religion. Nevertheless, despite all their denigration, they never 
sanctioned killing these religiously fallacious people for the sake of God, unless they 
posed political threat against the government, which was the case in the revolt of Shaykh 
Bedreddin.  
Indeed, some expressions in the text partly reveal the stimulus that made Hamza 
to pursue such a stern attitude and to give a fetvā with a political background. According 
to Hamza, not only the qizilbashes were disbelievers but those people whoever inclined 
to them, agreed upon their beliefs, and helped them were also disbelievers. (Ve dahi her 
kimesne ki anlara meyl idüb ol batıl dinlerine razı ve muavin olalar anlar dahi kafirler 
ve mülhidlerdür.) Perhaps a more interesting expression is the following. He says,  
(Ve bir nāhiye ehli ki bunlardan ola) Sultan-ı Đslam e’ezze’l-lahu ensārehu içün 
vardur ki bunların (ricāllerin katl idüb) mallarını ve nisālarını ve evlādlarını 
guzāt-ı Đslam arasında kısmet ide ve bunların ba’de’l-ahz tevbelerine ve 
nedāmetlerine iltifat ve itibar olunmayub katl oluna ve dahī bir kimse ki bu 
vilāyetde olub anlardan idügi biline ve yahud anlara giderken dudula katl oluna! 
Ve bilcümle bu tā’ife hem kāfirler ve mülhidlerdür ve hem ehl-i fesāddur, iki 
cihetden katlleri vacibdür.1798    
 
It is obvious that this statement is not related to the actual war involving the 
qizilbash warriors. Rather, it clearly refers to the villagers or rural population of the 
empire, i.e. the qizilbashes living in the Ottoman country. If people of a village would 
become qizilbash then the Sultan-ı Islam should execute their men and distribute their 
women, children, and property among gāzis of Islam as booty. Hamza further advises 
that even if the qizilbashes express regret upon their capture, the sultan should not accept 
their repentance but execute them all. Whoever in the Ottoman territories is known as 
                                                                                                                                                
gerekse ok ile ve gerekse kelb ile olsun murdardur ve ve dahi nikahları gerekse kendülerden ve gerekse 
gayrden olsunlar batıldur ve dahi bunlar kimseden miras yemek yokdur. …” See TSA, document E 6401. 
1798 TSA, document E 6401. The phrases in parenthesis are added from the other copies of the fetvā.  
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qizilbash (onlardan) or captured on his way to join them must also be executed. It is not 
the exaggeration to surmise from Hamza’s fetvā that whoever had any connection with 
Shah Ismail or the Qizilbash movement, no matter how and to what extent, had no other 
choice but die under the Ottoman sword. The harsh judgment of Hamza which leaves no 
room for error but brings all ways to execution resembles Selim’s political determination 
rather than the theological indictment of the orthodox ulemā for the sake of the religion. 
In other words, it resembles a ‘custom-made’ work rather than a scholarly theological 
treatise. 1799 Likewise, as the political threat of the qizilbashes calmed down, so did the 
severity of the fetvās of the Ottoman ulemā. Contrary to Hamza and Kemalpaşazāde, for 
example, Ebussuūd, who held the post of şeyhülislamlık between 1545 and 1574,1800 
forbade the enslavement of the qizilbash children.1801  
One feels legitimate to question the promulgation of such a critical religious 
sanction by a middle-ranking ulemā rather than the Mufti of Istanbul (şeyhülislam) or 
some other high-ranking ulemā.1802 The point rightfully raises suspicion on the 
mechanism that produced the first fetvā, as well as on the person behind it. According to 
Tansel, Hamza might have been induced to give the fetvā by threats, money or his own 
fanaticism.1803 R. C. Repp, on the other hand, rejects this approach claiming that the 
fetvā represented a view commonly held among the ulemā. According to him, a number 
                                                 
1799 Hamza’s judgments seem exaggerated according to the Islamic jurisprudence. For a discussion of the 
fetvā from the view of Islamic jurisprudence and its references, see Üstün, pp. 42-8. 
1800 See Repp, pp. 272-96. 
1801 Cited in Ertuğrul Düzdağ, Şeyhu’l-Đslam Ebu’s Suud Efendinin Fetvālarına Göre Kanunî Devrinde 
Osmanlı Hayatı, Đstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006, p. 136. For similar fetvās of Ebussuūd, see TSA, 
document E 7285. 
1802 Indeed, in his fetvā after counting sins of the qizilbashes, Hamza says that he and other scholars 
decided on their disbelief: “… bunlarun emsāli şer’e muhālif kavilleri ve fi’illeri bu fakir katında ve bāki 
ulemā-i din-i Đslam katlarında mālum ve zāhir olduğı sebebden biz dahī şeri’atün hükmi ve kitaplarımuzun 
nakli ile fetvā virdük ki ol zikr olınan tāyife kāfirler ve mülhidlerdür…” See TSA, document E 6401. 
However, available sources do not suggest the existence of other prominent scholars issued concomitantly 
with or before Hamza’s fetvā.   
1803 TNSS, p. 34.  
 544 
of ulemā must have written fetvās independently as the result of separate initiatives but 
only one of them, perhaps the best, survived.1804 One should note that Repp believes that 
the author of the fetvā was Molla Nūreddin b. Yūsuf al-Karasīwī known as ‘Sarı Görez’, 
a high-ranking scholar. Thus, he seems to be consistent in his argumentation. 
Nevertheless, a close examination of sources, as delineated, shows that the author of this 
fetvā could not be Molla Nūreddin. Furthermore, as Repp also admits, Ali Cemâlî, who 
was the şeyhülislam, the head of ulemā class at the time, seems to have been silent, 1805 
and thus one might surmise hesitant, on the issue.1806 As it is well-known, the 
şeyhülislam was the head of the fetvā institution in the Ottoman Empire. We have 
numerous fetvās of şeyhülislams pertaining to even seemingly unimportant, individual 
affairs. It is reasonable, therefore, to interpret the silence of şeyhülislam on such a vital 
issue of utmost importance for the state as a sign of hesitation among high-ranking 
ulemā. Following the enterprise of Hamza, however, Selim sooner gained further 
                                                 
1804 See Repp, p. 219.  
1805 Ali Cemâlî Efendi held the post during from 1503 to 1525-6, and was succeeded by Kemalpashazāde. 
See Repp, pp. 197-224. 
1806 There are some vague indications in Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman, a history of the virtues of the Ottoman 
sultans written in the late sixteenth century, to the attitude of Ali Cemâlî Efendi. In one occasion, Şahnāme 
narrates one of Sultan Selim I’s virtues as follows: Sultan Selim I decided to wage a campaign and asked 
the opinions of notables. At the end they decided to ask şeyhülislam (müftī’l-enām) Ali Cemâlî Efendi. Ali 
Cemâlî Efendi, however, did not approve Selim’s decision but offered to consult religious meditation. (In 
the text it is written as ‘istihāre’, which is a practice of consulting dreams with certain set of prayers and 
rites.) Being unpleased with şeyhülislam’s answer, Selim declined his offer, saying “it is not appropriate to 
consult dreams in such vital issues!” Then Molla Sarıgürz, the kadıasker of Anatolia, celebrates Selim’s 
decision arguing that it is suited to the religious law. Nevertheless, there are confusions in Şahnāme’s 
account. First of all, this event is recorded as if happened on the eve of Semend Campaign, which is 
unknown for the students of the Ottoman history. We know two campaign of Selim I, one over Safavids 
and the other over Mamluks. Therefore, one may surmise that the above-mentioned campaign must be one 
of these two. Ta’lîkîzâde, the author of Şahnāme, makes another mistake. In the following page, he reports 
the discussion between Selim I and Molla Sarıgürz. According to him, Selim first intended to wage 
campaign on Mamluks, but Molla Sarıgürz convinced him to march on Shah Ismail first. As already 
delineated above, this argument obviously contradicts the historical facts. Leaving aside his confusions, 
however, Ta’lîkîzâde’s account, which was written approximately one century later, affirms that 
şeyhülislam Ali Cemâlî Efendi was reluctant to sanction Selim’s war, most probably on Safavids. On the 
other hand, Şahnāme’s depiction of the position of Molla Sarıgürz should be read carefully. Molla 
Sarıgürz might well have been among those ulemā who inclined to support Selim’s harsh policy against 
qizilbashes. However, this still does not prove his authorship of the first fetvā. It should be also noted that 
Ta’lîkîzâde does not mention any fetvā. See Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman, fols. 22b-23b.  
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support of high-ranking ulemā as well, either through genuine persuasion or through 
threats to use force.  
The second fetvā/treatise declaring the faithlessness (küfr) of the qizilbashes was 
issued by Kemalpaşazāde. Indeed, there are at least two fetvās issued by Kemalpaşazāde, 
one in Arabic and the other in Turkish. His Turkish fetvā is in a classical question-
answer form. Kemalpaşazāde answers the questions on whether it is authorized by the 
religion to kill the qizilbashes and to declare gazā against them; and whether those who 
were killed in this war are şehits. His answers are: “Yes it is a great gazā” and “yes, they 
are absolutely şehits.”1807 The other fetvā/treatise of Kemalpaşazāde, which is written in 
Arabic, is not in the classical question-answer format. It is rather a memorandum 
proclaiming the heresy of the qizilbashes and the legitimization war against them. From 
this perspective, it would be rather appropriate to name this text as a ‘treatise’ (risāle) 
rather than a ‘fetvā’.1808 There are several copies of this treatise. The one included in 
Mecmūa-i Resā’īl is published by Şehabeddin Tekindağ.1809 Another copy is published 
by Elke Eberhard.1810  
None of these copies are dated. Elke Eberhard predicts that the first fetvā of 
Kemalpaşazāde, the Arabic one, must have been written in between 1513-14, while his 
second fetvā must have been issued between 1525 and 1535.1811 One should remember 
                                                 
1807 See the manuscript housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 3542, fol. 45b. For a brief 
summary and analysis of this fetvā see Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden, p. 165.  
1808 Compare, Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, EI2. 
1809 This copy of treatise with the title ‘Risaletü’l- Mevla eş-şehir bā-Đbn-i Kemal el-Vezir’ is located in 
between fols. 31a and 31b of Mecmūa-i Resā’īl, which is housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev 
Paşa Ktp., no. 621. Tekindağ published the full text in his article “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi” in appendix.  
1810 Eberhard used the copy located in fols. 45a-45b of a manuscript housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, 
Esad Efendi, 3542. See Eberhard, pp. 164-5.  
1811 Eberhard mistakenly accepts the date of death of KPZ as 1535. Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik 
gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz 
Verlag, 1970, p. 51.  
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that Süleyman I waged a campaign on Persia in 1534-5 and that Kemalpaşazāde died on 
April 16, 1534.1812 Thus, Eberhard regards this fetvā as a psychological maneuver before 
the campaign of Süleyman.  
Tekindağ, Ménage, and Parmaksızoğlu agree that the Arabic risāle of 
Kemalpaşazāde must be issued before the Persian campaign in 1514.1813 Even a cursory 
reading of the text which openly addresses Shah Ismail and his adherents makes it clear 
that the risāle was definitely written during the lifetime of Ismail by the aim of 
providing a religious ground for the war against the qizilbashes (against both the Safavid 
state and Ismail’s disciples in Anatolia). From this point of view, the best assumption 
seems to be the year of 1514 or a little earlier as the date of the risāle. It is known that 
Kemalpaşazāde was appointed as the müderris of Halebiye Medresesi in 918 (1512 / 
1513), then the müderris of Üç Şerefeli Medrese in Edirne, Sahn-ı Saman Medresesi in 
Đstanbul, and Sultan Bayezid Medresesi in Edirne consecutively.1814 Unfortunately, the 
contemporary sources do not specify the time interval when Kemalpaşazāde was in 
Edirne. One might likely suppose that he may quite possibly have arrived before Selim’s 
departure from there, thus attending the first assembly of Selim. Nevertheless, he does 
not mention the assembly of Edirne, even with a single word, in his Tevārih, while 
narrating the assembly of Istanbul in some details. His narration suggests that when 
Selim moved from Edirne, Kemalpaşazāde was in Istanbul, where he participated in the 
second assembly summoned in Filçayırı.   
                                                 
1812 See Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa-zāde”, IA; Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, EI2. I also want to remind 
that KPZ appointed as the kadiasker of Anatolia in 1516 and the şeyhü’l-islam in 932 (1525/6). (See 
Mecdī, p. 382)  
1813 Tekindağ, p. 55; Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, EI2, electronic edition; See Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl 
Paşa-zāde”, p. 563.  
1814 See Parmaksızoğlu, p. 563; Repp, pp. 229-231. 
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Kemalpaşazāde points out that in this meeting, the ulemā attended the assembly 
unanimously agreed on the legitimacy - even on the necessity – of a war against 
qizilbashes. They declared that those who adhered to him (Ismail) was surely in astray 
and those who performed the actions permitted by him were to be killed; the war against 
them was more important and necessary than the other wars (the gazā against the 
infidels); Ismail’s adherents and friends were all assumed as fallacious in their faith; 
they were to be executed when caught and they were to be extirpated from face of the 
earth.1815 Although the above-mentioned passage summarizes the risāle of 
Kemalpaşazāde, his narration does not include any hints implying that he issued a risāle 
or fetvā regarding the matter neither in the related part nor in any other part of his 
historical accounts. If we interpret this as a sort of modesty, then it would appear as the 
most reasonable way to admit that Kemalpaşazāde issued his risāle before the campaign 
either before or during the assembly of Istanbul. He did not participate in the campaign. 
But thanks to his risāle, he was appointed the qādi of Edirne on August 20, 1515, shortly 
after Selim’s return from the Çaldıran campaign, and on September 12, 1516, while 
Selim was staying in Aleppo after the battle of Merci-dābık, he was promoted to the 
qādi-asker of Anatolia.1816  
The risāle of Kemalpaşazāde repeats Hamza’s fetvā in essence but is much more 
developed and better-organized in a scholarly manner. Kemalpaşazāde’s treatise became 
a model for the later heresiography literature of Ottoman ulemā on qizilbashes. At the 
beginning of the treatise, Kemalpaşazāde directly expresses the aim of his work: “This is 
a statement pertaining to the disbelieving (küfr) of Shah Ismail’s followers, who are 
                                                 
1815 KPZ9, pp. 96-7.  
1816 Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, EI2, electronic edition; Parmaksızoğlu, p. 563; Repp, p. 231. 
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damned until doomsday.”1817 Then he states that a group (tā’ifa) of Shi’ite conquered 
most of the sunni lands and spread their fallacious path or madhab; they cursed the first 
three caliphs1818 and denied their caliphate as well as despising the Shari’a. According to 
Kemalpaşazāde, this group believes that path of Shari’a is difficult but the path of Shah 
Ismail is rather easy to follow and to perceive. In the same way, they believe in what 
Shah Ismail makes ‘permitted’ (helāl) as permitted, what he banned (harām) as banned. 
For example Shah Ismail made wine permitted, which is forbidden by the Islamic law, 
as well as rendering numerous act of disbeliever and the qizilbashes followed him. 
Kemalpaşazāde adds that whoever wears the red-cap, which is their distinguished dress, 
is bearing a clear sign of küfr.      
So, concludes Kemalpaşazāde, “we have no doubt that they apostatized and 
became disbeliever; they must be subjected to the law of apostasy. Therefore, their 
country turned into the ‘realm of the war’ (daru’l-harb); their marriages became invalid 
and their children are to be considered bastard (veled-i zīna); the animals that they 
slaughtered are impure.” Like Hamza, Kemalpaşazāde repeats the idea that when 
captured their cities, which are parts of daru’l-harb, their men should be executed and 
their properties, women, and children are helal to Muslims. Differing from Hamza, 
however, Kemalpaşazāde secures their life whenever they return to the true faith. He 
agrees upon Hamza’s judgment on the incumbency of cihād on all Muslims against 
qizilbashes.1819 
                                                 
1817 “Risāle”, in Mecmūa-i Resā’īl, Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev Paşa Ktp., no. 621. I 
thank Ahmet Simin for translating the text from Arabic into Turkish.  
1818 Hamza mentions only first two caliphs.  
1819 It can be clearly seen that Kemalpashazāde’s judgment is no less harsh than Hamza’s. Indeed, their 
references are more or less the same. For a brief discussion of Kemalpashazāde’s references and religious 
stand, see Üstün, pp. 49-59. 
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Kemalpaşazāde states separately that whoever leaves daru’l-islam and joins them 
choosing their fallacious faith must be sentenced to death by qādis, their property must 
be distributed among his heirs and their wives must be married to someone else. As was 
the case in Hamza’s fetvā, this statement is clearly addressed to the qizilbashes living 
within the Ottoman borders rather than the subjects or soldiers of Shah Ismail.   
To sum up, Selim managed to attain two religious sanctions, chronologically the 
first from a middle-ranking ulemā of Arabic origin and the second from a high-ranking 
ulemā of Turkish origin. Although it differs in detail and style, the essence of the two 
fetvās is more or less the same. Both fetvās were designed to justify and legitimize two 
upcoming ‘extraordinary’ acts of Selim: first, waging war on a Muslim ruler, and 
second, ‘extirpating’ a certain portion of his own subjects, namely the qizilbashes in the 
Ottoman country who adhered to Shah Ismail and his fallacious path.1820 As a matter of 
fact, Selim did not waste time putting his plan into action by starting with ‘cleaning his 
own home.’ 
 
8.4.  THE PERSECUTION OF ANATOLIAN QIZILBASHES 
According to a Venetian report dated back to April 8, 1514, the total number of the 
shi’ites (i.e. qizilbash) in Asia Minor is estimated to be the four-fifth of the whole 
                                                 
1820 One should notice that although both fetvās frequently refer to their targets as Shi’ite, by the term they 
obviously meant a specific group, namely the qizilbashes within and outside the Ottoman territories, but 
not the followers of Shi’a in general. Later ulemās such as Ebussuūd, did not regard the qizilbashes as 
ordinary Shi’ite. To him, they were even not among the 71 fallacious groups (fırka) of 72 fırka of Islam 
mentioned in the famous saying of the Prophet: “…Şi’a’dan değil ... bu tāife ol yetmiş üç fırkanın hālis 
birinden değildir. Her birinden bir mikdar şer ve fesad alıp, kendiler hevālarınca ihtiyār ettikleri küfr ü 
bid’atlere ilhāk edip, bir mezheb-i küfr ü dalālet ihtirā’ eylemişlerdir.” See Düzdağ, pp. 134-5. This 
formulation (regarding the qizilbashes outside the 72 fırka) later attained wide-spread acceptance among 
the Ottoman ulemā.  See, for example, see Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-Tekfīr-i Kızılbaş, Manuscript, Milli 
Kütüphane, YzA 695.  
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population.1821 Although this ratio seems to be an exaggeration, it still indicates the fact 
that before Yavuz Selim’s campaign on Shah Ismail, much, if not most, of the Anatolian 
rural population were either adherents or sympathizers to the qizilbash movement. As I 
have already delineated, the qizilbash existence in Ottoman Anatolia could not be 
reduced barely to their sizable population, but they also had a very effective part in 
politics and the military affairs. By Selim’s harsh policy, however, both the number and 
the influence of the qizilbashes in the political and military sphere reduced to a 
controllable level. Before he started the war against the Shah, Sultan Selim had already 
initiated a ‘purging operation’ within the Ottoman borders. It is traditionally reported by 
the Ottoman chroniclers that forty thousand qizilbashes were reported to the court and 
then executed by Ottoman officials.1822    
Idrīs states that while Sultan Selim was staying in Edirne in the winter of 1513-
1514, he dispatched decrees for the local governors ordering to register the names of all 
the disciples and sympathizers of Ismail be it young or old up to their third ancestors.1823 
According to Idrīs, the local governors were ordered to register the ancestors of the 
qizilbashes back to the third generation because of the fact that among the Safavid 
shaykhs only Ismail’s grand father, father, and himself (three generations) were 
enthusiastically engaged in politics and deviated from the ‘true path’ of Islam. Thus, the 
                                                 
1821 Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 1957, p. 438.  
1822 For a different approach to the qizilbash massacre by the Ottomans see Benjamin Lellouch, “Puissance 
et justice retenue du sultan ottoman. Les massacres sur les fronts iranien et égyptien (1514-1517)”, Le 
Massacre, objet d’histoire, sous la direction de David El Kenz, Gallimard, 2005, 171-182. This article 
attempts to bring a general conceptual approach to the massacre of the qizilbashes and Mamluks by Sultan 
Selim. To the author, Ottomans, and medieval Middle Eastern rulers in general, perceived the massacre of 
captives, even of the population of the conquered lands, as an act of sovereign power and justice. Thus it 
had ideological, judicial, and philosophical basis, as well as political reasons.   
1823 IDRS, p. 130. SLZ says, however, that Selim ordered the registeration of the names of the qizilbashes 
when he was in Anatolia. See SLZ, p. 16.  
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offspring of those who adhered to the Safavid Order by the time of Junayd were under 
suspicion and were to be listed.1824 ‘Āli reports it in a parallel fashion. After explaining 
Selim’s crossing to Üsküdar with the imperial army he says, 
Ve mukaddemā Anatolı vilāyetlerindeki hukkāma bāhiru’l-ahkām gönderilüb 
Kızılbaş-ı evbāş meredesinden olan riyāz-ı din-i Đslām’ı pejmürdelerden teftiş u 
tefahhuş itdirilüb, sinn-i heft-sāleden feftād-sāleye varınca kırkbin mikdarı 
nüfūs-ı menhūs ele girüb rafz u şenā’ati ve ef’āl-i şenī’a ile ol kallaşlara Şi’a ve 
Ravāfız ve ilhād serini ki, tu’me-i tīğ-ı ‘ālem-gīr ve lokma-i şīr-i şimşīr idüb 
defterin göndermişler idi...1825  
 
‘Āli’s account makes it clear that the defters of the qizilbashes arrived at the tent 
of Selim immediately after he had crossed to Üsküdar.1826 Müneccimbaşı further 
specifies the place saying that the defters were presented to the sultan when he arrived in 
Maltepe, and Hasan Bey, the beylerbey of Rumelia, had just crossed from Gallipoli to 
Anatolia.1827 According to the imperial decree, the local authorities were expected to 
prepare the list of names of all the qizilbashes within the boundaries of Rum with the the 
names of the places where they live; and these registers (defter) were to be conveyed to 
the Porte.1828 Idrīs argues that they had already deserved to be extirpated for being 
deviated from the true religious path. Likewise, many of these registered qizilbashes 
were killed.1829  
Ebu’l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi, the son of Idris-i Bitlisī, follows similar line of 
narration but adds that the number of the qizilbashes recorded in these registers (defter) 
reached 40.000; then these defters were sent to the local governors to give an account of 
                                                 
1824 IDRS, p. 130. 
1825 ALI, pp. 1076-77.  Also see SLZ2, p. 16.  
1826 SLZ follows the same account. See SLZ2, p. 16. 
1827 MNB, p. 457. 
1828 IDRS, p. 130. Also see HSE4, p. 176. Both IDRS and HSE clearly state that those qizilbashes who 
were living in the territory of Rum (diyār-ı Rūm) were registered and then killed.  
1829 IDRS, p. 130. As Edward Browne rightly noted long ago, curiously little or nothing is said by the 
Safavid historians about this massacre of the qizilbashes in Ottoman Anatolia. See BRW, p. 72.  
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the people to be killed. The number of executed qizilbashes by this way exceeded 
40.000.1830 According to Hoca Saadeddin, however, some of the registered qizilbashes 
were killed while some others were imprisoned.1831 Other historians such as Solakzāde 
and Müneccimbaşı agree upon the number.1832   
Indeed, Selim’s practice of registering the men in the opposite camp was not 
limited to the qizilbashes. One of Selim’s prominent spies, Yusuf’s report which 
informed Selim of the political situation in Istanbul while he was in Kefe in the autumn 
of 1511, clearly indicates that before his ascendance Selim had already ordered his spies 
to write down the list of opponents – mainly those who were pursuing pro-Ahmed stand. 
After reporting the tendencies of the leading statesmen and generals, Yusuf states that “I 
have registered the names of those who yelled against my Sultan [Selim] in detail; the 
list will arrive soon.”1833  
Learning from the contemporary historians cited above and from some further 
archival evidence, after his ascendance to the throne, Selim accelerated the journalistic 
activities of his spies – and from then on of the local official authorities as well - in 
Anatolia in order to determine the names, places, and positions of both Ahmed’s 
supporters and the qizilbashes. His aim was obviously ‘to clear the house’ before 
marching on Ismail.  
                                                 
1830 Ebu’l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi, Selimşāh-nāme, recited from Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, p. 56.  
The same account of Ebu’l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi is also recited in HAM2, p. 583. For the number of the 
registered qizilbashes also see HSE4, p. 176; TNSS, p. 38. This frequently repeated number pertaining to 
the executed qizilbashes, however, should be regarded as a conventional figure merely indicating a large 
number. For a similar approach see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les ottomans les safavides et leurs 
voisins, Istanbul, 1987, p. 53 ; Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 40.  
1831 HSE4, p. 176. 
1832 See SLZ2, p. 16; MNB, p. 457. MNB says, for example, that “... 920 Saferinin yirmi dördünde (April 
20, 1514), Perşembe günü Üsküdar tarafına geçip Rum Đli beylerbeyi ve askeriyle Gelibolu boğazından 
geçmişti. Önceden eyālet valilerinden tesbit edilebilen kırkbin kızılbaşın isimlerini muhtevī defter geldi. 
Selim Han hepsinin öldürülmesini emir buyurdu. ...”  
1833 “... Ve şol kimesneler ki sultanum hakkında na’ralar atmışlardur, mufassal defter etmişem. Đnşaallah 
dergāh-ı ālem-penāha arzoluna! ...” TSA, document E 7072.  
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Until now, historians had to rely on the contemporary chroniclers’ accounts on 
the registeration and persecution of 40.000 Anatolian qizilbashes before the Çaldıran 
campaign. Thus, some are inclined to deny this assumption arguing that this is just an 
invention of sixteenth century Ottoman court historians. Nevertheless, two unpublished 
documents in TSA leave no doubt that the qizilbashes of Anatolia, as well as the 
supporters of Ahmed, were registered to be executed by the order of Selim.  
The title of one of these documents, D 101491834, reads “This is the copy of a 
register (defter) that expresses (beyān ider) some people in the the Province of Rum.” 
Then it writes the people’s names with short notes indicating whether or not they 
supported Ahmed or Murad, or they somehow had any connection with the qizilbash 
movement. A short paragraph was attached at the end of the document explaining the 
reason of preparing this register and the way in which it was prepared. According to this 
paragraph, it had been ordered by Sultan (Selim) to register the names of all men who 
participated in the political or military actions in the Province of Rum, who had 
supported Prince Ahmed and who had not. It had been especially ordered to specify 
those who joined Ahmed’s forces and those who did not. Then, these registers were to 
be sent to the Porte. The scribe states that these men were all registered according to the 
style instructed by the sublime order; some of the registers were sent directly (with the 
requests of local governors) and some others were sent with the certificates of timars 
(timar tezkeresi). The paragraph ends by informing that when the Sultan read this 
                                                 
1834 In his book, Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins (p. 53, footnote 88) Bacqué-Grammont says 
that he published this documents in Suspects, without specifying volume and number of the journal. But 
unfortunately, I could not get the opportunity to read his article.  
 554 
register, he would be aware of the state of affairs of these people who were not capable 
of doing anything against the government of the Sultan.1835   
 
Table 8.1: The List of Ahmed’s Supporters and Some Qizilbashes in the Province 
of Rum1836 
 
NAME  NAHİYE ADHERED 
TO 
NOTE 
..... Beğ karındaşı Tokat Selim  Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye 
geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a 
Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık olmamışdur. 
Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak ihtimali dahi 
yokdur.  
Mustafa Beğ oğulları Tokat Selim  Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye 
geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a 
Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık 
olmamışlardur. Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak 
ihtimali dahi yokdur.  
Şah Beğ veled-i Şeyh 
Hasan Beğ 
Tokat Selim  Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye 
geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a 
Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık olmamışdur. 
Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak ihtimali dahi 
yokdur.  
Yıldızoğlu İmirza Tokat Ahmed   
Yıldızoğlu Abdullah Tokat Ahmed   
                                                 
1835 “Südde-i saadetden hükm-ü cihan mūta’ varid olub mazmūn-ı şerifinde şöyle emr olunmuş ki Vilāyet-i 
Rum’da Sultan Ahmed’e varan ve varmayan tā’ifenin ki ellerinden hayr u şer gelür ānın gibi kimesneleri 
‘arzınla irsal idesin deyu. Ve varanı varmayanı ellerine virdüğün ‘arzda i’lām idesin. Eyle olsa ber-
mūceb-i emr-i Padişahī ellerinden hayır ve şer gelen kimesneleri esāmileriyle ve haller ve evsaflarıyla 
defter olunub irsal olundu. Eyle olsa her biri ‘arzla veya timarların tezkeresi birle irsal olanda varan 
deftere dahī nazar olunub ahvalleri ma’lum oluna. Bā-husūs bu tā’ifenin mecalleri olmayub cümle bir 
yerden varmağa kābiliyet olmadığı ecilden sānıyla irsāl olunur. Şöyle ma’lum oluna!” See TSA, 
document D 10149. Hüseyin Hüsameddin says that following the execution of Prince Ahmed, some 
officials were charged to investigate the events that took place in Amasya and to report to the Porte: 
“Amasya’ya gelen kādı, mufti, mütevelli Amasya’da cereyan iden ahvāl ve fecāya’yı tahkīke me’mur 
olmuşlardı. Bu hey’et günlerce tahkīkāt icrā itdiler. Yapdıkları tahkīkāt evrākını bir kitāb şeklinde 
doğrudan Sultan Selim’e gönderdiler.” Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Amasya Tarihi, vol. 3, Đstanbul, 1927, p. 
272. Unfortunately, as his usual habit, Hüseyin Hüsameddin provides no sources for this information. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to think that the document D 10149 was, at least, a part of this ‘kitāb’ that 
Hüseyin Hüsameddin mentions.  
1836 The information in the table is taken from the document D 10149 in TSA.  
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Yıldızoğlu Kasım Tokat Selim  Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Sivas'a 
varmışlardur 
Yıldızoğlu Şah Veli1837 Tokat Selim  Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Sivas'a 
varmışlardur 
Horosoğlu Mustafa Beğ Tokat Ahmed   
Horosoğlu Mustafa Beğ'in 
kardaşı 
Tokat Ahmed   
Tokuzoğlu Cüneyd Beğ Tokat Ahmed   
Mehmed Çelebi evlad-ı 
Töz 
Tokat Ahmed   
Hasan Celebi evlad-ı Töz Tokat Ahmed   
Tozanluoğlu Kılıç Beğ Tokat Ahmed   
Tozanlu’dan Halil Beğ Tokat Ahmed   
Tozanlu’dan Üveys Beğ Tokat Selim  Amma mezkur Sultan Ahmed’e 
gelmeyüb Kızılbaşla mücavere ve 
muharebe itmekte kusur komamışdur. 
Meşalımlu()’dan 
Dede Beğ 
Tokat Ahmed  Sultan Ahmed bu defa Ruma geldükde 
mezkura Tokat Çeribaşılığı vermiş. 
Aşçı Ali Beğ Tokat Ahmed   
Barak Beğ oğlu Ali Çelebi 
(Aşçı Ali Bey'in güyagsu) 
Tokat Ahmed   
Veli Çelebi veled-I 
Bazarluoğlu Mustafa Beğ 
Tokat Ahmed   
                                                 
1837 According to Jean-Louis Bacqueé-Grammont, he was Shah Veli b. Celal who led a large-scale 
qizilbash uprising in 1520. Bacque-Grammont believes that these four people, namely Yıldızoğlu Đmirza, 
Yıldızoğlu Abdullah, Yıldızoğlu Kasım, and Yıldızoğlu Şah Veli were brothers. During the civil war, 
contrary to his two brothers Shah Veli did not join Prince Ahmed’s forces and went to Sivas with his third 
brother Kasım. See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Seyyid Taman, un agitateur hétérodoxe a Sivas 
(1516-1518)”, IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi’nden Ayrıbasım, Ankara: TTK, 1988, p. 868.  For the uprising of 
Shah Veli b. Celal see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents 
sur la révolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, 5-69.  
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Lütfi Çelebi veled-i 
Bazarluoğlu Mustafa Beğ 
Tokat Ahmed   
Hızır Beğ veled-i Bayad 
Beğ 
Tokat Ahmed   
Hızır Beğ veled-i Bayad 
Beğ'in kardeşi 
Tokat Kızılbaş  Tozanlu'dan kızılbaşa gitmişdür 
Ahmed Çelebi veled-i 
Denli Sinan 
Niksar Ahmed   
Mehmed Çelebi veled-i 
Taceddin Beğ 
Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Selim  Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde 
kaçub Kastamonuya Karacapaşaya 
varmışdur 
Elvend Çelebi veled-i 
Taceddin Beğ 
Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Selim Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde 
kaçub Kastamonuya Karacapaşaya 
varmışdur 
Ahmed Çelebi veled-i 
Taceddin Beğ 
Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Selim Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye 
geldükde beğlerbeğiyle bile bulunub 
dutulub sonradan bir suretle kaçub 
Kastamonuya varmışdur. 
Hasan Celebi veled-i 
Taceddin Beğ 
Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Selim Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye 
geldükde beğlerbeğiyle bile bulunub 
dutulub sonradan bir suretle kaçub 
Kastamonuya varmışdur 
Şah Beğ biraderi İşan 
Sultan 
Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Ahmed  Sultan Ahmed'in Sipahi oğlanlar ağası 
idi 
Tursun Beğ veled-i Ali Beğ Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Murad  Sultan Murad'a tabi olub Kızılbaş olub 
Sultan Murad gidicek mezkur yine 
yolunda kalmışdur 
İbrahim Beğ Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Kızılbaş      
İbrahim Beğ Oğlu Gedegra 
(Mecitözü) 
Kızılbaş   
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali 
Çelebi 
Kavak Murad-
Kızılbaş 
  
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali 
Çelebi'nin karındaşı İsa 
Kavak Murad-
Kızılbaş 
  
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali 
Çelebi'nin karındaşları 
oğlu Mehmed Çelebi 
Kavak Murad-
Kızılbaş 
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Bafra Çeribaşısı Musa Beğ 
Balısı 
Bafra Ahmed   
Ali Çelebi veled-i Kaya 
Çelebi 
Sonisa 
(Uluköy) 
Selim Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Yenişehir 
kalasına varmışdur 
Mahmud Çelebi veled-i 
Kaya Çelebi 
Sonisa 
(Uluköy) 
Ahmed   
Mehmed Çelebi veled-i 
Kaya Çelebi 
Sonisa 
(Uluköy) 
Ahmed   
Sonisa çeribaşısı Sonisa 
(Uluköy) 
Ahmed   
Eski çeribaşıoğlu Mahmud 
Çelebi 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Çiftlüoğlu Hazar Beğ Amasiyye Ahmed   
Amasiyye Çeribaşısı 
karındaşı Yakup Çelebi 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Mahmud veled-i Turan  Amasiyye Ahmed   
Mahmud veled-i Turan'ın 
oğulları 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş 
Ağa 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş 
Ağa'nın bir oğlu 
Amasiyye Murad  Sultan Murad'la bile gitmiş 
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş 
Ağa'nın biraderi Bayezid 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Ali Çelebi veled-i Hacı 
Nevruz 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Beğler Ağa veled-i 
Mehmed Çelebi 
Amasiyye Ahmed   
Hamza Beğ veled-i Ata 
Beğ 
Amasiyye Ahmed Mezkurun kızılbaşta bir kimesne tealliki 
vardur 
Hamza Beğ veled-i Ata 
Beğ'in bir yakını (tealliki) 
Amasiyye Kızılbaş 
(gitmiş) 
  
Bali Beğ veled-i Bekir Beğ Amasiyye Ahmed   
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Dülbendbastı Ali Amasiyye Ahmed   
..... Oğlu Ali Çelebi Amasiyye Ahmed   
Hasan veled-i Bardakçı Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
İlyas Beğ Oğlu Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Şah Beğ Oğlu Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Bali Çelebi veled-i Naib 
Abdullah 
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Kapıcı Mustafa'nın bir 
oğlu  
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Kapıcı Mustafa'nın diğer 
oğlu  
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Kasım Beğ veled-i 
Abdürrezzak 
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Çorlu'dan Uzun Beğ Oğlu Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Uğurlu veled-i Karamanlı Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Ali Çelebi veled-i Yaraş Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Minnet Ağa Oğlu Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Selman veled-i Şeyh 
Hasan Beğ 
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Ağa Beğ Oğlu Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Eski Nişancıbaşı Oğlu 
Haydar 
Amasiyye Kızılbaş   
Sultan Ali defterdarı Acem 
Sinan Oğlu Sinan Çelebi 
Çorum Ahmed   
Tatar oğlanlarından 
Gönülsüz 
Çorum Ahmed   
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Tatar oğlanlarından 
Gönülsüz'ün karındaşı 
Çorum Ahmed   
Tatar oğlanlarından 
Şehsüvar nam kimesne 
Çorum Ahmed   
Sadulmelik Oğlu Çorum Ahmed   
İnallu'dan Hasan Beğ Oğlu Çorum Murad  Sultan Murad'ladur 
Seyyid Nureddin  Ladik  Murad-
Kızılbaş  
Sultan Murad'a tabi olub kızılbaş olub 
cemiyyet dahi itmişdür 
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu 
Bali Beğ 
Salimin(?) 
Kara Hisar 
Ahmed   
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu 
Bali Beğ'in küçük oğlu 
Salimin(?) 
Kara Hisar 
Ahmed   
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu 
Bali Beğ'in büyük oğlu 
Salimin(?) 
Kara Hisar 
Ahmed Sultan Ahmed'in ulufecisibaşıdır 
Meşalimlu'dan Yinal 
Mensur 
Salimin(?) 
Kara Hisar 
Kızılbaş Kızılbaş olup hayli fesad itmişdür 
 
 
As it can be immediately recognized, this register includes not only the 
supporters of Ahmed and Murad or the qizilbashes but also some notables who had been 
indeed among Selim’s supporters but were under the suspicion of pursuing pro-Ahmed 
stand or of the qizilbash affinity during the struggle. It seems like a general survey 
aiming primarily, but not exclusively, to determine the prominent notables of the 
Vilāyet-i Rum who either sympathized or actively joined Ahmed’s troops during the 
struggle between Selim and Ahmed. Their affinity for the qizilbash movement, as well 
as their adherence to Sultan Murad if any existed, were also under investigation. In this 
journalistic report, people are attributed to one or two of the four stands: those who 
joined Ahmed’s forces, those who adhered to Murad, those who took part in the 
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qizilbash movements, and those who were not anyhow connected to one of these three 
parties. The last group was evidently not among the primary targets of the survey and 
did not include all the notables pursuing a pro-Selim stand. Among them were only 
those who somehow fell under suspicion of one of the former three attributes. The 
reporter seems to have included their names in the register simply to clear out any doubt 
on their names. The defter simply reports the stands of people; it does not indicate what 
happened to them. Nonetheless, it is not hard to deduce from the narrations of the 
chronicles and from one other archival document, to be analyzed below, that those men 
whose connections with one or more of the former three parties were destined to be 
executed. 
The first and foremost fact put forward by this document is that either before or 
immediately after the execution of his brother (Ahmed), Sultan Selim ordered to inspect 
all the dignitaries of the Province of Rum1838 in order to determine their previous (and at 
the time being as well) political and ideological tendencies; Selim’s order also included 
to register those dignitaries who had somehow been linked to Ahmed’s political party or 
to the qizilbash movements in separate defters. We do not have enough evidence to 
verify whether the same sort of inspection was carried out in other provinces. Even if it 
                                                 
1838 These men who were registered in D10343 were seemingly not ordinary people but the dignitaries of 
the region; in more proper words, they were mostly mālikāne holders. For a comparison with leading 
families of the District (kaza) of Amasya with mālikāne hold in c. 1480 and in 1520 see Appendix III in 
Oktay Özel, Changes and Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of 
Amasya (1576-1642), Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University 
of Manchester, 1993, pp. 241-255. In his table Özel provides a complete list of revenue holders of Amasya 
around 1480, 1520, and 1576 basing on the tahrir registers of the region. The events under scrutiny here 
occurred in 1512-1514, between the first and the second tahrir registers used by Özel. The same names in 
my list are not supposed to appear in tahrir registers of 1480 compiled more than thirty years earlier, a 
time interval enough for a generation change. On the other hand, although there was a period of time of 
less then ten years to the second register which was created in 1520, since they were somehow erased by 
Selim’s state, the names of this study are not expected to appear in this register too. Thus it is neither 
feasible nor fruitful to compare exact names in my list with those determined by Özel. Nonetheless, a 
comparison of their family attributions is still possible and provides enough evidence to affirm my 
suggestion above.  
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was not carried out, it is not difficult to recognize Selim’s distrust in the people of the 
Province of Rum, since Ahmed’s opposition, Murad’s activities and the major qizilbash 
uprisings all emerged from within this region. Thus, it is obviously reflected in this 
document along with other sources that before embarking his decisive campaign against 
Shah Ismail, Selim desired to extirpate social roots of any potential opposition in this 
province. As my next document clearly shows, he did not refrain to employ the most 
brutal measures for this purpose.  
The second document at our disposal is directly related to the registeration and 
execution of the qizilbashes by the Ottoman authorities.1839 To be more specific, it is a 
list prepared and sent by a local governor reporting those qizilbashes executed and the 
reasons why they were put to death. See Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: The List of Some Executed Qizilbashes in the Province of Rum1840  
 
NAME KARYE / SEHR REASON TO EXECUTE RESULT 
Divane Yakub Karye-i Tacüddevle 
(?) 
Kadurga seferine ve Torul (Hurhul 
/ Turhal) cengine ve Erzincan'a 
varduğundan 
Katl 
Osman veled-i 
Adilhan 
Karye-i Yassıviran 
(Merzifon-Amasya) 
Kadurga seferine ve Mihmanselam 
cengine varduğu malum oldukdan  
Katl 
Ali Kerye-i Yassıviran 
(Merzifon-Amasya) 
Kadurga seferine ve Torul cengine 
ve Erzincan'a varub kızılbaşoğlu 
kızılbaşdur şehadet eyledükleri 
ecilden  
Katl 
Halid veled-i Halil Karye-i Hallar ? 
(Osmancık-
Çorumlu) 
Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve ehl-i müfsid olduğu malum 
olundukdan  
Katl 
Mehmed veled-i Ali Karye-i Hallar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
varduğu malum olundukdan  
Katl 
                                                 
1839 TSA, document D 5720. 
1840 The information in the table is derived from document D 5720 in TSA. 
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Kasım (?) Karye-i Hallar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
varduğu külli malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Yahya veled-i Yusuf Karye-i Hallar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve ehl-i fesad olduğu malum 
olundukdan 
Katl 
Hızır Veli veled-i 
Yusuf  
Karye-i Afşar 
(Argoma, Yavaş-
Amasya, Gelmûgad-
Sivas-Tokat, 
Suşehri-Karahisar-ı 
Şarki) 
Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve Erzincan'a varduğu malum 
olundukdan  
Katl 
Mehmed veled-i Musa Karye-i Afşar Torul cengine ve Erzincan'a ve ehl-i 
fesad olduğu malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Mustafa veled-i 
Ahmed 
Karye-i Afşar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve Mihmanselam cengine varduğu 
malum olundukdan  
Katl 
İsmail veled-i 
Süleyman (Selman) 
Karye-i Afşar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve .....diğer uğrısuz (?) ehl-i fesad 
olduğu malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Mehmed veled-i 
Hasan  
Karye-i Afşar Torul cengine ve Kagurga seferine 
ve Osmancuk cengine varduğu 
malum ulundukdan  
Katl 
Ahmed veled-i 
Mehmed 
Karye-i Afşar Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve Torul cenginden ... bile olub 
...düştüğü malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Divane İbrahim Karye-i Ağören 
(Akviran adıyla 
Osmancık-Çorumlu) 
Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine 
ve bu diyardan ehl-i müfsid olduğu 
malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Receb ..... Karye-i Zogu 
(Argoma-Amasya) 
Kızılbaş canibinden taç giyüb Şehr-i 
Merzifon tamgasın üzerine oturub, 
zabt idüb, kitabet idüb ve il garet 
idüb ve mecmu' cenklerde bile 
olduğu malum olundukdan  
Katl 
Mustafa   Şehr-i Zeytun 
(Çorumlu) 
Taç giyüb, il garet idüb ve Torul 
cengine varduğu malum 
olundukdan  
Katl 
Rıza (?) Şehr-i Zeytun Taç giyüb Kadurga seferine ve 
Torul cengine varduğu malum 
olundukdan  
Katl 
Sofu Ali Oğlu Şehr-i Zeytun Acemü'l-cemal (?) olub üzerine 
hayli adem cem idüb memleket 
garet idüb ve fesada kadir idüğü 
malum olundukdan  
Katl 
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Considering the geographic distribution of the executions, it immediately 
becomes apparent that the qizilbashes registered in this report were all from a specific 
region which includes the nāhiyes or kazas of Merzifon, Argoma, Osmancık, and 
Zeytun. According to the administrative division in 1530, the first two kazas were within 
the border of Amasya Sancak while the latter two belonging to the Sancak of 
Çorumlu.1841 Considering the fact that during the political struggle between Prince 
Ahmed and Prince Selim this region almost fell under the control of the rebellious 
qizilbashes led by Prince Murad and Kara Iskender, this is quite meaningful.1842 
Nevertheless, one can hardly assure that this is the whole of the reports prepared by local 
officials, which indicates all the executed qizilbashes rather it simply appears to be an 
example survived while many others disappeared or have not been found in the archives 
yet. It would not be wrong to suppose, especially when the accounts of contemporary 
Ottoman historians are taken into consideration, that there were many reports of this 
kind listing the people somehow affiliated to the qizilbash movement in other provinces 
such as Karaman and Teke.  
D 5720 clearly demonstrates that some certain actions require execution as 
premised by the fetvās of Hamza and Kemalpaşazāde. This document specifies these 
actions as follows: participating in the campaign (sefer) of Kadurga, in the fights (cenk) 
of Torul and Mihmanselam, and arriving in Erzincan. For one case, participating in the 
fight of Osmancuk is also mentioned. Here, “arriving in Erzincan” obviously means 
                                                 
1841 See 387 Numaralı Muhâsabe-i Vilâyet-i Karaman ve Rûm Defteri (937/1530), published by T.C. 
Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire BAşkanlığı, Yayın no: 36, Ankara, 
1997, pp. 222-223.   
1842 See Chapter VII in this study. 
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joining Shah Ismail’s suite during his Erzincan congregation in the summer of 1500. 
“The fight of Osmancuk” refers to the fight occurred during the qizilbash uprisings in 
1512. But I could not determine which events are meant by “the campaign of Kadurga” 
and “the fight of Torul and Mihmanselam.” Most probably, these fights also have 
occurred in the Province of Rum during the qizilbash uprisings in the years 1511-1512.  
Apart from these, some other acts and deeds of the qizilbashes also caused them 
to be executed. Among them are wearing the qizilbash tāc, tyrannizing the lands (il 
gāret itmek), and causing dissension. Most of the qizilbashes registered in the list were 
included in both the fights cited above and other activities. Only one of the 19 listed 
qizilbashes was not participated in any of these fights but linked to Iran, and the 
plundering of land by summoning vagabonds around.  
What this document evidently reveals is that the Ottoman government under 
Selim I did not show any tolerance against those subjects whose connection with the 
qizilbash movement was proved. One should not disregard, however, the fact that the 
events used by Ottoman officials in reasoning the execution of the qizilbashes did not 
necessarily take place during the struggle of the princes which started approximately by 
1509 but by the advent of Ismail in 1500. As already delineated, the meeting of Erzincan 
became one of the most crucial milestones, perhaps the most crucial one, in the march of 
young Ismail to the throne of Persia. About 7000 qizilbashes gathered in Erzincan 
defeated the Akkoyunlu ruler Alvand Mirza’s army of 30.000 soldiers in Sharur in the 
summer of 1501 and thus opened the way to suzerainty of Azarbayjan and Persia for 
Ismail.1843 Ottoman authorities seem to have been aware of this crucial role of Erzincan 
                                                 
1843 See Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 26.  
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meeting in the growth of the new formidable ‘evil’ that they deemed the participation in 
this meeting as a reason for execution.  
 
8.5.  THE CAMPAIGN 
After eradicating the possibility of a qizilbash uprising within the empire, Selim could 
embark on his campaign on Shah Ismail. Anatolian and Rumelian troops met in 
Yenişehir.1844 Towards the end of March, Selim sent a letter to Abid Han, the Ozbek 
ruler, informing the Han about his campaign on ‘heretic’ Ismail and demanded his help 
from the eastern flank.1845 The answer of this letter was written in the last days of July. 
In his letter, Ubeyd Han mentions their war with the Qizilbash and expresses his 
pleasure of hearing sultan’s decision. He also promises to assault the eastern provinces 
of Safavid state concurrently with the sultan’s attack.1846 Selim also sent letters to some 
local begs and small-scale rulers demanding provisional and logistic help.1847 Among the 
rulers of the region, Dulkadiroğlu Alaaddin refused to support Selim’s campaign; he 
refused to dispatch Dulkadirlu fighters against the qizilbashes and to provide provisional 
help to the Ottoman army while it was passing through and near his territories.1848  
On April 28, 1514, when the army was in Izmit, Selim sent the first letter which 
was authored by Tācizāde Cafer Chelebi, to the Shah with one of Ismail’s incarnated 
spies called Kılıç.1849 For the students of the Ottoman-Safavid history, the importance of 
this letter is derived not only from the fact that it was the official declaration of the war 
                                                 
1844 KPZ9, p. 98. 
1845 For the full text of this letter see Feridun Bey, Münşeat, pp. 346-349.  
1846 Feridun Bey, pp. 349-351.  Nonetheless, for some reasons he did not do so. 
1847 See, for example, HYDR, pp. 42-3.  
1848 See Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, p. 59. 
1849 HYDR, p. 61, 136. According to IDRS, this letter was written on April 23. See IDRS, p. 142. Also 
consider ALI, p. 1077.  
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but also from its content reflecting the self-image, either achieved or desired, of the 
Ottoman state in the Islamic world and the new tendency in the official ideology 
encompassing both domestic and international affairs of the empire.  
Here I will give a brief summary of the letter. The letter begins with verses from 
the Koran. But, without doubt, the verses were selected carefully. At the beginning of 
the letter, the phrase “the true religion with God is Islam”1850 is recited from the Koran, 
Then it continues with another verse: “Inevitably those who lose faith after having had 
faith and then indulge in their loss of faith – their repentance shall not be accepted; those 
who are the ones who stray…”1851 Then comes another verse: “Whosoever receives an 
admonition from his Lord and gives over, he shall have his past gains, and his affair is 
committed to God; but whosoever reverts – those are the inhabitants of the Fire, therein 
dwelling forever.”1852 After reciting these verses from the Koran, a pray follows: “My 
Lord, register us among those who point out and follow the right path, but not among 
those who fall into astray!”1853  
In the following paragraph that this letter is written from Sultan Selim to Shah 
Ismail is mentioned. Here the epithets employed with the name of Selim call attention. 
Selim is described as the slayer of the wicked and infidel who crushes the enemies of the 
religion, the guardian of the noble and pious, the defender of the Faith, the head of gāzis 
and mücāhids, haloed in victory, triumphant like Ferīdūn1854, Alexander of eminence, 
and standard-bearer of justice and righteousness.  On the other hand, Ismail is described 
                                                 
1850 Koran,  III/19.  
1851 Koran, III/85. 
1852 Koran, II/275.  
1853 IDRS, p. 139; CLZ, p. 562, Feridun Bey, p. 351; Lütfi Paşa, p. 208; HSE4, p. 177; ALI, p. 1082.  
1854 An ancient celebrated king of Persia, who began to reign about 750 B.C.E.  
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as the āmir and the great commander of Acem, the usurping Darius1855 of the time, and 
the malevolent Dahhāk1856 of the age. The whole paragraph runs,  
[After the doxology] But to proceed. This excellent address hath been issued on 
our part, we who are the Refuge of the Caliphate, the slayer of the infidels and 
polytheists, the extirpator of the foes of the Faith, the humbler of the Pharaohs’ 
pride, the tarnisher of the Khākān’s crowns, the King of those who fight and 
strive for Religion, whose pomp is as that of Feridun, whose Court is as that of 
Alexander, whose justice and equity is as that of Keyhusrev, that Dārā of noble 
descent, Sultan Selim Shah, son of Sultan Bāyezid, son of Sultan Muhammad 
Khan, to thee, who art the ruler of the Persians, the most mighty general and 
puissant leader, the Dahhāk of the time, the Dārāb of the combat, the Afrāsiyāb 
of the age, the famous Amīr Ismail.1857  
 
After this paragraph, further reference to the Qor’anic verses, which declares the 
status of human being as the deputy of God on the earth, is made. Then Selim affirms 
that in order to fulfill this divine mission it is compulsory to follow the path of the 
Prophet Mohammad, which provides the peace and salvation in both worlds. If this is so, 
it is required for all Muslims in general but especially for the just sultans to obey the 
following divine order: “O believers, be you God’s helpers!”1858;  and to work faithfully 
to diminish the harms of whosoever does not obey the rules of God and tears the drape 
of the religion.  
The letter of Selim describes Ismail’s position with an analogy that when the 
forest is devoid of lion, jackal enters the forest as if it was a hero. He then recounts 
Ismail’s wickedness driving him to war: he opened the doors of torture and oppression 
                                                 
1855 Probably Darius III (ca. 336-330 B.C.E.), who was defeated three times by Alexander the Great. Selim 
is obviously alluding to current Ottoman-Safavid confrontation. See also William H. McNeill and Marilyn 
Robinson Waldman (eds.), The Islamic World, New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1973, p. 339. An English translation of Selim’s first letter is published in this book. (See Ibid, pp. 338-
342.) Nonetheless, the source is not specified. Furthermore, the text published here shows remarkable 
differences from those copies recorded in Feridun Beg, IDRS, CLZ, and other cited Ottoman sources.  
1856 A mythological king of Iran, notorious for his blood-thirstiness. Here again there is an allusion to 
‘tyranny’ and ‘blood-thirstiness’ of Shah Ismail against the ‘just rule’ of Selim.  
1857 Here I preferred the translation of Edward G. Browne. See BRW, pp. 13-14.  
1858 Kur’an, LXI/13. 
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to the faces of Muslims, fused the heresy and apostasy, spread discord and dissention, 
attempted to nullify the rules of the religion (şeri’at) according to his personal desires, 
sanctioned unlawful sexual course (zīna) which is strictly forbidden by the religious law, 
poured bloods of innocent Muslims, devastated the mosques, put tombs and graves in 
fire, despised great scholars, put the copies of Koran into dirty places, and ordered to 
curse two great khalifs of the Prophet, Abu Bekr and Omar. As a consequence of all 
these malicious deeds, says Selim, “The ulemā agreed on your disbelief and on the 
necessity of killing you and your followers.”1859 It was because of that, stated in the 
letter, that Selim wore armor and caftan instead of silk in order to strengthen the 
religion, to help those weak people who were under oppression, to obey the divine order, 
and to fulfill the honor of being a ruler. After threatening Ismail by some arrogantly said 
words, Selim explains the reason of writing the present letter as follows: “This ornate 
letter is written to invite you to the true religion, Islam, for it is a rule according to the 
way of Mohammad to invite to Islam before unsheathing the sword.”1860   
The final section makes reference to a Qor’anic verse, “… who, they commit an 
indecency or wrong themselves, remember God, and pray forgiveness for their 
sins…”1861 Then it s told to Ismail that if he would repent for his sins and evil deeds, and 
would recognize the sovereignty of Selim over certain parts of his country, which was 
formerly trampled by the Ottoman horses, he would see nothing but friendly treatment 
                                                 
1859 IDRS, p. 141; CLZ, p. 563; Feridun Bey, p. 352; Lütfi Paşa, p. 210; HSE4, p. 179; ALI, p. 1084. 
1860 IDRS, p. p. 141; CLZ, p. 564 ; Feridun Bey, p. 352; Lütfi Paşa, p. 211; HSE4, p. 179; ALI, p. 1084.   
1861 Koran, III/135.  
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from the Ottomans; otherwise, a brutal confrontation was inevitable. The letter finishes 
with a pray that “God’s compassion be upon whoever on the right path!”1862 
Shortly after dispatching this letter, Selim set off to Konya. On the way he 
visited the sanctuary of Seyyid Gāzi where he donated money to the poor of the hospice 
(May 12, 1514).1863 This act of Selim is quite interesting because Abdals (or Kalenders) 
of Seyyid Gāzi were known with their ‘heterodox’ beliefs/practices and with the familial 
resemblances of their religious perception to that of the qizilbashes. Remembering 
Selim’s extremely harsh policy against ‘the qizilbash heresy’, his benevolence to another 
religiously ‘divergent’ group, which was indeed fairly similar - from a religious point of 
view - to qizilbashes, is worth to be dwelt on.  
The relationship between the Kalenderī groups and the Qizilbashes during the 
early sixteenth century is still to be clarified for the most part. From the contemporary 
sources we learn of an unsuccessful attempt of a Hayderī dervish who claimed to be 
Mahdi to assassinate Bayezid II during the course of Albanian campaign in 1492.1864 
Ahmet Y. Ocak appears to be reasonable in arguing that this attempt could be interpreted 
as a protest under the disguise of Mahdist claims against the existing regime.1865 
According to Ocak, after this attempt, Bayezid II ordered to deport all Kalenderîs of 
                                                 
1862 IDRS, p. 142; CLZ, p. 565; Feridun Bey, p. 353; Lütfi Paşa, p. 212; HSE4, p. 180; ALI, p. 1085. For a 
brief Turkish summary of this letter also see HYDR, pp. 43-44.  
1863 HYDR, p. 62; IDRS, p. 143; CLZ, p. 223 ; HSE4, p. 181. (IDRS gives the date as May 1 while HSE 
gives as May 2)  
1864 This event is recorded in almost all the accounts of the time. Anonymous Ottoman history reads, for 
example, “... Ol gün fedâyi nemed-pûş kulağı mengûşlu, boyını toklu Hayderî şeklinde pâdişaha kadt 
itmek istedi. Hemandem ‘Mehdi benüm’ düyû nemedi eğnünden atub yalın kılıç elinde pâdişaha yüridi. 
Birkaç gayretsiz çavuşlar var idi. Önünden gidüvirüb pâdişaha yakın gelicek vaktin Đskender Paşa hazır 
bulundı. Hemandem karşudan bozdağan ile atup urdu, tepesi üstüne yıkıldı. Andan kılıcıyla pare pare 
eylediler.” See F. Giese (ed.), Anonim Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osman, haz. Nihat Azamat, Đstanbul: Edebiyat 
Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992, p. 130.   
1865 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the 
Sixteenth Centuries”, Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam, ed. G. M. Smith and C. W. Ernst, Istanbul: 
ISIS Press, 1994, p. 249; "Quelques remarques sur le rôle des derviches kalenderis dans les mouvements 
populaires dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVle siecles ",Osmanlı Araştırmaları, III, 1982, pp. 74-5.   
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Rumelia to Anatolia where they cooperated with the Safavid propagandists.1866 Ocak 
calls attention to the coincidence of the change in the Ottoman policy towards Kalenderī 
groups and the acceleration of Safavid propaganda in Anatolia, and he comes up with 
the argument that a connection between them and Safavid followers was established by 
the beginning of the sixteenth century.1867 He also puts emphasis on the emergence of 
Shi’ite elements in the works of the sixteenth-century Hurufī poets like Hayālī, Yetīmī, 
and Hayretī.1868 To him, after Kalenders realized that the governing circles of the 
Ottoman state turned against them, they sought a new political support. Furthermore 
their latitudinarian way of religious life formed an appropriate soil for the Shi’ite-
Safavid propaganda.1869  
Nevertheless, Ocak does not provide any direct evidence for such a co-operation, 
at least during the early sixteenth century.1870 On the contrary, above-mentioned act of 
Sultan Selim enables us to suggest another interpretation. It seems reasonable, within the 
available evidence, to propose that although there was a remarkable familial 
resemblance in terms of religious understanding and practice, the two groups did not 
establish a serious organizational connection. Selim was surely aware of the doctrinal 
and practical likeness between the the religious beliefs of the qizilbashes and abdals. It 
was most probably because of that, that Selim needed to visit the most celebrated center 
                                                 
1866 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Marjinal Sûfîlik: Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar), 
Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 122-3.  
1867 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Quelques remarques sur le rôle des derviches kalenderis dans les mouvements 
populaires dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVle siècles ",Osmanlı Araştırmaları, III, 1982, pp. 78-9. 
Ocak Fuat Köprülü already indicated the connection between Abdals and Safavid movement before. See 
Fuad Köprülü, “Abdal”, Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, Đstanbul, 
1935, pp. 30, 36.  
1868 Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration”, p. 251.  
1869 Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth 
Centuries”, p. 250.  
1870 I should add that I have not come across any indication to such a cooperation between the Qizilbashes 
and Kalenderī groups in the contemporary sources, at least until the battle of Çaldıran. 
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of abdals and showed his generosity to them: simply to keep abdals out of the scene 
during his fight with the qizilbashes. In other words, he aimed to isolate Kalenderīs from 
the Qizilbash movement.  
On June 1, Selim arrived in Konya where he visited the tomb of famous 
Sadreddin Konevī as well as the tombs of some other saintly people and delivered food 
and money to poor people.1871 He also ordered to give some promotion to his 
soldiers.1872  
On July 1, the Ottoman army arrived in Sivas1873 where a general inspection of 
the army was carried out. Idrīs records that the army was composed of 140.000 
soldiers.1874 Those sipāhis whose timars were lower than 3.000 akçe as well as the 
elderly, sick, and under-aged soldiers1875 were separated under the command of Iskender 
Paşa oğlı Mustafa Beğ to protect the rear.1876 Furthermore the registers of the treasury 
and other affairs as well as some other logistics were also left in the citadel of Sivas.1877 
Kemalpaşazāde draws attention to the turbulence of Kızılırmak, the reasons being his 
division of the army and his leaving some logistics behind.1878 According to Idrīs, 
                                                 
1871 As the ‘protector of sunni Muslims’ this practice of Selim needs no explanation.  
1872 KPZ9, pp. 98-99; IDRS, p. 143; HYDR, p. 65, 137; CLZ, p. 224.  
1873HYDR, p. 67; IDRS, p. 143. 
1874 IDRS, p. 147. HR records the size of the Ottoman army in Çaldıran as 200.000. See HR, p. 177. This 
number seems, however, quite exaggerated. Another Safavid historian who was contemporary of the 
events exaggerates further: Khwandamir argues in his Habibu’s-siyar, which was completed in 1524, that 
only the cavalry of the Ottoman army were more than two hundred thousand. Additionally twelve 
thousand matchlockmen, whom Selim always had with him, were stationed in front of the lines. (One 
would add foot soldiers, mainly the Janissaries, whom Khwandamir does not mention!) See HS, p. 605.  
1875 HYDR, IDRS, CLZ, ALI, and MNB say the number of these soldiers reached 40.000. See HYDR, p. 
67; IDRS, p. 147, CLZ, pp. 225-6;  ALI, p. 1090. Also see HSE4, p. 183; MNB, p. 458.   
1876 KPZ9, p. 100; CLZ, p. 226; HSE4, p. 183; ALI, p. 1090. 
1877 KPZ9, p. 100. 
1878 KPZ9, p. 100. 
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however, provisional anxieties were chiefly responsible for doing so. He says that the 
qizilbashes already pillaged and put the region all the way up to Erzincan in fire.1879    
Although three months had passed since the beginning of the campaign and the 
army already had entered Safavid territories, no signs of the qizilbash army appeared. 
On the other hand, the shortage of food and water was just to begin. Thus,  some 
grumbling arose especially among the Janissaries, who began to openly pronounce the 
option of returning without a fight.1880 Nonetheless, none of the pashas dared to convey 
the Janissaries’ sentiments to the sultan. At the end, they persuaded the beylerbey of 
Karaman Hemdem Pasha, who was one of the most trusted statesmen of Selim during 
the civil war. However, the pasha paid this mistake with his own life. On hearing the 
Janissaries’ complaints, Selim got so angry that he immediately executed Hemdem 
Pasha on July 24, shortly after they arrived in Erzincan.1881  
Then the army set off for Erzincan. Kemalpaşazāde says that in the plain of 
Erzincan , Selim sent two successive letters to Ismail inviting him to battle. Ismail 
received these letters in Ucan Yaylağı, in the highlands of Azarbaijan.1882 We know that 
before the battle Selim sent four letters to Ismail, the first two being in Persian and the 
third and fourth being in Turkish, while Ismail only sent one. Three of Selim’s four 
letters were written before the arrival of Ismail’s answer. As already delineated, the first 
letter was sent on April 28, 1514 from Izmit and its whole text is recorded by Idrīs, 
Celalzāde, Feridun Bey, Haydar, and some later historians. The place where the second 
letter was written and when it was written are not clearly delineated in the sources. What 
                                                 
1879 IDRS, p. 147, 162. Also see HSE4, p. 183 and ALI, p. 1090; MNB, p. 458.   
1880 SKB, pp. 151-2; HSE4, p. 187; ALI, p. 1094; MNB, p. 459. 
1881 HYDR, p. 70, 140; IDRS, p. 149, 153; SKB, pp. 152-3; CLZ, p. 232 ; ALI, p. 1094; MNB, 459. 
According to HSE, this event occurred on July 23. See HSE4, pp. 188-9.  
1882 KPZ9, p. 102.  
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is certain from the available sources is that it was written by Mevlāna Mürşid-i ‘Acem 
somewhere between Izmit and Erzincan. Its full text is available in the Münşeat of 
Feridun Bey and Ruznāme of Haydar Çelebi.1883 It repeats the content of the first letter 
authored by Tāci-zāde Cafer. The third letter of Selim was written in Erzincan in mid-
August 1514 (Evāhir-i Cemāzi II, 920) shortly before the arrival of Ismail’s answer to 
his first two letters.1884  
Selim’s last two letters which were written in Turkish were recognizably 
different from the first two ones in terms of style and content. These two letters were far 
beyond the diplomatic language and the international rules of diplomacy. On the 
contrary, they were written in a somewhat arrogant, despising, and insulting style. 
Selim’s aim by these letters was evidently to provoke Ismail to battle as soon as 
possible.1885 The apparently despising attitude of Selim comes out immediately in the 
introduction of the third letter. He totally abandons the customary way of diplomatica by 
not using any epithet before the name of Ismail; rather addresses Ismail by simply his 
name that “Ismail Bahadır”. Then comes a wish, or demand from the God (dua), which 
was as despising as the addressing was: “Eslahallahu şāneh” meaning “shall God 
improve his fame”.1886 Then the letter starts by reminding the heretical status of Ismail 
according to the Sunni religious scholars who also unanimously sanctioned the 
execution of all the qizilbashes for the sake of Islam. Then Selim affirms that according 
to the already reached decision of ulemā he waged war and that he is resolute to finish 
this affair. He reminds his former letters in an insulting manner that “I have explained 
                                                 
1883 See Feridun Bey, pp. 354-5; Ruznāme, Manuscript in Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, R. 1955.  
1884 Feridun Bey, p. 356; HYDR, p. 46. 
1885 As delineated above, Janissaries had already begun to speak loudly about the fruitlessness of such a 
march without enemy.  
1886 IDRS, p. 151; CLZ, p. 227; Feridun Bey, p. 355; Lütfi Paşa, p. 213; HYDR, pp. 44. 
 574 
my intentions in the beginning of my campaign so that you would not say  that you 
could not find enough time to prepare for a just war!”1887 Selim continues despising, 
“although I have already informed you on my campaign and although I have been in 
your country since tens of days, no sign of your presence appeared yet. There seems no 
difference between your existence and absence!” His following words are pretty heavy 
for a ruler to be addressed: 
Kılıç da’vasın idenlerin siper gibi belālara göğüs germek dāyim pīşesi, serverlik 
sevdāsında olanların zahm-i tīğ u teberden sırtartmamak her nefes endişesi olmak 
gerek. … Hazer selāmetde perde nişīnlik ihtiyār idenlere erlik adı hata, ölümden 
korkan kimesnelere ata binmek ve kılıç kuşanmak nā-sezādır. Hāliya bu 
mesābede ihtifā ve bu derecede zāviye-i hamūlede inzivā ki sebeb ağleb-i ihtimal 
kesret-i leşker-i bī-kıyasdan istīlā-yı ru’b u hirāsdır, imdi bu ma’nānın izālesi 
içün asker-i zafer-rehberden kırk bin mikdārı er ifrāz olunub Kayseriyye ile Sivas 
mābeyninde ikāmet emrolunmuşdur. Hasma irhā-yı ‘inān, tevsi’-i dāyire-i 
meydān bu denlü olur, bundan artuk olmaz.1888 Eğer zātında fi’l-cümle gayret ü 
hamiyyetden şemme vü eser var ise gelüb asākir-i nusret-me’āsire mukābil 
olasın. Ezel-i āzālde mukadder olan her ne ise ma’raz-ı bürūzda cilve-gir ola.1889   
  
Not long after the dispatch of this letter, the envoy of Ismail carrying his letter 
arrived in the Ottoman camp in Yassıçemen.1890 With this envoy Ismail sent not only the 
answer to Selim’s former letters but also two mocking symbols as well: a pot (hokka) 
and a paste (macun).1891  Ismail’s answer evidently aimed to calm the tension down. 
                                                 
1887 IDRS, p. 151; CLZ, p. 227; Feridun Bey, p. 356; Lütfi Paşa, p. 214; HYDR, p. 46. 
1888 Of course this was not the real reason; rather Selim was ridiculing in order to provoke Ismail’s pride. 
As already delineated, Selim’s concern in dividing his army was two-fold: on one hand, serious 
provisional risks appeared since Ustaclu Muhammed Han already pillaged the region from Sivas to 
Erzincan; on the other hand, those ‘weak’ soldiers were commissioned to protect any qizilbash attack from 
the rear. For a similar approach see TNSS, p. 43.   
1889 IDRS, pp. 151-2; CLZ, pp. 227-228; Feridun Bey, pp. 355-6; HYDR, pp. 44-46; Lütfi Paşa, pp. 215-6; 
HSE4, pp. 186-7. A summary version of this letter is included also in SLZ2, pp. 18-9. 
1890 On June 17. See HSE4, p. 185; ALI, p. 1091. In Tacu’t-tevārih Selim’s first Turkish letter is 
mentioned after the narration of the arrival of Ismail’s envoy with his letter in reply. However, in Ismail’s 
letter there are discernable references to this letter (the third letter of Selim).  Selim’s last letter, on the 
other hand, clearly refers to Ismail’s answer. Thus, Ismail’s answer must have arrived to the Ottoman 
camp between the two Turkish letters of Selim.  
1891 IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 229; SKB, pp. 149-50 ; ALI, p. 1091 ; MNB, p. 458. These presents were 
certainly a part of an arrogant and aggressive diplomacy between the two monarchs. Before the arrival of 
the Shah’s presents, as ALI says, Sultan Selim had already sent women and dervish clothes to Ismail 
insulting the masculinity of the Shah on one hand and reminding his humble dervish origin on the other. 
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First he give the reason of entering into Ottoman territories in 1507. His aim had not 
been to violate Ottoman borders but to punish the insolent beg of Dulkadir, Alauddevle. 
Then he explains how his ancestors, including himself, have borne positive sentiments 
against the Ottoman dynasty. At the same time, Ismail tacitly threatens Selim by 
reminding the victory of Timur over Ottomans. Then Ismail criticizes the style of 
Selim’s letter for they were quite arrogant and they violated the diplomatic courtesy. 
Ismail says that “there is no need for such inappropriate words. Indeed such a diplomatic 
style does not befit a ruler. I guess it must be the work of scribes who were most likely 
in ecstasy because of overtaking hashish! For them, I am also sending a pot of hashish 
with this letter!” At the end of the letter, Ismail states that he had written this letter 
which would be sent with friendly sentiments during a hunt in Isfahan. He declares at 
the same time that he started the preparations for a war which was not much desired by 
him. Ismail finishes his words by stating that if the sultan of Rum thought of nothing but 
the war then the confrontation should not be delayed; however, he is suggested to think 
the end very carefully for the descendants of Ali has not been defeated yet.1892  
                                                                                                                                                
ALI’s account runs, “… [Selim] ta’n u tevbīhi vāfir ve serzīşi mütekāsir nāmeler ile gāh nezkeb ü gāh 
çenber gönderirlerdi. ‘Senin gibi nā-merde destār u miğfer yerine bunlar lāyıkdır’ diyū muhannesliğini 
tasrīh kılurlardı ve gāh ‘Sen bir sofu-zādesin, taht-gāh-ı saltanata lāyık bir fürū-māye üftādesin. Sana 
münāsib olan bulnardur’ diyū hırka, ‘abā ve şal ve misvāk ve ‘asā gönderüb, ‘Sana zāviye-nişīn olmak 
münāsibdir’ diyū bildürürlerdi.” See ALI, p. 1091. Also consider HSE4, p. 190.  
1892 For the full text of this letter see Feridun Bey, pp. 356-7; HYDR, p. 47. A versified and, to a certain 
extent, altered version of Ismail’s answer is recorded also in KPZ9, pp. 102-103; YSF, pp. 49-50. All of 
the KPZ’s account except one couplet exists in YSF. As for Safavid chroniclers, none of them gives the 
text of this letter. HS summarizes it with two sentences while HR mentions only with one sentence. 
According to the both chronicles, Ismail received Selim’s letter (it must be his first letter) in Hamadan. He 
honored Selim’s emissary with royal robe and gave him permission to withdraw. See HS, pp. 604-5; HR, 
pp. 177-8. HS states that after giving Selim’s emissary permission to withdraw, Ismail set out for the 
battlefield. See also AA, p. 67.  
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Ismail’s letter annoyed Selim so much that he immediately ordered to execute 
the qizilbash messenger1893 and to write a fourth letter full of affront.1894 The style of this 
letter was more insulting than that of the third one. It starts with the same despising 
hitāp.1895 The starting paragraph states that his (Ismail’s) letter and that substance which 
augments the courage (hashish) were received. You have stated, says Selim, that you 
sent this letter in order to free me from expectation or waiting. Then Selim begins 
insulting in an ultimately arrogant manner stating that with the courage embodied in his 
disposition he had already moved with his army and entered into the country of Ismail. 
Then Selim’s letter continues,  
Âyin-i selātin-i ulu’l-emr ve mezheb-i kavākin-i zevi’l-kadrde padişahların taht-ı 
tasarruflarında olan memleket menkūhası mesabesindedir. Rücūliyetden hissesi, 
fütüvvetden bahresi, belki derūnunda fi’l-cümle zehresi olan kimesne kendüden 
gayri bir ferd ana ta’arruz itdüğine tahammül itmek ihtimali yokdur. Öyle olsa 
bunca gündür ‘asākir-i nusret-meāsir memleketüne dāhil olub kāmuranlık iderler, 
henüz senden ne nām u nişān peydā ve vücūdundan eser hüveydādır. Hayatın ve 
memātın ‘ale’s-sevādır. ‘Arīzī cüret kesbetmeğe hācet kimde var idüğüne zāhir 
hāl tamam şāhiddür. Vāki’-i hāl kaziyye budur ki şimdiye değin senden bir fiil 
vücūda gelmemişdir ki andan celādet ve merdānelik fehmoluna. Sūrete gelen 
amel dahī ser-ā-ser semere-i mekr ü hiyeldür. ... [After accusing Ismail of 
needing extra substance (such as hashish) to raise courage and reminding him 
that he had already left considerable portion of his army to raise his (Ismail’s) 
courage] … Eğer min ba’d dahī ber-karar-ı vaz’-ı sābık günc-i zāviye-i ra’b u 
hirāsda münzevī olasın, erlik adı harāmdır. Miğfer yerine mi’cer, zırh yerine 
çadır ihtiyār eyleyüb serdarlık ve şahlık sevdāsından ferāğat eyliyesin!1896      
   
On the other hand, Sultan Selim dispatched some pioneer troops under the 
command of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg in order to gather information and capture some 
                                                 
1893 IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 230. Indeed, during this campaign Selim executed all the qizilbash envoys who 
carried Ismail’s messages as well as the qizilbash captives nabbed on the way. See, for example, HYDR, 
p. 65, 69, 71-2.    
1894 This letter was written only days after the third one. Feridun Bey and HYDR record the dates of both 
letters as Evāhir-i Cemāzi II, which means the last ten days of Cemāzi II. This corresponds to the period 
between August 12 and August 21, 1514. See Feridun Bey, p. 358; HYDR, p. 49.    
1895 “Đsmail Bahadır, Eslahallahu şāneh!” See IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 230, Feridun Bey, p. 557; HYDR, p. 
47. 
1896 CLZ, pp. 230-31; IDRS, pp. 152-3; Feridun Bey, pp. 357-8; HYDR, pp. 47-9; Lütfi Paşa, pp. 217-8; 
HSE4, pp. 190-1; ALI, pp. 1087-8.  
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captives (dil almak).1897 For similar purposes, one of Ferruhşah Beg’s men, Şeyh 
Ahmed, also moved to Tabriz. It seems from the contemporary sources that Şeyh 
Ahmed, who reached the Shah in Ucan Yaylağı, accomplished a very successful 
espionage. He managed to make Ismail to believe that he was sent by Rumelian begs 
and Turkoman leaders in Selim’s army. He also persuaded the Shah on that most of the 
Rumelian and Turkoman begs were adherents of the shah by heart and they were 
requesting the order of the Shah on what to do and he told Ismail that they had promised 
to change sides during the battle. When he arrived in Hoy, Ismail who was utterly 
tricked by and believed in Şeyh Ahmed’s senario sent him to the Ottoman army ordering 
to continue pretending as an Ottoman soldier.  
[Şeyh Ahmed] eyitdi ki “Beni Rumili Beğleri ve Türkmān serverleri gönderdiler. 
Cümlesi kadimden muhibb-i Âl-i ‘Aba ve hevādār-ı evlād-ı Murtaza olub Şahun 
hizmetine tālipler, cān u dilden bende-i fermān olmağa rāğiblerdür. ... Cümlesi 
kemer-bend-i vifākı miyān-ı ittifāke şuşanub şöyle ahd-u misak eylemişlerdür ki 
miyān-ı meydana ki iki asker-i kine-ver mukābil olıcak bād-i āsūb esüb gavga-yı 
vağa ile sahra-yı masāff tolıcak ol emr-i mahfīyi izhār ideler. Rum askerin koyub 
Acem leşkerine gelüb gideler. Şahun uğrına can u baş oynayub dostuna dost 
düşmenine düşmen olalar.” Mezkūr mağrur bu efsāneye i’timād idüb aldandı. 
Mezkūr beğler cinayet-i hiyānete, ki cümle hiyānetten eşeddür, ikdām ideler 
sandı. Cāsusa vāfir in’ām idüb Hoy nām kasabaya dek bile getürdü. “Yine sen 
mukaddemā var istimālāt eyle, ben dahī Çaldıran’da yetişirim!” didi.1898  
 
 25 days after the execution of Hemdem Pasha, the Janissaries began to raise 
their voices again. Their complaint was the same: although they were in this foreign 
country which had been systematically devastated by Safavids1899 for a long time, no 
sign of the enemy appeared yet; if they continued in that way they would all die of 
                                                 
1897 KPZ9, p. 103; YSF, p. 50; 
1898 KPZ9, pp. 103-104. HYDR’s and HSE’s accounts pertaining to Şeyh Ahmed are more or less the 
same. See HYDR, pp. 73-74, 141; HSE4, pp. 195-6. For a slightly different version of this story see SKB, 
pp. 159-60; YSF, pp. 51-52. Also consider MNB, p. 461.  
1899 Ustacalu Muhammed Beg had already pillaged and put in fire all the region before Ottomans’ arrival. 
See IDRS, pp. 162-3; HSE4, p. 183.   
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hunger and thirst!1900 The situation was quite difficult for Selim, who thought no other 
alternative but to crush Ismail as soon as possible.1901 Thanks to the messengers of 
Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg and to Şeyh Ahmed who saved the position by the good news that 
Ismail would meet the Ottoman army in Çaldıran.1902 Upon returning to Selim’s camp, 
Şeyh Ahmed informed the sultan about Ismail’s plan to meet Ottomans in Çaldıran 
plains. In return for his services, he is shown the generosity of the sultan. At the same 
time, some of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg’s men arrived in the court and reported similar 
news.1903  
After receiving this good news, a solar eclipse was witnessed, which was 
interpreted by astrologers as the victory of the sultan of the western countries over the 
sultan of the eastern countries, on Cemāzi II 29, 920 (August 21, 1514).1904 On the next 
day the advance guard of the qizilbash army was seen. At first, the Ottoman army 
alarmed for a sudden clash. But upon realizing that the distance between the two armies 
could not be covered in one day, Selim ordered his army to camp but to be ready for the 
battle. The night was spent with great caution and preparation for the battle.1905 
Kemalpaşazāde’s portraying of Ottoman soldiers who were waiting for the upcoming 
battle is worth mentioning. He depicts Ottoman soldiers as gāzis fighting for the sake of 
                                                 
1900 CLZ, pp. 234-5; HSE4, p. 192; ALI, pp. 1095-6.  
1901 According to HSE and ALI, upon hearing the complaints of the Janissaries, in order to demonstrate his 
resolution, Selim came among them and gave an effective speech, which reaffirmed their absolute 
obedience to the Sultan. See HSE4, pp. 192-3; ALI, p. 1096. MNB follows their figure. See MNB, p. 460.  
See also TNSS, p. 49; Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, pp. 63-4. This event occurred in Eleşkird. 
1902 HYDR, p. 141; CLZ, pp. 237-8; HSE4, p. 196.   
1903 KPZ9, p. 104; HYDR, p. 74; SLZ2, p. 22; MNB, p. 461.   
1904 KPZ writes, “... erbāb-ı tencim (ve) ashāb-ı takvim zikr olan küsūfun ahkāmında ‘Mağrib vilāyetinün 
şehriyārı maşrık memleketine müstevlī olub hutbeyi vü sikkeyi tağyir ide!’ (diyu) takrir itmişlerdi. ‘Maşrık 
padişahına ‘azīm nekbet ü zillet vardur’ diyu takvimlerinde tahrir itmişlerdi. Vākı’a eğlenmeyüb zikr olan 
küsūfun akabince tahrir itdükleri ahkāmın eseri vulu’ buldu, didüklerinden ziyāde makhūr u menkūb ve 
meksūr u mağlūb oldı.” KPZ9, pp. 104-105. According to HYDR, IDRS, CLZ, and HSE solar aclipse 
occured on August 20. See HYDR, p. 74; IDRS, p. 154; CLZ, p. 233; HSE4, p. 197.  
1905 KPZ9, p. 105; HYDR, p. 142.  
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the  true religion and this battle as a holy war or cihād, which is supposed to be fulfilled 
against the enemies of Islam. Kemalpaşazāde also attempts to load a religious tone on 
the intentions and acts of Ottomans. To him, the Ottomans prepared themselves for the 
battle psychologically and morally by praying throughout the night for the victory of the 
army of Muslims.1906 
An important note for the purpose of this study, which was totally ignored by the 
contemporary historians, was recorded by a seventeenth century Ottoman chronicler, 
namely Hüseyin b. Ca’fer. When the Ottoman army camped on August 22 in the 
Çaldıran valley, the war assembly was immediately gathered in the evening. Since the 
soldiers were tired and suffering from hunger and thirst after a 1500 km march, the 
majority of the viziers and grand generals suggested resting the army for one day. Only 
Defterdār Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi’s1907 idea was different. He proposed to attack the enemy 
as soon as possible for there were a considerable number of Safavid sympathizers 
especially among akıncıs and it was not impossible that these akıncıs could 
communicate with the Shah and change their side. When the Sultan asked his idea, 
Hüseyin b. Ca’fer cites, Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi said, 
Heman durmayub göz açdurmayub duruşulmak ve adū’nun gözü öğrenüb 
alışmadın heman uruşulmak gerekdür. Zīrā ki askerden Mihallı tā’ifesi ve sāyire, 
Kızılbaşa muhibb olub anların mezhebinde olanlar bu gice Şah’ın casusları 
iğvāsiyle cāyiz ki öteye gitmek ihtimāli ola veyahut cenge el ucıyla yapuşalar, 
can ve gönülden cenk itmeyeler, dahī askere fütur gele. Ve andan sonra adūnun 
üzerine “Allah Allah” deyüb, yürüyüb, göz açdurmayub, tokunmakda çok hal 
vardur.1908   
                                                 
1906 “Subha dek ol giceyi gāzilr diri tutub Hālık-ı bī-niyāza tazarru’lar idüb Cenab-ı müfettihu’l-ebvābdan 
istimdād itdiler. ‘Eyyām-ı şerif mübārek’ diyu birbiriyle musāfaha kılub, isti’dād-ı esbāb-ı cihād itdiler.” 
KPZ9, p. 105.  
1907 At that time Pīrī Paşa was the defterdār of Rumeli. See CLZ, p. 236.  
1908 Hezarfen Hüseyin b. Ca’fer, Tenkīhu’t-tevārih, manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Fatih, 4301, 
fol. 114a. The reader might note that one of the major discontent groups with the growing Ottoman 
centralization was akıncıs of Rumlia. Hezarfen Hüseyin interestingly does not mention the Janissaries as 
potential sympathizers of the Shah, whom one might well expect because of the familial resemblances 
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Then Sultan Selim favored this suggestion saying that “here is the only man with 
a reasonable idea. It is a pity that he did not become a vizier.”1909 Hüseyin b. Ca’fer says 
that because of this idea Sultan Selim promoted Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi to the vizierate 
after the battle.1910 So the preparations were made to confront the enemy by the early 
morning.1911  
It clearly appears in the contemporary sources that the Ottoman army at Çaldıran 
was much larger than the Safavid army. Perhaps as effective as the relative sizes of two 
armies was the nature of their composition. Safavid force essentially consisted of 
traditional Turko-Mongolian type cavalry archers, exclusively derived from qizilbash 
oymaqs. As already mentioned in Chapter IV, the prominent oymaqs constituted Shah 
Ismail’s army were as follows: Ustaclu, Şamlu, Tekelü, Afşar, Çepni, Dulkadirlü, Kaçar, 
Varsak, Çepni, Bayatlu, Talişlu, etc.1912 
In the Ottoman army, on the other hand, as well as cavalry, there were infantry 
Janissaries armed with guns and field artillery, which the Safavid side totally lacked on 
this occasion.1913 Selim divided his army into three branches: at the center were the 
Janissary troops under the command of Selim himself while the Rumelian troops were 
on the left under the command of Hasan Pasha (the beylerbey of Rumelia) and the 
Anatolian troops being on the right under the command of Sinan Pasha (the beylerbey of 
                                                                                                                                                
between the religious understanding and the practice of Bektashi Order, which is alleged to have been the 
official spiritual order of the Janissary corps, and Qizilbashism. Rather, he indicates akıncıs as potential 
sympathizers of Ismail. As delineated above, the same line of narration also occured in the report of Spy 
Ahmed.  
1909 Hüseyin b. Ca’fer, fol. 114a; HAM2, p. 427. 
1910 Hüseyin b. Ca’fer, fol. 114a. HYDR records that Piri Paşa became a vizier instead of Mustafa Paşa on 
October 15, 1514. See HYDR, p. 147.  
1911 See also HAM2, p. 427; UZC2, p. 266; TNSS, pp. 52-53.  
1912 See Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārī eş-şehir bī Ta’līkī-zāde, Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman, manuscript, 
Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, III. Ahmed Kitaplığı, 3592, fols. 87a-87b. 
1913 See, for example, David Morgan, Medieval Persia 1040-1797, London, New York: Longman, 1988, 
pp. 116-7. 
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Anatolia).1914 On the other hand, Ismail organized his army under two wings: on the 
right wing were the 20.000 qizilbashes under the command of Ismail1915, while the left 
wing of Safavid army composed of 15.000 fighters who were commanded by 
Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg1916 and his brother Karahan. Ismail also separated some 
10.000 men under the command of his grand vizier Seyyid Abdülbāki and his kadıasker 
Seyyid Şerif to protect his standard.1917  
On the arrival of the Ottoman army to the plain of Çaldıran, two different views 
appeared at the court of Ismail. Muhammed Han Ustaclu and Nur Ali Khalifa, who had 
been already acquainted with the Ottoman methods of warfare, advised to attack at once, 
                                                 
1914 See HYDR, p. 76. Also see CLZ, pp. 239-40; ALI, pp. 1097-8. According to the tradition, during the 
wars in Europe, Rumelian troops fight on the right while Anatolian troops on the left; during the 
campaigns in the east, on the other hand, Anatolian troops take place on the right while Rumelian troops 
form their ranks on the left. See IDRS, p. 148; HSE4, p. 199; SLZ2, p. 23; MNB, p. 462.  Ottoman 
historians depict the majesty of the Ottoman army in detail. See, for example, Lütfi Paşa, pp. 221-228.  
1915 KPZ depicts these qizilbashes as very good fighters dealing with at least ten enemies in a battle. He 
says that “meymenesi tarafından kendü hulāsa-i ceyşiyle, ki yiğirmi bin mikdarı var idi, emmā her biri 
savaşta on merd-i neberde berāber idi, içi kara dışı kızıl, gören musavver mevt-i ahmer sanurdı, sol kola 
Rumilinün üzerine azimet itdi. Salābet ü şevketle meydan-ı muharebeye gelüb mizmār-ı muharebeye bir 
mehābet bırakdı ki kulūb-i ins ü cini korkutdı.” KPZ9, pp. 107-108. IDRS gives the number of soldiers 
under Ismail’s command as 40.000. See IDRS, p. 172.  
1916 Muhammed Han Ustaclu was  the governor of Diyarbekir since the capture of this city by Safavids in 
1507. He was famous for his bravery and skill in the art of war. HR says that his success in fights with 
local governors around Diyarbekir made him so conceited and self-esteemed that he began to write letters 
to the Ottoman sultan (Selim) provoking him to war. See HR, p. 177.  
1917 KPZ9, pp. 106-107; ALI, p. 1098. Apart from KPZ, ALI, who had most possibly derived his 
knowledge from KPZ, and Lütfi Paşa, another Ottoman historian do not mention the third wing of Safavid 
army commanded by Seyyid Abdülbāki. Rather, they narrate that Ismail divided his army into two 
branches: one was commanded by him and the other was commanded by Ustaclu Muhammed Han. See 
Lütfi Paşa, p. 220, p. 229; HYDR, p. 143; YSF, p. 58; CLZ, pp. 240-41. On the other hand, Safavid 
chronicles confirm KPZ’s account. HR depicts, for example, the organization of Safavid army in a similar 
fashion to KPZ. According to HR, Ismail divided his army into two main branches: on the right were 
Durmuş Han Şamlu, Halil Sultan Dulkadirlu, Lala Hüseyin Beg, and Hulefa Beg; the left wing of the army 
was commanded by Muhammed Han Ustaclu and Çayan Sultan Ustaclu (HS says, however, that 
Muhammed Han Ustaclu was dubbed “Çayan”, literally means “scorpion”. See HS, p. 604); the forces at 
the center were given under the command of Persian-origin notables, namely Emir Abdülbāki, Seyyid 
Muhammed Kemūne, and Emir Seyyid Şerif. Additionally, Korucubaşı Sarı Pīre was sent to the frontal 
line with some gāzis. Đsmail himself, with a group of korucu, was to watch over the progress of the battle 
and to help the weakened wing if any. See HR, pp. 179-80. HS describes Safavid organization of the army 
in a similar fashion. See HS, p. 605. AA chiefly follows the figure of these early Safavid historians. 
Differing from them, however, he says that “Esma’il himself was in command of the Safavid center.” See 
AA, p. 69. Selahattin Tansel, a contemporary historian who wrote the history of the reign of Selim I, 
follows KPZ and Safavid chronicles’ view. See TNSS, pp. 54-55. For a similar view also see Tekindağ, 
“Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, p.67.  
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before the Ottomans had time to complete their defensive laager. They also counseled 
against a frontal attack, thinking that the strong artillery of Ottomans would easily 
disperse the Safavid cavalries. Nonetheless, their seemingly reasonable advice was 
rejected both by a senior qizilbash commander, Durmuş Han Şamlu, who had the 
privilege of being the son of one of the ehl-i ihtisas1918 and the Shah’s sister, and by the 
Shah himself.1919 Instead, Ismail made his forces wait until the Ottomans had completed 
their dispositions, saying that “I am not a caravan thief, whatever is decreed by God, will 
occur.”1920 As a result, two armies clashed on the next day, on August 23, 1514.1921 
On the left wing of the Safavid army, Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg was 
defeated by Sinan Pasha, the former being killed in the battlefield.1922 On the other side, 
Ismail first attacked the Janissary troops guarding Selim at the center. Thanks to the 
firearms used only by Ottoman soldiers, the effective defense of the Janissaries forced 
                                                 
1918 A special group of Ismail’s companions during his concealment in Gilan.  
1919 HR, pp. 178-9; AA, p. 68. 
1920 Eskandar Beg Monshi says that “On the Safavid side, Khan Mohammad Ostājlū, who had just arrived 
from Dīār Bakr with his seasoned troops, counseled against a frontal attack because of the strength of the 
Ottoman artillery. ‘We must,’ he said, ‘give battle to them when they are on the move.’ Dūrmīš Khan, 
however, with arrogant pride in his own bravery, did not accept this advice, and the Shah said: ‘I am not a 
caravan-thief. Whatever is decreed by God, will occur.’ And Khan Mohammad fell silent.”  See AA, p. 
68. Also consider, Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 41. 
1921 See Selim’s letter (fetih-nāme) to his son Suleyman in HYDR, pp. 50-52. The same letter is also 
included in Feridun Bey, Münşeat, pp. 308-309. Also see IDRS, p. 154; CLZ, p. 239. CLZ frequently 
stresses that most of the qizilbash begs and soldiers were drunk before and during the battle. See CLZ, pp. 
237-8, 243-44. Lütfi Paşa puts forward the same idea. But his reasoning seems to be fabrication. To him, 
on realizing the astonishing greatness of the Ottoman army, Ismail thought that no one could dare to fight 
with such a gigantic army; thus, the best way of encouraging the qizilbash fighters was to make them 
drunk. Then, argues Lütfi Paşa, the Shah ordered his soldiers to drink wine. See Lütfi Paşa, p. 228. Shah 
Tahmasb also admits that most of the Safavid amīrs were drunk on the day of the battle.  See Şah 
Tahmasb-ı Safevî, Tezkire, translated from Persian into Turkish by Hicabi Kırlangıç, Đstanbul, 2001, p. 40. 
Also consider Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 88, reciting from Khwurshāh b. Qubād al-Husaynī, Tārikh-
i Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 473a. There is an interesting note in 
AA, which says that “according to the Jahān-ārā (most probably the work of Gaffārī), and this is 
confirmed by general report, Shah Esma’il, while his troops were taking up their stations for battle, went 
off to hunt quail, and returned to the battlefield after the fighting had started.” See AA, p. 69.  
1922 CLZ, p. 242; ALI, p. 1100; SLZ2, p. 24. HR says that at the beginning stages of the battle Muhammed 
Han routed the right wing of the Ottoman army, which turned back to the center. But upon his death 
during artillery fire, the qizilbashes dispersed and retreated towards the center. See HR, p. 181. AA says 
that “Khan Mohammad Ostājlū, who was in the forefront of the Safavid army, was struck by a cannonball 
and killed, along with a considerable number of the Ostājlū contingent.” See AA, p. 70.  
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Ismail to retreat. Then he turned towards the left wing of the Ottoman army which was 
commanded by Hasan Pasha.1923 Here, the qizilbash fighters commanded by Ismail 
managed to defeat the Rumelian troops, killing many prominent begs among which were 
Hasan Pasha, famous brothers Malkoçoğlu Ali Beg1924 and Tur Ali Beg.1925 When 
informed about the situation in the left wing, Selim ordered to send a portion of the 
Janissary troops, which were using rifle, to help Rumelian troops. When the Janissaries 
joined the battle with their firearms,  the fate of the war was changed and it brought the 
victory to Sultan Selim.1926 As David Morgan puts succinctly, “Çaldıran is seen above 
all else as the victory of modern military technology over the outdated steppe ways of 
warfare.”1927 Kemalpaşazāde’s following words clearly put forth how the qizilbashes 
were vulnerable to the fire-armed warfare:  
Lā-cerem, fermān-ı kazā-cereyān şöyle sādır buldu ki Yeniçeri askerinin tüfenk-
endāz serbāzlarından bir koşun asker Rumili leşkerine imdād u incād kasdine 
yüzlerin ol cānibe döndürdüler. Tüfeng-i tārek-şiken havādan tolı gibi yağub, 
‘adū-yı kīne-cūyun yüzin binin bir uğurdan Cehenneme gönderdiler. Terk ü 
                                                 
1923 KPZ9,p. 108. Roger Savory argues, however, that Ismail first attacked Rumelian troops of the 
Ottomans then turned towards the center. See Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 89.  
1924 According to HS, HR, and AA he was killed by Ismail himself. See HS, p. 606; HR, p. 180; AA, p. 69. 
Especially AA vividly describes the duello between Ismail and Malkoçoğlu. These sources specially 
praise Ismail’s courage and bravery underlining that he personally fought even in frontal lines of the battle 
and grounded a great number of Rūmīs into the dust of annihilation. HS says, for example, that on seeing 
most of his highest rank Hans were killed and his troops were routed “The Shah’s wrath was kindled and, 
unsheathing his sword, he charged without reinforcement into the midst of the enemy lines and killed a 
number of foes. Without fear of exaggeration it can be said that in that battle he displayed such a valor that 
Draco was vary of his serpentine arrows and Leo quivered in his lair from the heat of his fire-dripping 
sword.” HS, p. 606. AA recounts similarly that “Shah Esma’il entered that frightful field in person, 
supervising the course of the battle and performing deeds of valor surpassing those of Sām and Esfandīār. 
It is a matter of record among the Ottomans that the Shah several times forced his horse right up to the gun 
carriages and the barricade, and with blows of his sword severed the chains linking the gun carriages. …” 
See AA, pp. 69-70. On the other hand, HSE, a sixteenth century court historian of the Ottomans, recites 
from his grand-father Hafız Mehmed who attended the battle among Safavid ranks that during the battle 
the Shah personally committed seven assaults into Ottoman ranks, changing his horse in each case. See 
HSE4, p. 211. Also see MNB, p. 463.   
1925 KPZ9, pp. 108-111; CLZ, p. 245. KPZ says that during the battle the qizilbashes shouted “Şah! Şah!” 
while Muslim soldiers shouted “Allah! Allah!” See KPZ9, p. 110.  ALI repeats the same account. See 
ALI, pp. 1085-6. Also see IDRS, pp. 173-5.  
1926 IDRS, pp. 176-8; SKB, pp. 173-6; HSE4, pp. 201-202; ALI, pp. 1100-1101. See also the letter of 
Selim (fetih-nāme) to his son Suleyman in HYDR, pp. 51-52.  
1927 Morgan, p. 117.  
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miğfer ve cevşen ü siper māni’ ü dāfi’ olmayub, şahsār-ı vucūd-i bī-sūdlarında 
berg ü bār komadı kırdı. Kūh-şükūh güruhların tūde-i berg-i gāh gibi tārumār 
idüb, hirmen-i hayāt-ı bī-sebātların havā-yı fenāya virdi.1928    
 
Contemporary European observers affirm that the Ottomans owed their victory 
to their firepower.1929 Caterino Zeno, Venetian ambassador to the court of Uzun Hasan, 
writes,  
The monarch [Selim], seeing the slaughter, began to retreat, and to turn about, 
and was about to fly, when Sinan, coming to the rescue at the time of need, 
caused the artillery to be brought up and fired on both the janissaries and the 
Persians. The Persian horses hearing the thunder of those infernal machines, 
scattered and divided themselves over the plain, not obeying their riders’ bit or 
spur any more, from the terror they were in. Sinan, seeing this, made up one 
squadron of cavalry from all that which had made been routed by the Persians, 
and began to cut them into pieces everywhere, so that, by his activity, Selim, 
even when he thought all lost, came off the victory. It is certainly said, that if it 
had not been for the artillery, which terrified in the manner related the Persian 
horses which had never before heard such a din, all his forces would have been 
routed and put to the edge of the sword; and if the Turk had been beaten, the 
power of Ismail would have become greater than that of Tamerlane, as by the 
fame alone of such a victory he would have made himself absolute lord of the 
East.1930 
 
                                                 
1928 KPZ9, p. 111. HS and HR also underscore the decisive affect of firearms in this battle. See HS, p. 606; 
HR, p. 182.  
1929 In the battle of Çaldıran, the Safavid army was completely devoid of firepower. Why was Ismail’s 
army not equipped with firearms? According to Savory, it was not because of their lack of acquaintance 
with necessary technology but because of their conscious choice. He argues that at the time of Ismail I, 
Safavids thought the use of firearms unmanly and cowardly. See Roger Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 
43; “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, pp. 88-89; “The Sherley Myth”, Iran, Journal of the 
British Institute of Persian Studies, V, 1967, 73-81. Also see Rudi Matthee, “Unwalled Cities and Restless 
Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran”, in Safavid Persia, The History and Politics of an Islamic 
Society, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, 389-416.  
1930 Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 61. For a very similar account see Giovan Maria 
Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 120. D. 
Ayalon also underscores the crucial role of firearms in the decisive victory of the Ottomans in Çaldıran. 
He writes, “Had the Ottomans not employed firearms on such a large scale in the battle of Chāldirān and 
in the battles which followed it, it is reasonably certain that their victory – even if they had been able to 
win – would have been far less decisive. In other words, the Ottomans would have acquired far less 
Safawid territory in hat event and a much stronger Safawid army would have been left intact to prepare for 
a war of revenge.” See D. Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamlūk Kingdom, London, 1956, pp. 
109-10. ANMG also puts stress on the decisive role of firearms and the Janissaries in the battle. See 
ANMG, p. 180. For detailed description of the battle see, in addition to the already cited Ottoman sources, 
HR, pp. 177-84; HS, pp. 605-606; TNSS, pp. 55-61.   
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Shah Ismail hardly saved his life only by sacrificing a qizilbash for his own life 
instead.1931 The qizilbash army dispersed, some were killed in the battlefield while some 
others were taken prisoner.1932 With only a small force which managed to follow him, 
Ismail first retreated to Tabriz, then to Sultaniye.1933 Selim, perhaps thinking that his 
withdrawal was a ruse, did not pursue him.1934 Ismail’s wife, Taclu Hanım1935, who was 
the daughter of Hulefa Beg ,the governor of Bagdad, was among the captives. She was 
                                                 
1931 IDRS, p. 179; YSF, p. 62; HYDR, pp. 76-77; CLZ, p. 245; HR, p. 183; HSE4, p. 208. During the fight 
Shah Ismail fell down from his horse remaining vulnerable among the Ottoman soldiers. At this critical 
moment, one of Ismail’s disciples, called “Hızır”, who resembled a shaykh in appearance stepped forward 
and shouted “I am the Shah! I am the Shah!” After he convinced the Ottoman soldiers that he had been the 
Shah, Hızır succeeded to attract the attention and helped Ismail to escape on the spot. Some time later 
Ismail built a tomb over the grave of Hızır. See HSE4, p. 208. AA’s account is very similar but differs in 
detail: “… At the pressing insistence and urgent entreaty of his loyal companions, the Shah was forced to 
abandon the field. As he did so, he and his companions clashed with the troop of Ottomans which had 
shattered the Safavid center and was returning to his own lines. The Shah broke through their ranks and 
continued on his way. En route, his horse sank into a bog, whereupon Kezr Aqa Ostājlū brought up his 
own horse and mounted the Shah on it. He then extracted the Shah’s horse from the bog and followed on 
behind, later to be received by the Shah at Darjozīn.” See AA, p. 70. AA does not mention what happened 
to Hızır Aga then.  SLZ, a seventeenth-century Ottoman historian, recites a slightly different version of 
this story. See SLZ2, pp. 27-8.  
1932 Giovan Maria Angiolello recites an interesting story: “ … one of them [captivated qizilbashes] named 
Carbec, before he died, was taken before the Turk, who said to him: ‘O, dog, who art thou, who hast had 
the courage to oppose our majesty; knowest thou not that my father and I are vicars of the prophet 
Mohamet, and that God is with us?’ The captain Carbec replied: ‘If God had been with you, you would 
not have come to fight against my master the Sophi; but I believe that God has taken away his hand from 
you.’ Then Selim said: ‘Kill this dog;’ and the captain replied: ‘I know it is my hour now, but you, Selim, 
prepare yourself for another occasion, when my master will slay you as you now are slaying me;’ upon 
which he was immediately put to death.” See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and 
Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, pp. 120-21. Caterino Zeno also recites exactly the same story 
giving the name as Aurbec Samper. See Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 61-2. Tufan 
Gündüz, who translated Zeno’s work into Turkish, translates this name as Saru Pīre. See Tufan Gündüz 
(trs.), Uzun Hasan – Fâtih Mücadelesi Döneminde Doğu’da Venedik Elçileri. Caterino Zeno ve Ambrogio 
Contarini’nin Seyâhatnâmeleri, Đstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2006, p. 64.  
1933 KPZ9, p. 112. 
1934 HS, p. 606; HR, p. 183. Also consider Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 42.  
1935 CLZ, p. 246; HSE4, p. 212; ALI, p. 1102. Giovan Maria Angiolello also records this event without 
mentioning any names. See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King 
Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 120.  
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made to marry Tāc-zāde Cafer Chelebi by the order of the Sultan.1936 On the next day 
after the battle, all the captives were slain by the order of Sultan Selim.1937 
On the third day of the battle, Selim moved with his army towards Tabriz. 
Kemalpaşazāde states that the Ottomans executed all the qizilbashes on their way.1938 In 
Yediçeşme, Kürd Halid was executed with his 150 men; Hacı Rüstem and his men were 
also killed.1939 On Wednesday (September 6, 1514) the Ottoman army camped in 
Surhab, near Tabriz.1940 Selim accepted congratulations of the representatives of the 
dwellers of Tabriz. On Friday,1941 Selim entered the city with a great ceremony and went 
to Uzun Hasan Mosque, which had been used as an arsenal by Ismail but was re-
prepared in a couple of days for the Friday prayer.1942 
As Kemalpaşazāde underscores, what Selim first ordered to do in Tabriz was to 
clean out the reminders of Shi’a and to re-establish Sunni practices. Those who fall 
under the suspicion of adherence to Shi’ism were immediately put to death. 
Şehriyār-ı kāmkār āyin-i metin-i Ahmedī ile kavānin-i şer’-i mübīn-i 
Muhammedī’yi ol diyarda izhar idüb şi’ār-ı ahkām-ı Đslam’ı āşikār itdi. Fısk u 
                                                 
1936 KPZ9, p. 113; YSF, p. 63; HYDR, pp. 77-78; CLZ, p. 247; HSE4, p. 212; ALI, p. 1102. It is 
interesting to note that there were great numbers of women in the Safavid army. At the end of the battle 
these women became slaves of Ottomans. HYDR says, however, that they were freed on August 25 in 
order to avoid a possible shame that they could cause in the Ottoman army. See HYDR, p. 78.  
1937 KPZ9, p. 115; IDRS, p. 180, 189. KPZ recounts an interesting event. While Ottoman executioners 
(cellat) were slaying the qizilbashes, there were some religious scholars among them as well. Among 
these scholars, Kadızāde Erdebilī Mevlāna won the favor of Mevlāna Idris-i Bitlisī. The latter requested 
pardon for him from the Sultan saying that Kadızāde Erdebilī was one of his pupils (şakird). In the end, 
Sultan Selim forgave Kadızāde Erdebilī. See KPZ9, p. 115. IDRS does not mention Kadızāde but tacitly 
indicates the event. He says, only children, women, and those men of virtue and artisans who pretended to 
be adhered to the shah because of nothing but the fear could escape from the sword. See IDRS, p. 189.  
HYDR records that the captivated qizilbashes were massacred in front of the imperial tent. See HYDR, p. 
144. It is interesting to note that Lütfi Paşa, one of the grand viziers of Suleyman I, calls Çaldıran as 
“Sufikıran”: “... Çaldıran ovasına gelüb ki şimdi ol yire ‘Sufikıran’ dirler...” See Lütfi Paşa, p. 219.  
1938 KPZ9, p. 117. 
1939 HYDR, p. 80, 145; SKB, p. 182; YSF, p. 64; HSE4, p. 220; ALI, p. 1107; MNB, p. 466.  
1940 KPZ9, p. 117; HYDR, p. 80; YSF, p. 64; CLZ, p. 249.  
1941 On September 8, 1514. See HYDR, p. 146.  
1942 KPZ9, p. 119; MNB, p. 466. YSF follows a similar line of narration but gives the name of the mosque 
as Sultan Yakub Mosque. See YSF, p. 65. HR records the name of this mosque as “Hasan Padişah Cāmii”. 
See HR, p. 184. 
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fücūr, ki menba’-ı şerr ü şūrdur, ve zındıka vü ilhād, ki ol bed-i’tikādlar arasında 
şāyi’ydi, kimde sezdiyse siyāset idüb cihanı başına tar itdi. Sünnet ü cema’at 
mezhebine reyāc virüb, tüccār-ı füccārun bazār-ı kāsid ve sūk-ı füsūkı fāsid oldı. 
Meşāhid-i esrār olan ma’āhid ahyār-ı ebrāra ma’ābid oldı. ... [During the Friday 
prayer] Adet-i ma’hūd üzerine hoş elhān u şirin zebān cārī kārīler Kelām-ı 
Bāri’den bir mikdar tilāvet itdükden sonra hatīb-i fasīhu’l-beyān minbere şu’ūd 
ve hurūc itdi. Çār-yār-ı ahyārı ehl-i sünnet ü cema’at mezhebi üzerine ‘alet’t-
tertīb yād idüb her birinün mukābelesinde ‘Radıyallahu anhū’ sadāsı cāmi’i 
dutdı. Bunca müddet mütemādī olmışdı ki ol diyārın ahālisi hutbede Hulefā-i 
Rāşidin esāmisin işitmemişlerdi, āh u nāle ve feryād u ‘ulāle eyleyüb ol cāmi’-i 
kebirün figān u zārla içi toldı.1943  
 
Selim’s intention was to spent the winter in Tabriz and resume his cosnquest of 
Persia in the next spring.1944 However, the strong resistence of the Janissaries forced him 
to return to Anatolia.1945 During Selim’s short stay in Tabriz,1946 Ismail stationed in 
Dargazin. On Selim’s deportation, he immediately proceeded to his capital city.1947  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1943 KPZ9, pp. 118-120. Compare HYDR, p. 80, 146; CLZ, pp. 249-50; HSE4, pp. 220-21; ALI, p. 1103.    
1944 SLZ2, p. 30; MNB, p. 467; TNSS, p. 69. 
1945 MNB, p. 467; TNSS, p. 69.   
1946 Selim entered Tebriz on September 8 and left the city on September 15. This makes eight days. See 
HYDR, pp. 80-81. HS also reports Selim’s stay in Tebriz as eight days. See HS, p. 606. Also consider AA, 
p. 71. According to AA, Selim quitted Tebriz in a short time because of his fear about the qizilbash 
fighters, whose fighting qualities, along with the impetuosity and personal bravery of the Shah, were 
already experienced by the Sultan.   
1947 HS and HR say, Ismail entered Tebriz in Şaban (September / October). See HS, p. 606; HR, p. 184.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
THE AFTERMATH:  
THE WANING OF THE QIZILBASH POWER 
 
 
 
9.1.   THE DECLINE OF TRIBAL DOMINANCE IN SAFAVID IRAN 
Immediately after the establishment of the routinized Safavid state, more or less the 
same process that once occurred in the Ottoman case started in Iran: the inevitable 
contest between the sedentary bureaucracy and nomadic military appeared; and in time, 
parallel to the development of the bureaucratic governmental machine, the tribal 
founders of the state had been gradually diffused from the ‘center’, shifting to the 
periphery as an opposition party to the arising ‘imperial regime’. In the Safavid case, the 
lines of differentiation between the two contesting parties were even more clear-cut. In 
addition to the anthropological, religious, and political inconformity, the ethnic 
foundations of the two parties were also recognizably different: on one side, there was 
the tribal qizilbash (overwhelmingly Turcoman) military aristocracy constituting and 
controlling the army and holding the posts of provincial governorships; on the other side 
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was the Persian bureaucracy running the administrative and fiscal affairs of the state. 
The latter was usually called ‘Tācik’ by the formers in a despising manner, while the 
word ‘Qizilbash’ connoted ‘single-minded, uneducated and uncultured rough men’ 
among the bureaucratic elite. As it had been in the Ottoman case, the tribal mode of the 
polity here also lost the struggle against the bureaucratic imperial state. The sixteenth-
century Safavid history, in essence, was indeed nothing other than the history of the 
tragic decline of the tribal politics, as well as the religious mentality and the way of 
practice accompanied, against the rising literacy based on the bureaucratic organization 
and religious proliferation.1948  
The Safavid historians seem to agree upon the idea that until 1508, when Husayn 
Beg Lala was dismissed from the posts of vekālat and āmir al-umerā, the absolute 
qizilbash domination in the Safavid politics continued. From then on, the balance of 
power began to shift towards the Persian bureaucracy. However, the main turning point, 
in many aspects, was arguably the defeat of Çaldıran, which resulted in a sequence of 
fundamental changes in both international and domestic affairs of the Safavid State. As 
Savory states, “as a result of their defeat at Chāldirān, the Safavids were thrown on to 
the defensive in their long-drawn-out struggle with the Ottomans, and did not regain the 
initiative for the three-quarters of a century, until the reign of Shah ‘Abbās the 
Great.”1949 The consequences of battle of Çaldıran for the Safavid state, however, were 
to be far beyond the military defeat or territorial loss. Although it marked a turning point 
in the rivalry of the two powers for the leadership in the Islamic world, perhaps a more 
                                                 
1948 The analysis of the tribe-bureaucracy contest in the Safavid state is far beyond the scope of the present 
study. For a recent study of several aspects of the issue, see Kathryn Babayan, Mystics, Monarchs, and 
Messiahs. Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard 
University Press, 2002.   
1949 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 45. 
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important consequence was that it brought profound changes in the political and 
ideological trajectory of the Safavid state because of two consequent developments: 1) 
the collapse of Ismail’s mythical image as a divinely guided invincible leader1950, and 2) 
the death of most of the leading qizilbash khans on the battlefield.  
The subsequent effects of the defeat on the psychology of Ismail himself and on 
his relations with the qizilbash disciples had already been coined by several scholars. 
Indeed, before the battle of Çaldıran, both Ismail and his qizilbash disciples had reasons 
to develop such a mythical image. As Nasr Allah Falsafī underlines, having always been 
victorious until then, Ismail considered no adversary his equal and assumed that he had 
been invincible. Thus, the defeat of Çaldıran profoundly affected his character and 
behavior; his egoism and arrogance were changed to despair and dejection. From then 
on, he went into mourning and began to wear black robes and black turban. His 
pessimism was best reflected by the fact that during the remaining ten years of his reign, 
Ismail never led his troops into action in person.1951 “Nor did he devote his attention to 
the state affairs”, says Savory and goes on saying that “on the contrary, he seems to have 
                                                 
1950 I would like to quote from the testimony of a contemporary western observer: “This monarch is 
almost, so to speak, worshipped, more especially by his soldiers, many of whom fight without armor, 
being willing to die for their master. They go into battle with naked breasts, crying out ‘Schiac, Schiac’, 
which, in the Persian language, signifies ‘God, God’. [This is evidently wrong] Others consider him a 
prophet; but it is certain that all are of opinion that he will never die.” See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A 
Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 115. For a similar account 
also see “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 206-207.  Another Venetian source writes that 
“they [Ismail’s army] fight neither for gold nor for the state but for their religion and they believe that if 
they die they will go straight to paradise and thus they fight most valiantly.” See Theodora Spandugino, 
La Vita di Sach Ismael et Tamas Re di Persia Chiamati Soffi, in Sansovino, Historia Universale 
dell’Origine et Imperio de Turchi, 98-100 (This source was compiled after Ismail’s death), quoted in 
Palmira Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, in 
Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland 
Publishing, 1996, p. 337. 
1951 Nasr Allah Falsafī, “Jang-i Chāldiran”, in Majalla-yi Dānishkada-yi Adabiyyāt-i Tihrān, I, 1953-4, p. 
121.  
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tried to drown his sorrows by drunken debauches.”1952 A Safavid chronicle describes his 
years after this defeat as follows: “He spent most of his time in hunting, or in the 
company of rosy-cheeked youths, quaffing goblets of purple wine, and listening to the 
strains of music and song.”1953 A Venetian merchant records witnessing that in 1520, 
“on his second arrival in Tauris [Tabriz], Ismael committed a most disgraceful act, as he 
caused twelve of the most beautiful youths in the town to be taken to his place of 
Astibisti [Heşt Behişt] for him to work his wicked will upon them, and he gave them 
away one by one to his lords for the same purpose; a short time previously he had caused 
ten children of respectable men to be seized in like manner.”1954 
On the other hand, this defeat equally damaged the relationship between the Shah 
and his disciples, and consequently influenced the ground of the Safavids’ claims of 
legitimacy for the power. The autocratic power of the Safavid Shahs is alleged to have 
three foundations: the first was derived from the ancient Persian theory of suzerainty 
which attributed divine rights to the king regarding him as a ‘shadow of God upon 
earth’. The second foundation stemmed from the Shi’ite belief of Mahdi; the Safavid 
shahs, by the help of the newly migrated shi’ite scholars (especially from Jabal ‘Amil), 
declared themselves as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, Mahdi. And last but not 
least, they were the ‘perfect guide’, mürşid-i kāmil, of the qizilbash disciples.1955 During 
the preparation and formation period of the state, the most influential and functional 
instrument among these three foundations was, without doubt, the last one. Until the 
                                                 
1952 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, pp. 46-7. 
1953 Khwurshāh b. Qubād al-Husaynī, Tārikh-i Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 
513, fol. 445a, recited in Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, Der Islam, 41, 
1965, p. 93.  
1954 “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 207. 
1955 See Roger M. Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, in Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the 
Isfahan Colloquium, 1974, Part I, ed. R. Holod=Iranian Studies, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 184. 
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defeat of Çaldıran, the qizilbashes deeply believed in the infallibility of their Perfect 
Guide, which was again ‘approved’ by the uninterrupted ascendance of Ismail. On the 
other hand, the first two foundations were not really at work during the formation period 
because until then the Turkoman qizilbashes had been familiar with neither the ancient 
Persian theory of kingship nor the Twelver Shi’ism in its orthodox or written way.  
The artillery and firearms of Selim I, however, seriously damaged the qizilbash 
belief in the infallible and invincible nature of their Perfect Guide. Likewise, in the 
following episodes of the Safavid history, the role and effectivity of the title “mürşid-i 
kāmil” attributed to the Safavid shahs would decline, even if they stayed as the spiritual 
guide of the qizilbash until they disappeared from the scene of history. The other two 
fundamentals, on the other hand, gained eminence concomitantly to the decline of the 
latter. Therefore, the battle of Çaldıran marked this major change in the philosophical 
fundamentals of the Safavid polity. The following paragraphs will briefly indicate that 
this crucial change was not limited to the political philosophy; rather, it extended to all 
the aspects of life in the Safavid realm.  
As can be recalled, the qizilbash Turkomans of Anatolia and Syria considered 
Ismail as an omnipotent leader of both religious and political nature. First of all, he was 
mürşid-i kāmil, the infallible spiritual guide, of all the qizilbash mürids. In addition, he 
was also recognized as the head of the community in terms of temporal power. Until 
Çaldıran, Ismail successfully merged these two natures in his personality in such a way 
that his image appeared as a semi-divine being. Shortly before 1510, a Venetian 
merchant depicts his image in the eyes of the qizilbashes as follows:  
This Sophy is loved and reverenced by his people as a God, and especially by his 
soldiers, many of whom enter into battle without armour, expecting their master 
Ismael to watch over them in the fight. There are also others to go into battle 
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without armour, being willing to die for their monarch, rushing on with naked 
breasts, crying “Shiac, Shiac”. The name of God is forgotten throughout Persia 
and only that of Ismael remembered; if any one fall when riding or dismounted 
he appeals to no other God but Shiac, using the name in two ways: first as God 
Shiac, secondly as prophet; as the Mussulmans say “laylla, laylla Mahamet 
resurala,” the Persians say “Laylla ylla Ismael veliala”; besides this everyone, 
and particularly his soldiers, consider him immortal, but I have heard that Ismael 
is not pleased with being called a god or a prophet.1956    
 
Another Venetian source reads: “He is adored as a prophet and the rug on which 
he knelt for Easter was torn to pieces to be used by his followers as Christian relics. … It 
is said that Ismail was sent by God to announce that his sect was the only true sect 
whose members would be admitted to paradise…”1957 Zuan Moresini, a contemporary 
Venetian observer, further reports in 1507 that “[T]hese, in their way, adore the Sufi, 
and he is called not king or prince but holy or prophet. … He is the holy of holies, full of 
divinatory power, for he takes council from no one, nor did he as a child, and because of 
this all believe that the Shi’ī in his every act is divinely inspired.”1958 Yet in another 
occasion, Moresini says that “since Xerxes and Darius there has never been a king of 
Persia, neither so adored, nor so loved by his people, nor so bellicose, nor with such a 
great army, nor so graced fortune.”1959 
                                                 
1956 “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 206. It should be noted that the Venetian Merchant 
writes these words in the context of a description of sports and feasts prepared for the arrival of Shah 
Ismail in Tauris (sic) before 1520, most probably in 1518.  
1957 Theodora Spandugino, La Vita di Sach Ismael et Tamas Re di Persia Chiamati Soffi, quoted in Palmira 
Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, p. 337. However, 
one should read Venetian (in general western) accounts on Ismail very carefully for they exaggerated 
Ismail’s divineness and holiness. For a critical evaluation of Venetian accounts on Shah Ismail, and an 
analysis of psychological and political background of the Venetian reporters see Palmira Brummet’s 
abovementioned article. Brummett successfully shows that contemporary Venetian observers either 
consciously or unconsciously amplified extremist attributes to Ismail partly for they wished to see him 
outside the Islamic sphere as much as possible, partly for they wished a powerful ruler, who was at the 
same time non-Islamic and Christian-like or at least friends of Christians, against their formidable enemy, 
Ottomans.   
1958 Quoted in Brummett, p. 338, from Sanuto’s Diarii.  
1959 Quoted in Brummett, p. 340.  
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These contemporary accounts clearly reflect the extremist beliefs of the 
qizilbashes about their mürşid-i kāmil and shah. Nonetheless, the zeal of the qizilbashes 
was seemingly tuned down by the first defeat of Ismail; especially the religious and 
spiritual attributes to his image were seriously eroded. The mystical bond linking mürşid 
with mürid had been damaged and would never be fixed again, while the belief in the 
Shah as a divine or semi-divine and invincible figure was shattered.1960 In Savory’s 
words, “Although the qizilbashes continued to accord their leader with the title of 
mürşid, the title had become meaningless except for ritualistic purposes. Similarly, 
although the traces of the original Sūfī organization persisted in a fossilized form, they 
rapidly ceased to have any organic function within the Safavid body of politics.”1961 
Elsewhere, Savory also rightfully makes the point that “as the qizilbash dissociated 
themselves from the mürid-mürşid relationship with the shah, they reverted to their 
former and primary loyalty towards their tribe and their tribal chief.”1962  
On the other hand, this attitude of the qizilbash was anticipated by the 
developing Safavid administration which was gradually affected by the ‘literate’ 
Twelver Shi’ism. Indeed, following the establishment of the state, the Safavid 
propaganda machine gradually abandoned the doctrine of Qizilbash-Sufism because the 
ghulāt represented by it was beyond the pale of orthodox Islam, and of orthodox Shi’ism 
as well; and also because the state needed a written and well-cultivated religion with a 
developed judicial system. As Savory puts it, in the Safavid domain, the propaganda of 
                                                 
1960 Compare Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins, Istanbul, 1987, 
pp. 73-4.  
1961 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 46. 
1962 Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl I”, p. 92.   
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the Qizilbash-Sufism natural waned after the defeat of Shah Ismail in Çaldıran.1963 When 
narrating the event nearly a century later, Eskandar Beg Munshi, the historian of Shah 
Abbas the Great, says that “without doubt God, in his most excellent wisdom, had 
decreed that Shāh Isma’īl should suffer a reverse at the battle of Chāldirān, for had he 
been victorious in this battle too, there would have been a danger that the belief and faith 
of the unsophisticated (italics are mine) qizilbāsh in the authority of the Shāh would 
have reached such heights that their feet might have strayed from the straight path of 
religious faith and belief, and they might have fallen into serious error.”1964 
Although they were rare, the protests against the temporal authority of the shah 
were seen even in Ismail’s lifetime. Only two years after Çaldıran, the qizilbash 
governor-general of Horasan made a powerful challenge to Ismail’s authority, and 
“within a year of Ismail’s death, civil war broke out between the qizilbash tribes fighting 
for the control of the state with little or no regard for the sacrosanct nature of not only 
the Shah’s character but also his authority, in both its spiritual and temporal aspects.”1965 
It is interesting to note that two decades later, one of the leading qizilbash chiefs, Ulāma 
Beg Tekelu, not only simply challenged the authority of Shah Tahmasb, but also offered 
his services to the Ottoman army and fought against the Shah in Sultan Süleyman’s 
ranks upon realizing that he could not seize a high office within the Safavid state 
machinery. This evidence clearly shows that “the extent to which the qizilbash had 
                                                 
1963 Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, p. 200.  
1964 Eskandar Beg Monshi, History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great,vol. I, trs. Roger M. Savory, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1978, pp. 71-2.   
1965 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 46. Also consider his “The Consolidation”, pp. 93-94.  
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abandoned in practice their unquestioning obedience to the Shah as their mürşid-i kāmil, 
whatever lip-service they might continue to pay to it in theory.”1966          
The second consequence of Çaldıran, which seems to have been fundamentally 
changed the development of the ideological and political stand of the Safavid state, was 
that in the battlefield of Çaldıran most of the leading qizilbash begs who were chiefly 
responsible for the success of Ismail’s early advent (hurūc) died. Among them the most 
prominent were Ismail’s vicegerent, vekillü’s-saltanat or grand vizier, Seyyid 
Abdülbāki; his kadıasker Seyyid Sadr Şerif; the governor of Bağdad, Hulāfa Beg; the 
governor of Herat and Horasan, Lala Beg; the governor of Diyarbakır, Ustacaluoğlu 
Muhammed Beg; the governor of Hamedān, Tekelü Kāhi Beg; (Kemnān u Damğān 
sahibi) Sultan Ali Beg; the governor of Irak-ı Acem, Pir Budak Beg; the governor of 
Fars and Şiraz, Köse Hamza Beg; the governor of Đsfahan, Tursun Beg; korucu-başı Saru 
Piri; the governor of Gence, Serdar Beg; the governor of Damğān and Sa’īd Çukuru, 
Ağzıdar Beg; the governor of Kazvin and Sultaniye, Kara Sinan; and Seyyid 
Muhammed Kemāne1967, who was the official-responsible (nākib) of the sanctuary in 
Meşhed and known as descending from the Family of the Prophet.1968   
What is of utmost importance to be noted here is that the overwhelming majority 
of the grand leaders of the millenarist qizilbash movement deceased in this battle. 
Without doubt, the absence of these khans who were famous for their extremist beliefs, 
                                                 
1966 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 61.  
1967 On October 21, 1508, when Ismail entered Baghdād, he visited the Shi’ī shrines at Karbalā and Najaf, 
where Seyyid Muhammed Kemāne was invested with drum and banner and was made mütevelli of Najaf 
as well as governor of certain towns in ‘Iraq-i ‘Arab. See Sarwar, pp. 53-5; Roger Savory, “The 
Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, p. 77.  
1968 KPZ9, p. 113; HYDR, p. 143; CLZ, p. 242; Lütfi Paşa, p. 230; HR, p. 183; HS, p. 606; AA, p. 70. 
Also consider Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 90; TNSS, p. 61 ; Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un Đran Seferi”, pp. 
68-9. h  
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were extremely influential on the military and political affairs of the state, and vitally 
affected the balance of power at Ismail’s court.  
First of all, in terms of ideology, the absence of these great qizilbash warlords 
facilitated the establishment of the “orthodox” version of Twelver Shi’a in the Safavid 
realm. As already determined by several scholars, the shi’ism implemented by Ismail 
and by early qizilbashes was not much acceptable by the religious scholars of Twelver 
Shi’ism. The shi’ism of early qizilbashes who founded the state was composed of simple 
elements. As Aubin points out, “D’une part, culte des imams, attende messianique du 
Mahdi, adoration du souverain ; d’autre part, vindicte à l’égard du sunnisme, 
malédiction publique des trois premiers califes, profanation de ce que les sunnites 
célèbres, l’utilisation sacrilège de mosquées sunnites obstinés, ou, plus d’une fois, ceux 
que des vengeances personnelles feront passer pour tels.”1969  
Soon after the establishment of the new state, however, the need for a well-
established religious sect with a well-defined judicial basis emerged. At the beginning, 
on religious affairs Ismail conferred to Persian ulemā who were indeed not much 
acquainted with the well-developed theology and jurisdiction of Twelver Shi’ism. At the 
time of Shah Tahmasb, however, this role was fulfilled by Arab doctors of religion 
immigrated from Jabal al-‘Āmil and Bahrayn.1970 Under the direction of the newly 
imported scholars, ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism was soon established while the extremist 
beliefs of the founders were marginalized. Despite the contest posed by the qizilbash 
tribes, “the dogmas of the Imami theologians along with a growing abstraction and 
                                                 
1969 Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavides”, Le Shî’isme Imâmite, Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-
9 mai 1968, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 238.   
1970 Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavides”, p. 239.  
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depersonalization of political authority”1971 gradually established Safavid ideological 
and religious sphere, which might be called ‘Safavid Shi’ism’. Without doubt, the lack 
of influential qizilbash khans accelerated this process.   
The second consequence arose in the administrative system of the Safavid state. 
It is an established fact in scholarship that the administrative structure of the state was 
divided along ethnic lines between Turkomans and Persian, the former constituting the 
military aristocracy (men of sword) while the latter filling the ranks of the civil and 
religious bureaucracy (men of pen).1972 There was an intrinsic friction between these two 
elements for, as Minorsky has put it, “like oil and water, the Turkomans and Persians did 
not mix freely, and the dual character of the population profoundly affected both the 
military and civil administration of Persia.”1973 Both sides had a clear idea of what the 
function of the other and had pejorative attitude. Persians regarded the qizilbashes as 
vulgar men which were simply for fighting and devoid of any capacity to participate in 
the ‘civilized’ circles and in the bureaucratic affairs. For the qizilbashes, on the other 
hand, Persians, or Tājiks, were only fit for “looking after the accounts and divan 
business”1974, but had no right in military affairs and could not command the troops on 
the field.  
The death of the most prominent Qizilbash āmirs on the battlefield of Çaldıran 
deeply affected the advance of the struggle between the qizilbash tribal-military 
elements and the Persian bureaucracy; the balance considerably shifted towards the 
supremacy of the Persian bureaucracy. As Savory truly underlines, it was during the 
                                                 
1971 Woods, p. 172.  
1972 See, for example, Roger M. Savory, “The Qizilbāsh, Education and the Arts”, Turcica, VI, 1975, p. 
168.  
1973 TM, p. 188.  
1974 Roger M. Savory, “The Significance of the Political Murder of Mirzā Salmān”, Islamic Studies, 
Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, vol. III, no. 2, Karachi, 1964, p. 184.  
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temporary eclipse of the qizilbash power because of the death of many highest-ranking 
qizilbash officers in Çaldıran that the office of vakīl, the vicegerent of the Shah, and 
vazīr, the head of bureaucracy gained gravity in state affairs.1975 Together with the 
conscious withdrawal of the Shah from state affairs, the absence of powerful qizilbash 
khans granted considerable freedom in political and religious affairs to Persian 
bureaucrats on one hand and to newly consolidating Twelver Shi’ite clerics on the other. 
Khwandāmir reports, 
During the winter [following the battle of Çaldıran], when the shah was in the 
capital of Azerbaijan, he decided to turn over the administration of the realm to 
someone who was capable of dealing capably with the office, and after much 
deliberation to office was given to Mirza Shah-Husayn Isfahani, a former deputy 
of Ramish [Durmuş] Khan’s1976, and an order was issued for him to run the 
administration independently and autonomously. All viziers and high 
officeholders were to be subject to him, and no action, great or small, was to be 
taken without his prior knowledge and approval. Thereafter Mirza Shah-
Husayn’s threshold became a resort for the great and powerful, and his 
magnificence and grandeur increased as the shah’s favor shone upon him.1977 
 
Taking advantage of Ismail’s withdrawal from the day-to-day managements of 
affairs, Mirza Shah Husayn enhanced his own power.1978 Parallel to the increase of its 
influence on state affairs, the character of vekālat also experienced a radical change. As 
the use of ‘vakīl’ or sometimes ‘vakīl-i saltana’ instead of its original form ‘vakil-i nafs-i 
nafīs-i humāyūn’ reflects, the vakīl was no more the alter ego of the shah; the vakīl’s 
loyalty is now primarily to the state not to the shah. According to Savory, “this 
                                                 
1975 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 47.  
1976 When Durmuş Han was appointed as the governor of Isfahan in 1503, he remained at the court and 
delegated one of his retainers, Mirza Shah Husayn, to act as his deputy there and to look after the 
administration for him. After Çaldıran, however, the rank of the former servitor preceded that of his 
master. In April 1523, Mirza Shah Husayn was assassinated by a group of qizilbash, obviously because of 
the perception of the latter to be in service of a Persian as despising. Thus when opportunity appeared, 
they did not hesitate to kill the vākil, and as in Savor’s words, added “his name to the list of those who had 
become victims of the struggle between Turk and Iranian in the early Safavid state.” See Savory, Iran 
under the Safavids, p. 48. 
1977 HS, p. 606.  
1978 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 47; “The Consolidation”, p. 111.  
 600 
development marked a decisive step away from the original theocratic concept of the 
state, and toward a greater separation of religious and secular powers within the 
state.”1979  
On the other hand, the accumulation of Persian elements in the highest offices of 
the state was not limited to the office of vekālat. As we learn from Khwandāmir, 
“around the same time the shah assigned the office of comptroller to Sayyid Āmir 
Shihabuddin Abdullah, son of Sayyid Nizamuddin Lala, one of the great seyyids of 
Azerbayjan; but since he was incapable of discharging the office competently, the office 
was transferred to the great and learned naqīb and seyyid, Āmir Jalaluddin Muhammad 
al-Husayni al-Shirangi.”1980  
The decline of the qizilbash dominance on the Safavid affairs in the course of the 
sixteenth century is perhaps best reflected in the history of two offices: khalīfat al-
khulafā and āmir al-umarā. It has already been evaluated in detail in the present study 
that the establishment of the Safavid state was a process principally rested upon the 
qizilbash movement which was initiated by Ismail’s grandfather Junayd. In its early 
phases until transforming into the ‘routinized state’ under the auspice of shi’ite ulame, 
the qizilbash movement had two aspects: politico-military and millenarian-sufistic.1981 
The first aspect was represented by the āmirs or khans of the qizilbash oymaqs while the 
second was represented by the khalifas who fulfilled religious functions and the 
propaganda of the Order in each clan. According to Nasr Allah Falsafī, the leader of the 
                                                 
1979 Savory, Iran under the Safavids, p. 47.  
1980 HS, pp. 606-7. Also see HR, p. 185, 
1981 Concomitant to this dual structure of the movement, Shah Ismail and his successors embedded two 
institutions in their personality, which had hitherto been represented in Islamic states by two separate 
personalities: the holder of temporal power, the shah, and the perfect spiritual guide, the mürşid-i kāmil.  
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Sufis in each tribe was called khalifa.1982 Indeed, it has not been clarified yet whether the 
military chiefdom and the spiritual leadership of the clans were unified in one person or 
represented by two different people. Kathryn Babayan suggests, without providing 
historical evidence, that during the classical age of the Safavid rule (1501-90), these two 
offices in each oymaqs were filled by two different delegates appointed by the court, a 
khan, sultan, or beg, and a khalifa.1983 In any case, however, the organization of these 
two branches followed different lines. The tribal leaders who were the commanders of 
troops recruited from their own clan were organized under the supreme commandership 
of the āmir al-umarā, the head of the Safavid army. The Sufis or khalifas, on the other 
hand, were organized under the leadership of khalīfat al-khulafā1984 who was regarded as 
the nāyib or deputy of the mürşid-i kāmil. Beginning from the reign of Shah Tahmasb I, 
both offices gradually lost their eminence in Safavid politico-religious sphere, one 
contested by the ulemā of Twelver Shi’ism while the other was eroded by the Persian 
bureaucracy and the ghulām.   
During the formation period, the khalifas were extremely influential in 
propagating the Safavid message among Turkoman tribes and other affiliated social 
groups, organizing religious affairs of communities already converted to qizilbashism, 
recruiting fighters among disciples, organizing upheavals against the Ottoman 
administration, and consolidating the spiritual influence and the legitimacy of the 
Safavid shaykhs etc. It is not surprising that when this office was established officially 
by the foundation of the state, it was granted to a qizilbash Turkoman Hadim Beg 
                                                 
1982 Cited in Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 497.  
1983 Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi’ism”, Iranian 
Studies, v. 27, no . 1-4, 1994, p. 138.  
1984 Minorsky truly called the office of khalīfat al-khulafā the ‘special secretariat for Sufi affairs”. See TM, 
p. 125.  
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Khalifa, just like the office of āmir al-umarā, which was appointed to Lala Husayn 
Shamlu.  
As indicated above, the founders of the state, namely the qizilbashes, were 
gradually excluded from the officially approved ideological sphere. Shaykh Ali Karaki, 
the influential shi’ite mujtahid or jurisconsult at the court of Shah Tahmasb I, brought 
the dominance of the shi’te shari’a into the religio-ideological sphere of the state for the 
first time. He issued a fatwa (injunction) allowing the cursing of Abu Muslim, one of the 
most admired heroes of the qizilbashes, and wrote one of the earliest polemics against 
ghulāt-Sufism.1985 Towards the end of the sixteenth century, especially during the reign 
of Shah Abbas I, even the term “sufi”, once the foremost honorable epithet of Safavi 
adherents, fell into disrepute.1986 Since the office of khalīfat al-khulafā intimately linked 
to the Turkoman-qizilbash subjects of the Safavid State, one can observe the decreasing 
favor of the shahs with the qizilbashes on the declining prestige of this office. As Savory 
puts, “the prestige of the khalīfat al-khulafā , since this office was an integral part of the 
Sufi organization of the Safawiyya movement in its early stages, naturally declined pari 
passu with the general decline in the status of the sufi organization as a whole.”1987 
During the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588-1629), the office was totally discredited. “The 
Shah gave to the Sufis ever baser types of employment. From being in attendance on the 
Shah, and acting as his guards, they degenerated to being sweepers of the palace 
buildings, gate-keepers, and jailers. … The khalīfat al-khulafā himself, under Shah 
Abbas I, was reduced to the position of a tame religious official at the court.”1988 After 
                                                 
1985 Babayan, p. 144.  
1986 Savory, “The Principle Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl I”, p. 92.  
1987 Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 498.  
1988 Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 501.  
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Shah Abbas I, the status of the Sufis and that of the khalīfat al-khulafā further waned. As 
Savory concludes, “…in 1700, after almost two hundred years that Sūfī fervor had 
brought the Safawids to power, it was possible for a mujtahid to denounce Sūfism as 
‘this foul and hellish growth’.”1989    
In the same vein, the importance of the office of āmir al-umarā began to decline 
during the reign of Shah Tahmasb I, especially when he succeeded in establishing his 
absolute authority after the civil war over the qizilbash tribes. Savory notes that the 
office is not recorded among the appointments made by Shah Abbas I on his 
accession.1990 Among others, arguably one of the most affective factors contributed to 
the decline of the office was the introduction of Caucasian elements into the Safavid 
state under Shah Tahmasb I.1991 From then on, the influence of Caucasians in state 
affairs, especially in the army, continuously increased, reaching its apex under Shah 
Abbas I. It is suffice to indicate the extent to which Georgian elements infiltrated into 
the important positions even before the reign of Shah Abbas I and to remind the fact that 
in 1585-6, a Georgian, Keyhusrev Beg, was appointed as lala of Tahmasb Mirza b. 
                                                 
1989 Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 502.  
1990 Roger M. Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I (930-
84/1524-76”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIV, 1961, p. 84. 
1991 Indeed, Shah Tahmasb’s first attempt to curb excessive power of the qizilbash amirs and to break 
down their tribal loyalty came before the introduction of the Caucasian elements. As we learn from the 
author of the Şerefnāme, the sons of the noblest āmirs were taken to the royal court and given a special 
education under the direct supervision of the Shah.  Şerefhan Bitlisī says that “they were entrusted to the 
care of tutors of experienced piety and morals. As they grew up, they were thought all kinds of military 
exercises, including polo. Even painting was a part of their syllabus.” (Quoted in TM, p. 133.) As a result, 
they grew up as better educated and more cultured which at the same time loosened their tribal bonds 
while reinforcing their devotion to the royal house both in terms of practical means and ideology. As 
Savory has already indicated, another consequence of this practice appeared as the blurring of the formerly 
clearly-defined lines between ‘Turk’ and ‘Tājīk’, for the qizilbash princes who underwent this education 
turned out at the end “to be more ‘Tājīk’ than ‘Turk’ in their background and outlook.” See Savory, “The 
Qizilbāsh, Education and the Arts”, pp. 174.  
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Muhammad Hudabende; the post of lala to the Safavid princes had hitherto been 
considered a qizilbash prerogative.1992    
The introduction of the Caucasian elements into the Safavid state apparatus as a 
‘third force’1993 goes back to the four expeditions of Shah Tahmasb I between 1540-41 
and 1553-54, after which he brought a large number of captives, mostly women and 
children, back to Iran.1994 The offspring of these slaves would constitute the third 
element of the Safavid polity which turned into an officially recognized institution under 
the name ghulāmān-i khāssa-yi sharīfah, slaves of the royal household, under Shah 
Abbas I.1995 These Georgian and Circassian boys were given a special education and 
training, on completion of which they were either enrolled in the newly established 
ghulām troops, or assigned to special services in the royal household or employed in 
some other branch of the khāssa administration. The initiation and development of this 
third force was indeed an intended project of the shahs who felt uncomfortable with the 
excessive power and the tribal loyalty of the Qizilbash. The principal feature of the 
ghulām force was its unquestioned loyalty to the shah. It was because of two reasons: 
first, they were devoid of social roots and second, they were subjected to a special 
education, which surely was not simply aiming to teach necessary knowledge but 
including some sort of ‘brain washing’ as well.1996  
                                                 
1992 See Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I”, p. 84.  
1993 Roger M. Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, in Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the Isfahan 
Colloquium, 1974, Part I, ed. R. Holod=Iranian Studies, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 195.  
1994 From the last of these alone, 30.000 captives were brought back to Iran. See Roger M. Savory, “A 
Curious Episode of Safavid History”, Iran and Islam, in Memory of the Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. 
Bosworth, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971, p. 461.  
1995 Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, p. 196.  
1996 Although having certain differences, the Safavid ghulām system is surely comparable with the 
Ottoman kapı-kulu system, especially in their function of providing a core military force with absolute 
loyalty to the monarch.    
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As Babayan indicates, the entire tribal structure of the qizilbash was seriously 
affected by Shah Abbas I’s centralizing reforms. Especially when the centralization 
process gained impetus by transferring the capital to Isfahan (1590), the qizilbash āmirs 
lost their privilege to receive appanages along with lala-ships, a key element in their bid 
for their active participation in Safavid politics.1997 For many qizilbashes who were used 
to being regarded with special honor and respect; however, being dishonored was not 
only that they no longer enjoyed political and economic privileges, but many of oymaqs 
were now governed by ghulāms who had no blood ties but were directly appointed by 
the palace. The historian of Shah Abbas I, Iskender Beg, writes, “Since some of the 
oymāqs did not posses qualified candidates to take on high posts once their Qizilbash 
āmirs and governors had did, a ghulām was appointed, due to his justice, skill, bravery, 
and self-sacrifice, to the rank of āmir of that clan (īl), army (qushūn va lashkar) and to 
the governorship (hukūmat) of that region (ulkā).”1998     
 
9.2.  THE WANING OF QIZILBASH FERVOR AND ESTABLISHING A 
MODUS VIVENDI IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE  
The waning of the qizilbash dominance – and concomitantly the zeal - in the Safavid 
realm equally reciprocated among the ‘Ottoman qizilbashes’, i.e. the qizilbashes living 
within the Ottoman borders. Although the close connection between ‘Ottoman 
qizilbashes’ and the Safavid center continued after Çaldıran, their adoration to the Shah 
and zeal for the Safavid cause certainly started to calm down. It is true that in the 
following decades, a number of qizilbash uprisings some of which brought considerable 
                                                 
1997 Babayan, p. 142.  
1998 AA, p. 1088.  
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success emerged. Nonetheless, none of these uprisings had big aspirations such as 
Shahkulu and Nur Ali Khalifa.  
Indeed, after Çaldıran, Ismail completely lost his hope to gain a military success 
against the Ottoman army and so did the Anatolian qizilbashes. As a matter of fact, 
Ismail never intended to confront with the Ottomans again on the battlefield. However, 
he did not totally abandon his offensive policy; he continued to agitate the qizilbashes 
living on the Ottoman territories.1999 Archival evidence clearly shows, for example, that 
the uprising of Şah Veli b. Celal, known as Celāli uprising, was fulfilled under the 
direction and auspice of Shah Ismail.2000  
A contemporary archival report provides fairly detailed information on the Celalī 
uprising.2001 The report is undated but its content clearly reveals that it was written 
shortly before the break up of Shah Veli b. Celal’s uprising in 1520.  The anonymous 
reporter, who was evidently a spy or a local officer, states that after interrogating a 
certain Dervish Zaifiye from the village of Eymir of Zile, it is learned that a man called 
Shaykh Celal founded a tekke in the village of Sizir2002 in the the sanjak of Veys Beg2003, 
son of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg of Dulkadir. After Shaykh Celal’s death, his son Shah Veli 
succeeded his father’s post, i.e. the shaykdom of the tekke. While Sultan Selim was in 
Egypt (1516-7), Shah Veli paid homage to Shah Ismail. Upon his return from Iran, he 
                                                 
1999 See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la revolte de 
Şah Veli b. Şeyh Celal”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, p. 25.  
2000 See TSA, document E 2044.  
2001 The document is housed in TSA, document E 2044; its full transcribed text and facsimile copy, as well 
as their French translations are published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. 
Notes et documents sur la revolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, pp. 17-
22.    
2002 A village within the boundaries of contemporary Sivas.  
2003 This was the province of Bozok.  
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dispatched messengers to Erzincan, Kara Keçili2004, Rūm, Malatya, and some other 
places (obviously to prepare the qizilbashes of these regions for the upcoming uprising). 
Shah Veli maintained the communication with the shah by sending a baba called Koca 
as messenger. It had been six months since he had dispatched Koca Baba for the last 
time and the latter returned one month prior, carrying the following message: “The shah 
said with his best wishes that ‘you Shah Veli, son of Celal, on the fifteenth of Safer 
(February 5, 1520) you with the khalifas and disciples in the region rise up as perfectly 
armed and put the country in havoc; sooner we also will arrive with a sizable army!’” 
On receiving this order Shah Veli immediately re-sent Koca Baba in order to inform the 
shah of his advent, and dispatched messengers to the khalifas around. In a short while 
the khalifas and the qizilbashes gathered in the tekke and rose up under the leadership of 
Shah Veli. On this day, Shah Veli sent Gökoğlu Veli to Shah Ismail. The anonymous 
report gives the details of the invited qizilbash groups and their locations: the tribe of 
Selmanlu2005 in Malatya, the tribe of Kurisa near Misis, some people (bazı kimesneler) in 
Canik, some people in Osmancık near Arkud River, and the qizilbashes along the river 
toward Iskilip.2006      
Another occasion was recorded in Sivas. According to the document E 6188 in 
TSA2007, which is a report of a certain Shah Veli pertaining to the occasion of Seyyid 
                                                 
2004 A clan of Ulu Yörük living in Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, Kirsehir, and Ankara. See Faruk Sümer, 
Oğuzlar, pp. 201, 241. One should remember that one of the most influential qizilbash oymaqs, namely 
Ustaclu, was stemmed from Ulu Yörük Turkomans. Furthermore, another prominent oymaq, Rumlu, was 
also originated from the same region.  
2005 In the Ottoman tahrir defters, there are tribes registered with the name ‘Selmanlu’ in several entries 
such as Maraş, Bozok, Ankara, Kütahya, Çorumlu, and Kayseriyye.  See Orhan Sakin, Anadolu’da 
Türkmenler ve Yörükler, Đstanbul, 2006, p. 294.  
2006 TSA, document E 2044.  
2007 The full text of this document is published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Seyyid Taman, un 
agitateur hétérodoxe a Sivas (1516-1518)”, IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi’nden Ayrıbasım, Ankara: TTK, 1988, 
865-74.  
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Temam, when Sultan Selim proceeded to Egypt from Damascus (after the victory of 
Mercidābık on August 24, 1516), Seyyid Temam came to Sivas and gained the 
friendship of Hızır, the subaşı of the governor of Sivas (Sivas Sancağı beği Fāik Beğ), 
and some sipāhis of Sivas. He wrapped belts around some of their waists and girded 
some others with swords.2008 Seyyid Temam called aforementioned subaşı as Çayan 
Beg, a sipāhi named Đlyas as Kara Han, and a man known as Yiğitbaşı in Sivas as Div 
Ali.2009 They continuously gathered and engaged in eating and drinking. Their vagrant 
acts were in such a degree that because of their fear the commander of Sivas fortress 
reinforced the door of the fortress. Although they became silent when they heard of the 
conquest of Egypt, soon they resumed unlawful activities, pitching tents around the 
tekke in which Seyyid Temam was lodging. The aforementioned subaşı and sipāhis 
respected Seyyid Temam as a beg and the latter held meetings like a ruler (dīvan eder 
idi). At the end, the seyyids and notables of Sivas requested from qādi and dizdār 
(fortress commander) of the city to arrest Seyyid Temam and to inform the Porte on the 
issue. But the aforementioned subaşı (Hızır) prevented them to do so. Furthermore, the 
qādi also opposed the idea arguing that if they informed the Porte, then seventy to eighty 
men would die. Instead, he suggested to let him go out of the city. Consequently, Seyyid 
Temam left Sivas. Although he returned to a close vicinity of Sivas for a short time 
when the Sultan arrived in Halep from Damascus, following the sultan’s arrival in 
Kayseri he disappeared. One might also add some other minor qizilbash attempts in the 
first half of the sixteenth century aiming to disturb the Ottoman order. 
                                                 
2008 “... kimisine kuşak ve ba’zısına kılıç kuşadub...” 
2009 “... mezbūr subaşıya Çayan Beg ve Đlyas nām sipāhiye Kara Han ve Sivas’ta Yiğitbaşı nām kimesneye 
Div Ali deyu ad verüb ...” One would immediately notice that these three figures were among the most 
prestigious and powerful qizilbash āmirs after the battle of Çaldıran.  
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It should also be mentioned that the qizilbash movement among the Anatolian 
masses had its own momentum as well. Although it gradually calmed down, seemingly 
disappeared towards the end of the sixteenth century, the qizilbashes left within the 
Ottoman borders preserved a revolutionary spirit and organization capacity at least until 
the fourth decade of the sixteenth century. As Bacqué-Grammont has suggested, for 
example, the uprising of Kalender Celebi in 1526-7 could hardly be inspired by 
Safavids. When he rose up, Ismail already died two years before and Shah Tahmasb was 
fully occupied with a fierce civil war within his empire, thus was not in a position to 
organize a socio-military movement outside the borders of his empire. Consequently, 
one might safely agree with Bacqué-Grammont’s suggestion that “Il convient donc de 
souligner que, bien que menées par d’anciens dâ’î et halîfe de Şâh Isma’îl, ces révoltes 
présentent un aspect « indigène » et spontané…”2010  
The present thesis deemed the qizilbash movement in its emergence, 
development, and consolidation periods up until the battle of Çaldıran as predominantly 
a tribal-nomadic enterprise. As a matter of fact, when speaking of Shaykh Junayd’s 
immediate adherents, of the first ‘Kızıl-baş’, red-heads, under Shaykh Haydar, and of 
the sufi-warriors founded the Safavid state under the banner of Shah Ismail, our sources 
always mention tribal disciples of the order but barely refers to villagers or townspeople. 
As indicated above, one of the most crucial changes Caldiran brought to the qizilbash 
identity was that thenceforth the nomadic-tribal basis of this identity gradually 
dissolved. In the course of the sixteenth century, the socio-political basis of the qizilbash 
                                                 
2010 Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527”, Stvdia 
Islamica, LXII, Paris, 1985, p. 160. A report of Mahmud Pasha, the beylerbey of Karaman then, which 
most probably addressed the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha who was charged by the sultan to suppress the 
rebellion, which is dated as the end of April 1527, two months earlier than the repression of the rebellion, 
describes the development of the rebellion without mentioning Kalender Çelebi. See TSA, document E 
6369, published in Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527”, pp. 164-7.  
 610 
community within the Ottoman Empire significantly shifted from tribal-nomads to 
sedentary villagers.  
Nevertheless, although being the overwhelming color, this is not the whole 
picture. It would not be true to argue that the dissemination of the qizilbash message 
among sedentary people was a phenomenon of the post-Çaldıran period. Contemporary 
sources make frequent references to villagers and townspeople somehow adhered to the 
qizilbash movement at least by the year 1510 and onwards especially in the province of 
Rum, in the context of the intense qizilbash uprisings. Even some discontent Ottoman 
officials such as the timar holders and qādis supported these uprisings.2011 Especially in 
the Province of Rum, the number of non-tribal ‘qizilbashes’ increased dramatically. One 
may assure two possible reasons for this: first of all, in the first decade of the sixteenth 
century, the Province of Rum was ruled, nearly independently, by Prince Ahmed, whose 
vague policy regarding to the qizilbash issue is already delineated.  
The analysis in chapter VI showed that one should not totally ignore the claim 
put forward by the Ottoman historians that Ahmed established good relations with the 
qizilbashes simply to gain their military support in his struggle with Prince Selim. On 
the other hand, it seems that the official interest in the military potency of the qizilbashes 
somehow facilitated the legitimacy of qizilbashism within the public sphere.2012 
                                                 
2011 A detailed analysis of the role of timar holders in the Shahkulu rebellion and their incentives is already 
made in chapter VI. There are some occasional indications in the contemporary sources to the ‘somehow’ 
affiliation of state officials to the qizilbash movement. The qādi of Bolu, for example, lost his life because 
of his connection with the Safavids. As recited by Haydar Çelebi in Feridun Beg’s Munşe’āt 
(Münşe’ātü’s-selātin, I, Istanbul, 1274/1858, p. 497): “…Yiğirminci günde (20 Rebī II, 924/May 1, 1518) 
Bolu kadısı Mevlāna Đsa’nun Erdebil cānibiyle mu’āmelesi olmağın salb olunmak emr olunub Hüseyn ve 
Đskender nām kapucular gönderildi. Anlar dahī mezkūrı Merzifon’da bulub ‘ale-mele’i’n-nās salb 
eylediler.” Cited and quoted in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et 
documents sur la revolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal”, Archivum Ottomanicum, VII, 1982, p. 24. 
2012 For an exaggerated account of how qizilbashism attained popularity and ‘official’ acceptance in the 
Province of Rum under Prince Ahmed, see Amasyalı Abdizāde Hüseyin Hüsāmeddin, Amasya Tarihi, vol. 
III, Đstanbul, 1927, pp. 240-272.   
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Consequently, many officials either pretended to be or really adhered to the qizilbash 
movement. Within the framework of this political struggle between the Ottoman princes, 
even Ahmed’s son Murad became a qizilbash. Once the prince, who was then de facto 
ruler of the region, declared his qizilbash affiliation, many officials followed him simply 
to secure their position. Secondly, as Oktay Özel has already indicated, the geography of 
the Province of Rum was more suitable to agriculture than pastoral nomadism.2013 Thus, 
there were not many nomads in the region at all. Rather, the province and its 
neighborhood were densely populated by villagers. As a matter of fact, Bezm u Rezm, a 
late fourteenth century source,2014 clearly demonstrates that during the second half of the 
fourteenth century, nomadic tribes had already lost their eminence on the political scene 
in the region. Instead, the political and military power was scattered among the 
fortresses controlling strategic passages and important cities.2015 When these two factors 
are combined, the reason why the tribal character of the qizilbash movement was 
loosened in this region can be inferred.  
Apart from the tribal-nomadic contest, another peculiarity of this region should 
be mentioned: even before the Turkish invasion of the Anatolia, the region appeared as 
the niche of ‘heterodox’ beliefs. Under the Turkish rule, the same characteristic 
continued. It is well-known that the first large-scale uprising of the ‘heterodox’ 
Turcomans against the ‘orthodox’ Anatolian Seljukid rule was recorded in the same 
                                                 
2013 Oktay Özel, Changes and Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case 
Study of Amasya (1576-1642), Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, 
University of Manchester, 1993. 
2014 See Aziz b. Erdeşir-i Esterâbadî, Bezm u Rezm, translated into Turkish by Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara, 
1990.  
2015 Bezm u Rezm is full of stories narrating how Kadı Burhaneddin subjugated local lords of these 
fortresses, which usually followed the revolt of the latter when opportunity appeared.  
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region.2016 Thenceforth, ‘unorthodox’ beliefs and practices have always found deed-
roots in the Ottoman Province of Rum. Therefore, especially in Amasya, Tokat, Çorum, 
Sivas, and in the vicinity of these cities, the sedentary bases of the qizilbash movement 
traced back to the early sixteenth century, or perhaps to the late fifteenth century.  
Nonetheless, this does not seriously damage the thesis of the present study. Still 
it is highly plausible to argue that during its active phase until the defeat of Çaldıran, the 
locomotives of the movement were tribal devotees. The sincere sedentary qizilbashes, 
excluding those who pretended to be qizilbash within the framework of the balances in 
the Ottoman domestic politics, could be deemed only auxiliary supporters when they are 
compared to the role of nomadic tribes. Following the defeat of Çaldıran, however, the 
tribal characteristics of the qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Empire continuously faded 
away.  
It should be noted that the gradual fading of politico-military content of the 
qizilbash identity was a process intimately connected to the change in the social basis of 
the community; that is, the dissolution of the tribal organization and nomadic mode of 
life. Contrary to the exclusive tribal nature of qizilbash oymaqs gathered around Junayd, 
Haydar, and finally young Ismail, the copies of the Imperial Council (Divan) decisions, 
namely Mühimme Defterleri, the Register of Important Affairs, from the second half of 
the sixteenth century barely mention tribal affiliations of the qizilbashes subjected to 
persecution. Rather, the recorded occasions are mostly pertaining to the villagers or 
townspeople.    
                                                 
2016 The Babaī Revolt and the Qizilbash Movement have similarities in many aspects. For a brief 
discussion of these similarities, see chapter VI in the present study.   
 613 
Two reasons might be suggested in interpreting this situation. First of all, as it is 
delineated in chapter IV and chapter V, the effective militant tribes had already left the 
Ottoman lands to join the Shah’s suite either during his advent or in the course of 
uprisings during the interregnum in the Ottoman administration in the period between 
the years 1510 and 1513. Furthermore, many qizilbashes also must have left Anatolia in 
order to escape Selim I’s persecution on the eve of the Çaldıran campaign. At the turn of  
the second quarter of the sixteenth century, the tribal, thus political and militant, content 
of the qizilbash identity in Anatolia was recognizably siphoned off. 
Secondly, the remaining tribal-nomadic qizilbashes were subjected to a 
systematic sedentarization policy of the Ottoman administration.2017 Now being devoid 
of their military power which had already gone to carry Ismail to the throne of Persia, 
these tribal units could no longer resist against the pressure of the Ottoman imperial 
regime, and dissolved gradually. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the qizilbash 
identity in the Ottoman Anatolia lost its tribal characteristics to a greater extent and 
transformed into a religion of villagers.      
Records in the Mühimme Defterleri clearly show that the Ottoman persecution of 
the qizilbashes continued throughout the sixteenth century.2018 Nevertheless, parallel to 
                                                 
2017 It should be noted here that the Ottoman policy of sedentarizing nomadic-tribes was not restricted to 
the qizilbash tribes. It was a rather comprehensive policy which derived from mainly economic, fiscal, and 
administrative concerns of the Ottoman government. For a through evaluation of the issue in the 
seventeenth century Ottoman Empire, see Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı Đmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin Đskanı, 
Đstanbul, 1987. 
2018 Some of the related records in the Mühimme registers spanning from the mid-sixteenth century to the 
early seventeenth century, were first published by Ahmed Refik. See Ahmed Refik, On Altıncı Asırda 
Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik, Đstanbul: Ahmed Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932. Later on, two scholars published two 
articles dealing with the qizilbash persecution in the sixteenth century based of Mühimme records. See 
Colin H. Imber, “The Persecution of Ottoman Shi’ites according to the Mühimme Defterleri, 1565-1585”, 
Der Islam, 56, 1979, 245-73; Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Qizilbash ‘Heresy’ and Rebellion in Ottoman 
Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century”, Anatolia Moderna, fall, 1997, 1-14. Recently Saim Savaş 
published a more inclusive list of these records including whole texts. See Saim Savaş, XVI. Asırda 
Anadolu’da Alevilik, Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2002. A selection of documents from Mühimme registers 
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the fading of the political and militant content of the qizilbash identity, the policy of the 
Ottoman administration was relatively softened. Because of the above-mentioned 
changes in the Safavid polity, the Safavid call gradually became less excitant for the 
Anatolian qizilbash population, especially in terms of politics. And arguably it became 
nominal towards the end of the sixteenth century, when Safavid state turned into a full-
fledged bureaucratic empire, to a great extent diffusing tribal-qizilbash elements from 
the state machinery. In the mean time, as a closely connected and parallel process, the 
persecution of the Anatolian qizilbashes died down, even though Ottoman-Iranian wars 
went on intermittently down to the mid seventeenth century.2019    
On the other hand, the Ottoman policy regarding the remaining qizilbash 
elements was not limited to sedentarizing the qizilbash tribes, the government seems to 
have attempted to employ the Bektashi Order to neutralize the Qizilbash residue in 
Anatolia as a political force as well. The assimilation of the qizilbashes among Bektashis 
obviously aimed, on the one hand, to isolate the leaders from their political constituency 
and to eliminate all connections with Iran as much as possible,2020 and on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                
pertaining to Alevi-Bektashi affairs are also published by Cemal Şener and Ahmet Hezarfen. See Cemal 
Şener (ed.), Osmanlı Belgelerinde Aleviler-Bektaşiler, Đstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları, 
2002; Cemal Şener-Ahmet Hezarfen (eds.), Osmanlı Arşivi’nde (Mühimme ve Đrâde Defterlerinde) 
Aleviler-Bektaşiler, Đstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları, 2002. Although this publication is 
far beyond academic standards, the original facsimile copies of the documents are included.   
2019 Compare Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Bektashis, A Report on Current Research”, Bektachiyya: Etudes sur 
l’ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, eds., Alexandre Popovic and 
Gilles Veinstein, Istanbul: ISIS, 1995, p. 17. For a parallel interpretation, see Krysztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Die 
Kızılbaş/Aleviten, Untersuchungen über eine esoterische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien, Berlin: 
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1988. According to Faroqhi, a supplementary reason might have been that “by the 
1590’s, more militant Kızılbaş tribes had either been eliminated or were forced to migrate to Iran.” See 
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival: The Bektashi Order and the 
Ottoman State (Sixteenth-seventeenth centuries)”, Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis 
et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach, ed. Alexandre Popovic-Giles Veinstein, Đstanbul : ISIS Press, 
1996, p. 175.  
2020 Compare Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 177; Irène Mélikoff, “Un 
Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, in her Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur 
l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 115-125; “L’origine sociale des premiers 
Ottomans”, in The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389), ed., Elizabeth Zachariadou, Rethymnon: Crete 
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to evacuate the milleniarist-mystical and militant-shi’ite content of the qizilbash ‘way of 
religion’.  
It has been suggested that after their hopes in Safavids had been in vain, the 
qizilbashes themselves too shifted their allegiance to the Bektashi Order. The event of 
pseudo Shah Ismail in 1570 shows that this allegiance was already consolidated in the 
second half of the sixteenth century. This man appeared in Malatya district pretending to 
be Shah Ismail and visited the central tekke of the Bektashis, where he was offered a 
sacrifice. The reaction of Bektashi babas and dervishes is, however, not clarified in the 
contemporary sources.2021  
Indeed, the history of the Bektashi order, especially its early phases before the 
sixteenth century, and its relations with the Ottoman administration are still to be 
explored by modern scholars. Faroqhi deduces from a vague account in the 
Velâyetnâme2022 and from an inscription over the present meydanevi that the tekke of 
Hacı Bektaş probably existed in the period of Murad I, who either built the mausoleum 
or restored an older structure.2023 Faroqhi also tends to rely on the Velâyetnâme’s 
account, arguing that Sultan Bayezid II had a great respect for Hacı Bektaş, so he 
extended his vakıfs and visited his türbe in person having its cupola covered with 
                                                                                                                                                
University Press, 1993, 135-44. (Republished in Mélikoff, Irène, Sur les traces du soufisme turc. 
Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 127-37.) 
2021 Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da Bektaşilik, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, Đstanbul: 
2003, p. 187; “The Bektashis, A Report on Current Research”, p. 17; “Conflict, Accommodation, and 
Long-Term Survival”, pp. 175-6.  
2022 Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, ed., Vilâyet-nâme. Menâkın-ı Hünkâr Hacı Bektâş-ı Veli, Đstanbul: Đnkılâp 
Kitabevi, 1995, p. 89.  
2023 Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş: Social Position and Economic Activities”, Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 1976, pp. 183-4, 206. According to Yürekli-Görkay, the name in this 
inscription must be read as “Emirci Dede” instead of “Ahi Muad”. The inscription reads “Emirci Dede [or 
Ahi Murad], the king of shaykhs, the descendant of saints, made this building (‘imāra) flourish [i.e. 
restored this ‘imāra], and he ordered this on the last day of the month of Ramadan in the year 769 [1368].” 
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lead.2024 The vakıf of the tekke was well established in the second half of the fifteenth 
century, having possessions in the Kırşehir province, especially around Hacı Bektaş and 
in the area known as Sülaymanlı. From the period of Mehmed II onward, if not earlier, it 
also possessed vakıf in the Aksaray area. Faroqhi determines from archival sources that 
“while the dergâh received donations from different Sultans down to the period of 
Bayezid II, we have no further record of such gifts until the eighteenth century.”2025 
Furthermore, although the vakıfs of the tekke were recorded in the defters compiled 
under Mehmed II and Bayezid II, they are absent in the defters up until the defters from 
the late sixteenth century.2026  
The relationship between Bektashis and the Ottoman administration is also one 
of the most controversial issues of the Ottoman history. On one hand, the established 
acceptance by the current scholarship suggests a connection between Bektashi order and 
the Janissary corps.2027 On the other hand, because of their unorthodox way of Islamic 
mysticism, Bektashis had always remained suspicious in the view of the Ottoman 
official ideology.2028 For example, the central tekke in Kırşehir, if we rely upon the 
                                                 
See E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, Legend and Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid 
Gâzi and Hacı Bektaş, Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 2005, p. 121. 
2024 Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 184. For the original account see, Vilâyet-nâme,  p. 90.  
2025 Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 206.  
2026 Ibid, p. 206. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay determines stagnation in the architectural development of the 
shrine complex during the first half of the sixteenth century. The process of reviving and monumentalizing 
the buildings in the complex was started towards the end of the fifteenth century and completed during the 
mid-sixteenth century. However, until the 1550s there was a visible interruption, which might be a sign of 
the closure of the tekke as related in Bektashi tradition. See E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, Legend and 
Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid Gâzi and Hacı Bektaş, Unpublished PhD. 
thesis, Harvard University, 2005, p. 174.  
2027 I have discussed this issue briefly in Chapter III.  
2028 What is more controversial is that, as this thesis clearly puts it, the Janissary corps played the leading 
role in bringing Selim I, who had already established his program mainly on the qizilbash enmity during 
the period from his governorship in Trabzon, to the throne. 
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Bektashi tradition, was closed by Selim I, and not opened until 1551.2029 During the first 
half of the sixteenth century, however, the tekke benefited from the donations of 
Dulkadirlu family, especially of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey,2030 and during the mid-sixteenth 
century, of akıncı families like Malkoçoğlu and Mihaloğlu.2031  
It appears, however, that the Bektashi order (re)gained the support of the 
Ottoman administration by the second half of the sixteenth century. This must have been 
a natural result of the new Ottoman policy pertaining to the qizilbashes, which might 
well be called a policy of ‘taming’, rather than a Bektashi success. So when Ottoman 
policy of ‘taming’ qizilbashes under the supervision of Bektashi babas was accepted, the 
idea was first put forward by Köprülü and then flourished by Mélikoff and Ocak in that 
“by the late sixteenth century on several ‘un-approved heterodox’ groups took shelter in 
the Bektashi Order” gains further phase. “Not only did these people try to avoid 
persecution by joining the order”, as Faroqhi suggests, but also “the Ottoman 
                                                 
2029 Suraiya Faroqhi, who made an extensive research on the history of the tekke, says that “it has not been 
possible to prove the Bektashi tradition that the tekke was closed by Selim I. But since certain waqf 
villages show up in the defters compiled under Mehmed Fatih and Bayezid II, and then again in the late 
sixteenth century, while they are absent from the records of Süleyman Kanunî, there is some reason to 
assume that the dervish community at least suffered temporary losses”. See Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke 
of Hacı Bektaş: Social Position and Economic Activities”, Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 
1976, p. 206. Also see Ibid, p. 185; Remzi Gürses, Hacıbektaş Rehberi, Ankara, non-dated, p. 44. Faroqhi 
also notes that although zaviyes like Seyyid Gazi in central Anatolia and Sari Baba in Denizli were in 
serious difficulties, Mühimme registers of the period 1560 and 1585 provide no record on the persecution 
directed at the shaykhs and dervishes living in the well-known Bektashi centers like Hacı Bektaş, Abdal 
Musa, Koyun Baba. See Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 174.  
2030 In the complex of the shrine of Hacı Bektaş, there are two inscriptions written in the name 
Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey: one is located over the entrance to the mausoleum of Balım Sultan, dated 
925/1519, and the other is situated over the door of the Friday mosque in the village, outside the shrine, 
dated 925/1524. See Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 185. During the early decades of the 
sixteenth century the position of Kırşehir and the region around, which includes Hacı Bektaş as well, was 
ambiguous between the Ottoman Empire and Dulkadir dynasty ruling in Elbistan and Maraş as a buffer 
state between Ottomans and Mamluks. See Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Les district de Kırşehir et le 
Tekke de Hacı Bektaş entre le pouvoir ottoman el les émirs de zulkadir”, in Syncrétismes et hérésies dans 
l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 
2001, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 259-82.    
2031 Yürekli-Görkay, pp. 178-91.  
 618 
administration tolerated and even encouraged this move.”2032 Likewise Faroqhi surmises 
from archival evidence a connection between the tuning down of anti-Qizilbash 
persecution in the late sixteenth century and the official grant of privileges to the 
shaykhs of Hacı Bektaş.2033 When Bektashis’ role of reintegrating the qizilbash into the 
Ottoman polity is accepted, then it makes sense for the administration to be 
comparatively generous towards those tekkes formerly accused of heterodoxy or 
heresy.2034  
By the mid-seventeenth century, the shaykhs of the tekke in Hacı Bektaş attained 
a certain degree of control over almost all the tekkes of ‘heterodox’ groups, who 
gradually affiliated to Bektashism.2035 They had significant power in determining the 
shaykhs of these tekkes. Although the power of the shaykhs of Hacı Bektaş in this matter 
was limited for the reason that these tekkes were usually run by hereditary families, 
usually there were more than one heir to choose from and this provided the opportunity 
for the assumed descendants of Hacı Bektaş to interfere with the domestic affairs of thte 
provincial tekkes.2036 In any case, in the sixteenth century, the shaykhs of Pir-evi 
attained, on one hand, a recognizable control over other tekkes all over Anatolia, and on 
                                                 
2032 Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 177.  
2033 Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 179.  
2034 For some exemplary cases see Ahmet Refik, On Altıncı Asırda Rafızîlik ve Bektaşilik, pp. 32-3; 
Suraiya Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, pp. 180-1; “Seyyid Gazi 
revisited. The foundations as seen through sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documents”, Turcica, XIII, 
1981, 90-122.   
2035 In spite of the introduction of many heterodox elements into the order, Evliya Chelebi, who visited 
most of Bektashi tekkes in the middle of the seventeenth century, repeatedly assert that all the Bektashi 
dervishes he encountered were impeccable (ehl-i sünnet ve’l-cemaat). Nevertheless, as Faroqhi has 
already noted, not too much credit should be attached to his assertion. See Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da 
Bektaşilik, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, Đstanbul: 2003, p. 84; “Conflict, 
Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 174.  
2036 Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, pp. 178-8. For some exemplary cases 
see Suraiya Faroqhi, Anadolu’da Bektaşilik, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, Đstanbul: 
2003, pp. 141-4.  
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the other hand, a relative religious, economic, and administrative autonomy against the 
interference of the Ottoman officials at least by the mid-seventeenth century. 
To the contrary of the Ottoman Administration’s will, however, this autonomy 
which granted a certain capacity of resistance to the absorbed heterodox elements 
resulted in the survival of Anatolian heresy under (relative) Bektashi protection. 
Following Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher’s analysis on the society of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Damascus2037, Faroqhi attempts to explain this autonomy and 
immunity of dervishes against the government with the phenomenon of ‘sufi estate’. The 
sufi groups, or tarikats, in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire were 
bodies with a definite membership and a well-defined internal structure. Thus it was not 
so easy to violate the autonomous sphere of a sufi organization and to remove one or 
more people from this ‘estate’ to the status of ordinary re’āya.2038   
As far as the qizilbashes are concerned, however, one should further this 
analysis. Although it seems plausible to assume that the qizilbashes of Anatolia shifted 
their allegiance to Bektashi Order from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, 
one may hardly claim that they became Bektashi. Rather, their affiliation to – or 
connection with - the order developed in a peculiar way. Most probably stemming from 
its dominant tribal character during the formation, or more accurately speaking 
‘synthesis’ period, the boundaries of the qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Anatolia were 
formed not only by the religious discourse but also by a vague ethnicity. As elucidated 
throughout the present study, during the formative period under Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh 
Haydar, and Shah Ismail, the qizilbash community mainly appeared as tribal, close-knit 
                                                 
2037 Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, Families in Politics. Damascus Factions and States of the 18th and 
19th Centuries, Stuttgart: Berliner Islamstudien, 2, 1985.  
2038 Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 182.  
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social units maintaining a low degree of religious and cultural interaction with 
neighboring – especially sedentary – communities. This characteristics survived even 
after the disintegration of the tribal structure. The qizilbashes usually, though not 
exclusively, formed uniform villages and maintained their beliefs and rituals among 
isolated, close social groups within the Ottoman realm.        
This was perhaps the aim of the Ottoman administration with its two-fold policy 
indicated above. By confining the qizilbashes whose political threat had already been 
neutralized into a pre-determined social and spatial sphere, Ottoman bureaucrats reduced 
the qizilbash ‘heresy’, which once posed the most formidable threat to the very existence 
of the Ottoman imperial regime, to a manageable ‘religious heterodoxy’. From the 
seventeenth century on, the Ottoman government seems to have totally raised the 
persecution on the qizilbashes, even though the ulemā still proclaimed that they were 
heretic. The once overemphasized ‘religious heresy’ of the qizilbashes was now dealt 
with the policy of ‘do not talk so that there is not a problem!’      
To sum up, the present study argued that the ‘qizilbash heresy’ in the Ottoman 
context consisted, for the most part, of the politico-military aspects of the rising 
Qizilbash identity. Nevertheless, both sides employed an intense religious discourse in 
expressing their political concerns. As far as the political aspect of the issue is 
concerned, Çaldıran might be regarded as the last duel of the bureaucratic state and tribal 
organization on the basis of equal conditions and power. From then on, tribal efforts 
against bureaucratic organization would be no more then hopeless, ‘rebellious’ attempts. 
Consequently, following the defeat of Çaldıran, the politico-military character of the 
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Qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Empire rapidly faded.2039 On the other hand, the other 
essential constituent of the Qizilbash identity, namely the mystical or religious 
dimension, survived under a peculiar form.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2039 However, we see in later qizilbash texts, especially Buyruk texts, that some reminiscent of the politico-
military character survived in especially rhetoric and ritual of the qizilbash society.    
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CHAPTER X 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In the broadest framework, the Qizilbash Identity might be regarded as a product of two 
separate but interrelated currents. To explain these two currents, I will make use of 
Marxian scheme of ‘infrastructure’ and ‘superstructure’ with some specific adaptations 
to my own framework. I am inclined to call the first one the ‘deep current’ which 
corresponds to the ‘infrastructure’ in the Marxian terminology and is constituted by the 
anthropological, social and cultural norms, forms, and structures on – or within - which 
the social entity sustains. The other current is the ideological and political developments 
which rise on the ‘deep current’ but have a two-prong interaction with it. Therefore, I 
would like to utilize the term ‘surface current’.  
The ‘deep current’ traces back to the pre-Islamic periods of the Turkish history. 
After converting to Islam, Turkish masses, especially at the public level, did not totally 
abandon their old habits, traditions, and beliefs. On the contrary, many pre-Islamic 
Turkish beliefs and practices some of which contradicted the Islamic principles, 
survived under a vague varnish of Islam. Without doubt, the more the urbanization 
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increased, the more the ‘non-Islamic’ elements decreased. One might deem this process 
in urban centers as the ‘assimilation’ of the Turkish culture within the rising Islamic 
civilization. On the other hand, the vast rural Turkish masses were, to a great extent, 
immune to ‘Islamization’ in its literal forms. Among these echelons of Turkish societies, 
who were overwhelmingly nomadic-tribespeople, a peculiar form of ‘Islamization’ was 
experienced. The notion of Islam spread chiefly in the form of Sufism among the 
Turkish tribal nomads referred as ‘Turkoman’. The merging of the Islamic Sufism – of a 
rough and popular form -, with the social-anthropological-cultural bases of the Turkish 
tradition, as well as with some pre-Islamic mystic traditions of the Mesopotamia and 
Asia, created an original form of public Islam among the lower strata of Turkish 
societies. When Turkoman masses invaded Anatolia and conquered the whole peninsula 
in a short span of time, they brought such a public Islam to Anatolia. Throughout the 
following centuries, this public religion further developed, now being nourished 
additionally by the rich cultural-religious atmosphere of Anatolia. The second chapter 
already delineated that the early Ottoman beylik was an enterprise of the people who 
were attached to this public Islam in terms of religion. The development of the Turkish 
folk Islam has been studied by several prominent scholars such as Fuat Köprülü, 
Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, Irène Mélikoff, and Ahmet Yaşar Ocak.  
It has been shown that although the Ottoman dynasty, the ruling elite around it, 
and the urban population accompanied sooner dismantled from this level of religious 
and cultural perception, shifting towards the classical high Islamic culture, a 
considerable portion of the Ottoman society remained attached to this folk Islam. 
Parallel to the rise of the Ottoman power, however, the sphere of the ‘high Islamic 
culture’ expanded at the expense of the Turkoman milieu of folk culture and religion. It 
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is obvious that the expansion of the Ottoman high culture was a demanding one on the 
Turkoman way of life, not only forcing some structural changes but also threatening the 
very existence of it.  
A careful reader would immediately realize that the present thesis has primarily 
focused on the ‘surface current’ that refers to the political and ideological aspects of the 
historical process that produced the Qizilbash Identity. Although making occasional 
references to the cultural and religious background, the ‘deep current’ is of secondary 
rank of interest. Consequently, the religious aspects of ‘the making of the Qizilbash 
Identity’, which are without doubt as important as at least its political aspects, by and 
large remained untouched. This is, however, not the intention of the present author but a 
constraint posed by the present literature on the issue and the available sources. In order 
to discuss the religious, anthropological, and cultural aspects of the Qizilbash Identity, 
which might be labeled as the ‘invisible dimensions’ of history, or in Lévi-Strauss’s 
term “unconscious structure”2040 of societies governing the development of events, one 
should first establish the ‘visible dimensions’; that is, the historical data on the events. 
This thesis has already demonstrated that in the available literature, most of the 
historical data regarding the advent of events had been waiting to be explored. It is 
because of this fact that, the present study, although opening the discussion with 
providing an intense theoretical framework, inevitably gained a narrative character in the 
following chapters. Nevertheless, a careful reader would not miss that the narrative text 
is structured according to the theoretical framework presented at the first chapter. 
Accordingly, the theoretical approach, which is indeed derived from the analyses 
                                                 
2040 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 21.  
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regarding the ‘deep current’ and which for the most part focused on the anthropological 
fundamentals of the political formations, governed the whole thesis.  
It is only by now, having determined the ‘visible picture’ as far as the available 
sources allow, that the fundamentals of the Qizilbash Identity which are rooted in the 
‘deep current’, especially its religious and anthropological fundamentals, could be 
speculated on a comparatively safe ground of historical knowledge. Yet it should be 
stated that the present monograph of the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity will remain 
incomplete until a comprehensive evaluation of the religious and anthropological 
dimensions of this identity is carried out. We have copies of the religious-sacred texts of 
the qizilbashes, namely Buyruk, dating from the early seventeenth century. The Buyruk 
texts not only explain the pillars of the qizilbash belief and rules of the practice or 
rituals, but also include valuable information on the social organization, the socio-
religious hierarchy, and the religious-legal principles governing the community. Once 
the course of the events was established, which was what the present thesis attempted to 
do, then the accounts of Buyruk texts became meaningful and gain historical value even 
if the earliest text was from after a century later than the congealment of the Qizilbash 
Identity.2041 As a matter of fact, a sufficient study of the religious aspects of the 
Qizilbash Identity, which is mainly based on the Buyruk texts and which consults with 
some archival documents – especially the Mühimme registers of the Ottoman state - and 
with the other known sources, would complete the present monograph.     
As well as the ‘surface current’ is concerned, the attentive reader might have 
already recognized that ‘the making of the Qizilbash Identity’ was a phenomenon 
                                                 
2041 The earliest known manuscript of Buyruk texts was copied in 1612-3 in Manisa. The transliterated text 
of this copy, alongside with the facsimile of the original manuscript, is published by Ahmet Taşğın. See 
Bisâtî, Şeyh Sâfî Buyruğu (Menâkıbu’l-Esrâr Behcetü’l-Ahrâr), ed. Ahmet Taşğın, Ankara, 2003.  
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synthesized at the cross-section of two separate lines of story: it was the interference of 
the ‘dream of Osman Beg and that of Shaykh Safī, one started in Söğüt and the other in 
Ardabil at the beginning of the fourteenth century. After following two separate - but 
increasingly interrelative – trajectories for one and a half century, two lines of story 
intersected in the Anatolian peninsula. And this intersection created one of the most 
unique religio-social – and also political and military during the formative period – 
identity of the Islamic world. Apart from the foremost actors of the two lines, the 
Ottomans and the Safavids, the common actors of both lines, on whom the present study 
focused, were Turkomans.  
Turkomans were composed of the nomadic-tribal units, each constituting a 
‘compact community’ separate from each other and from the sedentary societies. 
Chapter I delineated that the most differentiating feature of the compact communities 
lays in its high degree of communality and low degree of individuality. As a social 
entity, a nomadic tribe is more like a biological unit rather than a set of individuals. 
Individual, as long as one can speak of the concept of ‘individual’ in such communities, 
is simply an incomplete part of the community and can not sustain separately. When 
abstract concepts such as faith, ideology, and polity are taken into account, the 
boundaries between individuals and the community as a whole further diminish. Thus, 
this is why in a compact community the faith is a social issue rather than an individual 
experience. Similarly, polity is also a social entity but not a collective initiative of 
individuals; therefore, the tribe constitutes an ‘indivisible’ – but greater and more 
influential - political unit.  
It has been one of the major arguments of this thesis that the nomadic-tribes as 
compact communities and indivisible political units posed an uncompromising problem 
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within the Ottoman imperial regime, which rose upon a political philosophy that 
premises the accumulation of the political power in the hands of one person and his 
agents. Consequently, as the Ottoman state evolved from the tribal chieftaincy to the 
bureaucratic empire, the tension between the Turkoman subjects of the Ottomans and the 
central administration triggered. Although the alienation between the nomadic-tribal 
elements – in addition to some recently settled peasants who maintained nomadic and 
tribal habits – and the Ottoman regime was a gradual and comprehensive process, 
including differentiation in culture, religious understanding and practice, mentality, and 
mode of life, the main reason behind the harsh measures of the Ottoman administration 
against Turkomans was, without doubt, their political and military ability to resist the 
expansion of the Ottoman regime. As a result, in every stage of the formation process of 
the Qizilbash Identity, the dominance of the political considerations is clearly visible.  
  Towards the mid-fifteenth century, the tension between the Turkomans of 
Anatolia and the Ottoman administration turned into antagonism. Interestingly, during 
the same period, the Sufi Order of Safavids underwent an essential transformation in its 
esoteric doctrine. While a quietist, contemplative Sunni – as long as one can speak of 
sects regarding Sufism – order until then, the order pursued an extremist-shi’ite teaching 
and militant-popular form of Sufism. What is more noteworthy is that Shaykh Junayd 
was exiled from Ardabil, most probably by the traditional disciples of the order headed 
by Shaykh Ja’far, and carried out a long journey in Anatolia. This journey marked one of 
the most significant turning points of the qizilbash history. The places Shaykh Junayd 
visited were by no means accidental for these regions were densely populated by the 
Turkoman tribespeople. Likewise, the regions that Shaykh Junayd visited soon appeared 
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as major ‘qizilbash zones’ and provided the main body of the qizilbash tribal fighters 
which constituted the backbone of Shah Ismail’s conqueror army. 
Obviously, Turkoman’s divergence from the Ottoman state and Shaykh Junayd’s 
recruitment of disciples among Anatolian Turkomans were closely interrelated 
developments. In the same vein, the doctrinal change in the Safavid order from the high 
Islamic Sufism to the militant-popular Sufism under Shaykh Junayd was not 
coincidental; rather, it was closely linked to a fundamental shift of the gravity in the 
disciple fundamentals of the order from the relatively cultured townspeople to the 
Turkoman tribespeople. The second half of the fifteenth century experienced the 
marriage of the Turkoman tradition, which had already been distanced from the Ottoman 
official sphere, and the Safavid mysticism.  
This marriage brought considerable innovations to both parties. As mentioned 
above, the Safavid order experienced an essential transformation. On the other hand, 
under the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Safavid shaykhs, the Turkoman tribes 
attained a capacity of organization, of coming together and forming a supra-tribal entity 
cemented by intense mysticism. It was these inter-tribal bonds provided by the spiritual 
mastership of the Safavid shaykhs that made the harmonious collective deeds of the 
qizilbash oymaqs possible and made them capable of shaking the Ottoman suzerainty in 
Anatolia.      
Moreover, the Safavid spiritual mastership shaped the Turkoman religious 
corpus evolved through centuries. The pillars of the faith and the fundamental rules of 
the practice (ritual) of the qizilbash understanding of religion are designed in the course 
of this period. Today, still many elements of belief and rules of ritual among qizilbashes 
bear clear seals of the Safavid mastership, especially of Shah Hatā’ī, i.e. Shah Ismail. If 
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we regard the ‘deep current’ as a dough kneaded in the course of centuries, this dough 
congealed during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century taking its shape in the 
hands of the Safavid shaykhs and shahs, especially of Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, 
Shah Ismail, and Shah Tahmasb.  
Under Shah Ismail, the qizilbashes reached the apex of their enthusiasm and 
power. However the heyday of the qizilbash zeal did not last long. After a fierce struggle 
against the Ottomans, the battle of Çaldıran marked the turn of the fortune for the 
qizilbashes, both in the Ottoman Anatolia and in the Safavid realm. Upon establishing 
their rule in Iran, Azerbaijan and the parts of Iraq and Central Asia, the Safavid Shahs 
also immediately realized the necessity of the bureaucracy to sustain their state. 
Consequently, more or less the same story in the Ottoman case, which is a general 
phenomenon in the Middle East as explained in the Chapter I, was carried throughout 
the sixteenth century. As were the cases in the previous experience, the nomadic-tribes 
were destined to lose against the sedentary bureaucracy, now the Turkoman Qizilbashes 
against the Persian men of pen. One century after the rise of Shah Ismail on the fervent 
qizilbash power, when the Safavid state attained its matured bureaucratic form under 
Shah Abbas the Great, the tribal qizilbashes were not only dispelled from the 
administrative circles but also regarded as an astray religious group.  
In the Ottoman realm, the conditions for the qizilbashes had already become 
much worse on the eve of the Çaldıran campaign and turned out to be more dreadful 
following the battle. Already before Selim’s victorious return from Iran, they had been 
proclaimed heretics and subjected to harsh persecution. Yet the Ottoman victory of 
Çaldıran marked a profound change in the situation of the Anatolian qizilbashes. Since 
this bitter defeat terminated the offensive policy of Shah Ismail on the Ottoman 
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territories, from then on the qizilbashes of Anatolia fell enclosed within the Ottoman 
borders, progressively losing their connection with and especially their hopes in the 
Shah. The rest of the sixteenth century witnessed the downfall of the political and 
military content of the qizilbash groups, as well as the severance of their connection with 
the Safavids. For this purpose, the Ottoman administration employed a variety of means 
of persecution, which is partly reflected in the Mühimme registers.  
As a result, the qizilbash population across Anatolia turned into a marginalized 
closed community towards the early seventeenth century. The tribal-nomadic social 
units with a strong political, military, and mystic content now transformed into 
marginalized socio-religious entities, isolated and surrounded by the Ottoman Sunni 
society. It constitutes one of the most interesting and original phenomenon of the 
Turkish history that the long experience of the qizilbashes in the Ottoman Anatolia 
produced an ‘ethnic’, socio-religious group, whose membership was based on the blood 
ties, from the Sufi-path. This social, religious, and anthropological process still remains 
totally untouched by the modern scholarship.2042 It is interesting to note that they 
attained a permanent existence in Anatolia while disappearing in Iran, where they once 
ruled as victorious war-lords.  
   
  
                                                 
2042 The only suggestion for this transformation from the sufi-order fundamentals to ethnic basis was made 
by Martin B. Dickson, who argues that by the time of Shah Ismail, individual conversion to the 
qizilbashism was no more possible, but “an individual became a qizilbash only by being born into one of 
the uymaq associated with the Safavid House.” See Martin B. Dickson, Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks 
(The Duel for Khurasan with ‘Ubayd Khan: 930-940/1524-1540), Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Princeton 
University, 1958, p. 8. Nevertheless, Dickson provides no evidence for his assertion. As long as the 
Anatolian qizilbashes concerned, one feels legitimate to suspect this assertion. True that the transition 
between the qizilbash groups and Sunni society must have decreased by the early decades of the sixteenth 
century. However, the total cut off of this transition, which transformed the qizilbashes into an ethnic-like 
society, must have occurred in a rather long dure.  
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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY 
 
 
1326  The death of Osman Beg, the founder of the Ottoman Beylik  
1331  The first madrasa is opened in the Ottoman Beylik in Iznik 
1334 September, 12 The death of Shaykh Safi 
1362  The death of Orhan Beg 
1386  First serious Ottoman-Karaman confrontation, ends with the 
victory of the Ottomans 
1389  The death of Murad I 
1391  The death of Sadreddin Musa 
1402  The death of Bayezid I 
1427  The death of Hāce Ali 
1444  Hurufi propagandists are burnt in Edirne 
1447  The death of Shaykh Ibrahim 
1448  Shaykh Junayd leaves Ardabil and goes to Kurtbeli 
1449  Shaykh Junayd visits Konya 
1453  Shaykh Junayd leaves Syria for Canik 
1456  Shaykh Junayd leaves Canik for Diyarbekir 
1456  Shaykh Junayd attacks Trabzon 
1459  Shaykh Junayd leaves Diyarbekir for Ardabil 
1460 May, 3 Shaykh Junayd is killed in Tabersaran during a battle with 
Shirvanshah Halil-allah 
1460  Ibrahim Beg of Karaman accepts the superiority of the Ottomans 
1461  Mehmed II annexes Trabzon 
1475  Mehmed II ends the Karaman rule 
1483  Kasim Beg of Karaman, who ruled the Karaman region as Ottoman 
vassal since 1475, dies and the political existence of the Karaman 
Dynasty diminishes. 
1484  Shaykh Haydar's first incursion on Circassia and Dagistan  
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1486  Shaykh Haydar's second incursion on Circassia and Dagistan  
1487  Shaykh Haydar's third incursion on Circassia and Dagistan  
1488 July, 9 Shaykh Haydar is killed in Tabersaran during a battle with 
Shirvanshah Farrukhyasar 
1489 March, Sultan Ali, Ibrahim, Ismail, and their mother Alamshah Bagum 
imprisoned in the fortress of Istahr 
1489  Selim I appointed to Trabzon 
1490  The death of Sultan Yakub Akkoyunlu 
1493 August, Sultan Ali, Ibrahim, Ismail, and their mother Alamshah Bagum 
released from the fortress of Istahr 
1494  Ismail arrives in Lahijan with great qizilbash amirs 
1497 Summer Rustem Beg Akkoyunlu is killed by Ahmed Mirza 
1499 August, Ismail sets off from Lahijan to Ardabil 
1500 December, Ismail defeats Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar in Jiyani near Gulistan 
1500 August Ismail in Erzincan 
1500 August, 10 The conquest of Moton 
1500 August, 17 The conquest of Coron 
1500 November-mid Bayezid II returns to Edirne, then to Istanbul soon after. 
1500 Spring Ismail proceeds from Arjuwan to Erzincan 
1500 summer  The qizilbash oymaqs from several parts of Anatolia gather around 
Ismail in Erzincan 
1500 summer  Mustafa Beg Karaman rises up against the Ottoman rule in 
Karaman region 
1500  First incursion of Selim on Gerogia 
1501 Summer Ismail defeats Alvand Mirza Akkoyunlu in Sharur and ascends to 
the throne in Tabriz 
1501 summer  The Ottoman administration takes measures to prevent the 
communication of Anatolian qizilbashes with the Shah 
1501  Ismail's writes a letter requesting the opening of the borders for his 
disciples 
1502 December, 11 Treaty with Venice. Signed in August 1503. 
1502  Death of Alemshah. Just after his appointment to Manisa 
1502  Qizilbashes of Teke region are deported to Moton and Coron 
1503  Selim's first assault on Erzincan 
 680 
1505  Ismail's ambassador in Istanbul 
1505  Bayezid II's ambassador in Ismail's court 
1507 Summer Ismail enters Ottoman land for Alauddevle and arrives in Sivas. 
Leaves here towards the winter. 
1507 Summer Ismail invades Dulkadir territories  
1507  Selim's second assault on Erzincan 
1508  Ismail's envoy in Istanbul. Campaign on Tatars, complaints of 
Selim's assaults.(coincided with Tatar envoy) 
1508  Selim's third incursion on Georgia 
1509 August Suleyman appointed to Kefe 
1509  Ismai's envoy in Venice. Secures artillery and obtains alliance 
against the Ottomans. (failed) 
1509  Korkud leaves Antalya and goes to Cairo 
1510 Summer Selim departs from Trebizond for Kefe 
1511 March  Korkud leaves Antalya for Saruhan 
1511 March, 29 Şahkulu attacks Korkud's caravan 
1511 April, 09 
(Muharrem 10) 
Şahkulu moves from Yenice  
1511 April, 16 Şahkulu defeats Nokta and captures Burdur 
1511 April, 22 Şahkulu defeats Karagöz Pasha and captures Kütahya 
1511 April, 22 Selim stops in Eski-zagra to await the results of advents in Anatolia  
1511 April, May Selim lands on Kili shores 
1511 May, 03 Şahkulu defeats Korkud's army, commanded by Hasan Aga, in 
Alasehir. Korkud flees to Manisa.  
1511 May, 8 Ali Pasha besieges Şahkulu in Kizilkaya 
1511 June, 01 Selim stays near Kamcisuyu 
1511 June, 10-15 Selim takes Semendire after a quarrel with his father near Edirne 
1511 June, 15 Şahkulu flees from Kizilkaya killing Haydar Pasha 
1511 June, 17 Şahkulu arrives in Beyşehir 
1511 June, 24 Selim in Zagra, awaiting the result of Ali Pasha's campaign.  
1511 July Bayezid II moves from Edirne to Istanbul. (Rebi II, 917) 
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1511 July, 02  Ali Pasha and Şahkulu battle in Çubuk, both die. 
1511 July, last days Bayezid moves from Edirne to Istanbul in order to enthrone 
Ahmed. 
1511 August 03 Selim shipped from Ahyolu, after being defeated by his father near 
Corlu. 
1511 August, 0-5 Ahmed moves from Eskişehir to Istanbul  
1511 August, 8 Selilm flees to Kefe 
1511 September, 11 Bayezid enters Istanbul. 
1511 September, 21 Upon learning that Ahmed had arrived in Maltepe, Janissaries 
revolt against Ahmed's saltanat.  
1512 January, 6 The cabinet changed by the pressure of Janissaries. Pro-Ahmed 
statesmen are eliminated. 
1512 March, 27 Selim is invited to Istanbul to command the imperial army against 
Ahmed. 
1512 April, 24 Selim ascends to the throne 
1512 Mayis, 17 Qizilbashes fall into conflict about where to go and battle in 
Artuğak, where Murad's man Kara Iskender achieves victory and 
goes to Dulkadir 
1512 Mayis, 23 Ismail's letter to Turgutoglu Musa, ordering him to move in 
accordance to the directives of Karamanlu Ahmed Aga. 
1512 July, 29 Selim crosses to Anatolia to march on Ahmed. 
1512 November  Selim returns to Bursa from Ankara. 
1512 Spring Nur Ali Khalifa captures Tokat and reads the khutba in the name of 
Shah Ismail 
1513 January, 29 Ahmed moves from Amasya and marches on Selim, who was in 
Bursa. 
1513 March, 17 Selim executes the princes and Korkud in Bursa. 
1513 April, 15 Ahmed and Selim confront in Yenişehir. Ahmed is defeated and 
executed. 
1513 May, Sultan Selim returns to Istanbul and then moves to Edirne 
1513 May, 14 Ahmed's son Osman and Murad's son Mustafa are executed in 
Amasya. 
1514 March, 20 Selim moves from Edirne for the Çaldıran Campaign 
1514 April, 28 Selim writes his first letter to Shah Ismail in Izmit 
1514 April, 3 Selim summons the ulemā in Istanbul to issue the fetva for the 
campaign 
1514 August, 23 The Battle of Çaldıran  
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APPENDIX B: A SELECT LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN TSA 
 
 
Arşiv no Konusu Tarihi 
D 10149 
Sultan Ahmed ve Sultan Murad taraftarları ve 
kızılbaşların listesi ve ne iş yaptıkları  
1513-4 
D 5720 Đdam olunan kızılbaşlar 1513-4 
D 9864  Kilidbahir kalesinde habs olan Kızılbaş elçisinin eşyası 1516 
E 10160/37 
Naib Davud imzasıyla Kargı nahiyesi Çaykışla 
Köyünde Küçük Abdal adında birisinin bir tekke yaptıği 
hakkında 
15.asır sonları 
E 10198 
Đran Şahı’nın Yavuz'un vefatından dolayı Kanuniye 
taziye mektubu(farsça) 
1520 
E 10213 
Seyyid Hüseyin'in Đran naiblerinden birinin yardıma 
muhtaç olduğuna dair mektubu(farsça) 
16.asır  
E 10270 Şah Đsmail’in fermanı(harap-farsça) 1503-14 
E 11606 
Đranda bulunan memurlara yardım edilmesine 
dair(farsça) 
1486 
E 11996 
Mehmet Başıbüyük tarafından yazılan Şah’ın ordusunu 
hangi beyin emrinde kaç nefer bulunduğunu rapor 
eden belge 
20 Cemaziyelahir 
922 / 21 Temmuz 
1516 
E 12077 Kızılbaslar hakkında Müftü Hamza'nın fetvası   
E 12077 
Kızılbaşlar hakkında fetva ile ilgili bir vesika(Hamza'nın 
fetvasından ayrı) 
  
E 2044 
Şah Đsmail’in Şah Veli ile birlikde ayaklanabileceğine 
dair anonim rapor 
16. asır 
E 2667 
Sultan Ahmed'in babasına Şahkulu ile buluşdukları ve 
onu takip ettikleri hakkında mektubu 
 1511 
E 2667 
Sultan Ahmed ahvalinden bahseden Mir-alem 
Mustafa’nın raporu 
1513 
E 2829 
Şehzade Osmanın 17 Muharrem 917 tarihli Şahkulu 
isyanı ve mezkurun faaliyetleri hakkında arizası 
h.917 
E 3057 
Ahmed'den Musa Turgut'a Taceddin Bey'e katılması 
için gönderilen hüküm 
Temmuz ortası 
1512 
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E 3062  
Sultan Ahmed'in Ali Paşa'nın Sivas yakınlarında Çubuk 
nam mahalde katl edildiğine ve ordunun durumunun iyi 
olmadığına dair mektubu 
 1511 
E 3192 
Ali b. Abdülkerim Halife'nin memleket işlerine dair bir 
raporu 
 1514 
E 3295 
Karaman Beylerbeyi Hüsrev Paşa'nın kızılbasların 
yenildiklerini bildiren mektubu 
 1510-20 
E 4467 
Eşkıyanın Zile ve civarında halkı soyduklarını 
herşeylerini kaybeden halkın vergilerini 
ödeyemeyeceklerini bildir vesika 
 1510-20 
E 4796 
Hızır Bey oğlu Ahmed'in padişahı Đran'a yürümeye 
teşvik eden bir yazısı 
 1510-20 
E 5035 Sultan Korkuddan gelen sufinin ifadesi 1510-11 
E 5293 
Bayat'ta isyan eden Şah veli adındaki mülhid ile 
Anadolu Beylerbeyi Sadi Bey'in çarpışmasına dair Sadi 
Paşa'nın bir raporu 
1517 
E 543 
Şehzade Selim'in Trabzon havalisinin verimsiz olduğu 
ve kendisine başka bir yer verilmesini istediğine dair 
arzı 
 1509-10 
E 5446 
Kemah beyi Đskender Bey tarafından şam ahvalini 
tecessüs ederek bilgi edinmek üzere Bitlis'den Tebriz'e 
gönderilen ve dönen casusun Đstanbul'a gönderildiğine 
dair 
16. asır başları 
E 5452 
Bursa kadısı Eflatunzade'nin Alaeddin'in şehre girip 
yağmaladığı şehir halkı tarafından geri püskürtüldüğü 
yardım gönderilmesine dair arizası 
19 Haziran 1512 
E 5451 
Bursa kadısı Ahmed'in Yeniçeri ağasına Tekedeki 
Đsyan hakkında mektubu 
  
E 5460 
Şah Đsmail'in Musa Durgutoğlu'na gönderdiği mektup: 
Şah değerli adamlarından Ahmed Karamanlu'yı o 
tarafa gönderdiğini ona tabi olunması ve birlikte 
hareket edilmesini emr ediyor. 
7 Rebi I 918  /  
23 Mayıs 1512 
E 5465 Erzincandan Tebriz'e kadar olan konaklar  1514 
E 5469/2 
Muhtemelen Diyarbakır Beylerbeyi Mahmud Paşa 
imzasıyla arz: Bağdad yakınlarında Kızlbaş esirlerin 
ifadesine göre Mısırın fethinden sonra Bagdada kaçan 
Canberd Gazzalinin Bağdad hakimi Şah Ali Obaş ve 
Erdebiloğlu ile ittifak ettiği hakkında 
1518 
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E 5483 
Halep Melikü'l-ümerası Hayırbay'ın kendi 
hükümdarından(memluk) kızılbaşlara karşı Osmanlı ile 
ittifak edilmesine dair emir aldığını ve sınırdaki memluk 
kumandanlarına Osmanlı askerine katılmaları için emir 
verdiğini bildiren mektubu 
 1513-5 
E 5570 Şah Đsmail'in Ali Kulu Bey'e namesi(farsça) 16. asır başları 
E 5572 Seyyid Hüseyinden Şah Đsmail’e mektub(farsça) 16.asır başları 
E 5578 Şah Đsmail'in fermanı(harap-verilmiyor) 1503-14 
E 5590 
Haydar Paşa tarafından rikab-ı hümayuna arz: Fenayi 
ve Dellak dimekle maruf mezhepsizlerin ve bu gibilerin 
şehzadeyi (Şehinşah) yoldan çıkardıkları yakında 
kızılbaşla katılacağına dair rapor 
1511 
E 5594 
Halep Melikü'l-ümerasının(Hayırbay) Şehinşah'ın 
Safeviler'le mektuplaştığını bildirir mektubu 
 1511 
E 5594-b Hayırbay'ın gönderdiği bir mektup  1511-20 
E 5594-c Hayırbay'ın gönderdiği bir mektup  1511-20 
E 5599 
Diyarbakır valisi Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa'nın, Şah 
Đsmail’in harekatı ve Đran işlerine dair padişaha 
gönderdiği mektup 
1515-6 
E 5674 
Şah Đsmail ile Đran ahvali, Alaüddevle ve Şehzade 
Murad hakkında bilgi veren Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa'nın 
Sultan Selim'e arizası 
Ağustos ortası, 
1515 
E 5685 
Şah Đsmail'in Dulkadiroğlu Kemaleddin Mustafa'ya 
Sultan Cihanşah'ın kendisine muhib olduğu ve O'na 
itaat etmesi hususunda yazdığı mektup 
1 Safer 916 /      
10 Mayıs 1510 
E 5839 Şah Đsmail'in ahvali hakkında Selim'e bilgi 1510-16 
E 5842 
Karahisarda zaviyadar Şeyh Musa’nın takriri: Kanber 
Bey’in Esterabad yakınlarında otururken 
Erdebiloğlunun Hata Irmağı yanına geldiği sonra 
Kanber üzerine yürüdüğü, Kanber müdafa ederken 
Erdebiloğlunu bozguna uğrattığı, Mardin Beyi’nin 
Ustacalunun kardeşinin başını kestiği hakkında 
1515 
E 5843 
Şah Đsmail'in fetva makamında bulunan zata Sultan 
Cihanşah'ın şiiliği kabul ettiğine dair namesi 
1 Safer 916 /      
10 Mayıs 1510 
E 5845 
Seyyid Şah Ali Sehrani'den Dulkadiroğlu Ali Bey'e 
Đsmail'in ordusunun ahvalli hakkında mektup (farsça) 
16.asır başları 
 685 
E 5851 
Kasım bin Abdüssamed imza ve mührüyle Rikab-ı 
Hümayun'a ariza: Yaralı olan Şah'ın durumunu 
öğrenmek üzere Adilcevaz ve Erciyeş tarafına adam 
gönderdiği, Şah hakkında bilgisi olan Ali Bey'i bulduğu 
ve Đstanbul'a gönderdiği hakkında 
13 Cemaziyelahir 
927 /                  
19 Mayıs 1520 
E 5877 
Yusuf imzasıyla gönderilen Sultan Murad'ın 
kızılbaşlığına dair arz 
 1512-3 
E 5881 
Abdühü'l-fakir Yusuf el-hakir imzalı Şahkulu isyanı 
hakkında ariza 
 1511 
E 5943 
Haydar(şeyh) Yakub padişahın Mısırlılarla ittifakına 
itiraz vesaireden bahseden Mehmed’in mektubu  
15. asır sonları 
E 5960 Kızılbaslar hakkında Hamza'nın fetvası  1514 
E 5970 
Şehzade Selim'in oğlu Süleyman'a tahsis olunan 
sancağı beğenmediği ve kızılbaşlara ait keleleri neden 
işgal ettiği 
 1509-10 
E 618 
Şehzade Selim'in memleket ahvalinin iyi olmadığından 
şikayet ettiği, Sadrazam'a yazdığı mektubu 
 1509-10 
E 6185 
Şehzade Selim'in işlerin kötüye gidişinden merkezi 
sorumlu tuttuğuna dair mektubu 
 1509-10 
E 6187 
Şahkulunun her tarafı tahrif ve katliam eylediğine dair 
teftişle görevli memura ait imzasız rapor 
1511  
E 6188 
Şah Veli adında bir şahsın takriri: Yavuz Mısır seferine 
hareket ettiği zaman Seyyid Temam adında bir zatın 
zuhur ettiği hakkında 
1517 
E 6316 
Mehmed imzalı Nur Ali Halife ile yapılan savaşı ve 
mezkurun katledildiğini bildirir ariza 
1515 
E 6320 
Đran ahvali hakkında bilgi veren ve bilhassa bir Osmanlı 
topunu numune alarak top imaline başladığına dair bir 
mektup 
Mayıs-Haziran 
1516 
E 6321 
Defterdarının Korkud'a gönderdiği Şahkulu ahvaline ve 
acele yardım gelmezse şehrin elden çıkacağına dair 
mektubu 
 1511 
E 6352 
Şahkulu isyanının sonuçları ve Ali Paşa'nın cengine 
dair imza yerinde M. Olan tarihsiz mektup 
 1511 
E 6352 
Sadrazam Hadım Ali Paşa'nın Şehzade Şehinşah'ın 
kızılbaşlarla münasebeti bulunduğuna dair mektubu 
 1511 
E 6369 
Karaman Beylerbeyi Mahmud Paşa'nın Kalender 
Çelebi ayaklanmasının nasıl başladığını ve gelişimini 
anlatan raporu. 
Nisan 1527 
 686 
E 6384 
Sadi Paşa'nın isyancıların reisinin ne sekilde 
yakalandığını bildiren mektubu 
 16. asır başları 
E 6401 Kızılbaslar hakkında Hamza’nın fetvası  1514 
E 6478-2 
Şadi Bey'in Dev Ali ve Sultan Murad'ın Anadolu'ya 
saldırı planı içinde olduğunu anlatan raporu. 
1512-3 kışı 
E 6522 
Sultan Murad'ın kızılbaş olduğu, onlarla birlikde 
hareket etdiği ve Çorum Amasya sivas taraflarında 
kızılbaşların faaliyetlerine dair rapor 
 1513 
E 6535 
Şah Veli bin Selçuktan Kızılbaşlar isyanına dair 
yeniçeri ağasına gelen mektub 
1510-20 
E 6536 
II. Bayezid’in Evvel-i Şehr-i Zilkade  908 (Mayıs 1503) 
tarihli Antalya sancakbeyi Şehzade Korkud’a ilave 
olarak Hamid sancağı verildiğine dair berat 
1503 
E 6556 
Sivas Beylerbeyi Hacı Mustafa imzasıyla mektup: 
Tebriz'den bir Seyyid gelerek Şah'ın vefat ettiğinden 
Akkoyunlu ailesinden Yakub Bey'in oğlu Sultan Murad'ı 
boş kalan Diyarbakıra davet ettiği vesaire hakkında  
16. asır başları 
E 6636 
Filibe sancağı beyinin Şahkulu'nun yakalanan Pir 
Ahmed nam casusunun ifadesi hakkında gönderdiği 
mektup 
 1511 
E 6664 
Hacı Mustafa'nın Şahkulu kuvvetlerini takip ettikleri 
Sivas yakınlarında Yenice karyesinde ok savaşı 
yaptıkları, Şahkuluna tüfenk dokunduğu, Erzincan 
taraflarına kaçtıklarına dair mektubu 
 1511 
E 6666 Şah’ın ordusunun ahvaline dair vesika  16. asır başları 
E 6668 
Kudsine Beyi Đbşir'den babasına gelen mektubun 
sureti: Şeybe Han oğlu Timur Han'ın Kızılbaşla yaptığı 
ve galip geldiği savaş hakkında 
II. Bayezid dönemi 
E 2667 
Ali Paşa'nın yenildiği ve Nur Ali Halife'nin Sivas üzerine 
yürüdüğüne dair rapor(Arşiv kataloğunda alakasız bir 
belge olarak görünüyor) 
1512 
E 6672 
Kürd beylerinden Halid ile kızılbaşların bazı şehir ve 
kasabaları yağma ve tahrib ettiklerine dair bir vesika 
 1512-3 
E 6942 Zulkadiroğlu Ali Bey’in Şah Veli’nin katline dair raporu  1520 
E 7052 
Bitlisi'nin oğlu Şükrulla'ın Sultan Ahmed'in ahvali 
hakkında Selim'e arizası 
1512 
E 7055 
Hemdem Paşa'nın Şehzade Ahmed ve müfsidler 
hakkındaki mektubu 
1513 
 687 
E 7118 
Şah Tahmasb mührüyle Kanuni Sultan Süleyman'a 
mektup: Hicaz ve Irak'ta bulunan evkaf ve imaretlerin 
masraflarını tanzim ve tedkikine mülazım olarak bir 
veya iki oğlunun kabul edilmesine müsade buyrulması 
hakkında 
1520 
E 7285 
Ebussuud Fetvaları: Diyar-ı Acem'de mütemekkin 
olanlara dair 6 fetva var 
 16. asır 
E 7292 
Sultan Murad ve sair kızılbaşların yaptıklarına dair 
rapor 
1512-3 
E 7296 
Kızılbaşlar hakkında Anadolu Beylerbeyi Sadi Paşanın 
arzı:Şahın beylerinden Gurgurunun 3 bin kızılbaş ile 
Gürcistanda olduğu ve sınıra yakın bulundıuğu 
hakkında 
1517 
E 7620 
Şah Đsmail ve Özbek Şeybani Han arasında 1510 
yılında cereyan eden savaşın neticesi ve Şah'ın ahvali 
hakkında Hasan adında birinin raporu 
1510 
E 77 
Anadolu valisi Karagöz Paşa'nın Şahkulu hakkındakı 
mektubu 
 1511 
E 8304 
Rumeli Beylerbeyi Hasan Paşa'nın Selim'e Korkud'un 
durumu hakkında mektubu 
 1513 
E 8316 
Emir Bey veled-i Gülabi mührü ile Div Ali Sultan'a 
farsça mektup: Şah Ali Bey ve arkadaşlarının perişan 
ve yardıma muhtaç oldukları hakkında (18.5-42.5 cm. 
Şikeste ta'lik) 
16.asır başları 
E 8325 
Div Ali mührü ile Abdülbaki Han'a mektup: O tarafa 
gönderilen Kemal Ahi adlı zata elden geldiğince Đzzet 
Đkram gösterilmesi hakkında. 
16.asır başları 
E 8328 
Şah Đsmailin fermanı: Hoca Beğoğluna, Ebulmuzaffer 
Sultan Cihanşah'ın kendi muhibbi olduğu ve bütün 
işlerinde kendisine itaatte bulunması hakkında(farsça) 
Gurre-i Safer 916 / 
10 Mayıs 1510 
E 8336 
Mehmed Ali mührü ile Emir Abdülbaki'ye farsça 
mektup: Ankara'ya gönderdiği adamdan aldığı mektuba 
göre amcazade ile oraya giden Kasım Halife ve 
kardeşinin Kayseri'de öldürüldükleri, Varsak 
ümerasından Yahya Bey tavassutu ile amcazadesinin 
kurtulduğu hakkında. 
20 Nisan 1514 / 
24 Safer 920 
E 8349 
Div Sultan tarafından Şah Đsmail'e farsça ariza: 
Semerkant'ın Kazaklar tarafından zabt edildiği, Abid 
Han'ın vefat haberinin asılsız olduğu, Cani Bey'in 
Belh'den firar ettiği, Özbeklerin yerlerinde oturdukları, 
Süleyman Kurci'nin Belh valiliğine tayin edildiği ve 
kendisine verilen emre göre Horasan'da bulunduğu.  
16.asır başları 
 688 
E 8350 
Emir Ca.. Bey tarafından Yavuz Selim'e farsça ariza: 
Kendisine tabi bil elçinin bir Đranlıyı da beraber getirdiği 
16 Şaban'da Div Ali Sultan emri ile Azarbaycan, 
Geylan ve Karabağ askerlerinin Kağızman'dan 
Erzincan'a hareket ettikleri, Diyarbakır ve civarı 
askerlerinin de onlara katıldıkları hakkında. 
16.asır başları 
E 8505 
Şah Đsmail'in ümeradan Zuhurettin Đbrahim Bey'e 
farsça mektubu: Muhaliflere karşı Ebulmuzaffer Sultan 
Cihanşah'la teşrik-i mesayi edilmesi hakkında. (18.5-43 
cm, şikeste ta'lik) 
10 Mayıs 1510 / 
Gurre-i Safer 916 
E 8758 
Şah Đsmailin harekatı ve Dev Ali ile Sultan Murad'ın 
Anadolu tarafına gönderildiğine dair padişaha gelen 
Malatya'nın Memluk valisi Mamay'ın mektubu 
1512-3 kışı 
E 8922 
Karacahan tarafından başvekil Abdülbaki'ye mektup: 
Hasan-ı Keyf'den istenilen paranın bu mıntıkanın harap 
olması ve halktan birçoğunun Erzincan'a hicret etmesi 
yüzünden tahsili mümkün olmadığından affı ricası. 
16.asır başları 
E 8923 
Şah Đsmail tarafından Đran ümerasına hüküm: 
Ebulmuzaffer Gıyaseddin Sultan Cihanşah'ın emrine 
tabi olunması hakkında 
10 Mayıs 1510 / 
Gurre-i Safer 916 
E 8932 
Şah Đsmail tarafından Kemaleddin Seydi Bey'e mektup: 
Ebulmuzaffer Sultan Cihanşah'a itaat ve hürmet 
edilmesi tavsiyesini havi.  
10 Mayıs 1510 / 
Gurre-i Safer 916 
E 8933 
Şah Đsmailin namesi: Şah Đsmail'in Şeyhullahoğlu 
Zeynel Ali Bey'e, Safeviye Hanedanına ve saltanatına 
bağlı bulunan Gıyaseddin Ebulmuzaffer Cihanşah'a 
itaat etmesi tavsiyesini havi 
1509-17 
E 8968 
Yavuz Selim ile Đran Şahı arasında sulh yapılmasına 
dair teati edilen nameler 
1520 
E 8974 
Cihanşah Abdülmelik imzasıyla başvezir Abdülbaki'ye 
farsça mektup: Hükümet merkezine gidip arz-ı 
ihtiramda bulunacak olan Emir Nizamettin'e iltifat ve 
teveccüh ibrazı hakkında.  
16.asır başları 
E 936 
Đran Şahı Tahmasb'ın biraderi olub Şirvan Valiliğinde 
bulunmakta iken Kırım'a kaçıp oradan Đstanbul'a gelen 
Elkan Mirza hakkında Şah'ın Sultan Süleyman'a 
gönderdiği name (farsça) 
1520 
E 9670 
Şah Đsmail'in namesi: Dulkadirli Şehabettin Ömer 
Bey'e, Sultan Selim'in Dulkadirli Alaaeddin Bey'i katl ve 
yerine Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey'i ikame ettiğinden Yavuz 
Selim'den intikam alması tavsiyesini havi 
 1515-6 
E 9671 
Şah Đsmailin namesi: Dulkadirli Celaleddin Abdüllatif'e, 
evvelce gönderdiği mektubun üzerine Yavuz Selim'e 
vaki ilticası sebebi ile habs edildiğinden halas temini 
ile... 
 1515-6 
 689 
E 5835/2 
Alemşah Zeynel Han'dan Đran vükelasına: Belh 
civarında vaki Sergan ve havalisi idaresine memur 
edilen Nuri Bey'in idaresinden halkın memnun 
olduğuna dair(farsça) 
 16. asır başları 
E 10739 Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça) 30 Haziran 1516 
E 9647 Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça) 1518 
E 5818 Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça) 1519 
E 8308 Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça) 1520 
E 5591 
Akkoyunlu Murad Bey'in Sultan Selim'e Đran ahvaline 
dair mektubu: Horasan'da Ubeyd Han ile Temur Han'ın 
Kızılbaş'ı zebun ettiği, Kızılbaş Horasan'da iken 
kardeşi Şah Süleyman'ın asi olup Tebriz üzerine 
yürüdüğü ancak burada katledildiği, ve Ustacalu 
Muhammed Bey'in Eğil kalesine doğru gittiğini 
anlatıyor.  
1514 başları 
E 9684 
Akkoyunlu Murad Bey'in büyük ihtimalle vezir-i azama 
yazdığı mektup: geçende dergah-ı muallayı ziyaretinde 
Sultan Selim'in muavenet vaadinde bulunduğunu 
hatırlatıp kendiseine yardım etmesi için astane-i 
saadete arz yazılmasını talep ediyor. 
1513 
 
 
 
 
 
